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Abstract 
Taxation methods are increasingly being used as tools to achieve environmental objectives, 
though the risks of ill-conceived environmental taxes are severe.  The thesis offers lawmakers 
and policymakers guidance as to choices of tax measures, and how such methods can be 
utilised effectively, by exploring the various issues and decisions facing policymakers in the 
introduction of such methods.   It does this by investigating means by which environmental 
taxes can be effective in changing consumption choices and behaviour towards the 
environment, which requires an examination of a series of pertinent issues which any 
policymaker is advised to respond to before implementing such tax methods; such as how the 
environment can be valued and how to decide which taxpayers should bear the burden of 
environmental taxation. 
The overarching objective for the thesis is to set out a design for a universal legal model for 
environmental taxation, and question whether this model can be utilised by policymakers to 
achieve environmental objectives in any jurisdiction.  The findings of all chapters will 
contribute to the purposeful design of such a model.  This initially requires a fundamental 
examination of the nature of tax itself, before considering the concept and utility of tax 
incentivisation.  The thesis then questions whether a tax can philosophically be considered an 
‘environmental tax’, and seeks to distinguish this from revenue-raising measures through its 
behaviour-changing functions.  The design of such taxation is then considered, with the aim 
of achieving maximum benefits at minimum cost.  In considering a variety of methods to 
achieve environmental policy, the thesis will identify methods to target environmental 
problems efficiently and in a manner which will prevent unintended consequences such as 
loss of competitiveness or other social ills.  It is intended that the findings will be useful 
initially in contributing to the knowledge in this field, but further the answer to the overall 
thesis may help tackle the greatest challenge facing mankind in our time. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
  
The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) have warned that environmental 
harm is a major threat to the planet and this research begins with an unconditional acceptance 
of the scientific need to encourage environmentally sustainable lifestyles and consumption 
behaviour.1   Nevertheless, any adopted environmental policy is regarded herein as a decision 
for policymakers, and the thesis intends not to dictate policy or debate the science behind 
environmental policy, but instead to help facilitate implementation of such a policy by 
providing guidance to policymakers.  Due to the continuing concerns over the environment, 
and heightened international environmental standards,2  implementation of domestic 
environmental policy and international environmental principles via the tax system is 
increasingly3 becoming a key tool of legislatures worldwide.4
                                                             
1 Recognised by United Nations scientists, IPCC, Climate Change 2007- Synthesis Report (IPCC: Geneva, 
2007). 
  A range of methods is 
2 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, (adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16/2/2005 37 I.L.M. 22) 
(Kyoto Protocol).  The Kyoto Treaty for the first time made countries sign up to a binding treaty with 
obligations to stabilise their greenhouse gas emissions.   
3 Whalley correctly predicted in 1998 that environmental considerations would increasingly affect tax policy in 
the decades ahead, Whalley J, ‘Environmental Considerations in Tax Policy Design’ (1998) 4 Environmental 
and Development Economics 111-124.  Additionally, Etkins estimates that between 1987-1994 there was a 50% 
growth in the use of market-based instruments in achieving environmental policy: Etkins P, ‘European 
Environmental Taxes and Charges’ (1999) 31 Ecolog. Econ. 1, 39-62 at 39. 
4 For instance, since the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, (adopted 16/9/1987, 
entered into force 1/9/1989 v1522 U.N.T.S.) many nations have imposed taxes on ozone layer depleting 
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available, both within and outside the tax system, to policymakers and lawmakers to create 
incentives and disincentives for private citizens and organisations such as businesses to alter 
environmental behaviour. 
 
Environmental taxation is however not guaranteed to meet policy objectives and may not be 
suitable in many circumstances.5  An ill-considered environmental tax structure may not meet 
environmental objectives, and furthermore can have far-reaching consequences ranging from 
inciting negative substitution behaviour to seriously damaging the economy.6  However 
certain methods are not only popular with taxpayers but reach desired policy goals at little 
cost, making them more attractive than alternative tools such as outright bans,7  whilst 
existing taxes can be reformed to provide fiscal, social or environmental benefits.  Due to the 
extensive use of this tool and its potential impact upon the everyday lives, choices and 
freedoms in all nations, it is crucial that policymakers are able to utilise such taxes in an 
informed and effective manner, in order to achieve environmental policy objectives as 
efficiently as possible.8
 
 
1.2 PURPOSE 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
substances, such as the Republic of Armenia, Law on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 2006, 1370 
Art.8(5). 
5 Marshall CJ believed, “the power to tax is the power to destroy”, in M’Culloch v State of Maryland et al 
(1819) 17 U.S. 316 (Wheat.) at 431. 
6 Germany’s mandatory drinks can deposit cost thousands of packaging jobs. See 
<www.apeal.org/Contents/Enviroment/200312_depositEN.pdf> Accessed 15/1/2010. 
7 In Ireland, S.I. No. 605/2001 — Waste Management (Environmental Levy) (Plastic Bag) Regulations, 2001, 
Reg.4 imposed a EUR €0.15 tax on plastic bags in Ireland.  This dramatically reduced plastic bag consumption 
in Ireland (<http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/Waste/PlasticBags/> Accessed 15/2/2010) and has been 
hailed a success - see Convery F, McDonnell S and Ferreira S, ‘The Most Popular Tax in Europe? Lessons from 
the Irish plastic bags levy’ (2007) 38 Environ. Resource Econ. 1. 
8 Here, ‘efficient’ means an objective is achieved at the lowest possible overall cost.  In this sense the outcome 
is achieved based on a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ between different options to achieve the same outcome.  See 
Chakravarty S, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis’ in Eatwell J et al, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (USA: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1987) 687-90. 
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The purpose of the thesis is to offer policymakers an extensive understanding of the various 
methods available within the tax system to implement environmental policy.  Crucially this 
involves analysing whether a tax system can be designed to shape a society’s environmental 
behaviour.  It is vital that policymakers are able to utilise environmental taxation effectively 
in order that tax strategies are only implemented once their potential effects and alternatives 
have been fully considered.  This requires an interdisciplinary analysis of the legal, economic 
and social justifications for and against certain methods of taxation, depending on the 
circumstances in which they will be used.  It involves a comparative study of the potential 
benefits and problems involved in implementing the possible methods. 
 
The Meade Report analysed taxation strategies available so future taxation policy could be 
well designed and meet long-term aims.9 It deliberately set a background for future research 
as it did not substantially address non-neutral taxation issues including taxes to affect social 
behaviour relating to pollution.10
 
  Furthermore it recognised it was contrived from a national 
perspective only.  The thesis aims to build on this and works completed since, to add to this 
field of knowledge by providing a fuller understanding of the methods available to 
policymakers to encourage environmentally sustainable lifestyles, as well as consider the 
transferability of tax systems between jurisdictions with different social and environmental 
structures.  
 
                                                             
9 IFS (Institute for Fiscal Studies), The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1978) (Report of the Meade Committee). 
10 ‘Non-neutral taxation’ is a term widely used but is elusive to define.  Essentially a neutral tax does not distort 
market choices whilst it is the intention of non-neutral taxes to do so, as may be the case with environmental 
taxation.  The precise differences are considered from an economic perspective in Lau LJ, ‘When is a Tax 
Neutral?’ (1978) 9 J. Public Econ. 319-339 who considers at 320 that in the case of a proportional income tax, 
the tax will be neutral if “…variations in the tax rate…do not affect the optimal composition of [the 
consumption commodities of a consumer].” 
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1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The overarching aim is to understand whether it is possible to develop a Universal Model for 
implementing environmental taxes which can be applicable in different jurisdictions.  This 
would involve a series of gateway questions which policymakers would answer to determine 
the appropriate circumstances in which to implement an environmental tax.  Once such a 
model has been formulated and explained, it can then be examined using both hypothetical 
and factual situations.  The results will determine whether it is indeed possible to design such 
a system.  Such a model is intended to be an apolitical tool so that any Government wishing 
to implement an environmental policy via their tax system will have a method of doing so.  
The aim is to provide a broad model of environmental taxation that can be suitable for 
countries with different economic, environmental, and social circumstances. 
 
In considering this Model a further question considers the extent to which a tax system can be 
effective in achieving domestic environmental policy objectives, by changing behaviour 
towards the environment, of both private individuals and organisations.  The research will 
therefore examine the range of considerations which must be taken into account before opting 
to implement any given method of environmental taxation.  This includes questioning the 
various justifications for using an environmental tax, the types of incentives and disincentives 
such a tax can provide, the wider utilities of a tax such as using it as an educational tool, 
identifying who should bear the cost of environmental tax, whether it is efficient to impose 
such a tax considering the administrative costs involved and the ease of avoidance, and 
possible negative substitution behaviour.  The practical implementation or enforcement of 
green taxes by Governmental bodies will also be judged, as it is important to determine 
whether there are problems outside direct legislation which are hindering the purpose of the 
taxes.  
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1.4 TECHNIQUES 
 
The research will involve a qualitative critique of both academic literature and existing 
evidence and experiences of environmental taxes in a range of jurisdictions.  This will not 
only contribute to the overall understanding of this field but will assist policymakers when 
considering the transferability of certain tax systems.  Such interdisciplinary findings are 
crucial to enable policymakers to create suitable tax structures with minimal negative 
consequences, and understand alternative techniques required to achieve the desired policy 
outcome.11
 
  Consequently this thesis will incorporate a range of examples from the UK and 
other jurisdictions to understand the means in which they have implemented their objectives 
and the consequences of doing so.   
Various perspectives are required to determine a universal model; hence it must be examined 
from both a macro-economic and micro-economic perspective, and involves technical 
analysis of relevant taxes utilised for achieving environmental objectives.  The main focus of 
the study is a legal one, though economic and other non-legal issues are necessarily included, 
and viewed from a legal standpoint. 
 
                                                             
11 Negative effects refers to consequences of a tax structure which are counter-productive, against the intention 
of the policy-maker when introducing the tax, or unforeseen events resulting from a tax.  Such effects can vary 
considerably and have a range of seriousness.  Actions particularly include negative substitution behaviour, 
where consumers will react to an increased cost by either changing their consumption to a choice unfavoured by 
the policy-maker, or by behaving in an anti-social way.  For example, the unintended consequence of the UK’s 
landfill tax has been an increase in fly-tipping as an act of avoiding the tax DEFRA, ‘Fly-tipping: National 
database - Flycapture 2007-2008 data’ <http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/localenv/flytipping/flycapture-
data.htm#0708> Accessed 13/9/2009.  More serious consequences can be damage to an industry or economy, a 
reduction in international competitiveness, civil unrest or rebellion, or even war – such as the American war of 
independence was partly sparked from a tax on tea under the Tea Act 1773. 
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As environmental policy is a global issue, the research will appraise reform proposals and 
consider the advantages of international coordinated responses to environmental problems.  It 
will further highlight any limitations preventing implementation of such strategies. 
 
1.5 BENEFICIARIES 
 
From a domestic perspective, the thesis offers policymakers guidance as to how taxation can 
be utilised to achieve environmental objectives without hindering competitiveness.  The 
thesis will be relevant to social scientists, lawyers, economists and environmentalists, and 
those concerned with tax policy, tax reform, environmental taxation, use of taxation within 
social policy, and environmental protection, improvement, and enforcement.   The potential 
beneficiaries of this thesis are the global community since proper implementation of 
environmental tax legislation can ultimately assist in achieving the objectives of the Kyoto 
Protocol and other such treaties in order to protect the environment.   
 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS (RQs) 
 
i. Is it possible to design a universal legal model for environmental taxation that can 
be applicable within different jurisdictions? 
 
ii. How can environmental taxation promote environmentally sustainable lifestyles 
and consumption behaviour without unintended consequences?   
 
a. How can policymakers determine who ought to bear the burden of 
environmental taxation?    
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b. What are the legal, economic and social justifications for environmental 
taxation? 
 
iii. How can the law use taxation to achieve environmental policy considering  
a. specific environmental problems; 
b. other jurisdictions with varying social, economic and environment factors; and 
c. certain economic climates such as a recession?    
 
1.7 STRUCTURE 
 
 
PART I 
The purpose of Part I is to introduce, explain and analyse the fundamental considerations 
which will be utilised throughout the thesis.  This will form a basis of understanding with 
which to provide more complex and focused analysis in Parts II and III.  Part I will invoke 
doctrinal research into the legal and environmental policy issues concerning green taxes.  
Chapter 2 will begin with a summary of the fundamental concepts and rationale behind 
taxation itself, including what constitutes ‘good’ taxation, before examining how taxes can be 
designed and drafted to create appropriate incentives.  This will provide an overview of the 
essential economic and legal basis for tax incentivisation for individuals and organisations to 
achieve environmental policy objectives.  Practical applications of such strategies will be 
utilised for demonstration purposes.  Terminology and theorems used within Chapter 2 will 
be pervasive throughout the thesis.   
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Chapter 3 will consider whether philosophically there is such a concept as environmental 
taxation.  It will look at non-neutral forms of taxation used to achieve policy objectives, and 
emphasise how distributional concerns impact in this field.  The purpose is to seek to identify 
whether, and if so, how taxes can be used by policymakers in achieving environmental goals.  
Methods of overcoming scepticism that environmental taxation is merely a façade for 
revenue-raising will be discussed.  Examples of experiences with such tax strategies will be 
analysed to demonstrate these advantages, and offer the policymaker guidance on tax design 
that will gain taxpayer support and approval, which can help improve compliance. 
 
In order for a policymaker to design a tax-and-incentive system in the means advocated in 
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 will consider the potential benefits of tax ‘packages’ which ‘recycle’ 
revenue from environmental taxation into the economy or environmental projects.  This 
assists the policymaker’s understanding of the justifications for adopting environmental 
taxation.  The chapter will seek to provide guidance for policymakers as to how taxes can be 
designed to limit negative consequences and maximise positive gains within environmental 
objectives and wider policy goals.  This will involve considering the possibility of a ‘double 
dividend’ of advantages, and how such strategies can be used to mitigate otherwise 
detrimental distributional impacts of environmental taxation.  The chapter will analyse a 
range of academic debate on the subject of revenue-recycling and tax packages, and will 
reach a conclusion on whether such methods should be used by policymakers and are 
appropriate to the Universal Model. 
 
In order for the market to take account of the environment as a factor of production cost, and 
for individuals to recognise the importance of environmental objectives to change their 
behaviour, environmental factors must be given an economic value.  Chapter 5 will identify 
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the complexity of placing an economic value on environmental factors, and explain the 
debate as to which values can be included.  The purpose is to provide guidance for 
policymakers so that they can question the type of values firstly held within their society, and 
secondly that are necessary to achieve the environmental objective.  In doing so, the chapter 
will guide policymakers as to the decisions that must be made in order to set rates of 
environmental taxes or incentives.  This requires consideration of both wider policy 
objectives and the extent to which a policymaker and their society are willing to sacrifice 
certain activities to achieve environmental targets.   The chapter will propose and evaluate 
solutions towards overcoming the deemed inadequacy of having a purely economic analysis 
of environmental factors.  The intention of this proposal is to highlight the possibility and 
desirability for policymakers of including social values in the valuation, and the challenges of 
doing so. 
 
PART II 
The purpose of Part II is to provide a more in-depth analysis and guidance into specific 
decisions facing policymakers in introducing an environmental tax.  The findings will be 
applied in Part III.  Chapter 6 will examine methods of tax which can be utilised to achieve 
environmental policy objectives, focusing upon realising behavioural change.  It will consider 
how effectively tax methods can be complemented by non-tax methods to convey a 
transformative message to impact upon environmental choices and consumption behaviour.  
The intention is to utilise demonstrations to provide guidance to policymakers as to tax 
methods available for various environmental policy objectives, allowing policymakers to 
make informed choices as to the appropriate taxes, incentives and wider social techniques 
suited to the objectives in question.  This will examine past multi-jurisdictional experiences 
of environmental taxes so that it can be demonstrated how methods can be successful or lead 
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to unforeseen circumstances.  The chapter analyses how taxes can influence decisions, and 
further how modern understandings of human psychology can be utilised to shape a tax 
structure with the intended outcome.   
 
In order for the Universal Model to assist policymakers in introducing environmental taxes, it 
must be determined which taxpayers within an economy will bear the burden of such taxes.  
This is a crucial decision since the effects of ill-conceived tax burdens can be disastrous and 
can entail severe unforeseen consequences.  Chapter 7 will guide policymakers as to the 
various considerations which must be made when deciding upon where a tax burden will fall 
and how this impacts upon the choice of method.  It will emphasise the importance for 
policymakers in deciding from the outset who actually should bear the burden in given 
circumstances, and how to decide upon a party to charge to tax in order that the party 
intended to bear the burden will do so.  The chapter will explain that such a decision is 
dependant upon economic efficiency, ethical and legal principles that are interrelated, and 
how policymakers will inevitably have to make value judgements about which members of 
society will be required to fund their environmental programme.12
 
   
Choices of tax methods involving their possible points of charge are discussed in Chapter 7 to 
demonstrate the various distributional considerations which must be taken into account when 
deciding upon a type of tax.  The chapter will consider negative and unforeseen consequences 
to question the wider policy implications of the imposition of a tax and how negative impacts 
can be mitigated.  Finally international considerations will be taken into account directing the 
chapter into considering the commercial realities of imposing higher costs upon one 
economy.  This necessarily leads to Chapter 8 which takes an international perspective and                                                              
12 For example, Mann criticises the US Government for selecting those to be advantaged in its tax subsidies 
without due consideration, in Mann RF, ‘Back to the Future: Recommendations and Predictions for Greener Tax 
Policy’ (2009) 88 Or.L.Rev. 355, at 399. 
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analyses the purpose and potential use of border tax adjustments.  The chapter will seek to 
describe how environmental taxes can be implemented without unilateral competitive 
disadvantages – a key concern for policymakers.  The result of this chapter is to evaluate the 
possible options and propose the most suitable methods of facilitating this real-world scenario 
which would otherwise cause a considerable dilemma for many users of the Universal Model. 
 
Chapter 9 will provide guidance for policymakers to ascertain how taxes can be targeted to 
create the necessary incentive for behavioural change.  This will involve consideration of 
taxes which have proved ineffective in failing to target the source of an environmental 
problem, and will advise the policymaker as to the lessons that can be learnt from such 
experiences.  The chapter will consider tax packages aimed at changing behaviour to 
demonstrate to the policymaker the considerations that must be made before introducing such 
tax reform.  Further it will identify unforeseen negative consequences associated with tax 
reform policies due to design flaws which fail to target the source of an environmental 
problem.  For such flaws the chapter will suggest solutions in order to demonstrate how a 
source can properly be targeted to achieve the desired outcome in an equitable and efficient 
fashion.  The chapter will initially formulate and evaluate a case study.  Aviation taxation 
will first be examined as an example of tax legislation which attempts to alter behaviour by 
targeting the source of the problem in encouraging alternative behaviour.  The chapter then 
considers the subject of targeting taxes at the source of environmental harm in a general non-
aviation context.  It is intended that the lessons learnt through these examples can provide 
guidance as to how a tax reform can most effectively be targeted to achieve the 
environmental policy objectives. 
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Chapter 10 will summarise the findings of Part II and its recurring conclusions which can be 
of use to the Universal Model and guide the policymaker as to the most appropriate means of 
achieving certain environmental objectives.  Further it will provide analysis into the potential 
impacts of environmental taxation methods, focusing on possible unforeseen consequences.  
This will be carried out in both a factual and a hypothetical manner which will demonstrate 
all the kinds of outcomes which should be considered.  Finally, this chapter will seek to 
establish how the Universal Model will aim to recommend the most effective solution. 
 
PART III 
The purpose of Chapter 11 is to propose a model which can be used by any nation to 
determine the most appropriate taxation method available to achieve a given environmental 
policy, and how to implement it.  The intention of the Universal Model is to offer 
policymakers a series of gateway questions to respond to in order to ascertain the most 
effective solution for achieving a given policy.  It will be emphasised that it is the duty of the 
policymaker to determine whether the costs (or benefits) are acceptable given pertinent issues 
within the jurisdiction.  The framework of the Model brings into practice the findings of 
every chapter, and will seek to offer a balanced, well structured design to facilitate purposeful 
use of the Model.  The chapter will explain how the Model should be used by policymakers 
and what information is required prior to its usage.  Finally the chapter will provide an 
evaluation of the Universal Model, including its potential limitations, and conclude whether 
the Model can be utilised in practice.  This leads the thesis to its overall conclusion in 
Chapter 12. 
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1.8 THEME 
 
 
International law purports to prevent pollution and particularly make those responsible for 
pollution bear its cost.  The Rio Declaration13
  
 (a ‘soft law’ declaration) set the international 
standard for dealing with pollution and environmental damage and paved the way for 
individual States to implement practical policies on the matter.  The ‘preventative principle’ 
provides States with the right and responsibility to prevent activities within their jurisdiction 
which will cause environmental harm or pollution.  The ‘precautionary principle’, as defined 
in Principle 15, places the scientific onus of proof on any party wishing to perform an activity 
which might cause environmental damage or pollution, in instances where the risk is 
plausible but there is insufficient scientific evidence to fully prove it.   
These principles justify the ‘polluter pays’ principle of Principle 16 which is enshrined in 
TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU),14 which states that “environmental damage 
should as a priority be rectified at source and…the polluter should pay”.15
 
  Principle 16 of the 
Rio Declaration also promotes use of the polluter-pays principle using both economic 
instruments and the internalisation of environmental costs.  Taxation measures fall into both 
categories. 
The thesis accepts as a starting point the international legal principle of the polluter-pays 
policy.16
                                                             
13 Pursuant to UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF151/26/Rev.1. 
  The theme will however pursue an additional principle that ‘improvers’ should be 
rewarded.  This means that those helping an environmental objective to be met can be 
14 OJ 2008 C/115/47. 
15 Article 191(2). 
16 The polluter-pays principle has largely been promoted through works of the OECD.  See OECD, Environment 
and Economics Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, 
Recommendation of May 1972, C(72) 128; Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning the Application 
of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, C (89) 88 of 7 July 1989. 
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rewarded through the tax system, or pursuant to it through a wider fiscal programme. In this 
way it recognises that policymakers can design a tax system not just to create penalties for 
those limiting the progression towards an environmental objective, but to recognise and 
reward voluntary efforts to achieve the objective.17
 
 
 
The thesis reflects the law as at New Year’s Eve 2010.
                                                             
17 Meade emphasised that a tax structure in a mixed economy must provide “effective incentives for private 
enterprise”, which the Model will strive for in line with the theme.  See n.9 at 20. 
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2.  INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter will form the basis of the understanding of relevant concepts of tax and 
incentivisation which will be utilised through the thesis.  It will begin with a brief 
examination of the fundamental nature of taxation and purposeful design of non-neutral 
taxation, and go on to study how this is applied to understandings of the concept of 
environmental taxation.  In this way, pure taxation theory can be applied in the context of 
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environmental taxation.  The purpose is to provide policymakers with an understanding of the 
key issues surrounding environmental taxation and how they relate to theoretical tax 
concepts.  Various tax incentive methods will finally be identified and their relative 
usefulness demonstrated in order that such concepts can be understood and justified 
throughout the thesis. 
 
3.  WHAT IS A TAX? 
 
In order to ascertain the most suitable form of tax it must first be established what constitutes 
a tax, which is a complex issue.  The findings can then be applied in the context of 
environmental taxation.  One definition given is that “a tax is any payment made to 
Government for which no direct benefit is provided in exchange.”1  However taking into 
account Tiley’s examination of the exact nature of a tax, this definition would be regarded as 
too broad since it does not distinguish between a tax and other forms of Government 
income.2
 
   
A tax contributes to Government or public body revenue for public purposes only – not for 
any direct benefit to the taxpayer.3
                                                             
1 Tax Justice Network, ‘Tax us if you can’ (2005) <http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/tuiyc_-_eng_-
_web_file.pdf> Accessed 16/6/2010. 
  This distinguishes a tax from a charge for a Government 
service, or a toll for use of a Government-run facility – both of which allow the taxpayer 
2 Tiley J, Revenue Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) pp.3-26. 
3 The US Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared a tax void due to an absence of public interest in raising the 
funds, Broadhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 652. 
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some benefit.  It is also a compulsory measure, so optional contributions are not taxes.4
 
   
Optional contributions can however be distinguished from the situation where a taxpayer has 
the option to claim a tax relief and wipe out the tax liability.  Even if the taxpayer chooses not 
to claim the relief, the tax is still regarded as compulsory, with a right to relief attached. 
Applying this in the context of environmental taxation, the charge would be a compulsory 
one, specifically dependant on the quantitative detriment to the environment, and while there 
is no direct financial benefit to the taxpayer, the revenue is gathered for public purposes.  
Whereas a voluntary contribution to offset one’s carbon usage, for example, would not be a 
tax since there is no obligation to pay.5
 
   
Despite the requirement for revenue to be claimed for public purposes, this does not 
automatically mean that the only purpose of the tax is to claim the revenue for public 
purposes.   Charging taxes can achieve many purposes such as to reduce harmful activity.  
Therefore ‘public purposes’ would be served if no tax was charged but a harmful activity (the 
object of the tax) ceased. 
 
A tax is distinct from a fine fixed by Parliament, since courts have the power to amend the 
sum of a fine.6   Furthermore, in the UK, fines7 on traders are not allowable deductions,8
                                                             
4 As a compulsory measure it is enforced through the justice system.  Offences against the public revenue are 
criminal pursuant to Theft Act 1968, s.32(1)(a). 
 as 
5 Individuals and traders have the option to off-set their specific carbon emissions for a fee to account for the 
detriment they cause to the environment, but this is not compulsory so therefore not a tax.  See eg DECC, ‘A 
short guide to Carbon Offsetting’ (2010) <www.decc.gov.uk> Accessed 16/6/2010. 
6 See Tiley, chapter 2, n.2, at 7. 
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they are not losses connecting with or arising out of their trade pursuant to the the Income 
and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 s.74(1)(e),9
 
 whereas some taxes can be deducted.  Statutory 
wording here has manipulated these definitions to achieve this outcome.  Nor would a fine be 
deductible when calculating losses under Part 4 of Income Tax Act 2007. 
This is in line with the general rule against permitting those fined for breaching the law to be 
allowed to deduct the cost,10 so as not to reward criminal activities.11 This distinction is 
important in the field of environmental regulation as businesses or individuals acting 
according to their best financial interests may consider the difference to be valuable.12
 
 
4.  WHAT CONSTITUES A GOOD TAX? 
 
4.1 MAXIMS OF GOOD TAXATION 
 
Adam Smith famously set out four ‘maxims’ of what constitutes good taxation.13
i. Equity:  taxpayers should contribute proportionately based on their activities; 
  These can 
be summarised as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
7 For example, HMRC charges a £100 penalty for late payment of tax returns 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/sa/dead-pen.htm>, and interest on late payments 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/RATES/interest-late.htm> Accessed 16/6/2010. 
8 McKnight (Inspector of Taxes) v Sheppard [1999] 1 WLR 1333. 
9 See also ITTOIA, s.34. 
10 Expenditure to be deducted must be ‘wholly and exclusively’ for the purposes of the trade, profession or 
vocation.  The ruling in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v E.C. Warnes & Co Ltd [1919] TC 227 ruled that 
penalties were not losses connected with and arising out of a company's trade so therefore were not deductible.   
11 Lord Hoffmann explained that penalties were non-deductible as the “purpose is to punish the taxpayer 
and…the legislative policy would be diluted if the taxpayer were allowed to share the burden with the rest of the 
community…”  See n.8. 
12 An assumption put forward in Smith A, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations 
(London: W. Strahan and T Cadell, 1776). 
13 Ibid, Book V, Chapter II Part II. 
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ii. Certainty:  taxes must be certain and not arbitrary; 
iii. Convenience: taxes must be payable at a time most convenient for the taxpayer. 
iv. Economy:        taxes must be economical to collect. 
 
4.2 EQUITY 
 
To achieve ‘equity’ in this sense, is generally a policy issue.  The proportion of the 
contribution required from the taxpayer’s income will vary between different States 
depending upon what, if at all, they deem to be a necessary redistribution of wealth.    
Applying this to environmental taxation, equity could arguably be achieved by taxing an 
amount to justifiably represent the quantity of environmental harm, such as on a taxpayer’s 
GhG (Greenhouse Gas) emissions.14  Klein and Bankman describe alternative understandings 
of ‘equity’ for the purpose of a tax; ‘vertical’ equity can be achieved by taking into account a 
taxpayer’s ability to pay when introducing a tax, while ‘horizontal’ equity can be achieved if 
taxpayers in similar circumstances are taxed similarly.15
 
 
4.3 DRAFTING CLARITY 
 
In order to achieve all of these maxims, particularly in terms of the ‘certainty’ maxim, the 
way the tax legislation is drafted is crucial.  Developing clear legislation creates both                                                              
14 This adopts the definition given by Article 1 of The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (1994) (the ‘UNFCCC’) “‘Greenhouse gases’ means those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both 
natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.” The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is 
to achieve "... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” (Article 2) 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php>  Accessed 5/3/2010. 
15 Klein WA & Bankman J, Federal Income Taxation 11 (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 1997) 
19. 
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certainty for the taxpayer, and makes revenue more economical to collect as there will be less 
litigation over unclear drafting.  Clear drafting avoids differing interpretations so means it 
will be more straightforward to collect taxes.  In the UK, HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs) are attempting to redraft primary direct tax legislation so that it is clearer and 
easier to use; such rewriting has already saved the Revenue millions of pounds and they have 
predicted this will continue.16  Sindico urges States when drafting climate taxes in particular 
to be “very clear and not leave any space for possible ambiguity.”17
 
 
Precision in the text will also prevent undesired consequences.  This was highlighted in HM 
Treasury’s 1997 Statement of Intent, which set one ‘general test of good taxation’ to be “well 
designed, to meet objectives without undesirable side-effects”.18 An imprecise tax in this 
context could be too vague, broad or narrow,19 leading to the development of many 
exceptions, various different interpretations,20 or tax avoidance.21
 
   
4.4 NEUTRALITY, PURPOSE AND UNFORESEEN 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
                                                             
16 HMRC, ‘Tax Law Rewrite Report and Plans 2008 – 09’ (2008) <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rewrite/plans2008-
09.htm> Accessed 16/6/2010. 
17 Sindico F, ‘Climate Taxes and the WTO: Is the Multilateral Trade Regime a further obstacle for efficient 
domestic climate policies?’ (2006) 3 Economic Policy and Law, Journal of Trade & Environmental Studies 8.  
18 HM Treasury news release, ‘Tax Measures to Help the Environment’, 2/7/1997  
<http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/budget/1997/hmt4.html> Accessed 3/2/2010. 
19 The availability of tax relief for constructors building on Brownfield sites has been criticised for being too 
narrow, British Property Federation, ‘Brownfield relief ‘too narrow’ says BPF’ 24/2/2008 
<http://www.bpf.org.uk/newsroom/pressreleases/document/23328/brownfield-relief-too-narrow-says-bpf> 
Accessed 4/2/2010. 
20 See Vasconcellos RP, ‘Vague Concepts and Uncertainty in Tax Law’ (2007) 
<http://works.bepress.com/roberto_vasconcellos/1> Accessed 17/6/2010. 
21 In 2006-7, almost a third of large businesses paid no corporation tax, National Audit Office, Management of 
Large Business Corporation Tax (London: TSO, 2007). 
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Tax may also be judged by how well it meets its given purpose.  If a tax affects behaviour of 
the market or society, then generally it will be ‘non-neutral’.  The success of a tax may be 
judged by a policymaker according to the extent to which it has encouraged or discouraged 
an activity the policymaker intended.22  Taxes which do not affect behaviour are ‘neutral’ 
taxes, and as such will be judged only by the extent to which they have succeeded in 
collecting the types of revenue the tax was intended to collect.23  Davies explains that “the 
aim of those designing taxes is to create neutral taxes, unless policy requires a tax to be non-
neutral.”24
 
  
Furthermore both neutral and non-neutral taxes can be critiqued by the extent of their 
undesirable consequences.25  Should a tax cause considerable problems that it did not set out 
to do, such as in altering human activity in a way which causes negative behaviour 
unforeseen by the legislature, then it will be deemed a failure.  An example of this is the 
Landfill Tax,26 which deliberately attempts to affect behaviour,27 by encouraging businesses 
in particular to invest in waste treatment routes other than landfill sites.  The unintended 
consequence of this has been an increase in fly-tipping28 as people seek to avoid paying the 
costs of the landfill tax, which in turn has led to an increase in prosecutions for fly-tipping.29
                                                             
22 It is of course extremely difficult to express certainty about the intention of Parliament. 
  
Consequently this tax has indirectly led to a range of the population becoming criminals, who 
otherwise would not have been.  Hence a well-designed tax will minimise unintended 
consequences.   
23 Neutral taxes are often sought in order to achieve economic efficiency; see Surrey SS and McDaniel PR, Tax 
Expenditures (Harvard, USA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
24 Morse G and Williams D, Davies: Principles of Tax Law 6 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) at 6. 
25 Discussed in context of the introduction of Stamp Duty Land Tax in Cannon P, ‘More is Less’ (2003) 6 BTR. 
438-442. 
26 Introduced under FA 1996 s.40(1). 
27 Hansard HC vol 475: Col 1337W (12/5/2008). 
28 Hansard HC vol 475: Col 1337W (12/5/2008) shows Parliament’s concerns over fly-tipping due to the 
imposition of the Landfill Tax. 
29 DEFRA, see chapter 1, n.11. 
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In some circumstances the entire function of the tax can be questioned as its operation may 
fail to meet the requirements of the policy.  For example, the Landfill Tax operates by 
imposing an additional cost for use of landfill, in order to encourage recycling.30  Recycling 
is economically feasible when there is a demand for recycled goods, but during the recession 
of 2009 demand for recycled goods collapsed.  This led to large stockpiles31 of waste goods 
that were unable to be recycled or sent to landfill32 resulting in taxpayers having to fund 
storage until demand returned.33
 
  Hence such taxes are very much dependant on the market 
remaining buoyant and it is important to foresee such consequences when designing a tax.  
The theme of the thesis can be emphasised herein, as taxes and incentives may be able to 
create a market environment where positive environmental gains are financially beneficial, 
such as a tax which encourages recycling of waste paper and reliefs to encourage a recycling 
paper mill.  
4.5 COMPLIANCE COSTS AND DISTRIBUTION 
 
The maxims and their contemporary counterparts are reflected in the 1997 Statement of Intent 
which set out principles of how green taxes should be designed, saying that “environmental 
taxation must meet the general tests of good taxation.”34
                                                             
30 Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, ‘Waste not, Want not’ (2002) at 5. 
  These tests involved designing 
31 Marzouk L, ‘Brighton and Hove's Recycling left in Storage after Waste Paper Market Collapse’ The Argus 
12/1/2009 
<http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/4039014.Recycling_mountain_stored_in_warehouse/?action=complain&cid=
744207> Accessed 20/1/2010. 
32 Hope C & Gammell C, ‘Mountains of Recycled Rubbish spring up across UK as Market for Waste Collapses’ 
The Telegraph 29 Dec 2008 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/4015775/Mountains-of-recycled-
rubbish-spring-up-across-UK-as-market-for-waste-collapses.html> Accessed 10/3/2010. 
33 Townsend M, ‘Recycled waste could be stored on MoD bases’ The Observer 16/11/2008 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/nov/16/recycling-waste-military> Accessed 6/5/2010. 
34 See n.18. 
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legislation to minimise undesirable side-effects, minimising compliance costs, having an 
acceptable distributional impact and ensuring that taxation did not hinder international 
competitiveness.   
 
5.  ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
 
5.1 DEFINITION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX 
 
Before going into any further detail on environmental taxation it is important to provide a 
working definition of this concept.  An EU (European Union)35 commissioned study by 
Jarass and Obermair defined an environmental tax as one whose “…tax base is a physical 
unit (or a proxy for it) of something that has a proven specific negative impact on the 
environment, when used or released.”   It defines a negative impact on the environment as 
one which deteriorates “…hitherto free environmental goods or a reduction of the supply of 
such goods.”36
                                                             
35 References to the ‘EC’ will only be used within this thesis to refer to laws, treaties or caselaws requiring such 
a reference.  Otherwise references to the ‘EC’ or ‘EU’ will be labelled ‘EU’, pursuant to changed made in the 
Lisbon Treaty: Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ C/306 of 17 December 2007, in force on 1 
December 2009. 
  The requirement of proof of a ‘specific negative impact’ in this definition 
would mean that a tax on an environmental factors whose effect had not been scientifically 
proven would not be regarded as an environmental tax.  If this definition were to be used as a 
basis for establishing specific environmental taxes, the burden of proof could prevent many 
36 Jarass L and Obermair GM, ‘Manual Statistics on Environmental Taxes’ (1996) ATW-Research 
<http://www.atw-forschung.de/dat/pub/0000/ecommission.pdf> Accessed 8/6/2010. 
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such taxes from being established.37  Indeed it is at odds with the ‘precautionary principle’ set 
out in international law.38
 
   
This contradictory definition is avoided when the OECD use the alternative definition of 
‘environmentally-related taxes’.  This is defined as payments made to Governments on “tax 
bases deemed to be of particular environmental relevance.”39
 
  The use of the term 
‘environmental tax’ henceforth consequently takes into account a potential reversal of the 
onus of scientific proof, and relates to taxes on what the policymaker considers to be 
environmentally relevant. 
5.2 SUITABLE ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
 
5.2.1 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS: CAVEAT 
It must be emphasised at this stage that much academic debate surrounds the issues 
summarised herein and it is not intended to further this debate.   Classical economists 
believed that leaving a free market to solve market problems would achieve the most efficient 
outcome, 40 though other economists later argued that Government intervention may 
sometimes be necessary to avoid market failure.41
                                                             
37 It is vital here to refer to Fisher who explains in more details the implications of the burden of the proof 
requirements under the precautionary principle.  See Fisher E (ed.), Implementing the Precautionary Principle 
(UK: Edward Elgar, 2006). 
  Keynes advocated the idea that 
38 See 1.8. 
39 OECD, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries: Issue and Strategies (Paris: OECD Publishing, 
2001) at 18. 
40 The origins of this argument rest in Smith, see chapter 2, n.12.  Coase further sought to prove that 
Government intervention was not required if private property rights could be clarified, in Coase RH, ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) J. Law Econ. 3, 1-44.  Coase’s arguments were furthered in Cheung SNS, The 
Myth of Social Cost (London: Institute of Econ.Aff., 1978). 
41 Mill JS, Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co, 1871). 
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Governments can take responsibility for leading the economy and could use interventionist 
methods and spending to correct negative externalities in the market.42
 
   
The thesis accepts as a starting point the view that Government intervention may be 
necessary to overcome what is deemed to be a market failure, where the environment is not 
valued as a factor of production.  However it is also accepted that intervention may not be 
appropriate in every case; sometimes it will be inefficient to intervene43 and international law 
supports the notion that environmental interests must be reasonably balanced against socio-
economic interests.44
 
  The stance taken within the thesis is that it is for the policymaker to 
determine the extent to which environmental interests will outweigh non-environmental 
interests. The purpose of the Universal Model is to provide a mechanism for policymakers to 
determine whether to, and how best to, intervene.   
The policymaker will be faced with the challenge of extrapolating the most efficient solution.  
Buchanan explained that since all solutions have costs, the true choice available when faced 
with an economic problem is to decide between a range of inefficient solutions.45  Various 
efficiency arguments are made to question whether it is efficient to intervene at all,46                                                             
42 Keynes JM, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1936). 
 and if 
43 Prosser argues that society’s need for industry means some individuals may have to suffer a “not 
unreasonable” private cost for the “general good”, in Prosser WL, Handbook on the Law of Torts (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1955) 398-412, at 412. 
44 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration requires national authorities when promoting the polluter-pays principle to 
have “due regard to the public interest…without distorting trade and investment”.  Article 191(2).of the TFEU, 
provides a ‘Community inspection procedure’ for environmental actions provisionally taken by any Member 
State.   
45 Brennan G and Buchanan JM, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1980). 
46 Meade JE, ‘External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation’ (1952) 52 Econ.J 54 at 56-57; 
Cheung SNS, ‘The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation’ (1973) 16 J. Law Econ. 11; Piguo AC, The 
Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan & Co., 1920); Chen P, ‘Complexity of Transaction Costs and 
Evolution of Corporate Governance’ (2007) 76 The Kyoto Economic Review  2, 139-153; Chen P, ‘Coase 
Fantasy of Zero Transaction Costs And Asymmetric Bargaining in Social Conflicts’ (2008) Cornell University 
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so, whether taxation or regulation47 is the most efficient measure – this will depend upon the 
type of problem.48  The thesis operates on the premise that the policymaker has decided 
taxation is the most efficient in a given case, and attempts to guide the policymaker in 
determining which method of tax can most effectively achieve a given environmental 
objective.49
 
   
5.2.2 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Law School; Stigler GJ, ‘The Economics of Information’  (1961) 69 J.Polit. Economy 3 pp.213-225; Halpin A, 
‘Disproving the Coase Theorem?’ (2007) Econ. Philos. 23 321–341; Helm D and Pearce D, ‘Assessment: 
Economic Policy towards the Environment’ (1990) 6 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol. 1; Samuelson P, ‘Some 
Uneasiness with the Coase Theorem’ (1995) Japan and the World Economy 7 1-7.  Arguments that intervention 
may be paternalistic are debated in Galbraith JK, The Affluent Society (London : Penguin, 1999); Friedman M, 
Friedman on Galbraith, and on curing the British disease (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1977); Knight FH, 
Ethics of Competition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935). 
47 Johnson explains that command and control regulation “provides no incentives to polluters to develop new 
strategies to reduce their pollution beyond the levels required by law.” Johnson SM, ‘Economics v. Equity: Do 
Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?’ (1999) 56 Wash.& Lee L.Rev. 
111, p. 112.  See criticism of command-and-control style regulation in Ackerman C and Stewart R, ‘Reforming 
Environmental Law’ (1985) 37 Stan.L.Rev. 1333, at 1343.  Nash demonstrates how, even when policy-makers 
opt to use regulatory regimes rather than environmental taxes to achieve environmental objectives, the tax 
considerations cannot be ignored.  Nash JR, ‘Taxes and the Success of Non-Tax Market-Based Environmental 
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 412.   
48 For taxation versus regulation debates see: Turner K, Powell, J and Craighill A, ‘Green Taxes, Waste 
Management and Political Economy’ (1998) 53 Journal of Environmental Management 121–136, at 122-3; 
Smith S, ‘Green’ Taxes and Charges: Policy and Practice in Britain and Germany (London: IFS, 1995) at 11; 
Krupnick AJ, ‘Policies for controlling nitrogen dioxide in Baltimore’ (1986) 13 J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 189-
97.  Negative consequences of non-compliance due to regulation can be seen with the USA’s National 
Prohibition Act 1919 (P.L. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305), which attempted to prohibit alcohol consumption, leading to an 
enormous increase in organised crime to meet demand for alcohol, and mass corruption in the Police: See 
Solomon RL, ‘Regulating the Regulators: Prohibition Enforcement in the Seventh Circuit’, in Kyvig DE, Law, 
Alcohol, and Order: Perspectives on National Prohibition (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985).  Following its 
repeal in 1933, the illicit black market collapsed as legal sales were priced lower and avoided the threat of arrest, 
though the licensing of alcohol remained strict and allowed the authorities control in limiting alcohol use as 
opposed to prohibiting it: Warburton C, The Economics Results of Prohibition (New York: Columbia 
Press,1968).  The tax code furthermore has been utilised to effectively regulate certain activities which go 
against Government policy.  For example, in the tax year 1978-79, the left-wing British Government wanted to 
discourage unearned income, since they believed it unfair that a small number of the aristocracy did not need to 
work whilst much of the country was poor.  Consequently they introduced a 15% surcharge on taxpayers with 
very high investment income, set above the maximum highest rate of income tax of 83%.  This saw some 
taxpayers paying the extremely high rate of 98% of their income to HM Treasury, having similar consequences 
in reducing investments as regulation would have brought.  Hence, whilst bans or regulations may be viewed by 
the public as a hindrance to freedoms, the continually changing rates of taxation can achieve the same affect of a 
ban without formally reducing the rights of the public.  Adam S and Browne J, A Survey of the UK Tax System 
(London: IFS, 2006) Briefing Note No. 9, p. 27 and Table 14 <http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn09.pdf> Accessed 
22/6/2010. 
49 Latin felt that throughout the debate on economic instruments there has been “an excessive preoccupation 
with theoretical efficiency” in Latin H, ‘Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform 
Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms’ (1985) 37 Stan.L.Rev. 1267, pp. 1270-71.  
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In order to achieve the aims above, the type of legislation should be analysed to ascertain the 
way in which it will encourage taxpayer compliance.50
 
  The traditional form of ensuring 
compliance whilst minimising undesirable side-effects has been in the ‘command and 
control’ model of environmental legislation.  This can involve simply creating a law to limit 
the use of a pollutant and ensuring it is complied with - a regulatory technique.   
However the OECD has for some time promoted the use of economic instruments to achieve 
environmental policy.51  The purpose of such instruments is to affect market costs in order to 
incentivise the use of non-pollutants over pollutants, for example, rather than simply forcing 
the change through regulation.  These include techniques such as tax methods, grants and 
subsidies, and recently the area has developed the concept of carbon trading.52  If 
environmental policy can be achieved via economic instruments in a less expensive manner 
than the command and control method, this is referred to by the OECD as ‘static 
efficiency’.53  Indeed empirical studies have demonstrated that static efficiency benefits 
caused by economic instruments in the market can in some circumstances significantly 
minimise environmental protection costs.54
5.2.3 PIGOVIAN TAX THEORY 
 
                                                              
50 Turner et al name six principles behind economic instruments such as environmental taxes, depending on the 
political economy in which the tax serves, in Turner et al, see n.48 at 125. 
51 “[Member countries should] make a greater and more consistent use of economic instruments as a 
complement or a substitute to other policy instruments…”; OECD, Council Recommendation on the Use of 
Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy (1991) [C(90)177/FINAL].  
52 Smith S, ‘Environmentally Related Taxes and Tradable Permit Systems in Practice’ (Paris: OECD 
Environment Directorate Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2008) 
COM/ENV/EPOC/CTPA/CFA(2007)31/FINAL 
53 OECD, Environmental Taxes and Green Tax Reform (Paris: OECD, 1997) at 7. 
54 Tietenberg TH, ‘Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation’ in Helm D, Economic Policy Towards 
the Environment (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991). 
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The traditional method of using taxation to achieve environmental policy goals other than 
simply command and control legislation is to create a tax on a pollutant and ensure 
compliance.  It is based on the Pigovian notion that a tax can correct negative externalities in 
a market.55  It will discourage the use of a pollutant in a way that the market would not, and 
in doing so make the taxpayer take into account the cost of the pollution in financial terms 
before using the pollutant.56  This is called external cost internalisation.  The Stern Review 
describes that, “putting an appropriate price on carbon…through tax …means that people are 
faced with the full social cost of their actions.”57  The economic basis for this theory is 
accepted as a starting point, though is it acknowledged that there is academic debate in this 
area.58
The dictum that those who pollute should bear the cost of their pollution is enshrined in 
Article 191(2) of TFEU; the difficult question of identifying exactly who should bear the cost 
is dealt with in Chapter 7.  However some industries must use pollutants anyway and will 
simply consider it as another tax with which they must comply.  The incentive to comply in 
this case is to avoid any enforcement action such as further charges or even prosecution.  Due 
to this the tax becomes a revenue-raising tax rather than a behaviour-changing tax.
 
59
                                                             
55 Piguo AC, Wealth and Welfare (London: Macmillan & Co., 1912).   
  An 
Asian Development Bank report acknowledges the weaknesses of achieving environmental 
policy through this ‘command’ approach since it only creates an incentive to comply with the 
56 See Baumol, WJ ‘On Taxation and the Control of Externalities’ (1972) 3 Amer. Econ. Rev. 62 307-322. 
57 Stern NH, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (London: CUP, 2007) p.xviii. 
58 Coase criticises the Pigovian logic which seeks to demonstrate how Government intervention can cause a 
nuisance in itself which then requires correction: see Coase, chapter 2, n.40, at 28.  Where Pigou argued for 
internalisation of negative externalities, Coase contested that if somebody is using their land which produces an 
economic output but which causes some harm to their neighbour, it should not automatically be assumed that 
the use should be stopped in order to protect the neighbour.  He argued that preventing the harm to the 
neighbour actually causes harm to the producer, and Coase believes that the required action depends on the 
balance between the private cost to the neighbour against the social gain from the production output. 
59 See the discussion in Soares CD, ‘An 'Environmentally Related Tax' is not necessarily an 'Environmental 
Tax'’ London School of Economics <http://ecpr-sgeu.lboro.ac.uk/research/soares1.pdf> Accessed 16/6/2010. 
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command, not go beyond it.60  Furthermore, the method of introducing severe penalties for 
breaching environmental legislation has been criticised.  South Africa’s National 
Environmental Management Amendment Bill (B36B-2007) which increased sanctions for 
non-compliance to a ZAR R10-million fine and/or 10 years in jail, arguably had “little 
effect”61 as the country still ranks lowly on an Environmental Performance Index.62
 
   
5.2.4 TAX INCENTIVISATION 
 
A contemporary approach to ensuring compliance is ‘tax incentivisation’.  The notion is to 
utilise taxation in order to give people an incentive to go beyond compliance.  Put simply, a 
tax on a pollutant can encourage less use of the pollutant up to the point of compliance, where 
the tax will be minimal.  Yet a tax credit or a significant reduction in taxation for going 
beyond compliance means that it is in the taxpayer’s financial interest to go beyond 
compliance and actually reduce their overall pollution – and even invest in environmentally 
efficient technology.63 This is an economic point, based on the financial practices of the way 
businesses are run.  The OECD refers to this type of “continuous incentive for pollution 
abatement and technical innovation” as ‘dynamic efficiency’.64
 
   
                                                             
60 See eg. Asian Development Bank, ‘Thailand: Capacity Building for Pollution Taxation and Resource 
Mobilization for Environmental and Natural Resources Sectors — Phase II’ (2008) 4667 THA. 
61 Gunn A, ‘On the right track? – South Africa’ (2008) <http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5628> Accessed 
16/6/2010. 
62 Produced from a study conducted by Yale and Columbia Universities; <http://epi.yale.edu/Home> Accessed 
7/6/2010. 
63 ‘Environmental efficiency’ means an action (such as production) which causes the least damage to the 
environmental objective given the available options. 
64 OECD, see n.53 at 7. 
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If a business is subject to taxation then it has an interest in arranging its affairs to reduce its 
tax liability, and the right to do so.65  By offering reliefs to reduce the liability, policymakers 
can encourage a certain form of positive activity.  Hence, policymakers would not be forcing 
a business to do a certain activity and not do another.  Instead they can charge the business an 
amount, justified as a necessary evil, but offer the business the option not to pay as much 
through certain schemes.  As such, the business carries out a positive activity which the 
Government may have otherwise had to do, and is better off for it.  The business chooses to 
do it and will likely be able to gain positive publicity from it.  Equally the Government does 
not have to raise additional taxes to fund the positive activity.  Thomas argues such measures 
can promote efficiency if activities with positive externalities are increased.66
 
 
Four models of tax incentivisation to achieve environmental objectives are considered 
below:- 
 
5.2.4.1 OUTPUT RELATED TAX 
 
An example of such a tax in operation is identified in First Principles of Economics, in a 
discussion related to a tax on a hypothetical factory’s pollution: 
 
“If the pollution were related to the volume of factory output, for instance, a well targeted tax 
would be output-related, so that the incentive to reduce the amount of pollution was directly 
related to the tax burden.  Such a tax would be more efficient than a tax on the profits of a                                                              
65 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster (1936) App.Cas. 1, 19 T.C. 490. 
66 Thomas KP, Investment Incentives: Growing use, Uncertain benefits, Uneven controls (Geneva: IISD, 2007) 
at 11. 
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polluter, who might pollute no less.  If a polluting firm was using the lowest cost methods of 
production before the tax, there is no reason why it should not continue to do so, being left 
merely with lower profits.”67
 
 
The notion here is that taxation can be targeted to fit in with the way that businesses operate.  
By making businesses take taxes on pollution output into the cost of production, the cost of 
production becomes higher and they have a vested interest in reducing such costs.  This 
provides both an incentive to reduce pollution output per se, as well as an incentive to invest 
in environmentally efficient technology which creates less pollution and therefore brings less 
pollution output into charge for tax.   
 
An example of this kind of tax is the Landfill Tax in the UK, which creates a charge per 
tonne on waste when delivered to landfill sites.  A higher rate68 applies to biodegradable 
waste than inactive waste, to further discourage landfill of the former.69  The Department of 
the Environment (as it was named then) set the prices based on the estimated external costs 
related to landfill, with the purpose of making those intending to use landfill sites take 
account of, and become responsible for, their environmental cost.70
 
 
Nevertheless, this model of taxation is questioned by Fullerton et al who argue that such 
taxes are frequently targeted in an imprecise manner which consequently provides inefficient                                                              
67 Lipsey RG and Harbury C, First Principles of Economics (London: OUP, 1993) at 230. 
68 The rates are specified by FA 1996, s.42. 
69 Inactive waste includes: rocks and soil, ceramic or concrete materials, minerals, furnace slags, ash, low 
activity inorganic compounds, calcium sulphate, calcium hydroxide and brine, water; Cabinet Office Strategy 
Unit, see chapter 2, n.30 at fn.100. 
70 An explanation is given in Davies B and Doble M ‘The Development and Implementation of a Landfill Tax in 
the UK’ (2004) in OECD, Addressing the Economics of Waste (Paris: OECD 2004). 
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welfare benefits.71  Indeed, the level of waste subject to the ‘standard rate’ of tax imposed on 
landfill in the UK was deemed to be static, signalling that this kind of output tax did not work 
successfully to reduce such levels of waste.72
Nevertheless, the tax significantly reduced landfill of inactive waste by 60%,
  This is despite an increase in the tonnage tax 
from GBP £7 upon its introduction in 1996 to GBP £40 in 2009.  
73 despite a rate 
of only GBP £2 – much lower than the charge for active waste – being charged until 2008.74
 
  
Hence an output tax can operate effectively but this is not guaranteed and it depends partly on 
the elasticity of demand of the subject of the tax. 
5.2.4.2 TAX REDUCTIONS AND DEDUCTIONS 
 
 
Even with the above output-related tax in operation, businesses would still have to bear the 
capital cost of investing in environmentally efficient technology in order to achieve the 
necessary tax savings.  Tax incentivisation can go further than this and assist businesses in 
investing in capital expenditure on this ‘clean’ technology in order to make it financially 
attractive to do so.   
 
In the UK, the Capital Allowances Act 2001 allows businesses to claim a FYE (First Year 
Allowance) of 100% on allowable capital expenditure on new energy-saving plant or 
machinery. This is a substantial incentive as businesses can then write off the cost of such                                                              
71 Fullerton D, Hong I and Metcalf G, ‘A Tax on Output of the Polluting Industry is Not a Tax on Pollution: The 
Importance of Hitting the Target’ (1999) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W7259. 
72 A Cabinet Office report called for an increased tax rate since the tax had been ineffective; see chapter 2, n.30 
at para 6.54. 
 73 Ibid, para 6.47. 
74 When it was increased to GBP £2.50. 
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expenditure against their tax liability.  Furthermore it promotes a demand for energy-saving 
plant and machinery which can help to reduce production costs as economies of scale develop 
and the market for such technology matures, and consequently reduces the overall cost to 
businesses of purchasing them.75
 
  In doing so it encourages economic growth of businesses 
who both use or produce energy-saving plants or machinery in an environmentally efficient 
way.  The limitation is that such allowances only create an incentive where a business 
produces sufficient chargeable profits to desire to lower its tax liability.  Further a business 
would need to make other capital investments in the ordinary course of its business, which it 
would additionally need to create sufficient profits to fund. 
Tax incentivisation in this manner can reduce undesirable side-effects, which could include, 
for example, a decrease in productivity, growth, or employment, or could make the industry 
less competitive internationally.  By allowing environmentally efficient machinery to be tax 
deductible, there should be no financial disadvantage in investing in this machinery – only 
the advantage in reduced taxes.  This is discussed by Ono, who concludes that there are:  
 
“…two competing forces that [environmental taxation] exerts on economic growth.  One is a 
negative force, which hampers production; the other is a positive force, which increases the 
level of environmental quality bequeathed to future generations…Environmental taxation is 
not necessarily harmful to economic growth.”76
 
 
                                                             
75 The intention of the US Climate Change Technology Initiative during the Clinton Administration was to 
encourage “the penetration of [the development of environmentally efficient] technologies, reducing costs, and 
creating a more mature market”), Energy Information Administration, Analysis of The Climate Change 
Technology Initiative: Fiscal Year 2001 (Washington D.C.: Energy Information Administration, 2000) at X. 
76 Ono T, ‘Environmental Tax Policy and Long-Run Economic Growth’ (2003) 54 Japanese Econ. Rev. 2, at 
215. 
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Ono believes that these competing forces are balanced by a “critical level of tax” – depending 
on where this is set it can be beneficial or detrimental to economic growth.77  However he 
identifies a crucial problem in that it is often unknown at what level this tax should be set, 
due to a lack of information or political constraints.78
 
  This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5.  Nevertheless if such a tax can be achieved then there can be both environmental 
improvement and economic growth. 
Similarly certain economic activities which may not be financially viable under standard tax 
rules, but which are environmentally positive, can be promoted by reducing or exempting the 
activities from tax measures.  For example the Chinese Cleaner Production Promotion Law79 
provides for potential exemption from VAT (Value Added Tax) of goods produced from 
wastes and materials reclaimed from wastes.80
 
   
5.2.4.3 TAX CREDITS 
 
A third strand of incentive is the tax credit model.   Whereas tax deductibles and allowances 
decrease a taxpayer’s taxable income before applying a tax, tax credits directly reduce the tax 
bill pound for pound.  This makes the tax credit considerably more valuable for a taxpayer 
and provides a substantial incentive to achieve the credit. 
 
                                                             
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of 
China in the 28th Session on 29/6/2002 <http://www.chinacp.com/EN/PolicyDetail.aspx?id=39> Accessed 
22/2/2010. 
80 Article 35. 
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In the UK the scale of tax credits varies greatly.  The Finance Act (FA) 1996 imposed a tax 
on landfill for operators of licensed landfill sites, in order to encourage recycling and reduce 
waste volumes.  Later regulations brought in via the Landfill Tax Regulations 1996 
introduced a tax credit against the Landfill Tax.  Under the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme, 
donations of up to 6.5% (originally 20%)81 of the landfill tax liability for the year could be 
made to approved Environmental Bodies for environmental projects.82  A tax credit worth 
90% of that contribution could then be claimed.  This is to encourage what are referred to as 
‘positive externalities’, where an action by a private individual confers benefits to others in 
society.83  While this scheme does provide an incentive to contribute to such schemes, the 
advantages available to businesses are limited due to the low percentage of the tax which can 
be claimed, and the amount contributed to fund environmental projects is limited.  Critics 
have warned that using this economic instrument alone cannot generate the revenue required 
to meet the UK’s waste strategy objectives.84  Again, such projects may be subject to market 
demand for them, though others may go ahead without any affect from market conditions.85
 
 
A considerably more attractive scheme to businesses was brought in under the Finance Act 
2000.  This allowed companies engaging in qualifying Research and Development activities 
(R&D) of technological innovation (provided certain criteria are met) to claim back 
significant amounts of their expenditure using tax credits.  SMEs (small and medium 
                                                             
81 Amended pursuant to Landfill Tax (Amendment) Regulations 2003 s.3(a). 
82 Contributions to other approved social and community projects also qualify. 
83 Pigou used the example of the need of the public to subsidise a lighthouse in Pigou AC, A Study in Public 
Finance (London: Macmillan, 1947) at 94. 
84 CBI, ‘CBI response to DEFRA/HM Treasury Consultation Paper ‘Possible Changes to the Landfill Tax Credit 
Scheme’’ (2001) 
<http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/positiondoc.nsf/1f08ec61711f29768025672a0055f7a8/397C607BDC62DBE98025
6BF4004F4B97/$file/environmentltcs050702.pdf> Accessed 2/3/2010. 
85 Such as recycling schemes affected by the collapse in demand for recycled goods; see n.32. 
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enterprises) could claim86 175% relief, while large companies could87 claim 130% relief.88  
Such high incentives provide significant attractions to invest in R&D of environmentally 
clean technology as they provide a great deal of assistance to offset innovation costs.  The 
advantages of using such market-based incentives to encourage investment in clean 
technology can be considerable.89  Indeed, California has for several decades used tax credits 
to promote renewable energy, with taxpayers being able to reduce both their federal and State 
tax payments through investment in renewable energy.  The IISD (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development) claim this helped California lead the world in renewable energy 
generation.90
  
 
As tax credits are essentially subsidies, it is a reasonable expectation of policymakers that 
they should encourage businesses to go beyond what is required by law.  In Oregon, USA, it 
was argued that the way tax credits operated meant that two businessmen were given a USD 
$30 million tax credit for meeting tax credit requirements within that State – even though 
they had only complied with the basic requirements of federal law.91  It is important therefore 
that tax credits and other incentives are so designed as to give the taxpayer an incentive to 
exceed the normal requirements of the law as much as possible, not just to comply, as is the 
case for Spanish companies to qualify for the Spanish Corporate Income Tax credit for 
environmental incentives.92
 
 
                                                             
86 FA 2000, Sch. 20. 
87 Ibid, Sch. 12. 
88 Increased rates pursuant to FA 2008, Section 26 and Schedule 8. 
89 See Wiersma D, ‘Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Pollution Control Strategies’ (1991) 1 Environ. Resource 
Econ. 1 63-82. 
90 IISD, Making Budgets Green (Canada: IISD, 1994) pp. 6-7. 
91 See House Committee on Water and Environment, 8/2/1999, State of Oregon 
<http://www.sos.state.or.us/archives/legislative/legislativeminutes/1999/house/water_environment/hwe02081.ht
ml> Accessed 22/6/2010. 
92 Art. 39.1 of Law 13/1996 of 30 December (Spain) (as amended). 
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An advantage of tax credits however is that they do not necessarily cause a drain on central 
Government funds.93  The Recycling Credits Scheme introduced pursuant to the UK’s 
Environmental Protection Act 199094 operated in such a way that payments were transferred 
to various levels of local Government, community organisations (such as charities) and 
private recycling companies (working in competition with local authorities’ recycling 
operators).95  Turner et al actually contend that recycling credits are “not a subsidy, but they 
do correct the market failure of the waste management system by reflecting the financial 
savings achieved by recycling.”96
 
  
5.2.4.4 ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION  
The annual accounts of a firm can depreciate the value of a fixed asset (such as plant or 
equipment) which is then regarded as an expense and reduces the firm’s overall taxable 
income (known as ‘depreciation’).  Normally under accounting rules the annual level of 
depreciation must be relatively proportionate to the overall useful life of the asset, in order 
that the entire cost of the capital asset is claimed gradually over a number of accounting years 
(known as ‘amortisation’).  However where ‘accelerated depreciation’ is allowed¸ a firm may 
write-down the value of fixed assets at an increased rate so that the depreciation is higher in 
the first few years of the purchase of the asset.  This creates the incentive for firms to 
purchase certain assets (such as environmentally efficient technology or renewable energy 
production facilities) in order that such assets can be quickly depreciated to reduce the total 
taxable income.  For example the USA offers accelerated deductions at a federal level for 
                                                             
93 So are therefore ‘Budget Neutral Instruments’ as defined by the IISD, see n.90 at 2. 
94 S.52. 
95 For a detailed account see Ozdemiroglu ZE, Turner RK and Steele P, ‘Recycling credits in the UK: Economic 
Incentives for Recycling Household Waste’, in Green Budget Reform (London: IISD and Earthscan, 1995). 
96 Turner et al, see n.48 at 130. 
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renewable energy technology assets such as geothermal heat pumps and small wind 
property97 and further ‘bonus’ depreciations to stimulate growth in renewable energy.98
 
 
5.3 SUMMARY OF INCENTIVES 
 
To summarise the measures explained above, the following methods are commonly used to 
incentivise financial activities deemed to be helpful in achieving environmental goals: 
1. Output-related tax: to encourage investments in improved technology or alternative 
production methods in order to reduce one’s tax liability (related to pollution output). 
2. Tax reductions: tax deductions, rebates and exemptions. 
3. Tax credits: personal; income; investment; production; corporate. 
4. Accelerated depreciation: accelerated depreciation of plant and technology for firms 
investing in specified technologies. 
 
6.  SUBSIDIES 
 
6.1 TAX SUBSIDIES  
 
Certain tax incentives are classified as tax subsidies.  Numbers 2-4 in 5.3 above are regarded 
as subsidies since they provide preferential tax treatment to benefit relevant taxpayers.  Other 
measures providing financial benefits such as tax deferrals with no interest charges would                                                              
97 Pursuant to The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (USA). 
98 Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (USA), included a 50% bonus depreciation (26 USC § 168(k)). 
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also constitute a tax subsidy since they essentially constitute an interest-free loan from the 
State.99 However since they are not direct expenditures (as with direct subsidies), such 
subsidies do not appear on national balance sheets as Government expenditure.  As such they 
are referred to as ‘off-budget subsidies’100 which incorporate indirect subsidies.  They are still 
however accountable as public spending programmes;101 for example EU law regards tax 
exemptions to be State Aid.102
 
  Number 1 (an output tax) is not a subsidy but a sliding scale 
of tax payments to encourage taxpayers to achieve the lowest possible tax payments.   
As discussed such tax incentives can be used to achieve environmental goals which may not 
otherwise be achievable.  On the reverse side, nations which fail to tax an environmentally 
harmful factor may be deemed to be indirectly subsidising the environmental harm by failing 
to internalise the cost and thereby providing the polluter with an indirect benefit for causing 
the harm.103 The OECD refers to this type of failure to charge or tax exemption as ‘implicit 
subsidies’ which differ from the payment-side benefits known as ‘explicit subsidies’.104
                                                             
99 McDaniel R, ‘Trade and Taxation’ (2000-2001) 26 Brook.J.Int’l L 4, at 1627. 
  
Further, tax subsidies may attempt to protect an industry by providing credits or other such 
benefits despite the industry being environmentally harmful.  It is also questionable whether 
100 Distinguished from ‘on-budget subsidies’ which appear as expenditure on Government balance sheets in: 
EEA, Energy Subsidies in the EU: a brief overview (Technical report No 1/2004) (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004) at 11. 
101 The EC publishes an annual ‘State Aid Scoreboard’ providing transparency on Member States’ subsidies 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/archive/scoreboard_arch.html> Accessed 
2/6/2010.  See for example the 2008 special focus on State Aid for Environmental Protection: EC, ‘State Aid 
Scoreboard Spring 2008 Update’ COM(2008) 304 final. 
102 Member States must seek EU approval to implement such measures: TFEU, Art. 107. 
103 Stiglitz argues that by the USA not addressing the issue of global warming by pricing global external costs, 
they made a de facto subsidy: Stiglitz JE, ‘A New Agenda for Global Warming’ (2006) 3 The Economists’ 
Voice 7, Art.3. 
104 OECD, Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Challenges for Reform (Paris: OECD, 2005) at 45. 
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such subsidies are economically positive.  If a subsidy is both harmful to the environment and 
the economy it is known as a ‘perverse subsidy’.105
 
 
There is no scholarly consensus that subsidies are the most effective means of achieving 
environmental goals, though they are in common use and have the potential to achieve such 
goals.  Further analysis of tax subsidies is provided in 36.7.106
 
 
6.2 DIRECT SUBSIDIES 
 
Direct subsidies in the form of capital grants from public funds can be utilised to encourage 
certain activities.107  This type of reward can be used for example to promote positive 
externalities, encourage environmental innovation and research, or stimulate the market in a 
way that may otherwise be unfeasible at the present time (such as by subsidising large-scale 
production of presently expensive energy efficient goods in order that they become 
commonplace in the market due to mass production, reducing their manufacturing cost and 
purchase price).  The US Climate Change Technology Initiative believed incentives and other 
environmental policies could “flip the clean technology from the low-production, high-cost 
state to a stable high-production, low-cost state, with corresponding benefit to the 
environment and the economy.”108
                                                             
105 Kjellingbro PM and Skotte M, Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Linkages between subsidies, the 
environment and the economy (Copenhagen: Environmental Assessment Institute, 2005) at 3 [REPORT] 
<www.imv.dk> Accessed 12/6/2010. 
  Indeed many private bodies or individuals may be unable 
to improve their environmental behaviour without some degree of direct subsidy.    In this 
106 Wiener states numerous reasons why such subsidies can create ‘perverse’ behaviour in: Wiener JB, ‘Global 
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context’ (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 677, at 726-7.   
107 The UK funds an ‘Offshore Wind Capital Grants Scheme’ to develop offshore wind farms 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23956.pdf> Accessed 3/3/2010. 
108 See n.75 at 18. 
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way the EU justifies the Community Guidelines on State aid for Environmental Protection, 
acknowledging that SMEs may be unable to afford initial investments (such as in more 
efficient technology) to adapt to compulsory environmental standards.109  Such subsides may 
be funded by additional environmental taxes elsewhere which will also add to the incentive to 
improve environmental behaviour; this mitigates the taxpayer burden.  Alternatively it could 
be funded through the removal of other subsidies which would counteract these measures.110
 
  
However this type of State Aid is subject to close international and national scrutiny since it 
both distorts the market and can create unfair competitive advantages for certain businesses.  
This matter is discussed further in Chapter 6.   
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Tax incentives intended to alter behaviour encourage businesses to go beyond the legislative 
requirements of reducing their emissions to a certain point.  Indeed, without them there may 
be little financial incentive for a business to do anything more than reach the point of 
compliance with environmental regulations.  Schemes such as tax credits make it worthwhile 
for businesses to invest in innovative technology and therefore let Governments work in a co-
operative manner with industry, rather than simply creating strict legislation that could 
discourage businesses from operating within the jurisdiction.  Subsidies can be offered either 
directly or through the tax code, and can be utilised to achieve environmental objectives in a 
similar fashion.  It may be necessary to offer such subsidies or to remove other subsidies 
which go against the environmental objective, in order to create the necessary market                                                              
109 OJ C 37, 02.02.2001, pp.3-15. 
110 As advocated in EC, ‘Green Paper on Market-based Instruments for Environment and Related Policy 
Purposes’ COM(2007) 140, at 5. 
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conditions for an environmental policy to succeed.  These findings, particularly the need to 
offer incentives, support the theme and will be applied throughout the thesis. 
  
CHAPTER 3 :  PHILOSOPHY OF ‘PURE 
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8.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The nature of environmental taxation depends upon an understanding not only that taxation 
can and should be used to achieve environmental policy, but crucially that it can and should 
be used to achieve any political objective.  By evaluating these points, this chapter asks 
whether philosophically there is such a concept as ‘green taxation’.  This is an important 
contribution to the understanding of environmental taxation and the legal, economic and 
social justifications for it RQ(ii).  The wider benefits to a society in recycling revenue from 
environmental taxation back into the economy will then be analysed in Chapter 4. 
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The chapter will seek to identify whether , and if so how, taxes should be used to achieve 
policy objectives – as this is the whole purpose behind the Universal Model in RQ(i).  This 
will consider taxpayer perspectives of environmental taxation and experiences of overcoming 
scepticism that such taxes are simply a revenue-raising measures and not a method of 
achieving behavioural change.  This will further contribute to RQ(ii) in ascertaining how 
taxes can achieve changes in environmental behaviour required to reach environmental policy 
objectives.  Multi-jurisdictional experiences of such methods will be drawn upon to 
demonstrate these points further. 
 
9.  SHOULD TAXATION BE USED FOR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES? 
 
9.1 DEVELOPMENT 
 
Historically the view in British tax policy was that to achieve public acceptance of income 
tax (deemed to be necessary for effective collection) the tax system must maintain an 
impartial and fair outlook.  As such the 1955 Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits 
and Incomes believed that the tax system should not be utilised to achieve an incumbent 
Government’s economic policy.1  Whilst this view stood, common acceptance of general 
income tax by the public grew alongside the popularity of economic theory displaying how 
taxation could serve public policy objectives in a cost-effective manner.  Later in 1972, the 
RCEP (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution) first promoted the idea of 
environmental taxation.2
                                                             
1 See Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Incomes, Final Report (London: HMSO, 1955) Cmd. 
9474, para. 416. 
   A 1990 White Paper helped bring this into Government policy by 
2 RCEP, Pollution in some British Estuaries and Coastal Waters (London: HMSO, 1972) Third Report, Cmnd. 
5054. 
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supporting the economic theory of environmental cost internalisation and the idea that 
taxation would be less costly than regulation in achieving environmental objectives.3
 
  
Consequently the grand notions of the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, of individuals taking 
responsibility for the harm they cause, could sceptically be seen to be a way of making 
reduced Government costs appear politically favourable.   
9.2 DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE 
 
Taking the environment out of the equation, Myddelton presents the debate of whether tax 
should be politically focused as two competing ideologies; one of the purist ‘liberal’ view 
that taxes should be impartial and treat everybody equally, against “the collectivist demand 
for the law to discriminate between people thought ‘deserving.’” 4
9.3 DISTRIBUTIONAL FACTORS 
  It must be recognised 
however that modern Governments generally take public welfare into consideration when 
deciding upon tax policies, if only to avoid its people falling into such poverty that they 
overthrow the Government.  Whilst this is a worst case scenario, the idea has developed in 
many democratic societies that taxing the poor brings negative consequences, and even non-
democratic Governments would likely take this into account to avoid unrest.   As such, the 
concept of ‘regressive’ taxation (taxing everybody at the same level) has fallen out of favour 
(though it still exists) since it means the poor bear a proportionately higher burden of tax than 
those with higher incomes, and ‘progressive’ taxation (taxing those with higher incomes 
proportionately more than those with low incomes) has taken precedence.   
 
                                                             
3 Department of the Environment, This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy (London: 
HMSO, 1990). 
4 Myddelton DR, The Power to Destroy: A study of the British Tax System (London: Johnson Publications, 
1969) at 148. 
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This is not to say that alternative methods are unsuitable in achieving policy, but that welfare 
and distribution considerations should be taken into account.  Felder and Schleiniger argue 
that “any tax reform gives – intended or not – rise to redistributive effects and therefore to 
political opposition.” 5  The notion of the wealthy contributing more to the Treasury than the 
poor is of course separate from the responsibility-based polluter-pays principle.  The point is 
that it has become acceptable to consider who should bear the burden of a tax.  This is in line 
with Adam Smith’s maxim that taxpayers in similar circumstances should be taxed 
similarly.6  In terms of the environment, ensuring that all taxpayers contribute equally to 
environmental protection would mean that even those who actively do not cause 
environmental damage would have to pay the same amount as those who deliberately cause 
it, which would seem more inequitable.  As such, the latter non-purist view of Myddelton’s 
debate appears to be politically more acceptable.  Indeed, the 1997 Statement of Intent sets 
out to shift the tax burden from what are perceived to be social ‘goods’ (such as employment) 
to social ‘bads’ (such as environmental harm).7
 
  Chapter 7 will outline the difficulty in 
determining who will bear the burden of an environmental tax programme. 
10.ACCEPTABILITY OF TAXATION TO ACHIEVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES VERSUS REVENUE RAISING 
 
10.1 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
 
Although the Marshall Report advocated that the effective use of economic instruments 
within a range of policies could be the most cost-effective and consequently efficient option                                                              
5 Felder S and Schleiniger R, ‘Environmental Tax Reform: Efficiency and Political Feasibility’ (2002) 42 
Ecolog. Econ. 107–116. 
6 See 4.1. 
7 See chapter 2, n.18. 
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to reduce harmful emissions, it should still be asked whether the true purpose of such 
measures is actually to achieve set environmental objectives.8  Whilst its stated purpose may 
be environmental, Driesen points out that any instrument can be adjusted “to change the 
allocation of benefits and try to influence equitable perception.”9 For example hydrocarbon 
taxes, such as petrol and diesel rates, are now officially regarded as environmental taxes even 
though oil was subject to tax prior to any evidence of environmental damage.  The UK’s 
ONS (Office of National Statistics) in 2007 counted hydrocarbon tax receipts as 64.5% of the 
total collection of environmental tax, making it the largest contributor - rebranding it an 
environmental tax made it more politically acceptable.10
 
 
10.2 COMPARISON WITH REGULATION: IRISH BAG TAX 
 
Indeed, the Irish bag tax11 is officially regarded as having been extremely successful.12  By 
citing environmental justifications the Irish Government also managed to increase the tax in 
2007 from €0.15 to €0.2213 which raised millions extra in revenue.14
                                                             
8 HM Treasury, Economic Instruments and the Business Use of Energy: a Report by Lord Marshall (London: 
HM Treasury, 1998). 
   An outright ban on 
plastic bags could have achieved a higher degree of compliance, however it would have 
brought in no receipts for the Exchequer, administration costs would have had to have been 
raised by general taxation, and it may have been politically unpopular if a ban was regarded 
as an infringement of liberties.  A ban may therefore have been in line with the logic laid 
down by the 1955 Royal Commission, meaning everybody would have contributed equally to 
its enforcement. Though plastic bag taxes have not reduced usage as much as a ban could 
9 Driesen DM, ‘Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context (2000) 27 Ecology L.Q. 1-52, 
at 12. 
10 ONS, ‘Environmental Taxes: Taxes up 7.4% in 2007’ 
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=152> Accessed 5/5/2010. 
11 See chapter 1, n.7.   
12 See <http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/Waste/PlasticBags/> Accessed 16/7/2010. 
13 See chapter 1, n.7. 
14 See n.12. 
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have, they have raised much revenue whilst largely achieving the objective.  This points to 
the idea that policymakers were willing to accept a lower degree of compliance in order that 
the policy was cost-effective.  It could sceptically be argued however the tax was simply a 
politically popular means of raising revenue. 
 
10.3 SCEPTICISM 
 
 
Opschoor believes that in practice many environmental taxes have been introduced mainly to 
raise revenue for the Government, though usually it is related to environmental protection.15
The CCL (Climate Change Levy)
 
16 for example, was introduced as a business tax on energy 
consumption.  The policy was publicised positively to businesses as it was explained that 
their overall tax contributions would not rise, since their employer NICs (National Insurance 
Contributions) would be cut by 0.3% to ‘recycle’ the revenue gained from the CCL.17   
Support was also announced to be offered to businesses to promote ‘energy efficiency and 
low carbon technologies.’18  However Budget 2002 increased employers’ (and employees’) 
NICs by 1% which more than cancelled out the CCL reductions, raising scepticism about the 
true purpose of CCL.19
 
    
                                                             
15 Opschoor JB and Vos HB, Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection (Paris: OECD,1989). 
16 Introduced pursuant to the FA 2000, Part II, clause 30 and in Schedules 6 and 7. 
17 HM Treasury, ‘Pre-Budget Report 1999’, Chapter 6 ‘Protecting the Environment’, Para 6.32 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/prebud_pbr99_rep06.htm> Accessed 7/2/2010. 
18 See eg. HMRC, ‘What is Climate Change Levy?’ at  
<http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=p
ageExcise_InfoGuides&propertyType=document&id=HMCE_CL_001174> Accessed 7/3/2010. 
19 National Insurance Contributions Act 2002, chapter 19. 
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The EAC (Environmental Audit Committee) recognised that green taxes must be properly 
advertised to the public and explained fully to Parliament, and that a failure to do so 
“…breeds suspicion about their objectives, increasing the perception of them as revenue 
raising measures with no environmental purpose.”20  Explaining the message of behavioural 
change and their importance in combating climate change, the EAC argue, will increase 
people’s preparedness to pay.21
 
   
10.4 DISTINGUISHING THROUGH USE OF REVENUE 
 
 
Where the revenue is deployed appears to be crucial in determining whether the tax is an 
environmental tax – both in the perception of the public and in the philosophical perception 
of green taxation.  Smith explains that in practice many such taxes are used primarily as 
revenue raising taxes, to fund environmental protection such as in clean-up operations.22  
This draws a philosophical distinction between taxes which are used primarily to change 
behaviour, and taxes used to fund environmental protection.  The former arguably gives the 
true meaning to ‘environmental taxes’, whilst the latter should be referred to as 
‘environmentally-related taxes’ since they do not directly prevent environmental damage and 
may only be used for environmental clean-up operations.  Smith concurs with this, arguing 
that with some taxes, “…their link to the environment is solely through the use of their 
revenues.”23
 
   
                                                             
20 House of Commons EAC, Vehicle Excise Duty as an Environmental Tax: Tenth Report of Session 2007-8 
(London: TSO Ltd, 2008) at 19 para. 52. 
21 Ibid at 24, para. 67. 
22 Smith, see chapter 2, n.52, at 18 para. 41. 
23 Ibid. 
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Moreover, some environmental enforcement institutions have been criticised for having 
misguided priorities.  The OECD criticised the operation of the authorities in the Kyrgyz 
Republic for focusing on collecting pollution taxes and maximising revenues for their own 
operations, rather than concentrating on environmental improvements.24
 
  This further 
degrades the public perceptions of the objectives of environmental taxes and reduces 
willingness to pay. If a tax system becomes primarily no longer for environmental purposes, 
the tax itself cannot be regarded as an environmental tax. 
11.EARMARKING 
 
11.1 HYPOTHECATION 
 
Research invoked by the EAC shows that where there is hypothecation (money designated 
for a particular purpose) of environmental tax revenues to a particular environmental cause or 
to reduce other taxes, public support for environmental taxation rises.25   The CCL itself 
pledged part of the revenue raised to renewable energy initiatives including The Carbon 
Trust.26  Research by Anderson suggests that The Netherlands’ water charging system was 
more successful than other similar systems in Europe, because revenues were earmarked 
which led to polluters co-operating with regulators and the psychological incentive helped the 
public to become favourable to achieving lower levels of water pollution.27
 
 
                                                             
24 OECD Environment Policy Committee, Environmental Enforcement in the Kyrgyz Republic: Promoting 
Environmental Improvements and Enhancing Good Governance (2005) at 16, para. 4.2. 
25 EAC, The 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review: An Environmental Analysis, Third 
Report of Session 2007-8, HC 149-I, para. 11. 
26 <http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/> Accessed 10/11/2009. 
27 Anderson MS, ‘Governance by Green Taxes: Implementing Clean Water Policies in Europe 1970 – 1990’ 
(1990) 2 Environ. Econ. Pol. Stud. 39-63. 
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In order for a tax to become classified as an environmental tax, from a philosophical 
perspective, by its very nature, it should include some environmental objective and not be 
purely to raise revenue.  Earmarking tax revenue to particular environmental investments 
means that the purpose of the tax is environmental, not merely to raise revenue.  Equally, 
using tax revenue from matters which cause environmental harm to lessen the tax burden 
elsewhere should also be considered within the environmental tax category.  If the taxpayer 
burden does not increase, the Government are not increasing their tax revenue, and the 
primary purpose is to discourage the environmentally damaging activity.  Of course there are 
different levels within this of how much the tax is focused on environmental objectives, and 
the possibilities remain for policymakers to partially earmark revenues as a façade for 
revenue-collection, but these two categories can prima facie be used to provide a 
philosophical distinction between environmental tax and revenue-raising tax.  
 
12.TAX NEUTRALITY 
 
12.1 REVENUE-NEUTRAL SCHEMES 
 
 
If the general purpose of a tax policy is not to raise revenue but to achieve environmental 
objectives, the tax can be considered to be neutral.  It is accepted however that there are 
instances where it may not be necessary to offset other taxes or hypothecate, in which case 
the tax will be non-neutral.28
 
 
                                                             
28 For wider reading, Lau examines the conditions necessary to mathematically determine when a tax is neutral: 
see chapter 1, n.10. 
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Returning to Ireland’s plastic bag tax, this was designed to be tax neutral.  Its objective29 was 
that after administration costs which were hoped to be kept at a minimum, all levies would be 
remitted to the Environment Fund.30  Within Britain the concept of using revenue-neutral 
taxation to avert climate change was proposed by the Pearce Report 1989 so that the burden 
on taxpayers would not increase.31  Whilst Dresner et al32 identify that at the time of the 
introduction of the supposedly revenue-neutral Landfill Tax and since, “landfill tax attracted 
very little attention or protest”, the use of revenue neutrality itself has been expressly 
criticised by the National Pensioners Convention (NPC).33  The NPC argue that the National 
Insurance Fund should have been credited for its losses from the landfill taxes gained by the 
Treasury since cutting NICs in this way has cost the Fund at least GBP £13bn with an annual 
loss of around GBP £2bn in lost contributions.34
 
  HM Treasury therefore used Landfill Taxes 
within the overall budget rather than earmarking the revenue to replace the reduction in NICs, 
which could pose a long-term threat to the social security system.  This however is a matter 
of Government accountability in this instance, and actual revenue neutrality should work to 
prevent additional burdens on taxpayers.  
12.2 VEHICLE EXCISE DUTY 
 
 
                                                             
29 See n.12. 
30 Set up pursuant to The Waste Management (Amendment) Act 2001.  Its objectives are described at 
<http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/Waste/EnvironmentFund/> Accessed 15/3/2010. 
31 Pearce D, Barbier E and Markandta A, Blueprint for a Green Economy (London: Earthscan, 1989). 
32 Dresner S, Jackson T and Gilbert N, ‘History and Social Responses to Environmental Tax Reform in the 
United Kingdom’ (2006) 34 Energy Policy 930-939. 
33 Ibid, at 931. 
34 NPC ‘The Facts about National Insurance’ Briefing No. 34, 
<http://www.npcuk.org/briefings/b34NInsurance.doc> Accessed 16/6/2010. 
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In order to achieve public acceptability, the EAC advised that VED (Vehicle Excise Duty)35 
changes should be communicated to the public as green taxation by increasing rates for 
vehicles with high emissions and reducing rates for low-emission vehicles.36  (This began to 
be implemented following the 1999 Budget.)37  Formerly VED was charged on engine size 
which did not differentiate between emissions types.  Whilst the duty raises non-
hypotheticated revenue, the means of raising it are done in a way which provides a real fiscal 
incentive to own a vehicle with low emissions and a disincentive to own a high-emissions 
vehicle.  Taxing cars according to their CO238
 
 emissions rather than their engine size means 
that philosophically the tax has been changed to a green tax.   
Furthermore, the overall charging strategy makes the system revenue-neutral.  From 1 April 
2009, there are 13 different VED tax bands for cars registered on or after 1 March 2001.39
                                                             
35 An annual tax on ownership of a motor vehicle in the UK. 
  
Cars registered before 1st March 2001 still pay according to their engine size so the incentive 
applies only to new car purchases.  In 2010-11 the standard rates for cars registered on or 
after 1 March 2001 ranged from zero for the lowest emission cars (Band A) to GBP £435 for 
the highest emission (Band M) cars.  However since at the time of the 2001 Budget there 
were no Band A vehicles on sale in the UK, it could be contended that it was merely a 
political move to popularise a new system which effectively increased the net revenue 
brought into HM Treasury.  Nevertheless, it did create demand for Band A vehicles.  The 
subsequent manufacturing of such vehicles somewhat alleviated such scepticism and 
confirmed the environmental status of the VED system. 
36 See n.20 at 20 para. 56.  The EAC had earlier strongly supported the use of VED as an environmental tax in 
EAC, Reducing Carbon Emissions from Transport, Ninth Report of Session 2005-6, HC 981-I. 
37 <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/bud99_pr_vehicle_excise_duty.htm> Accessed 3/3/2010. 
38 Carbon dioxide. 
39 See <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Motoring/OwningAVehicle/HowToTaxYourVehicle/DG_172916> 
Accessed 7/3/2010. 
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As a signal to the motor industry and motorists that the manufacture of high-emission cars 
was against environmental policy, the standard rates for brand new cars in 2010-11 were set 
so that the highest emitting vehicles were charged more.  Band M cars would be charged the 
significant sum of GBP £950, while the zero rate was extended so that the first four bands (A-
D) were each charged GBP £0.40  The fact that one can achieve the zero rate removes the 
contention that the duty is merely to raise revenue.  It is a considerable incentive for 
technological improvements to make cars more energy efficient.  Indeed, BMW gained much 
positive publicity when announcing the fuel-efficient BMW 118d which would attract only a 
Band B charge of GBP £35 in 2009-10 and GBP £20 in 2010-11.41
 
  Thus, the revenue-neutral 
system can have considerable benefits both as an attractive philosophical concept and as an 
incentive to improve technology to meet Government aims.   
It should be noted however that although the VED bands discussed appear revenue-neutral, 
policymakers will be aware that many people will be unable to afford to purchase a new car 
so they have to continue paying the old duty at increasing rates – which does add some 
scepticism to the Government’s real purpose when claiming an environmental objective – 
even though the rating system itself is difficult to challenge.  Furthermore if a buyer chooses 
an alternative energy vehicle the infrastructure in place to refuel the vehicle is at the time of 
writing insufficient which thus acts both as a disincentive for such purchases but also an 
incentive to improve the infrastructure.   Ironically the scheme has somewhat been a victim of 
its own success: as VED rates caused demand for high-emissions to fall, manufactures had to                                                              
40 2010 rates were brought in pursuant to FA 2009, s.14, which amended Schedule 1 to Vehicle Excise and 
Registration Act 1994. 
41 <http://www.bmw.co.uk/bmwuk/offers/1Series_3_5/0,,1156___bs-MQ%3D%3D%40bb-
S08wNw%3D%3D%40sit-bmwuk,00.html> Accessed 18/1/2010. 
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seek subsidies from the Government to avoid insolvency, thus imposing a higher burden on 
the taxpayer. 
 
13.  CONCLUSION  
 
 
The chapter concludes that taxation can be used for environmental taxation, as, 
philosophically, taxes are able to influence behaviour and such practices can be beneficial for 
wider social objectives.  Crucially, the findings within this chapter point to revenue-neutral 
tax schemes which are earmarked for environmental purposes to be the most politically 
acceptable methods of introducing an environmental tax.  The benefits or risks of 
hypothecation and recycling will  be considered in Chapter 4.  The outcome will help to 
shape the type of guidance advised within the Universal Model for RQ(i), and assists in the 
understanding of how environmental behaviour can be modified; this will form the starting 
point for further consideration in Chapter 6. 
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14.  INTRODUCTION 
 
14.1 PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Following Chapter 3 which examined the concept of revenue neutrality and whether there is 
philosophically such a concept as ‘environmental taxation’, this chapter will consider the 
possible benefits of recycling revenue from environmental taxation back into the economy.  
Importantly, this contributes to the understanding RQ(ii)(b) of the legal, economic and social 
justifications for adopting environmental taxation.  By gaining an essential understanding of 
the legal and economic concept of revenue recycling, the chapter will seek to provide 
guidance for policymakers as to how taxes can be designed to limit negative consequences 
and maximise positive gains upon environmental objectives and wider policy goals.  The 
concept of a ‘package’ of environmental tax-and-compensation goals for incentivisation will 
further form an invaluable basis for further RQ(ii) and RQ(iii) and contribute to the structure 
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of the Universal Model itself, as it is in line with the theme that both costs and rewards must 
be offered to create the appropriate structure of achieving environmental objectives.  To do 
this, the chapter will analyse a range of academic debate on the subject of revenue recycling 
and tax packages, and will reach a conclusion on whether such methods should be used by 
lawmakers and policymakers and are appropriate to the Universal Model, with the caveat that 
the relevant issues are regarded from a legal standpoint. 
 
14.2 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
 
There are a various methods available for ‘revenue recycling’.  For example, the additional 
revenue can be used to reduce employers’ labour taxes – as happened in the UK when the 
landfill tax was brought in alongside a reduction in employers’ NICs.1  There the overall tax 
burden can stay the same, the Treasury receiving approximately the same amount in revenue 
albeit from two different sources, instead of simply the original labour tax.  When this 
happens, it has been suggested that there are two benefits to a society: the environmental 
benefit targeted by the tax, and the greater incentive to employers to take on new staff as 
labour is less expensive, so employment may rise.2
 
  This is referred to as the ‘double 
dividend’.     
Environmental improvement is considered to be the first dividend.  Economic improvements, 
regarded as the second dividend, may be an increase in employment or GDP.  Depending on 
the method used, there are various potential economic benefits available.  Should any general                                                              
1 See 12. 
2 Patuelli et al define the double dividend as “the joint occurrence of an environmental and economic 
improvement”, in Patuelli R, Nijkamp P and Pels E, ‘Environmental Tax Reform and the Double Dividend: A 
Meta-Analytical Performance Assessment’ (2005) Ecolog. Econ. 55, 564–583, at 565. 
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economic benefit accrue with a revenue-neutral approach, it should indicate that the 
economic costs of the tax system have been reduced since society has benefited at no 
additional cost - meaning the costless introduction of environmental benefits, as noted by 
André et al.3  It is essentially a matter of shifting the tax burden to polluters not accounting 
for their environmental damage and away from those taxpayers who, with a reduced rate of 
tax, could cause a benefit to society.  An economic model shown by Jouvet and Oueslati, for 
example, demonstrates how such methods to tackle an environmental externality can mean 
reduced welfare costs for the State.4  Hence, the tax is raised in a less distortionary way, as 
illustrated by Oates5 and Ulph.6
 
   
15.EMPLOYMENT DOUBLE DIVIDEND 
 
The definition of double dividend given by Bovenburg and Van der Ploeg is specifically in 
terms of the potential for increased employment as the second dividend.7
                                                             
3 André FJ, Cardenete MA and Velázquez E, ‘Performing an Environmental Tax Reform in a Regional 
Economy.  A Computable General Equilibrium Approach’ (2003) 39 Ann. Reg. Sci. 2, 375-392, at 376: “…if a 
double dividend exists, it is possible to improve the environmental quality without any cost in terms of non-
environmental economic welfare.” 
  This refers to 
reducing employers’ labour taxes (such as NICs) in order to increase employment.  This 
notion has been favoured in the EU as a means of implementing environmental taxes since 
European labour taxes have commonly already been high relative to the USA; thus additional 
labour taxes would be unpopular in Europe.  Indeed, the EU has strongly promoted 
4 Jouvet PA and Oueslati W, ‘Tax Reform an Public Spending Trade-offs in an Endogenous Growth Model with 
an Environmental Externality’ (2002) Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 103.2002, Economic 
Theory and Applications. 
5 Oates WE, ‘Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment and Improve the Tax System at the Same 
Time?’ (1995) 61 Southern Econ.J 4, 915-922. 
6 Ulph D, ‘A Note on the “Double Benefit” of Pollution Taxes’ (1992) University of Bristol Discussion Paper 
No. 92-317. 
7 Bovenberg AL and Ploeg F, ‘Green Policies in a Small Open Economy’ (1993) Centre for Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Paper No. 785. 
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“…shifting the tax burden from welfare-negative taxes, (e.g. on labour), to welfare-positive 
taxes, (e.g. on environmentally damaging activities…)” amongst its Member States.8
 
  The 
concept is laudable since it moves the burden from the ‘positive’ part of the production 
process to the ‘negative’.   
There are however a number of studies which attempt to clarify the economic conditions 
necessary for an employment double dividend to occur.9  While there is much disagreement 
about the precise preconditions, there does appear to be common acceptance that an 
employment double dividend is possible.  Barker’s models show that unemployment can fall 
alongside energy use10 or with an improvement in environmental quality,11 whilst Morris et 
al show through a cost-benefit analysis that there can be significant benefits in recycling 
pollution tax revenue to cut labour costs.12  An OECD empirical study also demonstrates that 
there can be positive employment outcomes.13  Pezzey14
                                                             
8 EC, see chapter 2, n.110, para. 2.3. This was encouraged by the EC as early as 1993 in ‘White Paper on 
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’ (1993) COM(93) 700, Chapter 10. 
 however casts doubt on the studies 
and Baranzini et al support this in arguing that the employment double dividend argument is 
9 Since there is extensive writing in this area and it is primarily a debate for economists, it is intended that only a 
brief summary will be provided herein.  For further reading see for example Heady CJ et al, Study on the 
Relationship Between Environmental/Energy Taxation and Employment Creation (Bath: University of Bath, 
2000); Bovenberg AL and Goulder LH, ‘Environmental Taxation’, in Auerbach A and Feldstein M, 2.ed, 
Handbook of Public Economics (New York: North Holland, 1998); Kratena K, Environmental Tax Reform and 
the Labour Market: The Double Dividend in Different Labour Market Regimes (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2002); Parry IWH & Oates WE, ‘Policy Analysis in the Presence of Distorting Taxes’ (2000) 19 J. Pol. Anal. 
Manage. 603-613; and Määttä K, Environmental Taxes – From an Economic Idea to a Legal Institution 
(Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing, 1997), Part II. 
10 Barker T and Gardiner B, ‘Employment, Wage Formation and Pricing in the EU: Empirical Modelling of 
Environmental Tax Reform’, in Cararro C and Siniscalco D, Environmental Fiscal Reform and Unemployment 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1996) Chapter 9. 
11 Barker T, ‘Taxing Pollution instead of Employment: Greenhouse Gas Abatement through Fiscal Policy in the 
UK’ (1995) 6 Energy and Environment 1, 1-28. 
12 Morris GE, Révész T, Zalai E, and Fucskó J, ‘Integrating Environmental Taxes on Local Air Pollutants with 
Fiscal Refom in Hungary: Simulations with a Computable General Equilibrium Model’ (1999) 4 Environmental 
and Development Economics 537-564.  See also Tindale S & Holtham G, Green Tax Reform: Pollution 
Payments and Labour Tax Cuts (London: Institute for Public Policy Research: 1996). 
13 OECD, see chapter 2, n.53. 
14 Pezzey JV and Park A, ‘Reflections on the Double Dividend Debate’ (1998) 11 Environmental Resource 
Economics 3-4, 539-555.   
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“difficult to sustain”15 albeit admitting that it can sometimes work.16  Parry and Bento further 
argue that environmental taxes cause product prices to increase and consequently discourage 
investment and increase unemployment, which removes any efficiency benefit available.17  
Bonetti and Fitzroy however criticise those economic models that show only short-term 
benefits or even negative benefits, by illustrating that it is a frequent problem that they “make 
the unrealistic assumption of perfectly competitive equilibrium labour markets…” and ignore 
the reality of the market.18
 
  This problem of using theoretical economic models is pervasive 
in economics, models commonly only taking account of factors that are assumed within the 
model and not real-world.   
Any conclusion to be drawn from the debate is that there can (but not automatically) be an 
employment double dividend depending on factors such as the economic conditions, prior 
level of Government expenditure, and employment rates.  Ligthart’s research argues that in 
order to achieve a double dividend outcome, value must be given to the environment as a 
factor of production – which supports the assertion held herein.19  Furthermore Patuelli et al 
show the necessity of revenue recycling - regardless of the extent of a double dividend – by 
illustrating the dangers of a Government retaining revenues from environmental tax and not 
recycling them back into the economy, in suggesting that in such circumstances there could 
be an economic depression.20
 
 
                                                             
15 Baranzini A, Goldenberg J and Speck S, ‘A Future for Carbon Taxes’ (2000) 32 Ecolog. Econ. 395-412, at 
401. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Parry IWH & Bento AM, ‘Tax Deductions, Environmental Policy and the “Double Dividend” Hypothesis’ 
(2000) 39 J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 1, 67-96, at 68. 
18 Bonetti S and Fitzroy F, ‘Environmental Tax Reform and Government Expenditure’ (1999) 13 Environ. 
Resource Econ. 289-308, at 307, Note 3. 
19 Ligthart JE, ‘The Macroeconomic Effects of Environmental Taxes: A Closer Look at the Feasibility of “Win-
Win” Outcomes’ (1998) International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 98/75. 
20 Patuelli et al, see n.2, at 568. 
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16.COMPENSATORY MEASURES 
 
The EU have also favoured a double dividend in reducing employees’ labour taxes in order to 
achieve a specific form of double dividend.21
 
  Reducing income tax means workers have 
more disposable income for consumption spending which can raise demand for goods and in 
turn lead to increased employment and rising GDP.  This may not however be the case in an 
import-dependent country such as The Maldives, where it could lead to an increased flow of 
capital out of the country.  This emphasises the importance of appreciating the economic 
conditions of a country in order to determine the most appropriate tax package. 
Ono’s model shows that a revenue-neutral reduction in social security tax funded by 
environmental tax revenue can achieve a desirable double dividend, under certain 
conditions.22   This could alternatively be done through a lump-sum compensatory method.  
For instance, the French Government attempted to introduce a carbon tax for both individuals 
and businesses based upon their carbon usage, though the plans were dropped due to much 
opposition of the costs involved.23  It was intended that the scheme would be completely 
revenue-neutral, with reductions in income taxes based upon location so that those living in 
the countryside where public transport options are more limited would receive a greater 
income tax reduction than urban dwellers.24
 
 
                                                             
21 EC, see chapter 2, n.110, para. 2.3. This was encouraged by an EC White Paper as early as 1993, see n.8, at 
Chapter 10. 
22 Ono T, ‘Environmental-tax financed Social Security Tax Cuts and the Double Dividend’ (2005) 61 
FinanzArchiv 2, 178-200. 
23 ‘Nicolas Sarkozy under fire after carbon tax plan shelved’ The Guardian 23/3/2010, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/23/nicolas-sarkozy-carbon-tax-france> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
24 ‘France's solution to global warming? Tax citizens on the CO2 they produce’ Daily Finance 19/10/2009 
<http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/frances-solution-to-global-warming-tax-citizens-on-the-co2-
the/19200729/?icid=sphere_copyright> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
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One problem associated with this type of double dividend is that the extra disposable income 
achieved either through lower taxes or a lump-sum payment may increase demand for 
environmentally unfriendly goods which were previously unaffordable - even with 
environmental taxes in place to discourage such goods.  This would counter the purpose of 
the environmental tax.  For example, decreased income tax could mean a worker would not 
pay so much attention to keeping household energy bills low, or may decide to purchase a 
motor vehicle with high levels of pollution since in the past it was never affordable.  Should 
this happen on a large-scale, the net environmental benefits may be negligible or negative.  If 
the environmental tax was instead imposed at a greater level than the reduced income tax, in 
order to pre-emptively counter the increased demand for such environmentally inefficient 
goods, then the tax would not be revenue-neutral and could lead to a depression.25
 
   
Thus finding the correct method is problematic.  In a study by André et al of the Andulcia 
region of Spain, it was found that no double dividend occurred when income tax was reduced 
as a compensatory measure for the environmental tax.26  The study explains, “…reforms 
providing large economic improvements…will normally cause, as a by-product, rises in 
pollution which will dwindle the first dividend.”27  The study did however find that reducing 
employers’ labour taxes produced a double dividend, which suggests this is a more 
favourable option. In The Netherlands, environmental taxes imposed on ‘small energy 
consumers’ are passed onto domestic households through cuts in social security contributions 
and income tax.28
                                                             
25 Patuelli et al, see n.2 at 568. 
  If employees were to be compensated for an environmental tax, Goulder’s 
studies advise against compensating employees in a lump-sum fashion and instead advocate 
26 André et al, see n.3 at 376: “…if a double dividend exists, it is possible to improve the environmental quality 
without any cost in terms of non-environmental economic welfare.” 
27 Ibid, at 388. 
28 Barde JP, ‘Environmental Taxes in OECD Countries: An Overview’, in OECD, Environmental Taxes. Recent 
Developments in China and OECD countries (Paris: OECD, 1999), 19-50, at 34. 
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cutting distortionary taxes.29  This is supported by Timilsina, who argues that would be no 
revenue recycling effect with the lump-sum compensation method, but that use of the 
environmental tax revenue to fund reductions in employee’s tax would have a “significant 
effect on economic welfare…”30
 
   
17.  ENVIRONMENTAL DOUBLE DIVIDEND 
 
It is also possible that the taxes can be recycled into energy conservation projects rather than 
in reducing labour taxes.  This is referred to as ‘earmarking’.  This in itself could produce an 
environmental double dividend, and the project costs would likely provide economic benefits 
for an economy – though it cannot be stated whether such benefits would be equal to those 
achievable via an employment double dividend.31
 
  The environment would in this scenario be 
both the first and second dividend, though in different ways, and it would be hoped that 
economic improvements would create a third dividend. This was successfully achieved 
through the Irish plastic bag tax.   
Indeed, in empirical research conducted by Dresner et al it was found that there was 
substantially more support amongst interviewees for recycling revenues into energy 
conservation than using it to decrease other taxes.  This was put down to a suspicion of 
                                                             
29 Goulder LH, ‘Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader’s Guide’ (1995) 2 Int. Tax Public 
Finance 157-83. 
30 Timilsina GR, ‘The Role of Revenue Recycling Schemes in Environmental Tax Selection: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis’ (2007) World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 4388, 
at 33. 
31 The separate concepts of ‘environmental double dividend’ and ‘economic double dividend’ were explained in 
Hourcade JC, Richels R, and Robinson J, ‘Estimating the Costs of Mitigating Greenhouse Gases’, in IPCC, 
Climate Change, 1995—Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
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Government motives – that the reduced taxes may later be increased, as happened in the UK 
with employers’ NICs32 - whereas a real environmental benefit could instead be achieved 
through a project.33  Duff also argues that the ‘transformative rationale’ of eco-taxes require 
revenues to be earmarked for environmental purposes34
 
 - hence the overall environmental 
project can gain public support and be achieved via such methods. 
18.  WELFARE DOUBLE DIVIDEND 
 
A further possible use of environmental tax revenues could be to fund cuts in other taxes to 
correct non-environmental market failures to improve overall social welfare.  Parry looks at 
how using the revenue to fund deductions of consumption spending from personal income 
taxes can result in significant welfare gains.35   For example, he examines how deductions 
could be made from such taxes for private healthcare spending.  A welfare benefit is in this 
context regarded as the second dividend.  He acknowledges however that this would be less 
appropriate to a country which already funds universal healthcare nationwide, such as the 
UK’s National Health Service (NHS), than in a country such as the USA where most people 
rely on private health care.36  Additionally, Timilsina demonstrates how tax deductions for 
non-energy goods can significantly improve welfare.37  HM Treasury identified this method 
as beneficial, – though not all of the tax is applied in this way.38
                                                             
32 See 10.3. 
   
33 Dresner et al., see chapter 3, n.32 at 936. 
34 Duff DG, ‘Tax Policy and Global Warming’ (2003) 51 Can.Tax.J. 6, 2063-2118, at pp. 2070-2079. 
35 Parry & Bento, see n.17, at 67-96. 
36 Ibid, at 91. 
37 Timilsina, see n.30, at 33; see also Schemes 2 & 3. 
38 HM Treasury, Tax and the Environment: Using Economic Instruments (London: HMSO, 2002), at 36, para 
7.13. 
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19.  REVENUE-NEGATIVE MEASURES 
 
Tax revenues may not necessarily be recycled back into the economy.  A World Bank report 
recognises that finance ministries prefer the revenue-negative option since it helps them to 
balance the budget.39   However it is thought that this is rare, primarily because it is 
unpopular to impose a new revenue-negative tax; Patuelli et al noted that only three countries 
had introduced revenue-negative taxes.40  Indeed, Hsu argues that revenue raising should 
only be considered a secondary benefit – not the main argument – for environmental taxation, 
and shows that “revenue-raising and pollution reduction are inconsistent goals.” 41
 
 
20.OVERALL ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
An environmental tax policy may be more effective when combined with a wider policy of 
economic reform.  For example, between 1999–2005, Germany engaged a fiscal policy of 
‘Green Budget Reform’ which encompassed eco-tax reform.42
                                                             
39 The World Bank, Environmental Fiscal Reform - What Should Be Done and How to Achieve It (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development: USA, 2005) at 26. 
  The wider fiscal reforms 
aimed at investing in growth of the environmental technology industry, subsidising renewable 
energy and new clean technologies whilst removing environmentally harmful subsidies, 
establishing emissions trading and introducing financial incentives in the economy to 
improve environmental behaviour.  The tax-specific part of the programme aimed at affecting 
40 Patuelli et al, see n.2 at 566. 
41 Hsu SL, ‘Some Quasi-Behavioural Arguments for Environmental Taxation’, in Chalifour NJ, Milne JE, 
Ashiabor H, Deketelaere K and Kreiser L, Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International and 
Comparative Perspectives Volume V (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 29-52, at 33, para 2.09. 
42 For a detailed analysis of the initial tax reforms see Kolhass M, ‘Ecological Tax Reform in Germany: From 
Theory to Practice’ (2000) American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, volume 6 
<http://www.aicgs.org/documents/eco-tax.pdf> Accessed 16/6/2010. 
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energy use by raising taxes on petroleum and electricity to reduce energy consumption.43  
The tax rates were set to take account of environmental factors, and specifically aimed at 
promoting efficient energy production such as by excluding renewable energy sources from 
tax.  Further a reduction in social security tax meant the eco-taxes were essentially revenue-
neutral.44  These combined methods were, according to Görres, not only extremely positive in 
achieving environmental goals (such as reduced energy consumption and emissions, reduced 
dependence on foreign oil, more car-sharing, increased energy efficiency and use of efficient 
technology) but also economically successful in that many jobs were created whilst industry 
and exports benefited – showing that in this case the fears for reduced competition were 
unfounded.45
 
 
21.  CONCLUSION 
 
21.1  CHOICE 
 
The contentious choice must be made by policymakers depending on the outcome they 
intend, and Bonetti and Fitzroy explain that “…some distributional or goal conflict is 
inevitable for all but the smallest shifts in the burden of taxation.”46
                                                             
43 Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 378. (1999) (Act on the 
Introduction to the Ecological Tax Reform, Federal Law Gazette I, p. 378 (1999).  
  It is probable that the 
type of tax reform used will depend to some extent on how potentially efficient it is perceived 
to be; Timilsina illustrates this by explaining “the efficiency of a tax instrument is 
44 Gesetz zu Korrekturen in der Sozialversicherung und zur Sicherung der Arbeitnehmerrechte, vom 19. 
Dezember 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt I, S. 3843. Artikel 5: Gesetz zur Bestimmung der Beitragssätze in der 
gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung für 1999 und zur Bestimmung weiterer Rechengrößen der Sozialversicherung 
für 1999. 
45 See Görres A, ‘The Tragic Paradox: Germany’s very successful but not very popular Green Budget Reform’ 
(2006) Green Budget Germany, Green Budget Paper 2006/12. 
46 Bonetti and Fitzroy, see n.18, at 290. 
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significantly influenced by the scheme of recycling tax revenue.”47 Consequently countries 
will vary the type and intensity of their tax reforms depending on their specific 
circumstances,48 making some methods more suitable for some countries than others.  For 
instance, Felder and Schleiniger demonstrate how tax subsidies in specific market sectors 
could achieve higher efficiency gains than lump-sum compensatory refunds to households.49
 
   
21.2  FINDINGS  
 
To conclude, it does appear that under certain circumstances it is possible to achieve a double 
dividend through an environmental tax recycling policy.  There are a number of options 
available to recycle environmental tax revenue in order to achieve the double dividend (and 
possibly even a triple dividend).  Largely these comprise options including fiscal methods 
(such as reducing tax distortions), compensating those who have lost out financially or 
environmentally, or those who can least afford the tax, or earmarking (setting aside the 
revenue for particular environmental projects).  It is not an obligation of any policymaker to 
recycle the revenue, and budgetary constraints may prevent them from doing so, but 
politically they may need to and the economy may suffer if they do not.  The benefits of such 
taxes vary depending on factors such as the existing economic circumstances of the country 
in question, the method that is chosen, and the intensity of the policy enacted.  Largely the 
outcome depends on the economic efficiency of the chosen method.  Whether to recycle 
environmental tax revenues, and the choice of methods, are decisions for policymakers who 
should be aware of the potential efficiency benefits and that these are not guaranteed.  The                                                              
47 Timilsina, see n.30, at 32-33. 
48 Bosquet demonstrates this by showing a number of countries who had introduced tax reform policies with 
varying levels of intensity, with environmental taxation making up differing percentages of their total tax 
revenue.  Bosquet B, ‘Environmental Tax Reform: Does it Work?  A Survey of Empirical Evidence’ (2000) 34 
Ecolog. Econ. 19-32. 
49 Felder and Schleiniger, see chapter 3, n.5. 
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decision should be taken depending on the particular circumstances of the place in question.  
Nevertheless, it makes environmental taxation an attractive solution for policymakers who 
have the means to transfer the burden of taxation from social ‘goods’ to social ‘bads’. 
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22.  INTRODUCTION  
 
If an economic value is given to an environmental factor to reflect the cost of environmental 
harm, the market can take into account the actual effect of the harm caused by considering it 
a factor of production.1
                                                             
1 A new system for placing a value on trees has been adopted by all UK local authorities in order that trees are 
not cut down unnecessarily where it is believed the tree causes subsistence.  The ‘capital asset value for amenity 
tree’ accounts for size, health, historical significance and the amount of nearby residents who enjoy it: see 
London Tree Officer’s Association formula at <http://www.ltoa.org.uk/cavat.htm>.  The system valued one tree 
in Mayfair, London at GBP £750,000: Elliott V, ‘Put that axe down - this is Britain’s most valuable tree’ The 
Times 22/4/2008 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article3792556.ece> Accessed 
24/3/2010. 
  Depending on the value given to an environmental factor, the market 
may be discouraged from utilising it as a factor of production as more inexpensive options 
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may be available.  For example, if a factory chimney customarily emitted high levels of 
pollution into the air above it, value could be placed on air quality as a factor of production 
by taxing the pollution that damaged the air quality.  This would make the polluting activity 
more expensive, and policymakers would intend that this would incentivise the factory to 
alter their method of production to a more environmentally efficient means or cease 
production, which could also involve a social loss.   
 
This chapter seeks to provide guidance to policymakers on complex issues of valuing the 
environmental goals, focusing upon the difficulty of fixing economic values on non-
economic factors.2
 
  Performed from a legal perspective, the purpose is to provide 
policymakers with a sufficient understanding to enlighten their decision as to how to set tax 
or incentive rates to best serve environmental objectives.  Importantly this involves 
considering wider policy objectives, and will inevitably require the policymaker to seek to 
appreciate the extent to which its society is willing to sacrifice certain activities to achieve 
environmental targets.  This is an important part of answering RQ(ii)(b) in understanding the 
legal, social and economic background to a highly complex issue of environmental valuation. 
In turn this affects RQ(ii)(a) as it contributes to the understanding of the sacrifices that must 
be made to achieve behavioural change.  Crucially it will be used to advise policymakers 
within the Universal Model for RQ(i) as to how to set rates of taxes or incentives appropriate 
to a given environmental problem .  The chapter will propose and evaluate solutions towards 
overcoming the deemed inadequacy of having a purely economic analysis of environmental 
factors.  The intention of proposing solutions is to highlight the possibility and desirability for 
policymakers in including social values in the valuation, and the challenges of doing so. 
                                                             
2 Coase acknowledged that no adequate theory had been developed to account for the problem of harmful effects 
due to a “faulty concept of the factor of production”, in Coase, see chapter 2, n.40 at 43. 
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23.INADEQUACY OF AN EXCLUSIVELY ECONOMIC VALUE 
 
Hodas refers to China’s extensive policy in the 1980s of supplying inexpensive reconditioned 
refrigerators to Beijing households, pointing out that an alternative policy of supplying more 
efficient models would have saved over two-thirds of the total cost of the programme.3
 
  The 
high-energy needs of the inefficient appliances demonstrates how a good’s actual cost can be 
much greater than any initial costs when its full life costs are accounted.  
Economic measurements are clearly important to value the environment.  Yet it is asserted 
that they should not be solely used to value it since such measurements cannot appreciate the 
true importance of environmental factors.  The commercial value of an environmental factor 
is not enough; for example endangered species may only be measured by their potential 
income from tourists and not their importance as a species.4  Posner admitted that economic 
analysis was unable to determine whether an ‘efficient’ allocation of resources was ethically 
sound or socially acceptable.5  Hsiung goes further in arguing that economic analysis does 
not necessarily need to solely include economic phenomena, “but also social phenomena, the 
political process, as well as legal issues…” which need not include financial matters.6
                                                             
3 Hodas DR, ‘Appliance Energy Efficiency Labels and Standards’ (2007) 47-62, in UNEP, UNEP Handbook for 
Drafting Laws on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Resources (Hertfordshire: UNEP/Earthprint, 2007), 
at 47-48. 
  This 
paves the way for valuations to take account of issues based not exclusively on economic 
efficiency, which means that wider matters important to society can help in the valuation. 
Indeed, Malloy extends the meaning of economic analysis to include that which society 
considers to be relevant by advocating the notion that man is “the master of, rather than the 
4 For example, in the American case of Bartlett v Pickering 92 A 1008, 1010 (Me. 1915) Maine’s ‘wild-lands’ 
could only be valued according to the income that their trees could produce. 
5 Posner RA, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1992) at 15. 
6 Hsiung B, ‘Economic Analysis of Law: An Inquiry of its Underlying Logic’ (2006) 2 Erasmus Law and 
Economics Review 1, 1-33, at 16. 
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servant to, the alleged scientific principles of economic analysis.”7 Therefore when it comes 
to an endangered species or an area of natural beauty which may only be visited by a few 
tourists, the revenue they may bring in may be low and with a traditional economic approach 
would mean that they could be eliminated if a greater factor of production could take their 
place.  As explained by Diamond and Hausman, a strict economic approach would only 
consider the economic choices of people and not their environmental concerns.8
 
  Pure 
economic analysis may then fail to protect the environment. 
24.  INCLUDING NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS TO SET AN 
APPROPRIATE TAX RATE 
 
Determining what level the tax should be set at is problematic.  Several reports have 
attempted to value social costs of environmental factors.  One school of thought argues that 
the policymaker’s environmental objective should take precedence over other considerations.  
Baumol and Oates argue that the level of environmental tax should be fixed to achieve 
whatever environmental objective the policymaker intends.9  Hsu’s perception of the 
Pigovian tax is that it reduces the need for authorities to decide which activities should 
continue to exist after the imposition of the tax.  He argues that the rationale means that “if a 
Pigovian tax completely erases profits, then the productive activity was not worth the 
pollution in the first place, from a societal point of view…”10
 
  
                                                             
7 Malloy RP, ‘Is Law and Economics Moral? – Humanistic Economics and Classical Liberal Critique of 
Posner’s Economic Analysis’, in Malloy RP and Evensky J, Adam Smith and the Philosophy of Law and 
Economics (The Netherlands: Springer, 1994), 153-166, at p. 160. 
8 ‘On Contingent Valuation Measurement on Non-use Values’, in Diamond PA and Hausman JA, Contingent 
Valuation: A Critical Assessment (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1993). 
9 See for example, Baumol WJ and Oates W, The Theory of Environmental Policy (New York: CUP, 1988). 
10 Hsu, see chapter 4, n.41, at 50-1, para. 2.48. 
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Setting an environmental tax in this way could be attractive since in principle it means that 
those responsible for pollution will bear the burden of it and that environmental objectives 
can be achieved no matter what the consequences.  On the other hand, the consequences are 
wide-ranging and can be enormous.  In an effort to meet targets on reduced emissions under 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), Denmark and Ireland must reduce agriculture 
emissions by 10%.  Proposals have been made for a cow flatulence tax since cows produce 
high levels of methane.  The Times reports that the levels of taxes may be between EUR €13 - 
EUR €80 per animal, which could prove extremely expensive for farmers.11 The tax would be 
nationally revenue-neutral since the tax revenues would be equal to the amount the country 
would be fined by the EU for failing to meet such targets.12  This could have potentially 
conflicting interests with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy where taxpayers both 
subsidise farmers to meet production objectives and tax them to meet environmental 
objectives. Importantly it could mean farmers going out of business if they do not have 
enough cattle to make the farm profitable.  Furthermore, it could also result in significant 
reductions in cattle stocks which could drive prices up for consumers.  Applied globally, this 
type of tax – designed purely to meet an environmental objective – could cause huge 
reductions in food production.  A reduction in livestock to reduce GhGs would cause supply-
driven demand to rise, prices to increase, and consequently poor people in the world going 
without food.13
                                                             
11 Mortished C, ‘What do Cars and Cows have in Common? No, not horns’ The Times, 10/3/2009 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article5877416.ece> Accessed 25/4/2010. 
  A policymaker may have to decide whether the environmental-only objective 
goes so far that billions of the world’s poorest people must die in order for the planet to be 
sustainable.  This requires a determination of the acceptable ‘social cost’ to achieve 
12 Such a tax has also been proposed by a UN report at FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture (Rome: FAO, 
2009) at 71-74. 
13 According to a UN study, livestock contributes 18% of the GhGs which cause global warming, Steinfeld H, 
Gerber P, Wassenaar T, Castel V, Rosales M, and de Haan C, Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues 
and Opinions (Rome: FAO, 2006), see eg. Executive Summary, p.xxi 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/A0701E/A0701E01.pdf> Accessed 25/3/2010. 
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environmental objectives.  Indeed, a UK Government advisor has warned that the population 
of Britain must be at least halved in order to be environmentally sustainable.14  How this 
would be carried out, whether by following China’s one child policy, or whether it would be 
even more sinister with deportations or involuntary executions is another question.  In 
summary, policymakers should be cautious of considering only environmental objectives 
when developing environmental tax policy, since the danger is that the policy can result in 
environmental fascism.15
 
 
25.  PROPOSAL 
 
25.1 PROPOSED ‘MIXED’ SOLUTION 
 
 
A more practical solution would be to take both factors into account and weigh up the 
magnitude of each threat, using economic, social and legal considerations.  Helm and Pearce 
argue that it would need to be a special case to require production to cease entirely through a 
tax.  They explain, “…the problem of the market is not the creation of pollution, but rather 
the wrong amount of it.  The optimal level of pollution is only zero in the extreme case that 
the externality costs require a tax so great that the firm stops production altogether.”16
                                                             
14 An environmental advisor to the British Prime Minister warned that the UK’s population must fall to 30 
million in order to be environmentally sustainable, Leake J and Montague B, ‘UK population must fall to 30m, 
says Porritt’ The Times, 22/3/2009, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5950442.ece> 
Accessed 21/3/2010. 
  
Clearly this does not provide a clear-cut solution to valuing the environment as a factor of 
production, but it does illustrate that environmental reform can take place at a macro-
15 Driessen warns against human lives becoming valued as necessary expenditure for environmental objectives, 
particularly in the developing world.  Driessen P, Eco-Imperialism: Green Power, Black Death (New Delhi: 
Academic Foundation, 2005). 
16 See Helm and Pearce D, chapter 2, n.46, at 5. For more on this area, see Boswell J and Lee B, Economics, 
Ethics and the Environment (London: Cavendish, 2002), pp.1-9. 
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economic level considering production as a whole.  Essentially the environment should be 
considered highly but alongside social and economic considerations.   
 
25.2 EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
 
 
It would require the valuation of social factors to be regarded as exceptionally high to take a 
no-tolerance approach in any particular case, as happened in the USA with the Clean Air Act 
1990 (CAA).17  The case of Whitman v American Trucking Associations18 interpreted Section 
10919 of the CAA to forbid the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from taking any 
non-environmental costs into account when determining standards of air quality.20
 
  The US 
Supreme Court interpreted the legislation in this way so that the EPA would only give 
consideration to what was necessary to protect the health of American citizens.  Therefore in 
this case the potential social cost was deemed to be so high as to overrule economic 
considerations and became an ‘extreme case’.   
25.3 ESTABLISHING LONG-TERM BENEFITS 
 
 
Arguably the potential long-term economic costs of healthcare in the US due to illnesses 
caused by poor air quality may have outweighed any short-term economic losses, which 
could have affected the Judges’ rationale.  Policymakers may be minded therefore to seek to                                                              
17 42 USC §7409. 
18 531 US 457 (2001). 
19 42 USC §7409(b)(1). 
20 See 531 US 457 (2001), at 465: held that the EPA cannot use a cost-benefit analysis when implementing new 
quality standards for public health unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.  The cost of implementing 
national air quality standards specifically could not be considered as the level had to be adequate to protect 
public health, §109, 42 USCA 7409(b). 
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establish long-term economic benefits in order to introduces a correct environmental 
valuation.  This may be necessary to overcome the difficulties demonstrated by the EEA 
(European Environment Agency) who argue that it is frequently challenging to balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of taking preventative action since the apparent costs of taking 
it are usually short-term and clear, whilst the costs of not taking the action are “less tangible, 
less clearly distributed and usually longer term…”21  The EEA itself advocates using both 
ethical and economic considerations when balancing action versus inaction.22
 
 
25.4 APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO INDUCE BEHAVIOURAL 
CHANGE 
 
If precise environmental costs prove burdensome or impractical to determine then it may not 
be possible to set a tax at such a rate which reflects the exact internalisation of negative 
environmental externalities.  Fluctuating prices such as in energy costs may add further 
complication to the matter.  Consequently, the Baumol-Oates23 technique can be more 
practical;24 this proposes that when imposing a tax to achieve an environmental objective, the 
level of taxation must be appropriate to induce the required behavioural change in 
taxpayers.25
                                                             
21 In EEA, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: the Precautionary Principle 1896–2000, Issue Report No. 22 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001) at 3-
4.<http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_issue_report_2001_22/Issue_Report_No_22.pdf> 
Accessed 20/6/2010. 
  It may be difficult to convince the public to make changes in their lives.  
Rachlinski argues that even with scientific evidence demonstrating the dangers of climate 
change, people may psychologically refuse to alter their lifestyle as they would see it as a 
22 Ibid at 4. 
23 See n.9. 
24 EEA, ‘Market-based Instruments for Environmental Policy in Europe’ (2005) EEA Technical Report 8/2005, 
at 46. 
25 UNEP and the WTO recognise that many countries have been ‘pragmatic’ in using this option: UNEP and 
WTO, Trade and Climate Change: WTO-UNEP Report (Geneva: WTO Secretariat, 2009) at 96. 
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reduction in their living standards.26  He explains that “people become attached to their 
current level of prosperity.”27  Psychologists refer to this as ‘loss aversion’28
   
 and this topic 
will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Ascertaining the correct level of tax is therefore important, as low tax rates for those not 
prepared to change their lifestyles can be absorbed.29  For example Turner explains that 
vehicle fuel tax rates in North America are “glaringly inadequate” since from an 
environmental standpoint they have been set too low, to the point where they have “failed to 
wean enough Canadian and US drivers from their preference for gas-guzzling vehicles…”30
 
   
26.  SOCIAL POLICY 
 
26.1  POVERTY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
Nevertheless, policy makers should be minded that the tax can be set at a level that does not 
penalise the poor, as the danger is that it could drive the poor into increased poverty which 
would be a more severe social cost than the reduction in perceived living standards in the 
wealthy.31
                                                             
26 Rachlinski JJ, ‘The Psychology of Global Climate Change’ (2000) 1  U.Ill.L.Rev. 299-319. 
  Wiener for example illustrates that common environmental taxes throughout the 
globe could prove extremely regressive, “taxing billions of poor people in China and India to 
27 Ibid, at 303. 
28 See e.g. Tversky A & Kahneman D ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model’ 
(1999) 4 Quart. J. Econ. 107, 1039-1061, at 1039. 
29 The challenges of finding an optimum rate are expressed in Slemrod J, ‘Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax 
Systems’ (1990) 4 J. Econ. Perspect. 1, 157-178. 
30 Turner GS, ‘Gasoline Taxes as Environmental Policy – Time for a Common Canada-US Approach’ (2005) 39 
Tax Notes International 8, 711-719, at 711. 
31 Distributional concerns will be addressed in Chapter 7.   
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confer benefits on wealthier people elsewhere.”32  An energy tax, for example, can be 
particularly regressive since it is something the poor spend a proportionately high level of 
their income on.33  Even in the UK, when the Conservative Government in the 1990s 
attempted to increase VAT on domestic energy from being zero-rated to a reduced rate of 8% 
followed by a full rate of 17.5%, there was strong public opposition arguing the tax would 
mostly increase poverty for pensioners and the poor.  The incoming UK Labour Government 
in 1997 fulfilled their election pledge to reduce the VAT to 5%.34  CCL also exempts 
domestic energy users due to such concerns.  Clearly therefore there is a difficult balance to 
strike between protecting the poor and ensuring that behaviour is changed to the extent 
necessary to achieve environmental goals.  This was recognised by HM Treasury who 
acknowledged the necessity, when weighing competing priorities concerning distributional 
impacts, to make “value judgements…about the relative values of costs and benefits falling 
on different groups.”35
 
   
Nevertheless, excluding low-income groups from a requirement to change their 
environmental behaviour can have serious negative consequences if it provides a perverse 
incentive for other income groups to desire to join the exempt group.  For instance, those in 
low-income employment may wish to cease working if the unemployed are exempt and 
becoming unemployed provides a net economic benefit.  This is returned to in Chapter 7, and 
a potential solution for policymakers is considered at 26.2. 
 
26.2 BASIC NEEDS EXEMPTION 
 
                                                             
32 Wiener, see chapter 2, n.106, at 721. 
33 Recognised by Ligthart, see chapter 4, n.19, at 13. 
34 See discussion in Dresner et al, see chapter 3, n.33, at 931. 
35 HM Treasury, see chapter 4, n.38 at 16, para. 4.17. 
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To set the appropriate level therefore may require a common tax from which some users are 
excluded.  Baranzini et al, in the case of energy use, proposes that the distributional problems 
can be contained by taxing only above a certain threshold of energy use.36  This would allow 
some amount of energy to be considered tax-exempt for ‘basic needs’ whilst anything above 
that would be charged to tax.  This would therefore protect those on low-incomes and provide 
an incentive for all users to keep energy use at a minimum.  It would of course require some 
policy judgement as to what is classed as a ‘basic need’.  This system is already in place in 
The Netherlands with the ‘regulatory tax regime’.37
 
   
26.3 FURTHER SOCIAL BENEFITS 
 
 
By applying environmental tax policy in a more progressive way which attempts to include 
all polluters but not penalise, policymakers can achieve environmental objectives in a manner 
which minimises social cost and may even result in net social benefits.  Indeed, Whalley 
explains that an environmental tax to reduce carbon emissions (a carbon tax), applied on a 
global scale with revenues recycled back to the poorest countries, could increase capital flows 
to developing countries by three times their current incomes in foreign aid and have huge 
impacts on development and trade.38
 
 
26.4 UNDERVALUATION 
 
                                                             
36 Baranzini et al, see chapter 4, n.15 at 405. 
37 See explanation in DEFRA, ‘Greening the Tax System in the Netherlands’ 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/thematicstrat/greeningtaxnetherlands.pdf> Accessed 17/6/2010. 
38 Whalley, see chapter 1, n.3 at 122-3. 
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The Stern Review advocates the need to establish a price for carbon, either through tax, 
trading or regulation.39  Governmental efforts to monetise the social cost of carbon performed 
a series of cost-benefit analyses to emphasise the precarious balance between protecting the 
environment and protecting the economy.40  Reaching figures of between USD $5-65 per 
CO2 tonne,41 the report importantly recognised the considerable uncertainties in making such 
valuations.  Analysing the processes involved, Ackerman and Stanton however highlighted 
that the costs of carbon in the US Government report were consistently understated.42  The 
Stern Review prices the cost of pollution, set within a range of published estimates, at the 
higher rate of $85 per tonne of CO2.43
 
  This demonstrates the difficulty in ascertaining a 
monetary value. 
Whilst the method discussed at 26.2 could prove extremely helpful in a range of 
environmental issues such as energy use, the problem remains with the undervaluation of 
many environmental factors.  An early American case, Bradstreet v Huntington, regarded any 
natural wilderness as valueless ‘wasteland’ before it is adapted for use by humans.44  In the 
past, many economic activities have followed this rationale and ignored environmental value.  
Phipps looks at this in the context of wildlife habitats or wetlands being converted for 
agriculture use and calls it a market failure. 45
                                                             
39 Stern, see chapter 2, n.57, at 468-490. 
  His criticism is that the private costs to a 
farmer in converting land to cropland, for example does, “…not include the costs imposed on 
40 US Government Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, ‘Social Cost of Carbon for 
Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive Order 12866’(2010) Appendix 15A 
<http://www2.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/commercial/pdfs/sem_finalrule_appendix15a.pd> 
Accessed 17/6/2010. 
41 At 34. 
42 Ackerman F and Stanton EA, ‘The Social Cost of Carbon’ (2010) 
<http://www.e3network.org/papers/SocialCostOfCarbon_SEI_20100401.pdf> Accessed 17/6/2010. 
43 Stern, see chapter 2, n.57 p.xvi. 
44 (1831) 30 US (5 Pet.) 402, 448.  
45 Phipps TT, ‘Commercial Agriculture and the Environment: An Evolutionary Perspective’ (1991) 20 
Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 2, 143-150, at 147. 
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society of reduced wildlife populations and reduced ecological services provided by the 
land.”46
 
   
27.  FACTORS TO INCLUDE IN VALUATION 
 
Consequently environmental matters important to society which are not tradable can be given 
a relative value, such as a value for natural beauty and recreational value, even in an area 
with little tourist income.  The value of trees for instance may not be measured purely by 
their timber value, but for the living species they protect, their watershed protection, carbon 
absorbing benefits and air purification facilities – necessary for human existence.47  
Biodiversity is also extremely important for the planet and is undervalued by the market.   
The Stern Review recognised that the wider benefits of placing values on the environment are 
significant, explaining benefits range from “reducing ill-health and mortality from air 
pollution…to preserving forests that contain a significant proportion of the world’s 
biodiversity.”48  Financial estimates of the value of the Earth’s natural ecosystems that filter 
water and air and many other functions essential for human existence which counteract our 
activities, valued such ecosystem services to be worth at least, and likely more than, USD $33 
trillion.49  A post-Stern UNEP report further argues that the value of biodiversity goods and 
services must be included in such costs.50
 
 
                                                             
46 Ibid, at 147. 
47 The EPA estimated that between 1990-99 US forests and its additional ‘carbon sinks’ offset almost 18% of 
national environmentally harmful CO2 emissions: US Energy Information Administration, Department of 
Energy, ‘Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2000’ (2001) DOE/EIA-0573 at 69. 
48 Stern see chapter 2, n.57, at xvi. 
49 Costanza R, et al, ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and National Capital’ (1997) 387 Nature 
253-260, at 259. 
50 UNEP et al, ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for National and International Policy Makers’ 
(2010) <http://www.teebweb.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=I4Y2nqqIiCg%3d&tabid=924&language=en-US> 
Accessed 17/6/2010. 
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The difficulty for a policymaker is in ascertaining which factors should actually be included.  
This decision is dependent upon the type of values held by the society which the policymaker 
represents.  Including only ‘instrumental value’ means that only the value one can gain from 
something is represented, whereas ‘existence value’ would include the value of something to 
humans.  There may be no instrumental value, but humans may value the very existence of 
the subject even though they may never see it, such as with a polar bear.  However this is 
anthropocentric as it refers only to what humans value.  ‘Inherent value’ refers to the concept 
that a species has value without any human valuing it, as the natural environment holds a 
value on its own.51  Further, environmental harm can be interpreted in an anthropocentric 
manner so that it only includes harm to humans.  For example, an EU Directive defines 
pollution as being harmful to humans or human activity.52  Alternatively, it can be interpreted 
to include harm to species which humans would recognise as valuable or beneficial to 
humans, which is again an anthropocentric perspective.  Or it can include harm to any part of 
the eco-system, regardless of whether there is a benefit or loss to humans.53
28.  VALUE WITH SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE  
  The type of 
environmental problems involved will determine how a policymaker will draft the legislation 
to interpret key phrases, which will necessarily involve questioning what values are intended 
to be protected.   
 
As has earlier been stated, placing an appropriate level of tax can increase environmental 
value and serve to achieve environmental objectives.  If such substantial wide-scale and long-
term benefits are scientifically provable, or if there is some serious risk of environmental                                                              
51 Stone looks at means of giving legal protection rights to inanimate objects in Stone CD, ‘Should Trees have 
Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (1972) 45  S.Cal.L.Rev. 450. 
52 Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15/1/2008 concerning integrated 
pollution prevention and control (IPPC Directive)  OJ L 24/8, Article 2(2). 
53 UNFCCC, Article 1(1)), defines “Adverse effects of climate change” in a manner that does not necessarily 
involve harm to humans, but which also includes economic harm. 
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damage such as health concerns, destruction of a forest, or a loss of a species, this will add 
weight to the value of an environmental factor when measured against a proposed economic 
activity.  A White House report from 1965 called for the promotion of ‘public science’ in 
order to determine risks of pollution so that scientific need based on research could influence 
legislation exclusive of political influence; whether this is achievable is however outside the 
ambit of this thesis.54
 
 
How an environmental factor is valued is a matter for policy makers and will vary from time 
to time and between different societies.  For example, if badgers are considered by 
policymakers – following precautionary scientific advice – to be too common and therefore a 
pest, then a low value could be given to them.55  This would mean that if any are killed 
through an economic activity, little or no tax could be paid.  A negative value could also 
mean tax subsidies for culling badgers, as an incentive to control the species.  Such rates 
could be set for many environmental factors and reviewed periodically.  Then if the badger 
population fell to an unacceptably low level and was endangered, the value could be 
increased to achieve an optimum population level.  This would require value judgements 
being made and would entail high administration costs especially gathering the required 
information,56 but would only be used when the status quo needed amending.57
 
   
                                                             
54 US President's Science Advisory Committee, Environmental Pollution Panel, Restoring the Quality of our 
Environment (Report) (Washington, D.C.; White House, 1965) at 29-33. 
55 For example, UK policy on grey squirrels recognises the public value given to them but also the damage they 
cause to their environment and other species, which provides an optimum figure to control their population.  See 
DEFRA, ‘Grey Squirrels and England’s Woodlands: Policy and Action’ 
<http://www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/greysquirrel-policy.pdf/$FILE/greysquirrel-policy.pdf> Accessed 15/6/2010. 
56 A report into VED rates for lorries invoked research into environmental impacts, which reduced overall rates 
by 50% whilst encouraging lorries that were more environmentally efficient.  Dodgson J et al, Lorry Track and 
Environmental Costs (London: Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000). 
57 To demonstrate this, a range of such economic and ecological risks specifically related to GhG pollution are 
set out in Cutting RH and Cahoon LB, ‘The “Gift” that keeps on giving: Global Warming meets the Common 
Law’ (2008) 10 VJEL.. 110. 
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Taxes can be used to create a market for environmental protection which would allow the 
market to balance the costs and benefits of an economic action in a place where more than 
one activity could take place.  HM Treasury established a valuation mechanism in its Green 
Book58 to appraise whether an action is worth taking and this includes methods for valuing 
non-market impacts,59 distributional impacts,60 how to assess risk in the long-term where 
there is uncertainty,61 and crucially how to value undervalued costs and benefits.62
 
   These 
are, as mentioned, all important factors for a policymaker to consider.  Techniques such as 
surveys are used to gauge public opinion in order to ascertain values; for example surveys 
could help decide whether the public consider a certain area to be of outstanding natural 
beauty which needs preserving.  Such an approach is extremely useful and shows the desire 
to achieve environmental objectives alongside economic ones.   
In Cambodia, a reform of forestry taxes was undertaken in a similar way upon the advice of 
the IMF.63  An increase in forestry taxes to achieve protection of the forest was initially 
opposed by the logging industry, but the increase did not seriously damage the industry who 
managed to pay the additional revenues.  This is despite a threefold increase in tax.  Any 
modest decrease in logging was regarded as a balanced cost to achieve the environmental 
objective.  Thus a tax set at the correct level using guided mechanisms can value the 
environment correctly and correct market failures. The OECD also endorse such a cost-
benefit valuation, both generally and specifically to the issue of biodiversity.64
                                                             
58 HM Treasury, The Green Book - Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (London: TSO, 2005) 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf> Accessed 10/3/2010. 
  As to the 
question of administration costs, they note that a cost-benefit analysis should also be applied 
59 Ibid at Annex 4. 
60 Ibid at Annex 5. 
61 Ibid at Chapter 5, p. 17-34. 
62 Ibid at 34. 
63 IMF, ‘The IMF and Environmental Issues’ (2000) Issues Brief 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041300.htm> Accessed 10/3/2010. 
64 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Use of Economic Instruments in Promoting the Conservation 
and Sustainable use of Biodiversity (Paris: OECD, 2004) (Adopted by the OECD Council on 21/4/2004). 
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to the valuation study itself, so that it does not cost more to conduct the study than for the 
perceived benefits of conducting the study.65
 
  This will further be inputted into the Universal 
Model. 
29.  CONCLUSION  
 
The findings indicate that the imposition of an environmental tax does not have to be set at a 
level which will mean that an environmentally damaging activity ceases to exist partly or 
even wholly.  The equation to determine the requisite level of the tax, adopted herein to 
advise policymakers, is explained by a Treasury report to be that which will limit the 
damaging activity to “a level where the marginal (private and social) costs of the 
environmental impacts are equal to the marginal benefits derived from undertaking the 
activities which cause them.”66
 
  The crucial part in this equation is that includes both private 
and social costs, so that it is not purely an economic analysis.   
Determining the social costs is a matter for policymakers who have a number of techniques 
available to value such costs; if these techniques are realistic they can go some way towards 
acheiving both sustainable development and a sustainable economy without pressing either 
beyond what is required.  In doing this, it is important to consider where the burden should lie 
from a macro-economic perspective, taking into account various different environmentally 
damaging activities in order to determine how many should be permitted to survive in a 
society – rather than focusing on only one.  This will involve further questions to determine 
                                                             
65 Ibid at Annex III. 
66 HM Treasury, see chapter 4, n.38 at 20, para. 5.19. 
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who ought to bear the burden of environmental taxation.  Guidance for policymakers to 
decide this will be considered in Chapter 7. 
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30. INTRODUCTION 
 
30.1 INTENTION, PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY  
 
 
The intention of this chapter is to explore methods of ensuring that a tax reform programme 
can have the desired impact of behavioural change.  It will do this by examining means by 
which taxes, supported by non-tax measures, can be utilised to convey a message which can 
have an impact upon environmental choices and behaviour.   
 
The purpose of this undertaking is to gain understandings of tax methods which can be of use 
to a policymaker intending to introduce an environmental tax.  With such findings, a 
policymaker would be capable of making an informed choice as to the appropriate taxes, 
incentives and wider social techniques available, to determine the type suitable to meet the 
intended environmental objectives.  Further, the purpose is to contribute to a response to the 
Research Question relevant to Part II.  An understanding of available methods provides 
answers to both how environmental taxes can be utilised, and how unforeseen consequences 
can be avoided – by drawing upon lessons learnt from past experiences and using them for a 
policymaker to make an informed decision.  In responding to this Research Question, the 
conclusions can also be utilised as guidance to form the basic framework of a Universal 
Model in response to the RQ(i). 
 
The approach in this chapter initially involves analysing how taxes can influence human 
decisions, and further how modern understandings of human psychology can be utilised to 
shape a tax structure to have the intended outcome.  This requires analysis as to gauge how 
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non-tax methods can complement tax methods in achieving environmental policy objectives.1  
It will invoke a variety of multi-disciplinary research and empirical findings in order to 
facilitate a multitude of responses explaining potential methods.  This will be done by firstly 
exploring how in principle demand and behavioural attitudes can be affected by tax methods.  
Following this, the chapter will evaluate evidence to determine methods which should be 
embraced and avoided for a tax policy to be effective.  Initially however it is prudent to 
explain further background to the issue of how a tax can theoretically work to influence 
social behaviour.2
 
 
30.2 BACKGROUND: TRANSFORMATIVE RATIONALE 
 
It has been established that taxation can work to financially incentivise market behaviour in 
line with Government objectives.  However taxes can also have an impact that goes beyond 
finances.  Both the threat of being charged to tax – even if the rate is low – and the possibility 
of reducing one’s tax burden can have considerable psychological impacts upon behaviour of 
individuals and enterprises.3
                                                             
1 Duff points out that “environmental taxation can enhance regulatory measures, increasing the likelihood of 
effective enforcement and creating a dynamic incentive to reduce environmentally harmful activities beyond 
regulated levels.” Duff, see chapter 4, n.34 at 2070-2079.  Landfill taxes may not work in practice, for example, 
without legislation to criminalise fly-tipping.  Indeed, the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme is enforced with 
the threat of a GBP £150 penalty: Landfill Allowances and Trading Scheme (England) Regulations 2004, 
regulation 20(1) (as amended by The Landfill Allowances and Trading Scheme (England)(Amendment) 
Regulations 2005), Regulation 2(2)). 
  The aforementioned Statement of Intent of the British 
Government on tax policy recognised that what policymakers choose to tax “…sends clear 
2 On behavioural aspects of related to the environment, see Martens P and Chang C (eds.), The Social and 
Behavioural Aspects of Climate Change: Linking Vulnerability, Adaptation and Mitigation (Sheffield: Greenleaf 
Publishing, 2010). 
3 England’s ‘window tax’ historically caused many homes to be constructed without windows, or with windows 
blocked up.  The tax was introduced pursuant to: An Act for granting to His Majesty several Rates and Duties 
upon Houses, for making good the Deficiency of the clipped Money (1696) House of Lords Journal Volume 15: 
10/4/1696,  Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 15: 1691-1696 (1771), pp.732-733, <http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=12306> Accessed: 21/4/2010. 
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signals about the economic activities they believe should be encouraged or discouraged, and 
the values they wish to entrench in society.”4
 
 
The notion that taxation can alter social behaviour was introduced at 17 where Duff 
developed the concept of the transformative rationale for environmental taxes.5  The 
transformative rationale asserts that taxes can educate society as to the choices which should 
be encouraged, and can be reinforced with advertising and education.  An information 
campaign coupled with environmental taxes for example can work together, to achieve 
behavioural change.  Hoerner argues that such taxes do not need to prove expensive for the 
taxpayer, since the educational impact supported by even a low level of tax can often prove 
adequate to “induce significant environmental improvement”.6  How this is done therefore is 
through a combination of incentives, taxes and education to affect choice by restricting 
certain selections and encouraging alternatives.  Bemelmans-Videc et al refer to this 
combination as ‘carrots, sticks and sermons’.7  Sermons are devised as informational tools to 
make the consumer aware of the implications of their choices.  Within this it is argued that if 
a law is to be effective it must be publicised, explaining that “individuals within the target 
group must be made aware of its existence.”8
 
  Therefore this chapter will analyse how 
combined tax and non-tax methods can be used to supplement one another in the pursuit of 
environmental goals. 
31.  DEMAND AND BEHAVIOUR 
                                                             
4 See chapter 2, n.18. 
5 Duff, see chapter 4, n.34, at pp. 2070-2079. 
6 Hoerner A, Harnessing the Tax Code for Environmental Protection: A Survey of State Initiatives, 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a Sustainable Economy, 1998) at 15. 
7 In Bemelmans-Videc ML, Rist RC and Vedung E, Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments and their 
Evaluation (New York: Transaction Publishers, 2003).  See e.g. p. 51. 
8 Ibid at 48. 
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31.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Environmental taxes work primarily to influence demand in the market, often by reducing 
demand for certain goods and encouraging demand for environmentally efficient alternatives.  
This in turn affects the supply of goods as it is intended that the market will react by 
producing more of the alternatives and less of the environmentally inefficient goods.  This is 
known as ‘distortion’, which Kiekebeld defines as “...a noticeable influence on the market 
allocation of production and factors of production as a result of Government intervention.”9 
Taxes therefore work to change human behaviour and as such legal scholars and economists 
frequently favour demand-side tax policies.10
 
 
31.2 LOSS AVERSION AND DISCREDITING SCIENCE 
 
Nevertheless altering demand is not straightforward, as an effective coherent strategy is 
required to change people’s decisions governing their environmental behaviour.  The 
imposition of taxes without changing people’s minds may well be met with resistance, be 
politically unpopular and ultimately ineffective.  The issue is a psychological one regarding 
the perception among people that their standard of living will deteriorate if they change the 
manner of living to which they are accustomed.  It is possible that raising people’s awareness 
as to the dangers of environmental damage may in itself be insufficient to alter behaviour 
towards the environment.; the theory of ‘loss aversion’ was introduced in Chapter 5 and 
                                                             
9  Kiekebeld  BJ, Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union (Rotterdam: Kluwer, 2004) at 64. 
10 See e.g. Mann R & Hymel ML, ‘Getting into the Act: Enticing the Consumer to Become “Green” Through 
Tax Incentives’ (2006) 36 Environmental Law Institute 10419-10428. 
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demonstrates how once people are used to a certain way of life they are unwilling to make 
sacrifices for future generations.11
 
   
Further, Jamieson12 explains that since debate remains about the causes of environmental 
harms such as climate change, often people will in the first instance prefer the purported 
‘scientific’ evidence of those disagreeing with the need to change since it supports their pre-
conceived beliefs and means they do not have to alter their behaviour.13  Commenting on a 
study14 of Americans’ behaviour toward the environment, Mann and Hymel point out that 
only 15% of American consumers believed increasing petrol duty to be a good idea.15  They 
conclude that American consumers “want to help the environment but they don’t want to 
change their lives to do so.”16
 
   
31.3 SUSPICION OF DECEIT 
 
Another reason for public disapproval of environmental taxation is that people often believe 
it is a deception to raise revenue rather than for environmental improvement, particularly 
when the tax model cannot be easily understood.17
                                                             
11 Murkowski FH, ‘The Kyoto Protocol is not the answer to Climate Change’ (2000) 37 Harv.J.on Legis. 345 at 
358.  One potential means of overcoming this is where the sacrifices are brought down to a personal level, such 
as if a person considers that his actions in tree-planting may benefit future generations of a family estate. 
  This subject was explained in Chapter 4.  
Those required to change behaviour or fund extra costs should understand why they must 
suffer a detriment.  Failure to do so in British Colombia meant attempts to change the weekly 
12 Jamieson D, ‘Uncertainty and Risk Assessment: Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process’ (1996) 545 
Ann.Amer.Acad.Polit Soc.Sci.35-43. 
13 A number of British Newspapers led a campaign attempting to find errors in the IPCC’s Climate Change 
2007- Synthesis Report (see Chapter 1, n.1) and publicise a message that climate change science is not caused 
by humans.  See ‘100 Reasons why Climate Change is Natural’ Daily Express, 15 December 2009, p.1. 
14 ‘Survey of American Attitudes on the Environment’ (2005) Yale University School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies <http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/research.htm> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
15 Mann & Hymel, see n.10, at 10422. 
16 Ibid, at 10422. 
17 See research findings by Dresner et al, see chapter 3, n.32, at 937-8. 
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waste collection to a biweekly collection were met with hostility.18
 
  Therefore the question of 
how to overcome unwillingness to alter one’s behaviour towards the environment is sensitive, 
and it is advisable to get the public ‘on board’. 
31.4 FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE 
 
It is more straightforward when the environmental issue actually affects the taxpayer directly.  
If the public can see firsthand the damage caused by environmental harm, they may be more 
likely to support measures to protect the environment.  For example findings from surveys in 
Hong Kong show that residents perceive it to be suffering from environmental degradation 
and think their Government is not utilising eco-taxation to a satisfactory extent.19
 
  Therefore 
the difference between people’s own experiences of the environment can impact significantly 
on what measures they are prepared to take to protect it. 
32.  METHODS TO CHANGE BEHAVIOUR 
 
32.1  PURPOSE 
 
OECD researchers make an insistent call for further consideration into how Governments can 
most effectively target policies to affect individual and household decisions in order to 
achieve the appropriate change in sustainable consumption behaviour.20
                                                             
18 See IISD, chapter 2, n.90 at 45. 
  In particular it 
encourages analysis to be given to price signals affecting consumer preferences, as well as 
economic, social, demographic and other factors which affect consumption patterns – in order 
19 Cullen R, ‘Tax Reform and Democratic Reform in Hong Kong: What do the People Think?’ (2008) 6 BTR 
667-690, at 680. 
20 Geyer-Alle´ly E and Zacarias-Farah A, ‘Policies and Instruments for Promoting Sustainable Household 
Consumption’ (2003) 11 Journal of Cleaner Production 923–926. 
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to understand which policy can be the most environmentally effective, cost efficient and 
equitable.21
 
   This section considers such matters from a legal perspective but considers 
interdisciplinary material necessary to test these matters, such as economic studies and 
psychological research. 
32.2 CHOICE 
 
 
The right to choose means consumers are not acting upon instruction but upon their 
individual preference, giving the consumer freedom and individual responsibility.  
Completely restricting consumer choice to the State-approved choice (such as by prohibiting 
certain goods) provides artificial demand for the approved good and resentment for the 
consumer.  Further it can aid ‘black market’ goods which bring in no revenue and are costly 
to police.  Taxes however can affect consumption choices by making an environmentally 
efficient good or service less expensive than alternatives and consequently creates a demand 
for the product without affecting individual freedoms to the same extent.  Imposing a tax on a 
‘discouraged’ good also sends a message about the sustainability of the good, which can help 
the consumer reach a more informed decision.  
 
32.3 PRICING AND PSYCHOLOGY 
 
32.3.1 PRICING POLICY 
 
Næss-Schmidt et al identify that a problem of encouraging consumers to choose eco-friendly 
goods is that they may find it too time-consuming to choose the most efficient products –                                                              
21 Ibid, at 925. 
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relative to the savings they would make in energy costs.22  As such it is suggested that 
reduced prices for environmentally efficient goods can affect purchase behaviour more 
directly than eco-labelling.23  In Thailand, a purely pricing strategy was operated successfully 
to phase out leaded petrol using a scheme of tax subsidies and collaboration.  The strategy 
affected choice by making unleaded petrol at least USD $0.012 per litre less than leaded 
petrol.24
 
  This consistent pricing had the effect of making leaded petrol appear the more 
expensive option in the mind of consumers and empowered the market to choose to switch to 
unleaded petrol.  This may not work in every country or situation, due in part to varying 
incomes and other economic factors.  However by finding the appropriate incentive and 
message the policy can gain widespread public acceptance and understanding, helping it to 
succeed. 
32.3.2 STATUS-SEEKING AND GREEN CONSUMERISM 
 32.3.2.1 BACKGROUND: STATUS-SEEKING 
 
 
 
The economist Wendner explains that in society the need to seek status leads to 
overconsumption which can be detrimental to the environment.25
                                                             
22 Næss-Schmid St et al, Reduced VAT for Environmentally Friendly Products (Copenhagen: Copenhagen 
Economics: 2008) at 20. 
  He therefore advises that 
when setting the rate of tax on consumption it is essential to consider people’s desire to ‘keep 
23 An information method affecting consumer choice by attaching a label on a product to qualify it as energy 
efficient. 
24 Sayeg P, ‘Successful Conversion to Unleaded Gasoline in Thailand’ (1998) World Bank Technical Paper No. 
410. 
25 Wendner R, ‘Status, Environmental Externality and Optimal Tax Programs’ (2003) 8 Economics Bulletin 5, 
1-10. 
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up with the Joneses’. 26
 
  The tax design therefore should take this into account and whilst it is 
important to disincentivise environmentally harmful consumption through taxes and the 
message the tax sends out, it is also important to encourage alternatives.   
32.3.2.2 ATTACHING POSITIVE STATUS TO ENVIRONMENTAL EFFICIENCY 
 
 
If there is a positive status element attached to eco-friendly consumption then demand can 
shift accordingly.  In essence what is needed is for environmentally sustainable lifestyles and 
consumption behaviour to become ‘fashionable’.  Research by Kurani and Turrentine also 
suggests that currently there is a negative status attached to claims of good ‘fuel economy’.27  
Consumers often perceive ‘economical’ vehicles to be inferior, a symbol of deprivation and 
inadequacy.  Whereas the research found a much greater regard for claims of ‘fuel efficiency’ 
and the status of achieving it, since it is “…a term free from a cheap image and more closely 
associated to ideas of resource conservation, advanced engineering, and high technology and 
quality.”28  For example Audi have succeeded in portraying a desirable image of an 
economical vehicle range by utilising terms such as ‘aerodynamics’ alongside notions of ‘fuel 
efficiency’.29
 
   
32.3.2.3 ENDORSING GREEN CONSUMERISM  
 
                                                             
26 Ibid, at pp.1,7. 
27 See Kurani KS and Turrentine TS, Automobile Buyer Decisions about Fuel Economy and Fuel Efficiency 
(2004) University of California, Institute of Transportation Studies, Report ITS-RR-04-31, at pp.1-2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 ‘A5 Sportback: Saving you Fuel’ <http://www.audi.co.uk/new-cars/a5/a5-sportback/saving-you-
fuel/aerodynamics.html> Accessed 21/4/42010. 
  
113  
Taxes combined with the portrayal of a positive status image may therefore work more 
successfully in affecting consumer choice and behaviour. It is feasible that other 
conservationist or sustainable consumption behaviour could be promoted in this manner.  
Indeed, recent research indicates that consumer behaviour may be driven more for status-
seeking than to protect the environment.  The research suggests that consumers want to 
affirm their status in public by choosing certain environmental consumption goods.  If the 
market can be driven to react to this psychological anomaly by promoting social-status-
enhancing environmental goods, then consumerism could successfully serve the 
environmental interest.30  Scott however questions whether such ‘positive’ consumerism is an 
appropriate method for the environmental interest, concluding that such a policy should be 
approached with caution, as the potential incompatibility of the two competing interests could 
be counter-productive in causing ecological degradation.31
32.3.3 APPROPRIATE RATE OF TAX 
  Nevertheless, a well-balanced 
policy – recognising the threat of over-production - could take advantage of such consumer 
attitudes to promote a change in consumption behaviour, phase out inefficient appliances and 
adapt people’s overall behaviour towards the environment. 
32.3.3.1 REQUIRED IMPACT  
 
Clearly taxes can send a message to change behaviour but pricing alone may be insufficient.  
Despite the changes in the UK’s VED banding system (see 12.2), early indications following 
research by the Energy Saving Trust32
                                                             
30 Griskevicius V et al., ‘Going Green to be Seen: Status, Reputation, and Conspicuous Conservation’ (2010)  
98 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, 392-404. 
 suggest that the new system has done “very little to 
31 Scott A, ‘Keeping Up with the Greens:  How Consumerism  Hijacked Environmentalism  and the  Ideological 
Dilemma  it Left  Behind’ (2010) University of Florida Working Series.  See eg. ‘How Consumerism Hijacked 
Environmentalism’ at 16. 
32 <www.est.org.uk/> Accessed 21/4/2010. 
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persuade car buyers to choose a lower-carbon model”.33  It suggests that the initial reform did 
not go far enough since the rates of the taxes were not high enough to persuade motorists to 
buy more efficient vehicles.34  It does admit however that more research is required before 
any meaningful conclusions can be drawn, and since the piece was written the rates for the 
highest emitting vehicles have risen.  What can be learnt from this perhaps is that the rate of 
tax should be designed to make a more noticeable impact upon consumers’ income in order 
to achieve the desired change in consumption choice.  Mann points out that record oil prices 
in 2008 “encouraged Americans to curtail driving and try public transportation”, showing that 
high costs can ensure a behavioural shift is achieved.35  Rather than a penalty, this logic can 
also operate as an incentive, evident with the reform of the UK’s company car legislation, 
which in 2008-2011 allowed cyclists to claim GBP £0.20p per business mile for travelling by 
bicycle.36
 
  This substantial benefit for a virtually costless form of transport suggests that 
policymakers intended to offer a noticeable reward to encourage take-up. 
32.3.3.2 ACCOUNTING FOR FULL LIFE COSTS 
 
 
 
Further the consumer should be made aware of how a tax will affect the annual costs of a 
good.  Research on fuel economy37
                                                             
33 Energy Saving Trust, ‘Modelling the impact of VED: a new approach’ (2007) 
<http://www.lowcvp.org.uk/assets/reports/EST%20Vehicle%20Excise%20Duty%20Study%202007%20FINAL
.pdf> Accessed 22/4/2010. 
 suggests that many consumers only consider the initial 
three years of fuel savings when making consumption decisions related to vehicle fuel 
34 It cites research by the RAC Foundation which estimates that in order to persuade private motorists to 
downgrade their engine size or use an alternative fuel source, annual running costs of a vehicle would need to 
increase by at a minimum of GBP £1,100.  RAC Foundation, ‘Consumer attitudes to low carbon and fuel-
efficient passenger cars’ (2005) Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership. 
35 See chapter 1, n.12, at 367. 
36 (ITEAP) (Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003), ss.229-232. 
37 National Research Council, Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards 
(Washington DC, National Academy Press, 2002), at 112. 
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economy, which strongly underestimates a vehicle’s life spans.38
 
  For consumers considering 
the life-span of a vehicle, the understanding that increased annual running costs may severely 
diminish its second-hand value can also make an inefficient ‘status’ vehicle seem to be a poor 
choice. 
Alerting consumers to the full life costs of a vehicle enables an informed choice, thus 
enabling decisions based upon environmental impact.  High emissions can then appear 
expensive to the consumer and consequently unaffordable.  In India where average incomes 
are relatively low, the impact of consumption price and annual running costs can have a 
profound effect upon consumption.  The Tata Nano was launched in 2009 and advertised as 
the world’s least expensive car.  Not only was its new purchase price very low (USD $2,500) 
but its engine was highly efficient, decreasing the annual running costs.  These combined 
factors have targeted the Indian vehicle market and it is expected to become India’s most 
popular car, with waiting lists exceeding annual production capacity so much that buyers 
were selected in a lottery. 39     32.3.3.3 SUMMARY 
 
 
Consequently it is possible to target a market with an environmentally efficient consumption 
product and alter environmental behaviour, through a mixture of pricing strategies and 
publicity, which together can create demand.  Price elasticity of demand should also therefore 
be considered before embarking upon a campaign to encourage alternatives in order to alter 
                                                             
38 By up to 60%, according to Greene et al, ‘Feebates, Rebates and Gas-Guzzler Taxes: a Study of Incentives for 
Increased Fuel Economy’ (2005) 33 Energy Policy 757–775, at 758. 
39 Thottam J, ‘The World's Cheapest Car Debuts in India’ Time Magazine 23/3/2009 
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887070,00.html> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
  
116  
behaviour, as highlighted by Duff.40  On the other hand such strategies can be counter-
productive since petrol consumption will rise considerably if millions of extra people are able 
to buy new cars every year – even if they are environmentally more efficient - thus adding to 
the environmental burden.41
 
  
32.4 ENCOURAGING ALTERNATIVES 
 
32.4.1 INVESTMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE FOR REAL ALTERNATIVES 
 
These findings point to a need to offer further real alternatives to enable positive consumption 
choices.  Despite the re-banding of VED in Britain, it will be difficult to increase demand for 
carbon-neutral cars without changing wider factors; taxes cannot be effective otherwise.  
Electric cars for example, whilst encouraged officially and through the tax system, are 
currently difficult to operate since the infrastructure is not in place to run them properly.  In 
2009, Ireland’s Government took a positive step towards this by agreeing with car 
manufacturers to produce 250,000 electric cars within 10 years so that 10% of the national 
fleet would be electrically run. 42
                                                             
40 Duff, see chapter 4, n.34, at pp.2100-2101. 
   At the same time plans were made to provide recharging 
facilities nationally.  In providing the infrastructure and shifting such a huge proportion of 
production to this method, the idea will be to make electric cars the ‘norm’ in Ireland and 
thus alter the market accordingly.  China, which has particularly high levels of pollution has 
also been at the forefront of developing efficient vehicles and introduced recharging stations, 
in order to become a global leader in clean technology. China’s BYD Autos released a 
41 ‘Small car spells big trouble for Petro Firms’ The Hindustan Times 10/1/2008 
<http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=&id=c1503436-ee40-4795-9e23-
d2ebf86bb045&ParentID=2d28012e-0cc1-4ac2-ad09-
2b74a27953ac&Headline=Small+car%3a+big+trouble+for+petro+firms> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
42 ‘Government signs Electric Car Deal’ RTE 3/4/2009 <http://www.rte.ie/business/2009/0403/cars.html> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
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vehicle which on a single charge can travel 400km and has a top speed of 160km/h.43  Further 
China offers rebates on purchases of electric and hybrid cars of CNY ¥50,000 to encourage 
consumption, which is a considerable incentive to purchase such vehicles.44
 
  
32.4.2 PRIVATE EFFORTS TO FILL THE SUPPLY GAP 
 
 
Many Governments have been slow to invest in this change, thereby failing to send the 
correct message to motorists or provide real alternatives to support their environmental taxes.  
It may be, however, that private enterprise will itself adapt to consumer demand and offer 
such facilities.  In Sweden, where environmental concerns have long been a public concern 
and the tax code has reflected this, the McDonalds restaurant chain have reacted to consumer 
demand by achieving almost 100% carbon neutrality within every branch in the country.  It 
works within the Swedish Government’s policy of creating multitudes of electric vehicles 
nationally by completing a pilot programme offering electric car recharging at some of its 
restaurants.45
 
  Whilst both a novelty and a publicity exercise, it shows that the market can 
react to consumer concerns should the correct message be portrayed.   
32.4.3 MARKET INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
 
 
                                                             
43 ‘China's E6 electric car: 'We're not trying to save the world – we're trying to make money'’ The Guardian 
2/4/2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/apr/02/china-e6-electric-car> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
44 At the time of writing this was approximately GBP £5,000. 
45 ‘Refuel electric cars at McDonald's’ TenBees 20/2/2009 
<http://www.tenbees.co.uk/article/transport/20090220162911/Refuel-electric-cars-at-McDonald-s.htm> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
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Governments intervening directly to encourage private investment in green initiatives can, as 
discussed, achieve environmental goals at less cost than direct investment. The Netherlands’ 
‘Environmental Investment Allowance’ (milieu-investeringsaftrek) offer citizens and 
corporate entities tax-free savings on eligible environmentally positive investments as an 
incentive to invest.46 Consequently such projects offer “not just a sound environmental 
yield…[but] a sound financial return as well.”47
 
   
In the UK, despite the additional levies on business to protect environmental interests, such as 
the CCL, the reliefs available on overall taxation direct businesses into improving their 
environmental standing.  This can be beneficial to a business in terms of, for example, 
reduced energy costs and an improved public image.  Further, the fact that HM Treasury is 
willing to bear part of the burden to improve the environmental efficiency of a business by 
encouraging alternatives should send a message to businesses about Governmental desire to 
change behaviour.  For example, in the UK, a company carrying on a property rental business 
which installs an ‘energy saving item’ in a dwelling house48 may deduct expenditure49 on its 
purchase and installation costs.50
                                                             
46 Pursuant to Personal Income Tax Act (Netherlands), Art.3.42a. 
 This and similar incentives for landlords to improve the 
energy efficiencies of their properties, known as the ‘Landlord's Energy Savings Allowance’, 
show the willingness of Government to work with private enterprise to achieve 
47 DEFRA, see chapter 5, n.37. 
48 Or a building containing a dwelling house. 
49 Incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business prior to 1/4/2015.  For restrictions see the 
explanation in Hamilton P, ‘Finance Act notes: Environmental Tax changes – section 10 -24’ (2007) 5 BTR 
443-449, at 445. 
50 Pursuant to ICTA 1988, s. 31ZA.   
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environmental objectives.51  Nevertheless, take-up by landlords has been less than expected – 
partly due to limited awareness of the incentive.52
 
 
32.5 CONSISTENT, CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIATED MESSAGE 
 
32.5.1 CLEAR SIGNALS MATCHING INCENTIVES 
 
 
What is needed therefore is a consistent message to create the necessary conditions for 
sustainable consumption behaviour to flourish.  OECD research supports this proposition in 
calling for consumers to “receive a consistent set of signals about the sustainability of their 
consumption patterns.”53 Mann and Hymel point out54 that the USA’s Energy Tax Incentives 
Act 200555 gave more of an incentive to produce non-renewable energy than renewable 
energy which made consumers feel absolved in continuing to consume unsustainably.  HM 
Treasury recognises the need to send such a consistent message in the long-term and suggests 
that continual increases in taxes can make it clear that an activity will only become more 
expensive in the future.56  The Finance Act 2006 did this by linking the rate of the CCL to 
inflation as of 1 April 2007.57
                                                             
51 ICTA 1988, s.31ZA to 31ZC, and the Energy-Saving Items (Corporation Tax) Regulations 2008 (S.I. 
2008/1520), cover Landlords within the charge to Corporation Tax.  Landlords within the charge to income tax 
are covered in ITTOIA 2005, s.312-314 and the Energy-Saving Items Regulations 2007 (S.I. 2007/831). 
  This is an important means of education while creating a 
psychological barrier against certain decisions.  This consistency can create the appropriate 
52 The Energy Saving Trust noted the lack of awareness at ‘Engaging Private Landlords with Energy Efficiency’ 
(2008) <http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/> Accessed 12/4/2010.   The lack of take-up was noted by the 
Select Committee on Environmental Audit Tenth Report, ‘The Energy White Paper and the Action Plan’ (2004) 
Para. 69. <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmenvaud/490/49006.htm> 
Accessed 12/5/2010.    
53 Geyer-Alle´ly and Zacarias-Farah, see n.20, at 923. 
54 Mann & Hymel, see n.10, at 10420-1. 
55 Energy Policy Act of 2005, HR 6, 109th Congr., Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005), title XIII. 
56 HM Treasury, see chapter 4, n.38 at 35, para 7.7. 
57 FA 2006, s.171(2). 
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framework within which to make consumption decisions.  The European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association58 has called for consistency in the taxation of vehicles’ CO2 
emissions to make the cost proportionate to the emissions, so that “every gramme of CO2 is 
taxed the same.”59  Recognising the importance of sending a consistent message, the US Tax 
Extenders Act of 2009 extended the life of tax incentives programmes which were due to 
expire, such as incentives for renewable energy and alternative vehicles, in order that 
investments could be made with some certainty that incentives would continue.60
 
 
32.5.2 EDUCATION 
 
In Germany, the educational aspect of taxes was supported by advertising scientific 
educational slogans to ensure consumer support for environmental taxes and make people 
understand their purpose.  Binswanger and Weizsäcker popularised phrases such as ‘prices 
must tell the ecological truth’ within Germany.61  Dresner et al found through focus groups 
that German and Danish interviewees were generally more positive towards environmental 
taxation than other nationals due to having experienced greater education concerning 
environmental issues. 62  Education both directly through the media and indirectly through 
taxation and tax incentives can work collaboratively to maximise the behavioural impact of 
an environmental programme.  Further, Baranzini et al highlight that carbon emissions are 
already taxed in every country, though perhaps not under the label of an environmental tax.63
                                                             
58 <http://www.acea.be> Accessed 20/4/2010. 
   
59 ACEA, ‘CO2-taxation shapes consumer demand’ 
<http://www.acea.be/index.php/news/news_detail/trend_towards_co2_related_car_taxation_continues> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
60 H.R. 4213, 111th Cong.  
61 Wurzel RW, ‘Innovating with ‘New’ ‘Environmental Policy Instrument (NEPIs) in Germany’ (2001) ECPR 
Joint Sessions of Workshops, Working Paper, at 11, 
<http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/research/fut_governance/Wurzel_Germany.pdf> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
62 Dresner et al, see chapter 3, n.32 at 938. 
63 Baranzini et al, see chapter 4, n.15 at 397. 
  
121  
Since environmental taxes are already in place, Governments utilising educational techniques 
may find it more straightforward to convince the public of the need for environmental fiscal 
reform; the Meade Report thus quotes the relevant maxim ‘an old tax is a good tax’.64
 
 
32.5.3 CLEARLY DEFINED PURPOSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL FISCAL REFORM 
 
 
Snape argues that whilst the British public are beginning to understand the effects of new 
environmental taxes, more support and education is needed through evidence, explaining the 
requirement for policymakers to “…substantiate the claims made for different levels of 
environmental levy.”65   He illustrates this by pointing out that many issues are confused 
which prevents the message from getting across, such as a lack of understanding between the 
different purposes of congestion and emissions when implementing transport levies.66  
Educating people on environmental tax therefore means explaining how a tax works as well 
as its purpose.  Further Snape argues that low-visibility taxes (such as the Landfill Tax, which 
only businesses and interested parties would be aware of) and ‘proxy’ taxes (such as fuel 
duties that are often, as discussed, disguised as environmental taxes in order to raise revenue) 
increase the problem further by clouding and confusing the issue with the public.67
 
 
32.5.4 DRASTIC MEASURES TO ELIMINATE MISINFORMATION 
 
 
                                                             
64 See chapter 1, n.9 at 14. 
65 Snape J, ‘Finance Act notes: Environmental Provisions – sections 59 and 170-172’ (2006) 5 BTR 542-544, at 
544. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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The EU has been proactive in response to the need to send out a consistent message, in 
legislating against television advertisements which encourage behaviour prejudicial to the 
environment.  This EU-wide measure may have an important impact upon the way EU 
residents think and behave towards the environment.68
 
  Importantly it demonstrates how far 
the EU is prepared to go in seeking to protect the environment, as this type of measure 
infringes somewhat on public liberties and freedom of speech, as well as commercial 
interests.   Without environmental justification, this may have been unjustifiable.  
Policymakers will need to determine the extent to which they are prepared to act to support 
environmental taxes. 
32.5.5 PERSONALISING THE MESSAGE 
 
 
It is conceded, however, that Government intervention can only go so far, a point recognised 
by the House of Lords’ Science and Technology Committee when discussing waste reduction 
strategies.69   The committee encouraged the Government to address consumer behaviour 
through “a combination of education and encouragement”70 and alter unsustainable market 
practices by promoting sustainable business models and policies surrounding them, but 
concluded that it was vital for consumers to play their part in their consumption choices on 
the wastefulness of products.71
                                                             
68 Article 12(e) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3/10/1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid 
down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television 
broadcasting activities, OJ L 298 , 17/10/1989. 
  Perhaps then a drive towards educating people about what is 
happening at the present time may assist in supporting the impact of the taxation message, to 
make people realise that their actions will affect present generations and not just future ones.  
69 House of Lords’ Science and Technology Committee, ‘Report on “Waste Reduction” by the House of Lords’ 
Science and Technology Committee’ (2009) 1 Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 60. 
70 Ibid, at 62. 
71 Ibid. 
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For example on the Carteret Islands off Papua New Guinea, an entire community of 
thousands of native people have recently been evacuated due to rising sea levels which has 
destroyed their subsistence and way of life.72
 
  The plight of present-day ‘climate change 
refugees’ went largely unnoticed in the media, and it may be necessary through information 
campaigns to couple certain consumption actions or behaviour to present day events.   
32.6 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCENTIVES 
 
 
32.6.1 DESIRABILITY FOR INCENTIVES 
 
 
Even small incentives can prove to be a psychological attraction to alter behaviour towards 
the environment.  Research carried out by Dresner et al indicated that people wanted some 
form of reward and incentive to switch their behaviour, and not to be simply punished 
through extra taxes.73  A review of the tax exemptions provided under German law74 to 
promote the installation of catalytic converters in German vehicles found that “tax 
exemptions seem to have a psychological effect on taxpayers that is out of proportion to the 
benefits received.”75  Incentives for tax deductions were found to work better than direct 
benefits, as the scheme had successfully encouraged motorists to install the converters.76
                                                             
72 Monbiot G, ‘Climate Change Displacement has Begun – but Hardly Anyone has Noticed’ The Guardian 
7/5/2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/georgemonbiot/2009/may/07/monbiot-climate-change-
evacuation> accessed 22/6/2009. 
  In 
South Africa, one key criticism of national environmental legislation is that it lacked 
73 Dresner et al, see chapter 3, n.32, at 938. 
74 Following the 1985 amendment to Germany’s Federal Act on the Taxation of Fuels. 
75 IISD, see chapter 2, n.90 at 13. 
76 Ibid. 
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incentives for investment which was hindering its ability to succeed.77
 
  Thus tax incentives 
such as deductions – even if minimal - can have a considerable psychological impact on 
incentivising people to alter their behaviour – given that the public are aware of them. 
32.6.2 METHODS OF INCENTIVES 
 
 
Various methods of incentives can be seen with vehicle purchase policy, where formidable 
incentives exist for purchasers of new cars.  For example a ‘car scrappage scheme’ has 
operated in some countries to encourage motorists to scrap older vehicles and buy new ones.  
This serves the dual purpose of firstly incentivising sales in the motor industry but also means 
older, less efficient vehicles will be taken off the road and replaced with a more efficient, less 
polluting fleet.  In Germany, a scheme which offers EUR €2,500 for buyers who scrap cars of 
more than 9 years old and buy new fuel-efficient types, has been hailed a success after year-
on-year sales increased by 40% and demand soared.78  Rather than this non-tax rebate option, 
there is also the option of a ‘feebate’ which imposes additional taxes on purchases of the most 
polluting vehicles and ring-fences them to subsidise purchases of the low carbon vehicles.79
 
   
The USA, which has for several years offered tax credits for purchases of hybrid vehicles,80
                                                             
77 Kock N, ‘Giving effect to the Kyoto Mechanisms: Implications for South African Policy and Legislation’ 
(2006) University of Cape Town, unpublished dissertation, at 41, available at  
<http://lawspace.law.uct.ac.za:8080/dspace/bitstream/2165/246/1/deKockN_2005.pdf> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
 
operates an alternative scheme to encourage new car purchases by offering deductions in 
78 ‘German car scrappage scheme extended to meet demand’ The Guardian 7/4/2009 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/apr/07/automotive-industry-germany-scrappage> Accessed 
28/4/2010. 
79 For an evaluation of the various options see: Greene et al, see n.38. 
80 Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act, see n.55.  See IRS, ‘Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit’ (2008) 
<http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=157632,00.html> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
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federal income tax for buyers of new vehicles.81  Whilst this new measure was designed to 
help America out of its recession, such measures can provide important incentives to replace 
inefficient vehicles with efficient ones.  Tax cuts on car sales in Brazil for example led to a 
reported 36% increase in new car sales in March 2009.82  Schemes simply to replace vehicles 
are, however, limited as they only benefit the environment because newer models are 
generally more efficient than older models.  The more effective schemes for the environment 
are those offering incentives dependent upon the replacement of old vehicles with fuel-
efficient vehicles – such as electric and  hydro vehicles - as promoted with the French, 
German and first American schemes.  Such schemes are arguably a more environmentally 
efficient use of tax income.  Despite this a large proportion of a vehicle’s emissions take 
place during manufacturing, which would lead to an overall rise in emissions despite the 
lower emissions during its use83 - unless the replacement vehicles were low-emissions.84
 
  
Little research however exists providing a cost-benefit analysis into the replacement of older 
vehicles’ engines or components as opposed to the entire machine, or in the design of an 
engine which can be upgraded as technology advances.  This could allow reduced emissions 
caused through manufacturing new vehicles whilst achieving environmental benefits, but 
could also prove an inefficient measure compared to the complete replacement of a vehicle. 
                                                             
81 ‘Home and Car Buyers get Tax Breaks in Stimulus Package’ USA Today 10/3/2009 
<http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/block/2009-02-16-stimulus-home-car-buyers_N.htm> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
82 ‘UPDATE 2-Brazil Car Sales Jump 36 pct, best March on Record’ Reuters 3/4/2009 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerGoodsAndRetailNews/idUSN0332521120090403> Accessed 
28/4/2010. 
83 An OECD study concluded that scrappage schemes have “…high average cost per tonne of pollution avoided 
and they do not compare favourably with other alternative policy tools on purely environmental grounds”: 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport, Cleaner Cars: Fleet Renewal and Scrappage Schemes, Guide 
to Good Practice  (Paris: OECD Publishing, 1999) at 81.  
84 Research by ‘Clean Green Cars’ has shown that if the incentive was available for low-emitting vehicles only 
(under 130g/km of CO2) to replace cars over 10 years old, then the short-term increase in manufacturing 
emissions would be offset within six years by the new vehicles which would consequently produce a long-term 
net reduction in emissions: see’ Green Clean Cars <www.cleangreencars.co.uk/>; also see ‘Scrappage scheme 
gains momentum’ The Telegraph 11/3/2009 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/environment/4974318/Scrappage-scheme-gains-momentum.html> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
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Given the importance of car manufacturing to the German economy, it is likely that economic 
growth may have been the major rationale behind the decision to introduce such a scheme – 
but the environmental improvements do help justify such an investment.  A similar scheme 
was introduced in Britain with the 2009 Budget,85 with the scheme being hailed an initial 
success since 60,000 new car orders through the scheme were placed within the first few 
months alone.86
 
  
32.7 FAIRNESS AND RETROSPECTIVITY 
 
32.7.1 INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND UNCERTAIN LEGALITY 
 
 
Where an environmental tax is perceived as ‘fair’ it is more likely to gain public approval.  
Such support and lack of resistance can help it to succeed in its objectives in an economical 
manner.  For instance certain types of taxes are more detrimental to low-income groups than 
other income groups, which can cause resistance and reduce compliance.  In 1989, the UK 
legislature introduced a Community Charge known as a ‘Poll Tax’ to fund local amenities.87  
Its flat rate charge meant that everybody in employment paid the same amount regardless of 
property type, income, or wealth, which caused low-income groups to struggle to pay the 
charge.  Its regressive form led to much resistance,88 campaigns favouring anti-compliance, 
and ‘Poll Tax Riots’, leading to the charge being abandoned.89
                                                             
85 HM Treasury, Building Britain's Future (London: HMSO, 2009) at p. 75, para 4.1.6. 
  This concept of distributional 
86 Judge E, ‘UK Scrappage Scheme shifts 60,000 Cars’ The Times 15/6/2009 
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/industrials/article6502877.ece> Accessed 
18/6/2009. 
 87 Pursuant to Local Government Finance Act 1988. 
88 Meadowcroft J, ‘The Failure of the Poll Tax and Classical Liberal Political Economy: Lessons for the 
Future’ (2006) 26 Econ.Aff. 1, 25-30. 
89 Community Charges (General Reduction) Act 1991. 
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fairness was held to be paramount amongst UK taxpayers, and demonstrates how 
understandings of fairness in a jurisdiction can determine the success or failure of a tax. 
 
European principles of fairness aim to ensure a citizen knows his rights and is not 
discriminated against within the law, including tax law.90  In terms of application of such 
principles to British tax law, Nolan J in Yoga for Health Foundation v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners, found91 that UK courts must adopt European principles of construction when 
interpreting the Sixth VAT Directive.92  Such principles guarantee concepts of fairness 
relevant to the introduction of a tax such as legal certainty93 (as set out in De Geus v. Bosch), 
legitimate expectations94 (as applied in the VAT cases of Marks & Spencer v Commissioners 
of Customs & Excise95 and later Grundig Italiana)96 and non-retrospectivity (Kalsbeek v. 
Sociale Verzekeringsbank).97
 
  Applying these principles to VAT creates expectations 
amongst the public that these principles should be applied in all areas of tax. 
Whilst revenue recycling or earmarking receipts to specific environmental uses can add to 
concepts of fairness - allowing the public to find it easier to support the intent of the tax 
(discussed in Chapter 4) – a more antagonistic concept of unfairness is retrospective taxation. 
Adam Smith cemented this hostility into the public psyche in arguing that: “The certainty of 
what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance that a very 
                                                             
90 For further analysis see Helminen M, EU Tax Law: Direct Taxation (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009) at pp. 1-17; 
55-56; 111. 
91 [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 340, at 360. 
92 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17/5/1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment OJ L 145, 
13.6.1977, p. 1–40.  See also Morse and Williams, chapter 2, n.24 at 416-420. 
93 Case 13/61, De Geus v. Bosch [1962] ECR 45. 
94 See Raitio J, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2003) at 
pp. 340-5. 
95 Case C-62/00, Marks & Spencer plc and Commissioners of Customs & Excise [2002] ECR I-6325. 
96 Case C-255/00, Grundig Italiana SpA v Ministero delle Finanze [2002] ECR I-8033. 
97 Case 100/63, Kalsbeek v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1964] ECR 56.  
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considerable degree of inequality … is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of 
uncertainty.”98
 
 
People may consider it inequitable should they be taxed for choices they made in the past – 
before the environmental taxes came into force, and particularly before they were aware of 
the scientific evidence relating to environmental damage such as climate change, since this 
helps justify the purpose of the tax.99  Retrospective taxation is deemed to undermine the 
credibility of a tax and can lead to reduced compliance rates100 as well as affect investor 
confidence as it is regarded as a breach of the rule of law.101  In the US State of North 
Carolina, retrospective taxation is expressly unconstitutional for “sales, purchases, or other 
acts previously done”102 and under the US Constitution any retrospective legislation is 
illegal.103  The Swedish Constitution104 also expressly prohibits retroactive tax legislation.105
 
   
It is however not always completely certain whether such a measure constitutes retrospective 
taxation as the definition is not universal, which results in some arguably retrospective 
                                                             
98 See chapter 2, n.12, at 347. 
99 Willis J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) 6 QB 1, 23 stated that: ‘Retrospective laws are … contrary to the general 
principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first 
time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith 
of the then existing law.’   
100 See e.g. ‘Retrospective tax law 'will undermine credibility'’ Accounting Web 
<http://www.accountingweb.co.uk/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=137174&d=526&h=524&f=525> Accessed 28/4/2010.  
‘Tax law changes 'unlawful'’ Cape Times 23/8/2008 
<http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=3531&fArticleId=vn20080823105255506C493024> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
101 See Sampford C, ‘Retrospective taxation law’ in Sampford C, ‘Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law’ (USA: 
OUP, 2006) 147-155. 
102 North Carolina State Constitution, Art I, §16. 
103 Article 1, § 10. 
104 Chapter 2, para 10 Regeringsformen (the Swedish Constitution). 
105 However once a proposal for legislation has been submitted by the Swedish Government to her Parliament 
detailing planned changes to a tax statute, the changes can be effective from the date of that proposal if it is later 
enacted. Thereby the circumstances constituting a taxable transaction do not always occur  at the date the statute 
is enacted but can be at the date the proposal to change them is made.  A thorough account of this is given in 
Hultqvist A, ‘Taxpayers’ Rights in Sweden’ (1997) 7 Revenue LJ 1, 43-57 at 45.  Corkery demonstrates that in 
Canada and Australia there has increasingly been a practice of making laws effective from the date they are 
announced in Parliament rather than the date on which they are enacted, even though this can be months later; 
Corkery JF, Starting Law, (Queensland: Scribblers Publishing, 2002) at 153. 
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taxation being officially regarded as legitimate.106  Australia in 1982 passed the Taxation 
(Unpaid Company Tax) Assessment Act 1982 in reaction to a large-scale tax fraud107 which 
allowed it to recover tax that had been avoided at a time when the scheme leading to it being 
avoided was not expressly illegal.  Retrospectivity of this kind prevents certainty for the 
taxpayer; the then Australian Senator Chipp argued against the 1982 Act saying: “One of the 
few protections that the ordinary citizen has is that he knows the law.”108  Indeed Blackstone 
wrote that retrospective laws, whilst valid due to the sovereignty of Parliament,109 were 
morally wrong as they had not been prospectively prescribed.110
 
   
32.7.2 UK EXPERIENCE: QUESTIONABLE LEGALITY AND REDUCED 
CREDIBILITY  
 
 
In the UK environmental taxation has arguably been applied retrospectively on a number of 
controversial occasions, causing uncertainty and public disapproval of such measures.  The 
2006 Pre-Budget Report announced111 a proposed doubling in APD (Air Passenger Duty).112
                                                             
106 For further reading on retrospectivity see Sampford, see n.101; Corkery J & Anthea G, ‘Retrospectivity’ 
(2007) 17 Revenue LJ 1; Fuller LL, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). 
  
Before it was brought into force, the airline industry complained that it would mean millions 
of people who had booked and paid for future flights before the tax had increased, but had not 
yet taken them, would now have to pay more which they argued constituted a retrospective 
 107 The Painters and Dockers’ Union had partaken in an avoidance scheme known as ‘bottom of the harbour tax 
avoidance’.  For details see Jay T, ‘Retro-Active Tax Legislation: A ‘Deaf Leopard’ And His Spots’ (2007) 17 
Revenue LJ 1, at 4-5. 
108 Australian Senate Hansard: 19/11/1982, at 2592.  
109 Blackstone W, Commentaries on the Laws of England.  In Four Books. 17 (London: Richard Taylor, 1830) 
Volume 1, p. 91, highlighting that the judiciary could not disallow a statute if it was thought to be unreasonable 
since it would raise judicial power above the Government. 
110 “All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement, 
which is implied in the term ‘prescribed.’” Blackstone W, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia: 
Par, Birch & Small, 1803) 46.  
111 HM Treasury, ‘Pre-Budget Report 2006: Investing in Britain's potential: Building our long-term future’ (HM 
Treasury: HMSO, 2006) Cm 6984, at 176, Para 7.82. 
112 Introduced pursuant to FA 1994, s. 28. 
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tax.113  The Federation of Tour Operators (FTO) also formally notified the Treasury of the 
problem.  Nevertheless, the increase came into force114 under the Finance Act 2007115 and the 
airlines had to respond by either asking passengers for extra money or covering the costs 
themselves.116  Her Majesty’s Opposition at the time, the Conservative Party, argued that 
since it had been brought into force within eight weeks of the announcement in the Pre-
Budget Report, and had not been discussed by Parliament, it was an illegal measure.117  The 
controversy continued further when FTO challenged the legality of the increased duty with an 
application for judicial review of the decision, which failed when the English High Court 
refused the application.118  Despite this, the duty has proved an embarrassment for the 
Government since it was regarded as a revenue-raising measure only.  The continued 
increases119 in the rates of APD have repeatedly been branded unfair, with airlines publicly 
claiming that there is no environmental justification for them.120  Furthermore the EU 
indicated it would review the APD rises.121
                                                             
113 ‘EasyJet Demands Clarity over APD Tax Trap’ Travelmole 11 December 2006 
<http://www.travelmole.com/stories/1114569.php> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
  The controversy over retrospective application of 
environmental taxes, added to the perception that the taxes were not for environmental use, 
114 For travel from 1/2/2007. 
115 Section 12 amended the rates under FA 1994, s.30. 
116 Whilst the low-fare airlines including easyJet and Ryanair passed the cost onto customers, BA absorbed the 
cost at an expense of around GBP £11 million: ‘BA absorbs APD costs for passengers’ The Telegraph 
22/1/2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/739933/BA-absorbs-APD-costs-for-passengers.html> Accessed 
28/4/2010. 
117 ‘Air Tax Increase comes into Force’ BBC News 1/2/2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6317131.stm> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
118 See n.99.  The court held that APD were not within the scope of Art. 15 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, and was outside the ambit of Regulation 549/2004/EC (Single European Sky 
Framework) Arts 1 and 2.  Further it was not a breach of Art.1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 or Art.49 of the EC Treaty (Treaty Establishing the 
European Community; OJ C 321 E/3). 
119 The increases were announced in the 2008 Pre-Budget Report which further increase APD in 2009 and 2010.  
HM Treasury, see Chapter 9, n.67, p.139, para.7.56 
<http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/pbr08_chapter7_159.pdf> Accessed 21/4/2010.  The rates are contained in 
FA 1994 (as amended). 
120 ‘Sharp rise in Air Passenger Duty announced’ Reuters UK 24/11/2008 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUKTRE4AN6K920081124> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
121 ‘EC to Review latest Air Passenger Duty rise’ Travel Weekly 4/3/2009 
<http://www.travelweekly.co.uk/Articles/2009/03/04/30399/ec-to-review-latest-air-passenger-duty-rise.html> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
  
131  
causes a failure to persuade travellers to change their behaviour as the taxes became regarded 
as increased prices rather than environmentally beneficial. 
 
32.7.3 UK EXPERIENCE: IMPACT ON FUTURE CHOICES 
 
A similar sort of retrospectivity argument has been made over the rebanding of VED in the 
UK.  Whilst the changes appear fair for new cars bought after the date of rebanding, they still 
impact on the second hand market as private owners will see their vehicles move into a more 
expensive bracket.  This is recognised by the EAC, who accept that a criticism of the change 
is that it will not alter behaviour since “…the decision to buy a more or less carbon-efficient 
car – is in the past.”122  The justification for this is that it will affect the decision for those 
buying cars in the future.  Further, it does go some way to making those who actually pollute 
pay for the pollution, though the scheme does not apply to cars bought before 2001.  Thus it 
is a different type of retrospectivity than APD charges, but those who bought high emissions 
vehicles after 2001 may feel that they are being penalised retrospectively which will decrease 
the support for VED rates since they are deemed unfair.123
 
  Arguably this brings the notion of 
environmental taxes into disrepute.  
 
33.  CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has identified a range of relevant methods of influencing human behaviour 
through both tax methods and supporting measures.  A variety of interdisciplinary evidence                                                              
122 See chapter 3, n.20 at 12, para. 24. 
123 The decision has been controversial even within the Government, with some arguing that the impact of the 
recession means the highest rates should be scrapped: ‘Government challenged over tax rise for big cars’ The 
Times 27/5/2008 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4009690.ece> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
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and academic discussion has been analysed throughout to support and explain the 
conclusions, learning from the mistakes and experiences of previous policies. Such findings 
are of essential importance to policymakers in deciding appropriate means of influencing 
consumption choices and environmental behaviour. 
 
The findings point to interesting trends in human decision-making which can determine the 
potential success of a tax method.  A recurring feature stressed the importance of supporting 
the introduction of any tax or incentive package with a wider campaign of education, public 
information, a convincing explanation of the science and the purpose of the package, and in 
leading by example.  Education included ensuring that decisions could be made with an 
understanding of the full private and social costs of the choice.   Kosonen and Nicodème have 
attempted to identify when it is appropriate to use instruments to complement tax measures, 
and establish the kind of instrument to use, as the following flowchart demonstrates:124
                                                             
124 Kosonen K and Nicodème G, ‘The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental Policy’ in Taxation Papers 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 2009) at 13. 
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As people do not react well to feeling forced into making a decision, it was found to be 
important that choices remained within the market – but that pricing policies could be utilised 
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to ensure that the ‘best option’ would be the option endorsed through the tax code.  This 
could be done via taxes and subsidies.  Equally it was found that people react well to 
consumption choices with positive status attached to them, as well as to consumption choices 
promoted with upmarket rather than ‘cheap’ images, and that these human anomalies could 
be taken advantage of in order to promote sustainable consumption choices and 
environmental behaviour.  This can change people’s perceptions from thinking they are 
making a sacrifice to thinking they were making an improvement. 
  
It was found that people wanted to be rewarded for changing their environmental behaviour 
rather than simply paying more if they did not, and even small incentives could satisfy this 
demand.  This is in line with the theme which promotes the concept of rewarding improvers 
and ensuring the polluter pays.  As political resistance could hinder the effectiveness of a tax 
package, it was thought to be important to design a tax model which the public would not 
oppose.  Fairness and equity in the tax system were found to be fundamental expectations of 
the public.  This involved providing certainty of the system, such as whether taxes would 
continue to rise, so that people would be certain of the need to adapt behaviour and make 
their choices accordingly.  For this to happen, it was found that legal uncertainty and 
retrospective application could undermine confidence in the system. 
 
Whilst sending the intended message of behavioural change to the market in a personalised 
and reasoned manner, it was found also to be vital that real alternatives were available, to 
avoid simply penalising people for making a decision when they have no other choice.  
Therefore it was found that market-based incentives must be supported by investment in 
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infrastructure - whether private or public– to offer real alternatives so that a person can either 
alter his behaviour or bear a greater financial burden.   
With such findings, policymakers can make an informed decision as to the type of tax 
package to introduce to have the desired effect upon decisions towards the environment.  
What this chapter does not answer however is how the policymaker should decide which 
parties are to be charged to tax or offered incentives to change their behaviour.   To do this, 
the policymaker needs to decide: 
(a) Who ought to bear the burden of environmental taxation; and subsequently, 
(b) How to target those parties intended to be taxed or offered incentives. 
 
This Part will deal with these questions, not in offering policy solutions but in offering the 
policymaker informed choices as to the outcomes of potential decisions.  Chapter 7 will look 
at how a policymaker can decide upon the parties to include in their environmental fiscal 
reform, considering questions such as how the burden of tax can be shared without 
aggravating poverty issues or causing unforeseen consequences.  Chapter 9 then analyses tax 
methods to target taxes in the most efficient manner, again to provide the policymaker with 
an educated choice as to tax policy options available. 
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34.  INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
 
Where the burden of taxation lies is, as indicated in Chapter 1, a precarious question due to 
the various competing arguments related to it.  The purpose of this chapter is not to dictate 
who should be responsible for contributing to any environmental programme, as this will 
differ depending upon the nature of the environmental problem and the type of potential 
taxpayers.  Rather, its purpose is to set out the various matters to be considered by 
policymakers and lawmakers when deciding what sort of tax to introduce – as any chosen tax 
method can impact in a range of ways upon taxpayers, with a number of potentially counter-
productive side-effects for the economy, the taxpayer and the environmental objectives.  The 
chapter will explain why it is vital for a policymaker to understand who will actually bear the 
burden of an environmental tax, and why it may not be the party the policymaker intends, 
depending upon the given circumstances.1
 
 
The findings within are of vital importance to any policymaker seeking to introduce a 
workable tax to achieve their desired objectives.  Further the purpose of this chapter relates to 
RQ(i) regarding the formation of a Universal Model.  For such a model cannot achieve its 
objectives if the impact of any tax policy are not understood.  
  
                                                             
1 For examples, Mann criticises the US Government for selecting beneficiaries of its tax subsidies without due 
consideration: see chapter 1, n.12 at 399. 
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Policymakers have to make value judgements about which members of society will be 
required to fund their environmental programme, and this also involves analysing where and 
how to tax, raising various interrelated economic efficiency, ethical and legal principles. 
 
This chapter will examine the options available to policymakers in determining which party 
should bear the burden of environmental taxation, and in which circumstances.  In doing so it 
explores the legal, practical and philosophical consequences of selecting alternative parties to 
bear the burden, and identifies multi-jurisdictional comparative evidence to exemplify and 
resolve the complexities.  The choices of tax methods involving their possible points of 
charge are discussed to demonstrate the various distributional considerations which must be 
taken into account when deciding upon a type of tax.  A pervasive concern looks at the 
impact of the imposition of a tax burden on a party, which is frequently relevant if that party 
is a business.  This focus on consequences further requires the chapter to question the wider 
policy implications of the imposition of a tax and how negative impacts can be mitigated.  It 
is explained that for any environmental tax to be workable the costs of compliance both upon 
the taxpayer and the tax collector must be minimal.  Finally international considerations are 
taken into account which leads the chapter into considering the commercial realities of 
imposing higher costs upon one nation, which is a starting point for considering means of 
protecting the environment whilst remaining competitive – a focal point which is fully 
analysed in Chapter 8. 
 
Firstly however it is prudent to identify persistent terminology used throughout this chapter. 
 
34.1 TERMINOLOGY 
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The following terminology is commonly used to describe the various questions of who bears 
the burden. 
 
INCIDENCE 
 
Incidence of tax refers to the party who ultimately pays a tax, which is not necessarily the 
party who is charged to tax.  A tax may be charged upon an employer but if this is passed on 
to an employee in the form of lower wages, then final incidence falls upon the employee.  
Similarly a retailer may be responsible for paying a sales tax but the consumer may bear the 
final incidence with higher purchase prices (such as with VAT).  Determining the party who 
bears final incidence involves considering the economic reality of the relationship between 
the parties.  It is largely dependent upon supply and demand.   If demand for a good is 
inelastic (such as petrol) then the consumer has less choice as to whether to buy the good and 
therefore pay the tax; the reverse is true where demand is elastic. 
 
BURDEN 
 
The tax burden refers to the actual change to a taxpayer’s net position once all economic 
adjustments have been made in an economy.  Therefore it is the actual net-of-tax change in a 
person’s economic situation.2
 
 
TAX BASE 
                                                             
2 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the Individual 
and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once (Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office; 
1992) at 146. 
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The question of what in particular is taxed, such as carbon emissions, is referred to as the ‘tax 
base’.  Which tax base is used and the rates at which it is applied can have distributive effects 
which can make certain groups of society financially better or worse off.  Identifying the tax 
base and the incidence and burden of the tax are distinct but inseparable issues.   
 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Organisations responsible for taxation should be accountable to those it is taxing, to ensure 
good governance.  This requires transparency of information regarding objectives and how 
they will be achieved.   
 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES 
 
The distinction between these two tax methods involves asking whether a tax paid by one 
party is directly paid to the Treasury, or whether it is first collected by an intermediary.  
 
Direct taxes are those imposed upon and collected from one party.  For instance, a 
manufacturer may be responsible for paying a corporation tax.   
 
By contrast, indirect taxes are those which are not paid by one party directly to the Treasury, 
but are collected by an intermediary.  For example upon purchasing a good, a consumer will 
pay a tax as part of the purchase price, but this will be collected by the intermediary retailer 
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and passed onto the Treasury.  Such indirect taxes can themselves be imposed directly or 
indirectly on goods or services.3
 
 
35.  CHOICE OF PRINCIPLE  
 
Finding the correct taxpayer to charge to environmental tax involves many questions about 
the nature of a society, to which a policymaker must respond.  This section will explain what 
is understood by two distinct principles: the beneficiary pays principle, and the polluter pays 
principle.  In doing so their advantages and shortcomings can be established, and crucially it 
can be explained why the polluter pays principle is the adopted philosophy in environmental 
law.  Once this is understood, it will be possible to apply this to the subject of determining 
who in practice would and should be responsible for environmental taxation, and what 
method of tax would most feasibly ensure that final incidence rests with the intended party. 
 
35.1 BENEFICIARY PAYS 
 
 
The Meade Report explains that when the State is going to make some expenditure and it is 
obvious who will benefit from it, it is “appropriate to tax those particular members of society 
who will benefit…”4
                                                             
3 The WTO Secretariat made this distinction in WTO Committee on Trade and Environment ‘Taxes and 
Charges for Environmental Purposes – Border Tax Adjustment’ (1997), Note by the Secretariat, 
WT/CTE/W/47, 2/5/1997, para 31. 
  For example this is implemented in local planning rules, where the UK 
Department for Communities and Local Government requires developers themselves to fund 
4 See chapter 1, n.9 at 12. 
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the assessment and mitigation of the impact of their development plans on the historic 
environment.5
 
   
Expenditure for environmental protection poses a more complex problem since it may be the 
public at large who are the deemed beneficiaries, for instance by not enduring the disastrous 
consequences of climate change scenarios.  Even though the public may invariably benefit, 
they may not in such cases be responsible as primary contributors (such as by way of a tax 
per citizen) since this would not differentiate between those responsible and those not 
responsible for such environmental damage.  Furthermore, it would provide no individual 
incentive to discourage environmentally damaging activities, as the costs of one party’s 
negative activities would be borne by the general public.  This would fail to assist in the 
achievement of environmental policy objectives. 
 
35.1.1 CRITICISMS OF BENEFICIARY PAYS DOCTRINE 
 
 
The following subsections aim to summarise various criticisms of the concept of beneficiary 
pays from an environmental perspective.   
 
35.1.1.1 GENERAL TAXATION AND VICTIM PAYS 
 
 
                                                             
5 DCLG, ‘Consultation paper on a new Planning Policy Statement 15:Planning for the Historic Environment’ 
(2009) at 40, paragraph 26. 
<http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/consultationhistoricpps.pdf> Accessed 
2/11/2009. 
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Certain environmental damage might constitute a threat to all citizens, such as climate 
change, meaning prevention would benefit all parties.  A beneficiary pays policy would mean 
that everybody would contribute to its prevention which could have considerable negative 
distributional effects if such a tax was regressive, driving persons into poverty or further 
poverty.   
 
Other threats are more localised, such as air pollution.  Introducing a general tax on all people 
within a city, for example, on the basis that all citizens would benefit from lower air 
pollution, could be unpopular as many may not contribute (such as if the tax was means 
tested) and some may feel that those responsible for the pollution would be benefiting at the 
expense of all citizens.   
 
LTAP (Long-range Trans-boundary Air Pollution) can cause environmental problems in a 
completely different part of the globe to where it begins.  It would be extremely difficult to 
prevent LTAP through a beneficiary pays policy since it could never be determined where the 
problem would fall.  Furthermore, it would seem extremely unjust that the victims of LTAP 
may have to make payments – such as to subsidise pollution mitigation in a company 
responsible for causing their harm.  Even without victims having to pay taxes to mitigate 
damage, in many cases the victim already bears the burden of environmental damage through 
uncompensated losses.  For example, the Chernobyl power plant disaster caused a nuclear 
fall-out in many regions outside of the former USSR.  Many years later, sheep farmers in 
Cumbria suffered damaged lambs due to the fall-out making them unfairly bear the burden of 
that damage.6
 
 
                                                             
6 Food Standards Agency (UK), Post-Chernobyl Monitoring and Controls Survey Report (2005) 
<http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/Chernobyluk05.pdf> Accessed 10/5/2010. 
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HM Treasury regards it a market failure that environmental externalities can lead to those not 
responsible for causing the externalities bearing the cost.7  It points out that it is frequently 
those on low incomes who suffer from environmental externalities they are not responsible 
for, and in particular the most adverse affects, such as climate change, can fall on the poorest 
countries. 8  Thus general income taxes to raise revenue for environmental purposes may not 
be favoured by the policymaker.  Indeed the rationale is no longer justifiable for NICs.  NI 
(National Insurance) was extended to self-employed despite their exclusion from benefiting 
from the ‘unemployed’ benefits of the insurance.9
 
 
35.1.1.2 UNCERTAIN BENEFICIARIES 
 
In the case of a woodland species endangered by logging, it is not clear who would directly 
benefit from their protection other than those who work in local tourism, who may then have 
to contribute to protecting the species.  Evidently beneficiary-pays is not a particularly 
workable solution, which Meade points out in explaining that frequently “…it is difficult or 
impossible to attribute different amounts of the benefits of the public expenditure to 
particular individuals or groups…”10
                                                             
7 HM Treasury, see chapter 4, n.38 at 15, para.4.14. 
  In the UK, all taxpayers contribute to the running of the 
NHS even though some may never use it, but this is justified on the basis that the majority of 
the population can benefit from it.  Further, it is regarded as a lesser evil than a pay-per-use 
system which could mean some people not being able to afford basic healthcare.  One part of 
its justification is that nobody knows when they will fall ill and there may be nobody to 
blame for it, whereas in principle if somebody causes harm to another, such as in a road 
8 Ibid, para.4.15. 
9 Self-employed persons pay ‘Class 2’ NICs entitling them to certain benefits but are excluded from paying 
‘Class 1’ NICs entitling them to Job-Seeker’s Allowance.  <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ni/intro/benefits.htm> 
Accessed 10/5/2010. 
10 See chapter 1, n.9 at 12. 
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traffic accident, then they are liable in tort to pay the cost of their victim’s healthcare.  The 
distinguishing factor therefore may be, to some extent, the element of blame. 
 
35.2 POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE 
 
 
As claimed in Chapter 1, this principle requires that those responsible for environmental 
damage should bear the burden of the tax.  This differs from the beneficiary pays principle 
since the party causing the negative externality would bear the cost regardless of whether it 
accrues any benefit.   
 
In theory, this seems fair and in line with general principles of tort law and general taxation 
principles; as such it has been adopted by Governments worldwide as a philosophically and 
politically favourable form of environmental taxation.  The IISD (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development) found that the polluter-pays principle operating11 within France’s 
water charging system12 has “enjoyed both wide acceptance and impressive results.”13  The 
polluter pays principle has important legal consequences since the payments redefine 
property rights to pollute from being owned by polluters to being owned by the Government 
or society as a whole.14
 
  The difficulty can lie in ascertaining who the polluter is, and, if there 
are many polluters, which of them should pay. 
                                                             
11 France’s Decree No. 66/700 of 1966 set out the basis of charges for water pollution. 
12 Pursuant to the French Water Act 1964, No. 64/1245. 
13 ‘The System of Water Charges in France’, in IISD, Making Budgets Green: Leading Practices in Taxation 
and Subsidy Reform (Canada: IISD, 1994) at Chapter 14, p. 30. 
14 As recognised in Buchanan JM & Tullock G, ‘Polluter’s Profits and Political Response: Direct Control Versus 
Taxes’ (1975) 65 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1, 139-147. 
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In identifying a polluter or polluting activity, it is necessary for a policymaker to ascertain 
what sort of tax that polluter will be charged to.  Various methods are consequently discussed 
below. 
 
 
36.  METHODS 
 
36.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A policymaker should determine from the outset which parties are intended to bear the 
burden of environmental taxation, in order to design tax methods to facilitate this.15
As identified in 34.1 Terminology, the type of tax (or incentive) chosen can impact 
significantly upon the party bearing the actual tax burden.  Much can depend upon the 
realities of the economic structure in place.  A useful example in demonstrating this can be 
taken from Barker et al’s application to a European model as repeated below,
 This 
section considers a range of methods determining how a tax can be implemented so that the 
burden rests with the intended party.  It invokes a range of comparative evidence alongside 
theoretical debate to ascertain whether a type of tax is suited to the anticipated arrangement. 
16 showing the 
varying impacts of carbon and energy taxation upon prices:17
                                                             
15 The importance to policy makers in knowing the distributional effects of environmental taxes is stressed in 
Heutel G and Fullerton D, ‘The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental Taxes’ (2007) 91 J. Public 
Econ., 571–591, at 572. 
 
16 Econometric model E3ME - An Energy-Environment-Economy Model of Europe, see 
<http://www.camecon.com/ModellingTraining/suite_economic_models/E3ME.aspx> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
17 Barker et al, ‘The Macroeconomic Effects of Unilateral Environmental Tax Reforms in Europe, 1995 to 
2012’ in Cottrell J et al, Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International and Comparative 
Perspectives, Volume VI (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 73-100, at 77. 
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36.2 CONSUMPTION TAXES AND USER CHARGES 
 
 
Taxes on the sale (or purchase) of environmentally damaging goods or on the use of similar 
services can be referred to as consumption taxes.18
                                                             
18 Though ‘consumption taxes’ are not necessarily related to any environmental issue or negative externality. 
  Such taxes increase the cost of 
purchasing goods harmful to the environment which can reduce the incentive to purchase 
them.  This can work when there is a feasible alternative good or service that can be 
encouraged as less environmentally damaging (a ‘positive substitute’).  The positive 
substitute would not attract the tax and it would be intended that the price difference would 
alter consumer behaviour so that the positive substitute is preferred over the harmful one.  
Reducing the market for harmful goods or services which are elastic limits their production 
and encourages production of positive substitutes.  Even if goods themselves are not 
environmentally damaging, their production process might be, so this method can be suitable 
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in both instances.  Another advantage is that the administration costs of implementing 
consumption taxes can be very low, as it may just be a case of altering its VAT rate.  This 
does, however, pass the cost of the implementation onto the seller who will have to amend 
their prices. 
 
Consumption taxes on inelastic goods such as oil can bring in a valuable source of revenue 
and can involve only minimal administration costs.19
 
  Whether this means they are truly an 
environmental tax or just a revenue-raiser is another question, considered in Chapter 3.  
  
36.3 BROAD TAX BASE: CONSUMPTION 
 
 
On the question of where to tax, the Hong Kong Government in 2006 opened a public 
discussion on how to broaden its tax base.20  It found that taxes on goods and services were 
the most appropriate method of expanding its tax base for a number of reasons.  Part of the 
justification was that the user-pays principle was considered both fair and difficult to avoid.  
Further, the broad nature of such taxes means they do not have to be set at a high rate in order 
to bring in sufficient revenue, and could increase in line with economic growth.  It was also 
the preferred option in terms of competitiveness since it made other taxes unnecessary.21
 
   
Whilst the Hong Kong Government thought this could be imposed instead of specific eco-
taxes, the justification for introducing such broad taxes can be applied to the environmental                                                              
19 See e.g. OECD, chapter 2, n.39. 
20 Government of the Hong Kong SAR, ‘Public Consultation on Tax Reform Final Report’ (2007) 
<http://www.taxreform.gov.hk/eng/pdf/finalreport.pdf> Accessed 10/5/2010. 
21 This is further discussed in VanderWolk J, ‘Green Tax Measures for Hong Kong: A Policy Proposal’ (2010) 
Paper Presented at The 2nd International Conference of the Taxation Law Research Program, 29/1/2010  at 2. 
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question since it shows that consumption taxes on goods and services have advantages over 
other taxation.  However this was politically unpopular in Hong Kong and plans for such 
taxes were shelved, as the public regarded it as regressive, and would undermine the island’s 
competitiveness for tourist-shoppers.22  In the case of publicly financed goods and services – 
such as landfill sites - Leape argues that user charges for publicly financed goods and 
services are favourable since they are both fair and efficient.  He shows that without such 
charges, there is in fact an implicit public subsidy of the user.23
 
   
36.4 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT 
 
 
With a consumption tax any user is initially responsible for paying the tax.24  Philosophically 
this is in line with the polluter-pays principle since anybody who decides to damage the 
environment has to bear the responsibility by paying.25
 
  
In terms of vehicle energy taxes such as petrol duty, every user has to pay the same amount 
of tax upon purchase.26  While this is regressive as it means the wealthy can afford to drive 
further than the poor, it means that all users pay the same amount for each mile they drive 
and encourages more people to use public transport.  Turner argues that the regressive nature 
of this consumption tax does not matter, explaining that a “poor person does as much damage 
to the environment by driving his car as a rich person.”27  McDaniel28
                                                             
22 See n.20 at para.56-7. 
 argues, however that a 
23 Leape J, ‘User Charges – a Reassessment’ in Wales C et al., Fair Tax: Towards a Modern Tax System 
(London: The Smith Institute, 2008). 
24 Though frequently the burden will not be borne by business consumers who can often offset the tax, and 
instead will be borne by the ultimate consumer who is not a taxable person for business purposes – see 
‘Business Exemptions at 36.5. 
25 Though final incidence may not rest with the person paying initially. 
26 There are exceptions such as reduced rates for agriculture vehicles, which are policy exemptions. 
27 Turner GS, see chapter 5, n.30, at 718. 
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shift from a progressive income based taxation to consumption based taxation, which will 
have a single rate of tax and therefore be regressive, would mean that upper income 
individuals would proportionately enjoy substantial tax decreases whilst the poorest would 
endure the highest increases – and consequently this could mean further tax reform is 
required to redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor.29
 
  There are means of 
compensation in an environmental fiscal reform to prevent counter-productive outcomes for 
wider policy areas, such as inflicting harm upon low-income groups, as elaborated  in 36.9.4. 
36.5 BUSINESS EXEMPTIONS 
 
36.5.1 TAX DESIGN  
 
In reality saying that all consumers pay the same amount of consumption tax and therefore 
have equal disincentives to pay for a particular product or service is not always true.  
Businesses can frequently claim back consumption expenses which are tax-deductible.30  For 
example in the EU, VAT expenditure can frequently be claimed back for VAT-registered 
businesses.  A taxable person pays VAT upon a purchase but regards it as an ‘input tax’.  
This can be offset against ‘output tax’, the VAT that the taxable person charges its 
customers.31
                                                                                                                                                                                              
28 McDaniel PR, ‘Taxing Consumption Only: Indentifying the Issues’ (1995) 47 The Tax Executive 6, 442-4. 
  Therefore the businessperson bears only the initial charge, not the burden.  This 
reduces any financial incentive to limit environmentally damaging consumption behaviour 
and passes the burden of environmental taxation onto private individuals – making the 
‘ultimate consumer’ who is not a taxable person bear the burden.  Therefore consumption 
29 Ibid at 444. 
30 Comparison of consumption taxes in terms of broadening a tax system are analysed in Schenk A and Oldman 
O, Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach (New York, CUP, 2007) at  2; 13. 
31 See HMRC, ‘The VAT Guide’ (2002) Notice 700 
<http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=p
ageVAT_ShowContent&propertyType=document&columns=1&id=HMCE_CL_001596#P865_71819> 
Accessed 10/5/2010. 
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taxes must be implemented with consideration to the wider tax framework to prevent this 
distributive inequity.   
 
Prior to 2002, UK businesses had a tax incentive to do extra business miles in their company 
cars.32   Drivers reaching a higher threshold of business miles could claim a larger tax 
discount, which was estimated to cause up to 300 million extra business miles being driven 
annually.33  This was abolished in 2002 when the charge became linked with the car’s CO2 
emissions and there became no incentive to do more business miles.34  For company cars 
doing business miles, the statutory rate from 2002/3 onwards allows GBP £0.40 for the first 
10,000 business miles and thereafter a lower rate of GBP £0.25.35  Such measures have been 
deemed a success as they have led to both a significant reduction in emissions and lower tax 
revenues, demonstrating that the tax system has been effective in incentivising lower 
mileages of company cars.36
 
  This reduces the extent to which businesses are exempt from 
bearing the tax burden, whilst protecting competitiveness by allowing a ‘necessary’ degree of 
travel. 
Fullerton et al note that various EU Member States have lower rates of tax for diesel than 
petrol.  The suggestion is that this may be designed as a partial exemption for business 
taxpayers since diesel engines are commonly used in commercial vehicles.37
                                                             
32 HM Treasury, ‘Protecting the Environment: Reform of Company Car Taxation’ (2000) <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/bud_bud00_pressrev6.htm> Accessed 10/5/2010. 
  Though the 
33 Ibid. 
34 <http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/financebill/1999/c44.html> Accessed 10/5/2010. 
35 See HMRC guidance at <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/eimanual/EIM31240.htm> Accessed 10/5/2010. 
36 HMRC’s 2006 report suggested the environmental impact was equivalent to 0.5% of CO2 emissions from all 
road transport; see HMRC, ‘Report on the Evaluation of the Company Car Tax Reform: Stage 2’ (2006) 
Appendix II <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2006/company-car-evaluation.pdf> Accessed 10/5/2010.  See also 
HMRC’s 2008 report for tax revenue figures and further improvements in HMRC, ‘Report on the Interaction 
between Company Cars, Employee Car Ownership Scheme Cars and Mileage Allowance Payments’ (2008) 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2008/comp-car-tax-805.pdf> Accessed 10/5/2010. 
37 Fullerton, D, Leicester, A and Smith, S, ‘Environmental Taxes’ in IFS, Dimensions of Tax Design: The 
Mirrlees Review (Oxford: OUP; 2010) at 484. 
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lower rates are also available to non-commercial diesel vehicles, potentially leading to a 
distorting situation of inadvertently encouraging non-commercial consumption of diesel 
vehicles,38
 
 this reality demonstrates how both tax rates and tax types can be manipulated to 
partially reduce the tax burden for business taxpayers. 
Recognising where final incidence falls in a given situation can assist a policymaker in 
designing a tax to cause private individuals to bear the burden without negative public 
opposition which could hinder the effectiveness of the tax.  Loewenstein et al recognise the 
psychology where many taxpayers are uncertain as to where final incidence of some taxes 
will fall and may assume it is not them.39  Since, for example, a corporate taxpayer can be 
nominally responsible for payment of a tax, the public may assume that they have been 
exempted from the burden (such as with CCL) whereas in reality the effects of elasticity and 
relationships (such as between retailer and consumer) cause final incidence to rest with non-
corporate taxpayers.  Such a method is available to the policymaker, though may not always 
work in practice if the public recognise the extent of such ‘stealth taxes’.40
  
 
36.5.2 CONCLUSION 
 
The decisions as to both whether, and how far, a policymaker intends business taxpayers to 
be included as burden-bearing parties in an environmental programme, can dictate the type of 
tax utilised.  A policymaker may have good reasons for wishing to reduce the extent to which 
business taxpayers bear a tax burden thereby protecting the competitiveness and prosperity of                                                              
38 A point recognised in Fullerton et al, Ibid at 484. 
39 Loewenstein G, Small DA, & Strad J, ‘Statistical, Identifiable, and  Iconic Victims’,  in McCaffery EJ & 
Slemrod J, Behavioural Public Finance (New York: Russell Sage Foundation Press, 2006), pp. 32–46, at 38-39. 
40 Macnaughton A, Matthews TA and Pittman J, ‘‘Stealth Tax Rates’: Effective Versus Statutory Personal 
Marginal Tax Rates’ (1998) 46 Can.Tax.J. 5, 1029-1066, at 1031-1033.  See also Rupert TJ and Fischer C, ‘An 
Empirical Investigation of Taxpayer Awareness of Marginal Tax Rates’ (1995) 17, supplement, Journal of the 
American Taxation Association 36-59. 
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the business economy.  It is shown to be possible to provide an incentive for business 
taxpayers to reduce their environmental impact.  However, a policymaker may also design a 
tax which inadvertently exempts businesses, even though it may have been intended that 
businesses would share the burden.  If a policymaker wishes business taxpayers to bear some 
or the entire burden, then taxes such as VAT should be avoided and instead taxes such as 
excise duties can be used.  If not, then it may be private individuals who end up bearing a 
disproportionate burden of an environmental programme.  
 
36.6 ELASTICITY CONSIDERATIONS AND INCIDENCE 
 
 
If a product or service is inelastic and is subject to a consumption tax, final incidence tends to 
fall upon the consumer in the form of higher purchase prices.  In passing on the cost, the 
producer has no incentive to alter any production techniques, and the status quo can lead to 
potential environmental harm.   
 
If the harm takes place during production, a consumption tax on an inelastic good or service 
(representing the harm caused during production) may therefore be ineffective in reducing the 
damage.  The only benefit will be to raise revenue (whether or not earmarked for 
environmental projects) at the expense of consumers.  Even if the producer is charged to tax 
to represent the harm caused during production, the additional cost is often passed on and 
final incidence rests with the consumer.  Indeed Turner et al argue that the decision of where 
to place the tax is not a straightforward issue of distributional fairness since, particularly if 
there is a monopoly, “it is households which ultimately bear the burden of the tax, regardless 
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of who makes the tax payments...”41  The OECD estimate that most environmentally-related 
taxes in reality are sales taxes related to emissions or pollutions.42
 
  As such the burden can 
frequently fall on the consumer which incites distributive concerns.   
Turner et al’s statement is not invariably true.  Consumers tend to bear the highest burden 
when there is high price elasticity of supply and low price elasticity of demand.  Where there 
is low price elasticity of supply and high price elasticity of demand then it is producers who 
bear the tax burden, potentially via a reduced return on their investment.  Incidence of a tax 
on production can also fall partially on production workers who may receive lower wages.43
 
 
36.7 SUBSIDIES 
 
36.7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax subsidies can provide considerable incentives to private individuals or enterprises to 
become more environmentally efficient.  This can be the most efficient means of achieving 
environmental goals depending on the circumstances.  Notionally, however, it is the Treasury 
who loses revenue from doing so, and therefore means that the burden for environmental 
protection falls upon the taxpayer.  On the other hand, if environmental objectives can be 
achieved through private means rather than Government spending then this does not cost the 
taxpayer.  In essence, tax subsidies can be a more efficient expenditure for the taxpayer than 
direct Government spending, if the environmental objective can be achieved at a lower cost 
through private enterprise via tax incentives. 
                                                             
41 Turner et al, see chapter 2, n.48 at 123. 
42 See chapter 2, n.52, at 18, para. 39.  
43 See EC, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Green Paper on Market-Based Instruments 
for Environment and related Policy Purposes (2007) {SEC(2007)388} at 3. 
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36.7.2 GUIDELINES: JUSTIFIABLE STATE AID 
 
The EU makes considerable use of tax exemptions and deferrals as a form of aid to various 
sectors.  Between 2002-2004, tax exemptions made up over 32% of EU aid instruments for 
the manufacturing and services sectors, with tax deferrals adding another 3%.44  State aid is 
discouraged by the EU by virtue of Article 92(1), and the EU generally45 discourages use of 
State aid to align domestic companies with Community standards.46
 
  This is in line with the 
polluter-pays principle since it goes against the idea that the public at large should be made to 
bear the cost for achieving private companies’ environmental standards.   
However not all measures to protect the environment are classified by the EU as State aid,47 
including tax measures designed to promote environmental objectives which is classed as a 
‘general measure’.48 Thus around 80% of environmental and energy saving aid to businesses 
was granted by EU Member States in 2004 through tax exemptions.49  The justification given 
is that “such exemptions are only allowed where the taxes themselves are intended to make a 
significant contribution to protecting the environment and the exemptions should not 
undermine the general objectives pursued.”50
 
   
                                                             
44 EC, State Aid Scoreboard (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2005) COM(2005)624, at 
26, Graph 2. 
45 Allowances are made for SMEs who the EC regard may have ‘special difficulties’ in achieving environmental 
standards: Regulation (EC) No 70/2001. 
46 EC, ‘Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection’ (2001) OJ C/37 of 03.02.2001. 
47 EC, see n.44, at 37, para. 2.1.5. 
48 Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures relating to Direct Business 
Taxation (98/C 384/03), Rule 13. 
49 EC, see n.44, at 39. 
50 Ibid, at 39. 
  
156  
This guideline, applied generally, could serve the environmental interest substantially since it 
would prevent any aid being given to a company which would cancel out the incentive to 
avoid environmental taxation.  Furthermore it would require a high onus of justification; it 
would need to be shown that the environment could benefit significantly through the tax 
relief.  Making provisions less onerous than this would make it difficult to justify a cost to the 
taxpayer.  The World Bank supports this and warns against using tax subsidies on energy 
suppliers which would undermine their incentive to produce electricity in an efficient 
manner.51  Otherwise it would be inequitable for taxpayers to be required to fund an activity 
from which they will not benefit.52
 
   
36.7.3 PURPOSEFUL DISTRIBUTION 
 
McDaniel considers the equity of tax subsidies and argues that for a tax subsidy of this sort to 
be equitable, it must be fair to distribute it, which involves identifying whether there is an 
externality of public importance which the tax expenditure can correct.53
 
   It must also be 
distributed fairly among deserving recipients which requires ensuring that all of the benefit 
reaches the desired recipients.  This reasserts the principle that the public must benefit from 
anything they subsidise and consequently they must receive value for money. 
36.7.4 CONTRADICTORY SUBSIDIES 
                                                              
51 The World Bank, see chapter 4, n.39 at 95. 
52 Research by the GSI (Global Subsidies Initiative) of the ISSD calls for increased transparency in order to 
identify and remove subsidies for fossil fuel producers which would cancel out incentives for renewable energy: 
Laan T, ‘Untold Billions: Fossil Fuel Subsidies, their Impacts, and the path to Reform’ (2010) 
<http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf> Accessed 10/5/2010. 
53 McDaniel PR, ‘Tax and Spend’ (2002) Unpublished manuscript cited in Mann R, ‘Waiting to Exhale: Global 
Warming and Tax Policy’ (2002) 51 Am.U.L.Rev. 1135-1222, at 1206, fn. 503. 
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The USA has had differing experiences of tax subsidies in this respect, where they have been 
used as incentives for the domestic energy policy.  The US Energy Policy Act 199254
 
 
provides production tax credits for qualifying facilities to produce renewable electricity, in 
order to subsidise and consequently reduce the price of renewable electricity.  This is in the 
public’s financial and environmental interest and as such it can be argued that such tax 
expenditure can be justified given the guidelines above.   
Mann55 demonstrates however that the US revenue code allows considerable deductions for 
investments in oil and gas to the point that such investments can “yield greater proportionate 
tax benefits than investment in any other type of property.”56   This treatment may be 
regarded as of national importance as it has benefits for energy independence, employment, 
and can work to minimise energy prices for consumers.  Yet it undermines environmental 
efforts by favouring non-renewable energy as an investment as well as reducing the cost of 
non-renewable energy which distorts efforts to reduce the costs of renewable energy.57
 
 
36.7.5 SUMMARY 
 
As shown, subsidies can work as economically-efficient tax expenditures to achieve 
environmental policy objectives.  However, since it means that the public bear the tax burden, 
it is crucial that subsidies are directed to where they can have most effect.  This means 
                                                             
54 PL 102-486. 
55 Mann, see n.53. 
56 Ibid, at 1164-5. 
57 GSI research argues for the removal of subsidies for non-renewable energy subsidies, citing grounds of 
economic, social and environmental interest.  See eg.  Ellis J, ‘The Effects of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy 
Reform: A Review of Modelling and Empirical Studies’ (IISD, 2010) 
<http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/effects_ffs.pdf> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
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ensuring that non-environmental subsidies do not conflict with the environmental purpose of 
the tax expenditure, and it targets those recipients who will put it into use beneficial to the 
environmental interest. 
 
36.8 TAXES ON INDUSTRY 
 
36.8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As has been mentioned, taxes on producers of goods need to be targeted so that they have the 
desired impact in making production methods more efficient rather than simply passing the 
additional cost onto the consumer.  Equally it is important that the taxes provide the correct 
incentive for producers to minimise their tax liability by meeting environmental objectives.  
In this way the tax system does not inflict harm on industry by over-burdening it, and can 
actually benefit it by making it more efficient and rewarding industries which are proactive in 
reducing their negative environmental impact.   
36.8.2 VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS 
 
 
Various methods have been employed to agree voluntary agreements to achieve 
environmental policy.  A Swiss CO2 law58 imposed a tax on large-scale polluters but 
provided an exemption for those entering an undertaking with the authorities to reach 
negotiated targets.59  In the UK, energy intensive businesses can60 pay a reduced rate61                                                             
58 Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions (1999) (Bundesgesetz vom 8. Oktober 1999 über die 
Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen. 
 of 
59 Pursuant to Article 9. 
60 Pursuant to FA 2000, para.44, Schedule 6. 
61 20%. 
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CCL if they make a supply to a facility covered by a Climate Change Agreement.62  The 
EU’s Energy Taxation Directive recognises the use of voluntary agreements for tax reduction 
as legitimate, in order to gradually introduce environmental taxes.63
 
 
The opportunity to make a voluntary agreement provides a significant incentive and 
essentially works similarly to a command-and-control system with the threat of financial 
penalties, though implies greater freedom of choice.  If the correct level of taxation is not 
threatened, then it could mean the cost of implementing the improved environmental 
standards is lower than the cost of the tax.  If industry is prepared to bear the burden of the 
tax, this indicates industry has not fully accounted for its environmental impact.  Generally, 
however, environmental taxes are unpopular with businesses who are keen to avoid them, as 
argued by Snape.64
 
   
With the threat of tax set at a level which makes industry achieve the voluntary agreement’s 
standards, this means that the method ensures industry bears the cost of achieving the 
environmental objective.  Nevertheless, should the voluntary targets be achieved there are no 
incentives in this method to go beyond what is required by the targets.65
 
  Incentives beyond 
the voluntary targets such as further tax deductions could provide a significant incentive to 
meet environmental goals. 
36.8.3 CHOICE OF TAXABLE PART OF PRODUCTION PROCESS 
                                                             
62 Given that the Agreement has been certified by DEFRA. 
63 Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27/10/2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of 
energy products and electricity, OJ L/283, 31/10/2003 P. 0051 – 0070.  Art.29 permits exemptions for 
businesses entering into agreements to significantly enhance environmental protection and energy efficiency 
deserve attention. 
64 Snape, see chapter 6, n.65, at 543. 
65 This is recognised by the OECD, see chapter 2, n.39 at 41-42. 
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What part of the production process to tax depends on the type of industry involved and 
polluters tend to disagree that their part of the process should bear any burden.  The World 
Bank for examples discourages (particularly in the developing World) the burden of energy 
price subsidies falling on generators of electricity since it could have wider impacts, such as 
hindering a reliable source of energy.66  A Canadian Government report advises that 
abatement opportunities at the end of the production process are limited which reduces the 
scope for ‘end-of-pipe’ taxes. 67  An EU Directive68 requires Member States to exempt from 
tax, electricity and energy products used to produce electricity, and electricity used to 
maintain the ability to produce electricity.69  This has been ruled to have direct effect in 
national courts, and shows that the EU are prepared to limit the scope of taxation where it is 
in the interests of the community.70
 
  Placing taxes on the production of electricity is deemed 
to produce greater social ills by providing a disincentive to generate electricity which is 
regarded as a vital social utility, and would only serve to increase consumer energy prices.  
Taxes are instead focused on reducing consumption rather than reducing generation, so as to 
affect the demand side rather than the supply side in order to avoid electricity shortages.  
Consequently the choice of the taxable part of a production process, and therefore who bears 
the burden, will differ depending upon the circumstances in question. 
36.9 WIDER POLICY ISSUES 
 
                                                             
66 The World Bank, see chapter 4, n.39, at 95. 
67 Government of Canada, Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection: Discussion Paper (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at 57. 
68 Council Directive 2003/96, Art. 14(1)(a) on taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ L283/51) 
69 See comment by Edwards V, ‘Case Comment: Taxation’ (2009) 21(1) JEL 157. 
70 Case C-226/07 Flughafen Köln/Bonn GmbH v Hauptzollamt Köln (judgment of 17/7/2008) (ECJ (Third 
Chamber)) (OJ C 155, 7.7.2007). 
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36.9.1 POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES 
 
  
Political sensitivities can prevent entire groups or sectors from being charged to tax which 
means they are not required to contribute to environmental protection.  The CCL in Britain 
applied only to business energy, thereby removing domestic energy users from the 
requirement to contribute.  Furthermore, by taxing business energy rather than carbon 
emissions, the CCL avoided bringing the coal industry into charge as this would have been 
politically unpopular for the Government at the time.71
36.9.2 POLICY EXEMPTIONS 
  Thus parts of the decision on who 
bears the tax burden of environmental reform can depend not only on the economic realities 
of a business but on the political circumstances related to an incumbent Government.   
 
Other exemptions are designed to protect or encourage environmental interests as well as the 
economy of the industry to which they are related.  For example, the Hydrocarbon Oil Duties 
Act 1979 imposes fuel duty on different types of oil, and the rates are regularly increased 
which impacts upon both industry and consumers.72  However, repayments are allowed for 
certain industries which policymakers want to encourage if it serves an environmental 
interest.  Horticultural producers in the UK are able to claim repayment73 of the excise duty 
for the heavy oil used through production, subject to set conditions, which encourages 
production in an industry that may otherwise not be able to survive.74
                                                             
71 Dresner et al, see chapter 3, n.32 at 933. 
  The rates of available 
repayment were increased in 2007 to reflect the increased duties, showing that it is not merely 
72 FA 2007, s.10 increased the rate of fuel duty from 1/10/2007. 
73 By virtue of Hydrocarbon Oil Duties Act 1979, s.17 (as amended). 
74 The Hydrocarbon Oil (Amendment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1134) lays down conditions governing 
repayment. 
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a revenue-raising measure.75
 
  This, however, means that other taxpayers who cannot claim 
this allowance must bear the tax burden. 
Nevertheless, should the horticultural industry fold then long-distance transport may be 
required to get substituted produce to the consumer.  This justifies the tax subsidies to this 
industry both economically and environmentally.  Economically it is in the national interest 
to protect such production which reduces the need to import goods and produces domestic 
income.  Environmentally, the result of increased long-haul transport would be damaging - 
potentially to a much greater extent than the use of heavy oil in horticultural production.  The 
withdrawal of this subsidy would not mean a reduction in net heavy oil in horticultural 
production, since there is no guarantee that the products will be produced in a country 
without such subsidies.  This mindfulness towards international competitiveness and the 
consideration of the global net environmental harm caused by subsidies or taxes is returned to 
in Chapter 8.  However the point has been emphasised that the policymaker may need to 
consider such exemptions due to wider policy implications. 
 
36.9.3 WELFARE AND DISTRIBUTIVE CONCERNS 
 
 
The concept of revenue recycling has been analysed in Chapter 4 and it is accepted that it is 
important to change social behaviour towards the environment without increasing poverty.  
Therefore taxes can be targeted towards particular groups in order that those on the lowest 
incomes do not bear the majority burden of environmental taxation.  Indeed, Baranzini et al 
                                                             
75 FA 2007, s.10 increased the rates of rebate. 
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suggest that revenue recycling can be used to cancel out any regressive impacts on 
environmental taxes.76
 
   
The type of tax used will vary depending on the economic and social circumstances of each 
particular country.  In the Republic of Turkey, for example, taxes on vehicle fuel have not 
been considered to be regressive and have actually resulted in progressive income 
distribution.  This is because in Turkey it is the wealthier households who generally own 
vehicles and not the poor, so the wealthy end up paying more in tax than the poor which 
means a progressive sharing of the burden.77  Generally however environmental taxes are 
regarded as being directly regressive on income distribution, particularly with energy taxes.78  
Different types of goods or services also have varying distributional impacts.  For example 
passenger taxes on public transport such as bus tickets are regressive while passenger 
transport taxes such as on air travel or fuel duty are progressive, because of the incomes of 
those who use each type.79
 
 
36.9.4 COMPENSATORY MEASURES 
 36.9.4.1 TAX-AND-COMPENSATION PACKAGES 
 
 
 
                                                             
76 Baranzini et al, see chapter 4, n.15 at 405. 
77 OECD, ‘An OECD Framework for Effective and Efficient Environmental Policies: Overview’ (2008) 
[ENV/EPOC(2008)6/FINAL] at 4. 
78 OECD, ‘Policy Brief: The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes’ (2007) at 4, 
<www.oecd/org/env/taxes/politicaleconomy/> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
79 EC, see n.43 at 3.  It should also be noted however that much food is flown into the UK because it can be 
efficient to fill the aircraft holds.  The air passengers effectively subsidise the cost of importing food which 
could otherwise be more expensive, having regressive effects on those with low incomes. 
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Consequently compensatory measures may be used to rectify these distributional concerns, 
and the OECD advise that this should be done through income compensation (through the 
social security or income tax system) rather than through exemptions from tax, so as to 
prevent the effectiveness of the tax being diminished.80  This is not, however, how the British 
Government sought to assist elderly citizens with fuel payments when direct ‘Winter Fuel 
Payments’ were introduced for old-age pensioners.81
 
  However, this was not introduced in 
response to an increased energy tax, but rather to increased energy prices and to prevent 
energy poverty causing unnecessary deaths among the elderly.   It was also done in a non-
means tested manner so that anybody of State Pension age could claim it regardless of 
personal income or wealth.   
The Fabian Society, the UK Government’s oldest policy think-tank, believe that moving to 
zero-carbon energy sources will increase energy prices, at least in the short term, and 
consequently advise the Government to protect the poorest consumers in order to achieve the 
desired objective.82  Consequently, if this policy is to be used generally, it is important that 
compensation is provided in a way which does not undermine compliance with 
environmental objectives.  The Meade Report criticises the combined use of income tax, 
NICs and social benefits as being a complicated and “uncoordinated system of tax and 
subsidy on personal incomes…not fully effective in the relief of poverty.”83
                                                             
80 OECD, see n.78 at 4. 
  Coordinated 
compensation policies working within wider reform of the tax system are therefore necessary 
to avoid further distortion and over-complication.  They can also be more politically 
acceptable than simply imposing a new eco-tax, as advocated by Ligthart, who proposes the 
81 See The Pensions Service, ‘Winter Fuel Payment’ 
<http://www.thepensionservice.gov.uk/winterfuel/home.asp> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
82 <http://fabians.org.uk/index.php/20090108756/Publications/Publications-News/cheap-energy-harman-
independent.html> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
83 See chapter 1, n.9 at 86. 
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solution for policymakers can be to market environmental tax-and-compensation ‘package 
deals’.84
 
 Again such compensation methods mean that the burden is a progressive one based 
on consumption.   
36.9.4.2 LEVEL OF SACRIFICES OF LOW INCOME GROUPS  
 
 
Chapter 5 emphasises the importance of finding the correct rate of taxation so as not to 
intensify poverty and penalise the poor.   When considering compensatory measures it is 
necessary also to determine how to avoid undesirable side-effects related to low-income 
groups.  As eluded, if low-income groups are protected from environmental taxation, they 
may equally not suffer the same incentive to modify their environmental behaviour.  This 
would increase the burden on higher-income groups, who may themselves have to make 
sacrifices (such as driving less) whilst low-income groups do not.  It is necessary therefore to 
consider the level of disposable income available to low-income groups, and what sacrifices 
individuals would need to make if they are to share a proportion of the burden.  For instance 
if a low-income group was required to pay an environmental tax, it would be appropriate to 
identify what type of sacrifices the individuals would need to make.  If the disposable 
incomes were so low that essential consumption goods such as food would need to be 
sacrificed, then some sort of tax protection or compensation may be required to avoid further 
poverty.  However, if the disposable incomes allowed the consumption of luxury goods such 
as cigarettes, then the policymaker would have more flexibility in determining whether to 
allow any sort of compensatory package, as low-income individuals would have a choice of 
whether to sacrifice luxury goods or essential goods.  Again, this assumes that the 
policymaker considers welfare objectives as well as environmental ones.                                                              
84 Ligthart, see chapter 4, n.19 at 28. 
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 36.9.4.3 OVERCOMPENSATION AND THE POVERTY TRAP 
 
 
The danger of increasing the ‘poverty trap’ exists through compensatory measures to low-
income groups as part of package where, for example, the unemployed are compensated due 
to rising levels of environmental taxation. For example a welfare system may already offer an 
incentive to the unemployed to seek employment.  However, if levels of compensation for an 
environmental tax to the unemployed were set too high, this may alleviate the incentive to 
seek employment – as it may become less economically worthwhile working than remaining 
unemployed and claiming the compensation.  Any salary would necessarily need to be larger 
than the compensation available for the unemployed.  Therefore prior to introducing a 
package of tax and compensation, a policymaker should evaluate how rates would affect 
existing incentives and various income groups. 
 36.9.4.4 COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE MEASURES: EXACERBATING POVERTY 
 
A further pertinent issue is that it may be entirely fruitless to impose environmental taxes on 
those who can least afford it.  Taxes on the poorest in society may simply be unaffordable, 
particularly in deprived regions of developing countries.  An income tax for example may be 
simply ignored and any attempts to enforce compliance could only lead to the criminalisation 
of groups already below the poverty line, thus increasing the burden on the State to fund 
prison places for those who were never going to be able to afford the burden.  Consumption 
taxes on items essential for basic needs could leave people unable to afford other essentials 
such as food, housing or heating, leading to increased poverty and death and thus reversing 
efforts aimed at assisting such groups.  For those in any society who are dependent on State 
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benefits, some environmental taxes would be counter-productive if they led not to people 
changing their environmental behaviour but to increased poverty.  Indeed, it could only mean 
that State benefits have to increase in order to offset the threat of poverty which would result 
in the State having to raise revenue by taxing other groups.   
 
An example of this type of change can be given in the UK’s income tax code.  Prior to 2008 
there were three income tax bands: the ‘lower rate’ of 10%, the ‘basic rate’ of 22% and the 
‘higher rate’ of 40%.85  However, the Finance Act 2008 abolished the 10% rate, leaving only 
a basic rate of 20% and a higher rate of 40%.86  Since most taxpayers were paying the basic 
rate previously, the decision was popular amongst the electorate as it was thought to represent 
a 2% reduction in income tax.87  Yet the decision meant that millions of people on the lowest 
incomes who previously paid 10% tax then had to pay double that, hurting them the most.88  
Due to political revolt within the Government’s own party, HM Treasury then had to 
compensate those who were losing out from the new rates by increasing the personal 
allowance on anybody not subject to the higher rate89 and providing lump-sum payments in 
affected taxpayers’ pre-amendment wages. This effectively was a tax allowance worth GBP 
£120 to most – but not all – of those who had lost out, and meant HM Treasury had to borrow 
an additional GBP £2.7 billion to fund the change.90
 
  Hence the policymaker is advised that 
welfare considerations should always be made before such severe changes are carried out, as 
the effects can result in the need for further embarrassing changes to the tax code. 
                                                             
85 See  <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/it.htm> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
86 FA 2008, s.1. 
87 Described as “the lowest for 75 years.” ‘Gord help us’ The Sun 22/3/2007 
<http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/sun_says/article6152.ece> Accessed 1/11/2009. 
88 Thought to be 5.3 million people: ‘Darling unveils £120-a-year tax giveaway’ Daily Mail, This is Money 
14/5/2008, <http//www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/article.html?in_article_id=441545&in_page_id=2> Accessed 
11/3/2010. 
89 FA 2008, s.2. 
90 ‘Gordon Brown pays £2.7 billion to end 10p tax crisis’ The Times 14/5/2008 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3927280.ece> Accessed 11/3/2010. 
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36.9.4.5 COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE MEASURES: OVER-BURDENING THE EMPLOYED 
 
Much of this points to taxes being focused instead on those who can afford it, though this can 
lead to another form of injustice.  Those who have a job are then put under increased pressure 
to contribute, further risking the poverty trap.  Increased taxes can also disincentivise those 
who have greater mobility from working (or operating in the case of a company) within the 
jurisdiction, leading to legal persons (often with the highest incomes) leaving the jurisdiction 
to work and pay taxes abroad.  Indeed, in the UK in 2009, only 48% of the adult population 
had a job and it was predicted that, following the recession and rising numbers of pensioners, 
the burden of taxation would continue falling on fewer taxpayers91 in a context where the 
overall tax burden had risen by 10% in 12 years.92
 
  Thus the problem of deciding where the 
burden should fall within the jurisdiction arises for the policymaker who must scrutinise the 
welfare situation of the economy before any decision is made, as well as the effects on 
workers at large. 
 
36.10 ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
36.10.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
An additional burden for a taxpayer will be any costs of ensuring they have complied with 
and paid a tax.   If a tax system is complex then a specialist tax advisor may be required to 
ensure compliance.  Attempts at compliance may also lead to disputes or litigation with the                                                              
91 ‘Weight of the national debt will fall on fewer shoulders’ The Times 14/4/2009. 
92 ‘Budget 2009: Family tax up by 10pc since Labour came to power in 1997 and it could get worse’ The 
Telegraph 16/4/2009 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/budget/5162430/Budget-2009-Family-
tax-up-by-10pc-since-Labour-came-to-power-in-1997-and-it-could-get-worse.html> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
  
169  
tax authorities, requiring specialist professional advice or representation.  Any such costs 
would lead to compliance costs being considered high.  These costs, whilst indirect, add to 
the overall burden of tax and can be seen to make the system less economically efficient.  
This section aims to identify how compliance and enforcement costs can be minimised for 
private parties and the Treasury. 
 
36.10.2  DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
 
A nation’s Treasury would generally prefer such costs to fall on the taxpayer than on the 
Treasury itself.  If enforcement of a tax is expensive, then it is regarded as administratively 
inefficient.93  Further, if the tax distorts the market by causing undesirable market conditions, 
causing additional indirect economic costs then it can be regarded as fiscally inefficient.94
 
  
Therefore there are private, social and mixed costs associated with various types of taxes, and 
these costs vary depending upon who the taxpayer is and the rate of tax payable.  Even if 
private costs of compliance are tax deductible this is of net cost to the Treasury and therefore 
makes the general taxpayer bear the burden. 
Nevertheless, the Meade Report illustrates that private compliance costs can be significantly 
higher than any administration costs95
                                                             
93 The administrative costs of compliance with environmental taxes can be compared with parallel costs for non-
environmental taxation to determine whether they are proportionately efficient. Research into environmental tax 
reform in the Czech Republic found that an average 1.3% proportion of tax revenues in administrative costs was 
economical. Pavel J and Vitek L, ‘Administrative Costs of the Czech System of Environmental Charges’ in 
Cottrell J et al, see chapter 7, n.17 at pp.258-9. 
 and be regressive and resented by taxpayers who can 
94 On Compliance Theory see Curry PA, Hill C, and Parisi P, ‘Creating Failures in the Market for Tax Planning’ 
(2007) 26 Va.Tax Rev, at 943. 
95 See chapter 1, n.9 at 20. 
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go to considerable effort and expense to prove minimal tax liability.96  Further, 
administration costs are open to public scrutiny and easily definable since they are met from 
public funds whereas compliance costs are non-transparent and difficult to quantify since 
they fall on private parties.97
 
   
36.10.3  LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
 
Clear legislation can serve to minimise compliance costs by making it less expensive for tax 
returns to be completed.  Certainty created by clear legislation means private taxpayers do not 
have to risk costs through litigation, nor do tax authorities need to spend public money 
enforcing their interpretation of the law.98  The Meade Report urges that a tax system should 
make it “clear to the taxpayer what is and what is not taxable”, 99 and should be coherent and 
precise.100  Further it advises for certainty as to the amount that is payable pursuant to a 
tax.101
 
   
The limited resources available to the tax authorities are more justifiably spent on enforcing a 
high level of compliance with the tax than in funding litigation or investigations caused by 
ambiguous or imprecise legislation.  Higher compliance means a wider tax base.  This is 
more equitable per taxpayer because more parties share the burden as opposed to ‘honest’ 
taxpayers taking responsibility for dishonest parties.  Glachant recognises that “…in reality 
                                                             
96 Ibid at 21. 
97 Ibid. 
98 See chapter 2, n.23.  
99 See chapter 1, n.9 at 18. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid at 19. 
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full compliance is far from being frequent due to limited administrative resources…”102 This 
makes clear drafting crucial.103
 
    
36.10.4  UTILISING THE EXISTING TAX CODE 
 
 
To minimise both types of costs, and particularly administration costs, there is a case for 
ascertaining the feasibility of incorporating the new tax into the present tax code.  Inclusions 
within the VAT code, while not costless, would mean there is an existing and accepted 
system within which the tax can operate.  The Irish plastic bag tax is a good example of this 
since it enjoyed low administration costs both initially and annually.104  Further, it was not 
privately onerous since retailers were able to incorporate their collection and reporting of 
revenue within their pre-existing VAT collection procedures.105
 
   
The UK altered an existing functioning system of VED so that it was based on emissions 
rather than vehicle value, which meant that is was not just ‘piggy-backing’ on a tax system 
but restructuring an entire tax operation for environmental purposes.  This changed an 
arbitrary though arguably progressive tax system into a polluter-pays code.106
                                                             
102 Glachant M, ‘The Political Economy of Emission Tax Design in Environmental Policy’ (2002) Fondazione 
Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 96.2002, at 25. 
  As the 
103 Cockfield explains that tax planning takes value away from other economic activities without adding real 
value, and as such is a waste of resources which reduces economic growth, in Cockfield A, ‘Optimal Climate 
Change Tax Policy for Small Open Economies’ in Cullen R and Vanderwolk JD, Green Taxation in East Asia 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011). 
104 According to the personal communications between Convery et al and Ireland’s Revenue Commissioners 
Ireland’s, and Ireland’s Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government in 2002 the initial set-
up costs were EUR €1.2 million whilst annual administration costs stood at EUR €350,000.  See Convery et al, 
chapter 1, n.7 at 6. 
105 See Convery et al, Ibid at 6-7. 
106 It is arguable however that the VED rates do represent a progressive based system since frequently the 
highest emitting vehicles are those that are the most expensive to buy outright, such as 4 x 4 vehicles with large 
engine capacities.  
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emission charging only took place on newly purchased vehicles, it meant that the issue of 
progressive taxation was irrelevant.  
 
Whilst it may be economically favourable to piggy-back on existing tax systems, the problem 
is that the pursuit of lower administration costs can lead taxes not necessarily being placed 
where they would have most effect.  It can also mean that those who are ‘easiest’ to tax, such 
as consumers, end up bearing the majority of the burden.107  Hufbauer notes that in terms of 
administration “…it is relatively easy to tax human residents on their wages or consumption, 
and relatively hard to tax paper entities on their income.”108
 
  It is advisable therefore that 
taxes include those who are more complex to charge to tax in order that the burden of the 
environmental programme can be shared not just amongst those who are easiest to tax but all 
those who share responsibility for environmental damage.  
It can also prove expensive either for the tax authorities or private parties to measure the scale 
of the taxable subject.  Smith explains that if the measurements are especially technical and 
require scientific skills – such as to monitor emissions – the costs will likely be high until 
suitable technology is developed. 109
                                                             
107 Smith notes that the large majority of existing taxes are on transactions (such as income tax and sales tax).   
   Further, if there are many sources to measure this can 
add to the cost.  Thus it would be an attractive option to relate the taxes to items that are 
already measured for commercial purposes unrelated to tax, which would limit the cost 
significantly.  Smith recognises this would also likely prove more accurate if the 
108 Hufbauer GC, ‘Income vs. Consumption Taxation: Domestic and International Reforms’ (2000-2001) 26 
Brook.J.Int’l L 4, 1555-1563, at 1557, quoting Rosenbloom in  Rosenbloom DH, ‘From the Bottom Up: Taxing 
the Income of Foreign Controlled Corporations (2001) 26 Brook.J.Int’l L, 1525. 
109 Smith S, ‘Green Tax Reforms and Road Transport in Britain and Germany’ (1997) 3 Environmental Taxation 
and Accounting, 21-37, at 20. 
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measurements are already taken for non-tax purposes since the incentive to avoid taxes would 
not have been a factor. 110
 
 
36.11 FOREIGN INCOME 
 
36.11.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As discussed, the type of tax imposed determines where the burden falls.  Income tax falls 
immediately upon national residents and enterprises. Taxes imposed on consumption within a 
jurisdiction bring in revenue from national consumers.111
36.11.2  EXPORT TAX 
  However it is possible to bring in 
revenue from outside the jurisdiction so that residents are not bearing the sole burden for a 
nation’s environmental programme.  The various methods are analysed below. 
 
 
One method is to tax exports.  This additional price of the exported goods or services could 
be borne by foreign consumers who will therefore fund the nation’s environmental tax 
revenue.  This could represent the environmental cost in producing or transporting the export 
abroad.   
 
This is an especially dangerous method since, unless it is a highly inelastic export, it will 
likely reduce foreign demand for the export, which will be detrimental to national business                                                              
110 Ibid, at 20. 
111 Non-national tourists also bear some responsibility, though higher consumption taxes can lead to fewer 
overall tourist consumers which can be damaging to national business.  Non-EU residents can however claim 
VAT refunds for some purchases – see HMRC, ‘VAT refunds for visitors to the UK’ 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/VAT/sectors/consumers/overseas-visitors.htm> Accessed 11/5/2010. 
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interests, and final incidence may fall upon employees in the form of lost jobs.  Alternatively, 
it could mean the exporter or producer reducing the cost to maintain demand for the export, 
which would cause final incidence to fall upon the national exporter or producer.  This should 
therefore be avoided in most cases, though could be used if there is a particular policy interest 
in keeping the item within the jurisdiction.  It could be a national treasure or there may be a 
shortage of a particular item within the country which would mean there is an interest in 
avoiding its export – though the environmental justification would in such cases be a façade 
for other national interests. 
 
36.11.3 BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 
 
 
Import taxes per se can be impermissible under global free trade rules as they are deemed to 
be anti-competitive.  An alternative method is to tax imports in the same way that nationally-
produced goods or services are taxed.  This may be justifiable if the foreign nation has not 
taxed their exports to take account of environmental costs, as it would otherwise be a 
disadvantage for the importing nation since locally produced goods or services would be 
subject to higher costs due to internal environmental taxation.  Such taxes are referred to as 
‘border tax adjustments’.  There are specific rules of international trade and competition law 
necessary to impose border tax adjustments which will be analysed in Chapter 8.   
 
When one nation has already harmonised taxes with another nation, then this will not be 
necessary.  When it is done it effectively works as a tax on environmentally inefficient 
production methods albeit in a foreign jurisdiction.  Without such adjustments, the foreign 
nation would be producing goods at a non-internalised environmental cost and benefiting 
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from this by selling them to a country whose own products have been so produced, thus 
placing them at significant advantage.   
 
Thus there are strong concepts of equity and competitiveness to justify the adjustments.  
Metcalf and Weisbach112
 
 further point out that border tax adjustments provide a further 
robust advantage by incentivising the countries without tax harmonisations to harmonise their 
taxes.  Since the adjustments mean they would no longer enjoy a trade advantage, the result is 
that the importing nation receives the tax revenues which the exporting nation forgoes.  
Therefore by imposing such a tax the revenues can be collected internally.   Political 
opposition to the tax could be mitigated through a revenue-neutral approach.  A country 
imposing border tax adjustments can consequently achieve environmental improvements 
domestically and in foreign countries who wish to trade with them, as well as making those 
responsible for environmentally inefficient production techniques bear the cost. 
36.11.4 TRANSPORTATION TAX ADVANTAGES 
 
If the environmental costs of transporting a product are taken into account as a border tax 
adjustment, this could have serious impacts on fuel duties.  It has only been in recent years 
that fuel duties have been regarded as environmental costs.  If a country with high fuel duties, 
charges foreign-registered lorries wishing to import goods, for example, into a country then a 
border tax adjustment could ensure that the foreign lorry’s fuel is charged at the same rates as 
within the country.  It may be regarded as an abuse of tax codes for a transporter purchasing 
low-tax fuel in one jurisdiction to compete in another jurisdiction where fuel taxes are much 
higher.                                                              
112 Metcalf G and Weisbach D, ‘The Design of a Carbon Tax’ (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review 
499-556, at 546. 
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Adjustments could be achieved for environmental reasons though it is likely that 
competitiveness would impact strongly upon the decision to impose the charge.    Whether 
this is legally permissible is a question to be considered in Chapter 8.  Nevertheless, the same 
environmental and competitiveness justifications as shown above could potentially be used to 
legitimise this sort of adjustment.  In a country such as Britain, where retailers encourage 
consumers to consider the ‘carbon footprint’ of imported goods, this could be advantageous 
to local producers.  It would likely however prove extremely controversial outside the UK 
and could seriously damage trade in developing countries as well as drive up prices of goods 
domestically and fuel prices abroad.113
 
 
37.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter has identified and explained the importance of a policymaker understanding and 
deciding who will bear the burden of a chosen tax method in achieving environmental policy 
objectives.  It has been emphasised that the policymaker must determine in advance who 
should be ultimately responsible for the cost, and design a tax method to achieve that 
outcome, understanding the market realities in any given context of who will inevitably bear 
the burden.  The implications of failing to do so can be severe both in achieving policy 
objectives and in the wider context of a society and its economy.  The findings are of 
importance to policymakers and answer RQ(ii) and RQ(iii) in part by enabling an 
understanding of how environmental objectives can be achieved via taxation.  These findings 
                                                             
113 The EU has already considered some fuel tax harmonisation which has proved controversial; 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/commission-proposes-harmonised-tax-diesel/article-115985> Accessed 
11/5/2010. 
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will be inputted in each stage of the Universal Model as they impact upon every policy 
question. 
 
The chapter began by critiquing the various principles of international law establishing which 
parties should be responsible for environmental taxes in theory.  It concluded that the 
polluter-pays principle was advantageous and equitable, and this worked alongside the theme 
of advocating that polluters should pay and ‘improvers’ (those helping to meet environmental 
objectives) should be rewarded. 
 
The chapter went on to analyse a range of tax methods available which can be designed to 
meet the intended contributors to the tax.  This considered whether it would be appropriate to 
limit the distributional impact of such methods upon low-income groups, and advised 
policymakers specifically upon how taxes can be designed if business taxpayers are intended 
to be contributors, due to competitiveness implications.  It was pointed out that a policymaker 
must understand how elasticity impacts upon tax incidence, which is further to be highlighted 
in Chapter 11. 
 
Subsidies are explored to advise policymakers both as to their legitimate usage and as to how 
they affect who bears their burden, including how they can negate the impact of tax 
incentives.  As taxes on industry bring in large receipts but can equally cause much harm to 
the economy, methods of ensuring that industry meets environmental objectives without 
overburdening it were considered. 
 
The question of who shares the burden of environmental taxation was subsequently 
considered in light of wider social, political and policy objectives.  Questions of political 
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feasibility in introducing burden-sharing legislation were examined, and importantly the 
chapter focused on the appropriate means of ensuring that all intended groups, including low-
income groups, could bear the burden without worsening poverty.  Methods of tax-and-
compensation packages were examined, in line with the theme, and the chapter explored the 
dangers of over-burdening various groups such as ordinary workers. 
 
Methods of ensuring administrative efficiency to limit the burden on the general taxpayer 
were considered in the penultimate section, which focused on minimising compliance and 
enforcement costs.  This advocated reducing administrative costs via methods such as 
ensuring drafting certainty and utilising the existing tax code. 
 
Finally, an international aspect was broached, with the chapter looking at how it can be 
advantageous and feasible for foreign taxpayers to share part of the burden.  This also looked 
at inequities for domestic taxpayers to bear a responsibility which foreign taxpayers may 
avoid, despite their contribution to the pollution itself.  This led the chapter to identify the 
usefulness of utilising Border Tax Adjustments in achieving environmental objectives, which 
will be analysed in Chapter 8. 
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38.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Universal Model proposes the use of BTAs (border tax adjustments) in circumstances 
where other jurisdictions fail to implement similar environmental standards or taxes, and 
where it may otherwise disadvantage the implementing nation.  However by introducing 
unilateral environmental policies, potentially using tax methods discussed, a nation can put 
itself at competitive disadvantage – and it is recognised that this may prevent policymakers 
from using such measures.  Following the introduction of this subject in Chapter 7, the 
purpose of this chapter is to explain the potential and purpose of BTAs, and demonstrate 
means by which environmental taxes can be implemented without unilateral disadvantages.  
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The objective is to offer policymakers viable methods to offset any competitiveness concerns, 
in order that their tax methods – and those suggested in the Universal Model – can be 
introduced without undue detriment to the economy.   
 
39.  INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
Resolving international environmental problems usually requires coordinated global action.  
With sources located around the world, necessary action could be taken where required 
without the obstacle of political and boundary limitations.  At the time of writing, this 
concept is politically unfeasible; Wiener explains it would require “…universal or nearly 
universal coverage of present and potential source locations.”1
 
   Even with issues of global 
environmental and political importance, all countries may not agree – such as with the USA’s 
refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
In the absence of any international consensus not only upon the most appropriate means of 
achieving environmental goals, but significantly upon whether certain environmental harms 
exist in the first place, it can  be argued that unilateral actions are necessary. 2
                                                             
1 Wiener, see chapter 2, n.106 at 696-7. 
 Advocates 
justify this by reasoning that action to protect the environment cannot be postponed pending 
2 With climate change there has been general international consensus amongst Governments about the existence 
of the problem.  However the possibility of non-agreement on the Copenhagen Protocol would have meant 
countries pursuing differing policies to tackle climate change, as identified in Sheldon I, ‘Climate Policy and 
Border Tax Adjustments: Some New Wine Mixed with Old Wine in New Green Bottles?’ (2009) 
<http://aede.osu.edu/programs/Anderson/trade/Climate%20Policy%20and%20Border%20Tax%20Adjustments.
pdf> Accessed 9/12/2009, at 6. 
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international consensus. 3   Others believe that where such consensus has been reached in the 
form of an international agreement, then non-signatories can be incentivised to ratify the 
agreement if signatories take trade measures against them. 4
 
 
These justifications are particularly relevant to environmental taxes, since countries may be 
wary of introducing them within their own jurisdictions if similar measures are not to be 
introduced abroad.  The rationale for this is that countries do not wish to put their own 
national industries at a disadvantage to foreign goods produced without such taxes with 
consequently lower costs.5   For instance, President Sarkosy has called for BTAs to represent 
carbon on imports into the EU to create a fair playing field.6  Furthermore, should mobile 
taxpaying industries relocate to ‘pollution haven’ countries offering little environmental 
regulation or taxation, 7
 
 then an environmentally conscientious country can lose valuable 
industries and their receipts, whilst there is no overall environmental benefit since the 
industry may continue or even increase levels of pollution overseas.  This is known as 
‘leakage’ and often involves a polluting company relocating to a DC (developing country) in 
need of revenue even at the expense of the environment. 
                                                             
3 Voon T, ‘Sizing up the WTO: Trade-Environment Conflict and the Kyoto Protocol’ (2000) 10 J.Transnat’l 
L.& Pol’y 1, 71-108, at 78 
4 This issue is examined in Weber CL and Peters GP, ‘Climate change policy and international trade: Policy 
considerations in the US’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 2, 432-440, at 437-439 
5 This is known in Game Theory as the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’, a paradoxical scenario where two parties can 
benefit by co-operating but may instead try to preserve their own interests perhaps due to mistrust that the other 
will cooperate.  See Poundstone W, Prisoner's Dilemma (New York: Anchor; 1993).   
6 Parashar S, ‘France wants a 'carbon tax' on EU imports’ The Times of India 30/11/2009 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/France-wants-a-carbon-tax-on-EU-
imports/articleshow/5282146.cms> Accessed 9/12/2009. 
7 Foreign direct investment in developing countries was found to be “relative to the stringency of their 
environmental regulations” in Elliott RJR and Shimamoto K, ‘Are ASEAN Countries Havens for Japanese 
Pollution-Intensive Industry?’ (2008) 31 The World Economy 2, 236-254, at 250. 
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The legality of BTAs for environmental purposes under WTO law has been debated in 
considerable depth and it is not intended to repeat this herein.8  The author accepts the 
considerable consensus that such measures are legitimate under certain circumstances,9
 
 and 
the law is expressed herein as it is commonly understood.  However the caveat is that there 
remains some uncertainty in the extent to which various applications of BTAs are permissible 
under WTO law.   
40.  WHAT IS A BTA? 
 
Any environmental tax which increases costs to domestic businesses may put them at a 
disadvantage against foreign produced goods not subjected to similar taxes.  Environmental 
taxes designed to disincentivise environmental harm or internalise negative externalities may 
come in the form of non-refundable taxes on businesses, such as excise taxes.  Such taxation 
can increase costs of production and consequently increase the sale price of a good relative to 
overseas goods (given that final incidence of the additional cost falls upon the consumer).  A 
country can operate an internal environmental policy and prevent over-exposure of its market 
to foreign-produced, less expensive but environmentally unfriendly goods through the use of 
BTAs.                                                                
8 See eg. Sindico F, ‘The EU and Carbon Leakage: How to Reconcile Border Adjustments with the WTO?’ 
(2008) 17 E.E.E.L.R. 6, 328; Goh G, ‘The World Trade Organisation, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the 
Border’  (2004) 38 J.W.T. 3, 295-423; Demaret P and Stewardson R, ‘BTAs under GATT and EC law and 
General Implications for Environmental Taxes’ (1994) 28 J.W.T. 4, 5-65; Bernstein S and Hannah E, ‘Non-
State Global Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space’ (2008) 11 Journal of 
International Law 3, 575-608, at 590. 
9 Switzer S, ‘International Trade Law and the Environment: Designing a Legal Framework to curtail the Import 
of Unsustainably Produced Biofuels’ (2007) 6 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 1, 30-44; Ismer R 
and Neuhoff K, ‘Border Tax Adjustment: a Feasible way to support Stringent Emission Trading’ (2007) 24 
European J. Law Econ. 2, 137-164; Veel P, ‘Carbon Tarriffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies’ 
(2009) 12 J. Int. Econ. Law 3, 749; UNEP and WTO, see chapter 5, at n.25 at 103-109; Kemp J, ‘Trade Law no 
block to Carbon Tariffs’ The Guardian 26/6/2009 <http://www.carbonoffsetsdaily.com/uk-
carbonmarketnews/trade-law-no-block-to-carbon-tariffs-john-kemp-9280.htm> Accessed 24/11/2009. 
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A BTA is a fiscal measure which adopts the ‘destination principle’ which allows: 
 
i. exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax charged in the exporting 
country in respect of similar domestic products sold to consumers on the home 
market; and/or 
ii. imported products sold to consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax 
charged in the importing country in respect of similar domestic products. 10
 
 
Therefore both exports and imports may be adjusted.  An example can be displayed as 
follows: 
 
Fiji intends to reduce consumption of sugar nationwide for environmental purposes.  It 
introduces an excise tax on producers of sugar cane.  This is passed onto the consumer in the 
form of an increased selling price, making Fijian-grown sugar sell at $10 per bag more than 
before the tax.  This increases the price per bag at sale in Fiji from $100 to $110.   
 
However sugar cane produced in Samoa is not subject to any excise tax on production.  When 
Samoa exports sugar to Fiji, Samoan sugar would sell at $100 per bag which would undercut 
the Fijian-produced sugar.  This would increase demand for Samoan sugar and decrease 
demand for Fijian sugar.  The consequence would be that Samoan sugar producers, whilst 
ignoring the environmental damage caused in the production of sugar, would benefit at the 
                                                             
10 As per the OECD’s definition adopted by GATT: Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18 
Supp. 97, adopted on 2 December 1970, para. 4 <www.worldtradelaw.net> Accessed 19/11/2009. 
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expense of Fijian producers.  Fiji’s policy would be a failure since demand would not fall for 
sugar consumption in Fiji, whilst its sugar industry would have lost out competitively.   
 
Fiji realises this and puts a BTA of $10 on imports of Samoan sugar, so that both imported 
and domestically-produced sugar sell at $110 per bag.  Therefore the playing field is level 
and Samoan sugar is charged as if it had been produced with the Fijian excise tax. 
 
Samoan-produced sugar also sells in Samoa at $100 per bag.  Fijian sugar exported to Samoa 
would sell at $110 as it is still subjected to the excise tax on production within Fiji, putting it 
a disadvantage against Samoan-produced sugar.  In order to protect the competitiveness of 
Fijian sugar producers, Fiji offers producers who export sugar a $10 rebate on the Fijian 
excise tax when the sugar is exported.  Therefore Fijian sugar can also sell at $100 in Samoa.   
 
This serves as an example of how no advantage is gained by either country by introducing the 
BTAs, though Fiji is able to protect the environment.  In reality the situation is much more 
complex than this since there is a range of taxes to consider and transaction costs complicate 
matters further. 
 
The rationale of the destination principle is that goods ought to be taxed in the country where 
they are consumed, so that the burden of indirect taxes is borne by the user.  This differs from 
the ‘origin principle,’ not accepted in WTO law, which requires that products be taxed in the 
country where they are produced.  Taxation of a good in both jurisdictions would result in 
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‘double taxation’ and could cause “serious economic distortions.”11  BTAs are only necessary 
in the absence of the origin principle and tax harmonisation,12
 
 and can consequently be 
justified somewhat on the basis that the omission to tax at source constitutes an indirect 
subsidy.  A common environmental tax policy would render BTAs obsolete, since if all 
products were taxed in the same way at source, any border adjustment would be nil. 
It is only possible under international trade rules to use BTAs on imports where the 
equivalent taxes apply to internally produced goods.13
 
   Similarly if a regulatory system  (or 
cap-and-trade system) imposes costs upon a domestic producer to improve environmental 
standards, but the same regulations do not apply in an imported good’s country of origin, it is 
possible to use BTAs to reflect these non-tax costs upon a producer.  Thus there should be no 
protectionist effect contradicting WTO rules. 
Pursuant to WTO rules, BTAs may be applicable to internal indirect taxes on products 
(whether applied directly or indirectly) such as an excise duty, consumption tax, sales tax, or 
VAT.  However, they are not applicable to internal direct taxes on the factors of production, 
such as corporate income taxes on producers.14  BTAs are thought to be not normally made 
for ‘tax occultes’,15 which are defined16
                                                             
11 Vehorn C, ‘Border Tax Adjustments’ in Cordes JC, Ebel RD and Gravelle J, Encyclopaedia of Taxation and 
Tax Policy (The Urban Institute: USA, 2005) at 25. 
 to include “...consumption taxes on capital 
12 Droge S, Harald T, Biermann F, Bohm F and Brohm R, ‘National Climate Change policies and WTO law: a 
case study of Germany’s New Policies’ (2004) 2 WTR 2, 161-187, at 176. 
13 GATT Panel: United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, 1987.  Report of the 
Panel, 17/6/1987, GATT Doc. L/6175. BISD 34S/136, para.5.2.7 
14 The distinctions are analysed in Phillips JC, ‘Border Tax Adjustments in International Trade’ (1976) 9 UQLJ 
2, 151-166, at 153-159 
15 Literally meaning ‘hidden taxes’, it refers to taxes on goods or services which partially input into a product 
but could only be included by averaging the extent to which a range of such taxes proportionately contribute to 
the total taxes on a final product.  This was the situation which had occurred in countries such as India with 
cascade tax systems, see McNamara JA, ‘Tax Adjustments in International Trade: The Border Tax Dispute’ 
(1972) 3 J.Mar.L.& Com. 2 339-362, at 345. 
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equipment, auxiliary materials and services used in the transportation and production of other 
taxable goods.”17  The hidden nature of these taxes meant that for those countries using them, 
applying them precisely was so difficult that a system of averaging developed instead - which 
caused numerous disputes concerning under-compensating and over-compensating 
adjustments.18  Nor are they thought to be made for payroll or social security taxes19  or ad 
valorem taxes such as stamp duty, property taxes or registration taxes.20
 
   
The legitimate purpose of using BTAs is not to limit imports per se, but to provide a level 
playing field for national producers.  The net result of using BTAs on trade should be 
neutral.21  One advantage of using BTAs is that countries would not need to offer exemptions 
to environmental taxes which could be detrimental to their purpose.22
 
 
Refunding internal taxes on export of a good would normally be an infringement of WTO 
rules23 since it would be considered a subsidy, but it is permitted under certain circumstances 
via a BTA.24  Milne argues that environmental objectives may not be most effectively served 
by reducing the cost of exports to importing countries who themselves do not charge 
environmental taxes.25
                                                                                                                                                                                              
16 The adopted meaning was originally defined in OECD, Border Tax Adjustments and Tax Structures in OECD 
Member Countries (Paris: OECD Publications, 1968) 
  However, regarding adjustments for exports as illegal subsidies 
would provide a disincentive for countries to introduce domestic taxes due to the belief that it 
17 GATT, see n.10. 
18 Vehorn C, see n.11 at 25. 
19 GATT, see n.10. 
20 Ibid. 
21 However it may not be depending upon market conditions, see: McCorriston S and Sheldon IM, ‘Market 
Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for Environmental Excise Taxes under Imperfect Condition’ (2005) 
7 J. Public Econ. Theory 4, 579-592, at 591. 
22 Highlighted by Goh, see n.8 at 400; Fischlowitz-Roberts B, ‘Restructuring Taxes to Protect the Environment’ 
(2002) Earth Policy Institute, Eco-Economy Update. 
23 GATT Article XVI:4 
24 See explanation in Pitschas C, ‘GATT/WTO Rules for Border Tax Adjustment and the Proposed European 
Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy’ (1995) 24 Ga.J.Int’l.& Comp.L. 3, 479-
500, pp. 489-492, 497-498 
25 Milne JE, ‘Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context for the Future’ (2008) 10 VJEL. 1, at 12. 
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would create a competitive disadvantage for exporters – since their goods could be 
unfavourably priced in the international market.  As such, the ASCM (Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures)26
 
 declares that exemptions or remissions of internal 
duties or taxes for exports are not classed as subsidies for the purposes of GATT (General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1947), Article XVI.  The rationale is that they are not 
subsidies and do not distort trade; they simply level the playing field whilst allowing internal 
permitted policies to succeed.   
Exemptions or remissions designed specifically to provide an advantage to internal producers 
would include any form of subsidy aimed at promoting domestically-produced goods over 
imported ones.  They could also take the form of deductions from internal taxes based upon 
export performance, so that the more goods domestic producers export, the more taxes they 
are refunded – providing an incentive to export such goods.  Since both these objectives 
would distort trade by providing an advantage to national producers, the ASCM prohibits 
such practices.27
41.  RATIONALE FOR USING BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS TO 
ENABLE ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
 
 
41.1 COMPETITION ISSUES 28
 
 
 
Since concerns about competitiveness have previously caused Australia, the USA and the EU 
to cancel planned eco-taxes,29                                                             
26 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm> Accessed 24/11/2009. 
 it is crucial that countries can introduce environmental 
27 Article 3. 
28 Note that this issue was introduced in chapter 7. 
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measures without significantly increasing production costs of its goods against foreign goods.  
The feared disadvantage for a country intending to introduce internal eco-taxes is that 
consumption may shift to pollution-intensive imports.30  Though some have suggested there 
is no benefit to be gained in practice for a country offering lax environmental regimes,31  the 
economics are uncertain32 and the prospect of a possible competitive disadvantage may itself 
discourage countries from utilising eco-taxes.  Any tax situation which would allow nations 
to benefit from their omission to internalise environmental negativities would go against the 
theme, which aims to include all sources in an environmental policy.  Using BTAs can 
remove any potential benefit for a country in reducing environmental standards33  or lowering 
its taxes to attract mobile taxpayers,34
 
 and therefore enable nations to impose environmental 
taxes without fear of a competitive loss. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
29 Hoerner A and Muller F, ‘Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection in a Competitive World’ (1996) Paper 
Prepared for the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Econ.Aff.,  at 7-12 
<http://www.rprogress.org/publications/1996/swiss_1996.pdf>  Accessed 10/12/2009.  On the technical reasons 
explaining the failure of USA’s tax, see Milne, see n.25, pp.10-18. 
30 ‘Pollution-intensive imports’ refers to goods produced using environmental standards falling below, and 
causing more negative environmental externalities than, similar goods produced in an importing country.  In this 
respect the term “carbon-intensive” is used to demonstrate a potential shift in consumption in Lockwood B and 
Whalley J, ‘Climate Change-Related Border Tax Adjustments’ (2008) The Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, Policy Brief No. 4, at 2. 
31 Dowell et al argue that multi-national corporations adopting poor environmental standards of host countries 
do not increase their net worth and are generally valued financially lower than environmentally proactive 
companies - for a number of reasons including not utilising innovative technology, lower morale amongst 
workers disaffected by the environmental standing of their country, and negative reputation and costs caused by 
protesters: Dowell G, Hart S, and Yeung B, ‘Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy 
Market Value’ (2000) 46 Management Science 8, 1059-1074.  Porter argues that environmental standards in a 
country can actually increase innovation which would be beneficial to an economy, in Porter ME and Van Der 
Linde C, ‘Toward a new conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship’ (1995) 9 J. Econ. 
Perspect. 97, at 101.  There is also the prospect of the exchange rate mechanism operating to negate any 
advantage, and the balance of payments cancelling out such benefits: see eg. Grossman GM, ‘Border Tax 
Adjustments: Do they Distort Trade?’ (1980) 10 J. Int. Econ. 1, 117-128.  On comparative advantages see eg. 
Johnson H and Krauss M, ‘Border Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments, Comparative Advantage, and the Balance of 
Payments’ (1970) 3 The Canadian Journal of Economics 4, 595-602. 
32 OECD studies have found little evidence of environmental taxes causing competitive disadvantages for 
industries, this concessions made to industry could explain this: COMETR is a European research project which 
studies the competitive effects of eco-taxes by sector, see: COMETR, ‘Competitiveness Effects of 
Environmental Tax Reforms’ <http://www2.dmu.dk/cometr/>  Accessed 18/11/2009.  See also OECD Policy 
Brief, ‘Environmentally related taxes: Issues and strategies’ (2001) at 4. 
33 Korten warned of a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental standards for countries seeking to attract new 
indsutries, in Korten D, When Corporations Rule the World (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1995) 
34 Harmful tax competition including a “tax race to the bottom” would serve no environmental benefit: 
Kiekebeld, see chapter 6, n.9 at 13. 
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41.2 ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
 
Furthermore, the three main purposes of using environmental taxes are applicable as follows.  
Pollution havens can remove nations’ ability to internalise negative environmental 
externalities if leakage occurs, whereas BTAs can correct this insofar as imported goods are 
concerned.  By imposing additional costs on the import, the consumer can become more 
aware of the external costs involved, and the good will be sold at a higher price than if there 
was no BTA. 
 
In terms of revenue-raising for environmental purposes, a BTA ensures that revenue is gained 
from both domestic producers as well as imported goods.  For example, in USA/Superfund,35 
the purpose of taxing sales of domestic and imported chemicals and oils was to raise 
contributions towards a ‘Superfund’ for the recovery of contaminated sites.  Given that there 
is a clear environmental goal, it is irrelevant under WTO law that the tax is for the purposes 
of revenue-raising since this argument was rejected in US-Taxes on Automobiles, where the 
goal of conservation justified the measure to raise revenue for domestic objectives.36
 
 
A crucial aspect of BTAs is their use to achieve behavioural change.  From the point of view 
of domestic consumers, the increased price provides greater information as to production 
costs, and importantly may lower demand for such products.  This allows a country to reduce 
the extent to which an environmentally unsound product is produced internally and 
externally.  This is important because it impacts upon behaviour outside the jurisdiction.  
Theoretically, producers may be less willing to make high-pollution products if there is lower                                                              
35 See n.13. 
36 GATT Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R, ii October 1994, unadopted, at 
para.3.201. 
  
190  
demand for them, so production may need to shift to less damaging products to access the 
importing market without any BTA.  If production decreases in the exporting country, the 
BTA will have been used to achieve extra-territorial behavioural change which it would 
otherwise not have been able to do given sovereign rights over taxation.  Even if there is no 
behavioural change at home or abroad, a country may wish to send a message in protest over 
environmental policies to the source nation, and may want “…to ensure its own consumption 
does not contribute to what it regards as a great evil.”37  For Bagwell and Staiger, this is an 
issue of sovereignty that allows a nation to achieve environmental protection without 
damaging its industry.38
 
   
An example of this is Belgium’s 1993 Ecotax Law,39 which sought behavioural change by 
aiming to eliminate environmentally negative production and consumption choice, namely in 
reducing waste, limiting pollution and conserving resources.40  The tax fell on sales of 
disposable products,41
 
 where there was a sustainable alternative available.  Importers of such 
products assumed liability for the tax upon retail, whilst exports were refunded.  Being 
similar to an excise tax meant that all covered products were charged to the same level of tax 
immediately, regardless of their origin. 
Current thought has moved on from the idea that taxes should be placed solely upon 
environmentally unsound products – despite the relative administrative ease this allows.  
Taxing a final product based upon its expected negative externalities in order to internalise 
the environmental cost, fails to account for two concerns.  The first is that a good may be                                                              
37 Howse R and Regan D, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining. ‘Unilateralism’ 
in Trade Policy (2000) 11 EJIL 2, 249-289, at 275.  These arguments are explained further at 274-5. 
38 Bagwell K and Staiger RW, ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’ (1999) Amer. Econ. Rev. 89, 779-795. 
39 Articles 369 to 401 of the Law of 16/7/1993 completing the Federal Structure of the State (Moniteur Belge, 
20/7/1993, p. 17013. 
40 Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 1992, 1-2. 
41Article 369(7). 
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domestically produced or imported which is not itself environmentally damaging, but which 
has been produced in an environmentally damaging manner.  Since the end-use of such a 
good is not damaging, it would not ordinarily be charged to tax.  Therefore it may be 
necessary to consider the production and process methods (PPMs) used to produce a good.42
 
  
This can be done by charging the PPM to tax, or charging the end product to tax to reflect to 
the fact that it was produced using a damaging PPM.  The option to tax the end-use of the 
good remains as a separate charge from the charge based upon its PPMs .  For example, a 
motor vehicle could be charged to tax to represent its pollution-intensive production method.  
However, this tax does not exclude the option for policymakers to charge road user tax or 
vehicle excise duty, which aim at different objectives such as incentivising consumers to 
purchase vehicles with more efficient engines.   
 
The second concern is the unsatisfactory result of considering only the qualities of a final 
product.  Inputs into a final good may themselves be damaging or have been produced in an 
environmentally damaging manner.  Component parts (known as ‘intermediary goods’) must 
be accounted for – both intermediary goods which are imported, and those which are used in 
the assembly of final goods before import.43
                                                             
42 Whalley, see chapter 1, n.3 at 120. 
   The PPMs of intermediary goods must also be 
identified otherwise the full environmental attributes of a good will be ignored.  For example, 
an imported car may be capable of outstanding fuel efficiency and its foreign production 
plant may assemble the vehicle in an energy efficient manner with all waste recycled.  
However, this does not take into account that many intermediary goods may have been 
imported from a number of countries, some of which are produced using unsound PPMs that 
43 Intermediate goods are the subject of the majority of environmental excise taxes: McCorriston and Sheldon 
see n.21, at 579. 
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resulted in much pollution or environmental destruction.44
 
  As such, intermediary goods 
ought to be considered to be charged to tax either individually or based upon their input into a 
final product. 
Indeed, the EU advocated the further step of looking at the full life cycle of a product to 
ascertain where efficiencies can be improved.45
This will be considered at 42. 
  This would involve considering a range of 
processes including how all of a product’s intermediary goods are sourced - from their most 
basic form such as the environmental impact of mining minerals to produce each 
intermediary good, to the expected overall impact of a final product during its average life-
span.  Only by accounting for a good’s net environmental impact can its external costs be 
established. 
 
41.3 AVOIDING LEAKAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DUMPING 
 
The problem of leakage has largely been focused upon the specific problem of carbon 
leakage,46
                                                             
44 Poterba JM and Rotemberg JM, ‘Environmental Taxes on Intermediate and Final Goods when both can be 
Imported’ (1995) 2 Int. Tax Public Finance 2, 221-228. 
 though the same principle applies to any environmental problem which continues 
to have an impact upon the country losing the taxpayer.  High mobility taxpayers – 
particularly enterprises - may relocate to another jurisdiction to avoid any form of 
environmental taxation (or regulation), and the problem lies where the taxpayer continues to 
cause the negative externalities in the new jurisdiction which has a trans-boundary impact.  
45 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 18/6/2003 - Integrated 
Product Policy - Building on Environmental Life-Cycle Thinking [COM(2003) 302; EC, Green Paper on 
Integrated Product Policy COM (2001) 68. 
46 See eg. Babiker MH, ‘Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage’ (2005) 2 J. Int. Econ. 
421, at 422. 
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Consequently this analysis will consider the issue of leakage within its context as a pollution 
that causes continuing environmental problems globally or at least for the original country. 
 
The problem of leakage is real and worsened by the opportunity for enterprises such as 
MNEs (Multi-National Enterprises) to sell goods at low prices to countries with stringent 
environmental policies. The actual consequences of leakage will differ depending upon the 
industry sector involved and may not apply to every sector; a study into the cement industry 
for example showed that there was a significant danger of leakage causing a rise in global 
emissions without BTAs.47  Imposing BTAs removes the ability of imported inexpensive, 
high-pollution goods to undercut domestically produced goods on grounds of imposed 
environmental costs, known as ‘environmental dumping’.48
 
 
41.4 PERSUASIVE TOOL 
 
 
The EU recognised the risk of leakage as potentially undermining “...the environmental 
integrity and benefit of actions by the Community.”49  As such it may be possible to act 
communally by imposing EU-wide BTA measures on trading nations who attempt to sell 
goods which are not compatible with EU environmental standards.  With such an enormous 
market this is likely to have a strong incentive for trading partners to make changes within 
their own jurisdictions and harmonise with EU standards.50
 
 
                                                             
47 Demailly D and Quirion P, ‘Leakage from Climate Policies and Border Tax Adjustment: Lessons for a 
Geographic Model of the Cement Industry’ (2006) Working Papers halshs-00009337_v1, HAL 
<http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/06/01/89/PDF/cement_industry.pdf> Accessed 23/11/2009. 
48 UNEP and WTO, see chapter 5, n.25 at 101. 
49 EC, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC 
so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community’ Brussels, 
23.1.2008 COM(2008) 16 final, at 8. 
50 EC, see chapter 2, n.110, at 9. 
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It is also possible to utilise BTAs to further the remit of any ETS (Emissions Trading 
Scheme).51  Non-participants in any global or even EU ETS may be subjected to BTAs – 
either from the EU alone or from the global community generally.  Barrett displays how 
‘free-riding’ countries and those not cooperating with global targets in order to benefit, can 
lose out through communal international measures.52  Thus the international community can 
utilise BTAs as a deterrent to encourage participation in global treaties on the environment. 
Indeed this has been considered at Community level in the EU to combat carbon leakage,53 
and may be useful for any customs union.54  Further it has been proposed to encourage non-
participants of any global treaty on climate change into participating.55
 
  
 
The technical difficulty in introducing any BTA is that countries being subjected to such 
measures on their exports would need to view them as a trade-neutral measure.  Countries 
feeling coerced into changing their environmental policies may react badly and the result 
could be counter-productive on the environment and trade, whereas expressing that the 
measure is to level the playing field would do no such harm.  BTAs were suggested to be 
placed on imports from the USA for failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, in order to represent 
any lower environmental standards resulting in lower costs.56
                                                             
51 Cendra J, ‘Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-à-vis 
WTO Law’ (2006) 15 RECIEL 2, 131 – 145. 
  However, the US itself 
proposed introducing BTAs on non-participants of any cap-and-trade measure in the 
52 Barrett S, ‘A Theory of Full International Cooperation’ (1999) 11 Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, 519-541, 
at 533-537. 
53 EC, see n.49, at 8. 
54 Shadikhodjaev discusses the potential of BTAs for the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
Shadikhodjaev S, ‘Trade Integration in the CIS Region: A Thorny Path Towards a Customs Union’ (2009) 12 J. 
Int. Econ. Law 3, 555- 578. 
55 See Ismer R and Neuhoff K, ‘Border Tax Adjustments: A Feasible way to Address Nonparticipation in 
Emission Trading’ (2004 ) Cambridge Working Papers in Economics CWPE 0409. 
56 Bhagwati J and Mavroidis PC, ‘Is Action against US Exports for Failure to Sign Kyoto Protocol WTO-
Legal?’ (2007) 6 WTR 2, 299–310; Biermann F and Brohm R, ‘Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the 
USA: the Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border’ (2005) 4 Climate Policy 3, 289-302. 
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Copenhagen Accord,57 pursuant to the Waxman-Markley Bill58which caused an outcry59 
from emerging economies.  The Senate’s version of that Bill, the Kerry-Boxer Bill,60 
proposed imposing BTAs on imports from countries not facing emissions limits, whilst the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill61 proposed action for countries not taking ‘comparable action’ to 
America.62
 
   
If the political situation suggests that countermeasures may arise from using BTAs it would 
be inappropriate to consider this tool. 63  Further, Wiener lists a range of potential risks of 
using this tool, including the possibility of hindering poverty reduction targets and the chance 
that the measures may be an empty threat if needed against a major global power such as 
China.64
 
 
42.  PRODUCTION AND PROCESS METHODS 
 
42.1 UNILATERALISM 
 
 
                                                             
57 Draft decision -/CP.15  (1999) FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf> 
Accessed 26/4/2010. 
58 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Congress. 
59 ‘UN climate expert warns against carbon tariffs’ Times of India, 22/7/2009 
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS/Environment/Developmental-Issues/UN-climate-expert-warns-
against-carbon-tariffs-/articleshow/4807957.cms> Accessed 24/11/2009. 
60 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S.1733, §.765. 
61 Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. (2008), Amendment in the Nature of a 
Substitute Intended to be Proposed by Mrs. Boxer. 
62 Ibid at §1306(b)(2). 
63 Chang HF, ‘An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment’ (1995) 83 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 2131, at 2162-3. 
64 Wiener, see chapter 2, n.106, at 757-760. 
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Many scholars have debated the legality under WTO law of using PPMs as a basis for any 
unilateral trade measures.65  Unilateral trade measures based upon PPMs were regarded as 
legitimate66 in Shrimp/Turtle,67 where shrimp trawlers were required under US law68 to use 
special nets when fishing in areas known to include endangered sea turtles.  Since this 
regulation applied domestically, it was permissible under GATT Article XX to prohibit 
imports where such nets had not been used in areas where sea turtles were known, or where a 
similar regulatory system was not in place.   Article XX(b) provides justifications for 
distorting imports, including measures to protect ‘human, animal or plant life or health’ and 
‘measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ given that such 
measures are also applicable internally.69  The Shrimp/Turtle case extended the ability to use 
PPMs, where Tuna/Dolphin70 had previously limited the ability of WTO Members to take 
such unilateral action despite the relevant provisions in GATT, by indicating that Members 
must first attempt multilateral action.71
 
 
At a philosophical level, there is a conflict of sovereignties between the right of the exporter 
to gain access to an importer’s markets without hindrance pursuant to the principle of free 
trade, and the right of the importing country to limit imports of undesirable goods.  One view 
                                                             
65 Cheyne I, 'Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System' (1995) 24 Ga.J.Int’l.& Comp.L. 3, 433-
465; Howse R and Regan D, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy (2000) 11 EJIL 2, 249-289; Kennedy KC, ‘Illegality of Unilateral Trade 
Measures to Resolve Trade-Environmental Disputes’ (1997-1998) 22  William and Mary Environmental Law 
and Policy Review 375. 
66 However the fact that the measures had discriminated between WTO members rendered the system illegal. 
67 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 
12/10/1998, WT/DS58/AB/R.   
68 US Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884 (1973),§609. 
69 Article XX(g). 
70 GATT Panel Report, United States –Restrictions on the Import of Tuna, DS29/R, 16/6/1994 
71 For further reading on the extent of PPMs see eg. Ahn D ‘Environmental Disputes In The GATT/WTO: 
Before And After US-Shrimp Case’ (1999) 20 Mich.J.Int'l L. 819; Grosko B, ‘Just When Is It That A Unilateral 
Trade Ban Satisfies The GATT?: The WTO Shrimp And Shrimp Products Case’ (1999) 5 Environmental Law 
817; Cheyne I, ‘Trade and the Environment: The Future of Extraterritorial Unilateral Measures After the Shrimp 
Appellate Body’ (2000) 5 Web JCLI. 
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is that PPM-based measures are a form of “paternalistic intervention”72 into the exporting 
State’s sovereignty.73  However the author concurs with Howse and Regan that to deny a 
country the right to impose restrictions on imports produced using practices it does not even 
allow in its own jurisdiction would be an infringement of its sovereignty.74
 
  The 
Shrimp/Turtle decision thus allows countries to impose measures on imports that it applies 
internally. 
Regardless, Biermann warns of PPMs being used to coerce smaller countries into changing 
their environmental practices in order to continue trading with larger trading nations, which 
may inflict high costs upon smaller countries,75 and the practices may be primarily influenced 
by (and in the interests of) wealthy countries in the Northern Hemisphere.76  However, this 
fear is reduced somewhat by the requirement for WTO Members to show that their restriction 
under Article XX(b) is ‘necessary’ which means that the availability of alternative measures 
which could produce the same results in less restrictive ways should normally be utilised 
instead of more restrictive measures. Further, Korea-Beef establishes77 that it is more 
straightforward for a WTO Member to justify their actions when the common interest to be 
protected is one of high importance.78
 
  
                                                             
72 Winter G, ‘The GATT and Environmental Protection: Problems of Construction’ (2003) 15 JEL 113-140, at 
130. 
73 For further reading see Sarooshi D, ‘Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy, the United States, and the 
International Trading System: Representations of a Relationship’ (2004) 15 EJIL 4, 651. 
74 Howse and Regan, see n.65, at 275 
75 Biermann F, ‘The Rising Tide of Green Unilateralism in World Trade Law’ (2001) 35 J.W.T. 3, 421-448, at 
433. 
76 Tussie D, ‘The Environment and International Trade Negotiations: Open Loops in the Developing World’ 
(1999) 22 The World Economy 535-545, at 544. 
77 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, 11 December 2000, para. 162ff.  This argument was made on the basis of France’s goal of 
protecting health being perceived as of extremely vital and therefore permissible in Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS/135/R, 
adopted 5/4/2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243, at para.172. 
78 Highlighted in Ismer and Neuhoff, see n.9, at 150. 
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A unilateral approach may not recognise the ability of exporting nations to take different 
types of measures to the importing nation which achieve similar results.  Goh suggests that 
mutual recognition of alternative strategies to achieve similar environmental policies may be 
more appropriate and have less extra-territorial consequences than simply demanding 
harmonisation with the importing nation’s tax system.79  He cites the USA’s Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 199680
 
 as an example of such extra-
territorialism.  It fails to recognise not only possible alternative trade policies between any 
nation and Cuba, but also any alternative strategies for dealing with Cuba at all, by placing 
sanctions on any non-US company that trades with Cuba – forcing companies to choose 
between the Cuban and American markets.  This goes against the normal practice of mutual 
recognition of alternative policies or strategies for dealing with similar issues. 
In terms of the environment, a unilateral approach may importantly not recognise nations’ 
‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ as recognised in the UNFCCC.81  This practice 
enables States to work together towards achieving the same environmental goal, but allows 
some States to take on more or alternative responsibilities. This recognises the varied stages 
of States’ economies, their varied capacities to affect the environment, and differing 
contributions to an environmental problem – in this case climate change.82
 
  A unilateral 
requirement may instead impose the same burdens upon all nations regardless of their 
international agreements and ability to adapt to harmonised goals.   
                                                             
79 Goh, see n.8 at 421. 
80 Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996). 
81 UNFCCC, Art. 3:1. 
82 See explanation in: Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, ‘The Principle of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and Scope’ (2002) <http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/brief_common.pdf> 
Accessed 9/12/2009. 
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42.2 LEGALITY 
 
Since the purpose of BTAs is to be trade-neutral, States are not permitted to manipulate them 
to protect their own economies by creating unnecessary obstacles to free trade.  This is 
endorsed in the TBT Agreement83 which prevents States using mandatory regulations or non-
mandatory standards to limit trade.  However standards based upon PPMs related to the 
characteristics of a product are permissible under the Agreement84 provided they are 
transparent,85 used for legitimate objectives86 and do not create restrictions beyond what is 
appropriate to achieve those objectives.87
 
 
These rules apply to taxes as well as regulatory standards.  It has been confirmed in 
USA/Superfund that BTAs can apply to imported intermediary goods when a State’s internal 
tax applies to upstream producers.88  This must be the equivalent charge to internal charges 
for “...like domestic products or in respect of an article from which the imported product has 
been manufactured or produced in whole or in part”. 89  This allows PPM measures given that 
the BTA does not raise tariffs above the bound tariff rates,90 and the comparison91 should be 
done based upon the ‘actual tax burdens’ as suggested in Argentina – Hides and Leathers92 
so that the burdens would be equal in reality.  This is in line with the ‘National Treatment’93
                                                             
83 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf> Accessed 
24/12/2009. 
 
84 G/TBT/W/11 29/8/1995, para.3(c) <http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/HTM/M50.WPF.HTM> Accessed 
24/12/2009. 
85 Lopez-Hurtado C, ‘Social Labelling and WTO Law’ (2002) 5 Journal of International and Economic Law 3, 
719-746, at 737. 
86 Article 2.2 stipulates this includes the prevention of deceptive standards, and the protection of human health 
and safety, animal or planet life health, and the environment.  <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-
tbt.pdf> Accessed 24/11/2009. 
87 Article 2.2. 
88 GATT, see n.13; McCorriston and Sheldon, see n.21, at 581. 
89 See n.13, para.5.2.7. 
90 GATT Article II. 
91 In Article III(2). 
92 Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Imports of Finished 
Leather, WT/DS155/R, 2000, adopted 16/2/2001. DSR 2001:V, 1779. 
93 GATT Article III. 
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principle which requires that WTO members do not discriminate against imported goods in 
terms of internal laws and regulations, including domestic taxes.  The Bangladesh Customs 
Act (1969) for instance charges an Advance Income Tax on imports which can later be 
credited, but Daly points out that for importers operating at a loss such a tax can amount to a 
surcharge; given that it only applies to imported goods it could be a violation of the National 
Treatment principle.94
 
 
What is regarded as a ‘like product’ is a subject of debate95 and the test established in Japan 
– Alcoholic Beverages for the purposes of GATT Article III:2 requires an analysis in a 
market of consumer preferences, the product’s end-uses, as well as the product’s properties, 
nature and quality and similar tariff classifications – done on a case-by-case basis.96  As 
identified by Quick, PPMs can differentiate between products which are physically identical 
and used for the same purposes.97  Differentiation based upon PPMs has  been done for many 
years using eco-labelling as a basis.  Germany uses a labelling scheme based upon energy 
efficiency used in the production of products to empower consumers to differentiate between 
products based upon energy.98  Given that such schemes do not discriminate against imports 
they will be ‘origin-neutral’ and will comply with GATT Article III:4.99
 
 
A further requirement is that countries offering special trade privileges to some WTO 
Members must offer them to all.  The MFN (Most Favoured Nation) principle requires that 
                                                             
94 Daly M, ‘WTO Rules on Direct Taxation’ (2006) 29 The World Economy 5, 527-557, at 527. 
95 For further discussion and explanation of the complexities see: Cheyne, see n.65, pp.437-443; Veel see n.9, 
pp.778-784; Quick R and Lau C, ‘Environmentally Motivated Tax Distinctions and WTO Law—The European 
Commission’s Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy in light of ‘Like Product’ and ‘PPM –Debates’’ (2003) 
6 J. Int. Econ. Law 2, 419–458; Goh, see n.8, pp.402-413. 
96 WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, adopted 1/11/1996, 
para.18. 
97 Quick and Lau, see n.95, at 149. 
98 Energy Consumption Labelling Act (Energieverbrauchskennzeichnungsgesetz, Federal Law Gazette, BGBL 
I, P. 1632) of 1/7/1997. 
99 This conclusion was also reached in Lopez-Hurtado, see n.85 at 746. 
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any advantage granted to one country shall apply to all countries, in order to prevent a 
country from discriminating between different foreign producers.100  In terms of taxes, 
Belgian Family Allowances confirmed that countries cannot use domestic taxation to 
discriminate between foreign producers, in the same way that they cannot use it to protect 
their own competitive standing.101  Similarly this provision prohibits the advantages being 
dependant upon certain conditions, such as countries having to adopt certain policies 
unrelated to the imported product.102
 
  In this way there is free trade and countries cannot 
manipulate the system to offer different countries special treatment since this may be 
reciprocated and inevitably be of benefit to those countries.   
42.3 BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY 
 
The difficulty in using PPMs as a basis for BTAs is in determining what standard should be 
set for both domestic and imported goods.  If the good is non-essential, a nation may decide it 
can do without it entirely, and impose prohibitively high taxes to discourage production and 
reflect this in BTAs.103  If the good is essential or the nation decides to continue consuming a 
non-essential good, one standard proposed by Ismer and Neuhoff is based upon the use of 
‘Best Available Technology’ (BAT).104
                                                             
100 GATT Article I:1. 
  Their proposal, made to limit leakage within an ETS 
but which can also be applicable without an ETS, is that adjustments should be determined 
upon the basis of costs “…corresponding to production with BAT rather than average 
101 Report of the Panel, Belgian Family Allowances, G/32 – 1S/59, adopted 7/11/1952. 
102 Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS54R, WT/DS55/S, 
WT/DS59R, WT/DS64/R, adopted 23/7/1998, para.14.143. 
103 Whether such a restrictive measure would be legal under WTO law would depend upon it being regarded as   
“necessary to protect human, animal and plant life and health” (GATT Art.XX(b)) or “related to the protection 
of exhaustible natural resources.” (GATT Art.XX(g)).  For a discussion of what would constitute ‘necessary’ or 
‘related to’, see Young A, ‘WTO and Integrated Product Policy (IPP): Trade Law Implications for the Use of 
Product Policy Instruments to Reduce the Risk of Exposure and Harm from Hazardous Substances in the Life 
Cycle of Personal Computers’ (2001) 9 Journal of Cleaner Production 297-311, at 299. 
104 Ismer and Neuhoff, see n.9, 137-164. 
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technology.”105   This has similarities with America’s proposed economic incentives for 
retailers selling ‘Best-in-Class Appliances’ to improve household efficiency, pursuant to the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.106
 
   
If such technology is commercially available107 on the market and can be produced in the 
most efficient manner possible at any one time, producers will only be able to get BTA 
reimbursements if they use it.  This could create demand for clean technology and provide a 
continuing incentive to innovate, which consequently may lead to a technology-driven 
response to environmental protection.108  Even Dowell, Hart and Yeung, who argue against 
the risk of leakage, advocate innovative clean technology as being able to “…achieve 
simultaneously world-class cost, quality, and environmental performance.”109 Though 
difficulties have been highlighted in requiring BAT, the ‘BAT-BTA’ method will be 
considered henceforth as a basis for exempting imports from BTAs to exemplify the ‘leakage 
loophole’ problem.110
 
 
The BTA-BAT method was contemplated to be relatively straightforward to implement and 
ensure compliance,111  with the onus being on producers to specify whether BAT was used in 
production. 112
                                                             
105 Ibid, at 140. 
  This would involve a self-certification process monitored by importing 
authorities, or an international body if the system was accepted multilaterally.  EU law 
106 H.R. 2454, 111th Congress, §214. 
107 In practice this means being available to buy on the open market, preferably from a range of competitive 
sellers as opposed to only being available in countries requiring its use, since this could cause a country to 
exploit its ability to offer trade concessions in order to increase sales of its domestically produced technology.   
108 The potential for BAT requirements to incite innovation is recognised in Ismer and Neuhoff, see n.9, at 155. 
109 Dowell et al, see n.31 at 1060. 
110 Difficulties related to requiring BAT as a basis for BTAs are considered in Bernstein and Hannah, see n.8, at 
65-68; Quick and Lau, see n.95, at 432-433. 
111 Ismer and Neuhoff, see n.9, at 156. 
112 Ibid, at 153. 
  
203  
already requires proof of origin certificates for traded electricity113 amongst other items, and 
have previously proposed to reduce VAT for products showing an EU eco-label.114  
Therefore the method would not be novel, and indeed Demaret and Stewardson believe115 
that this approach was permitted in USA/Superfund, where the Panel did not consider the 
USA’s BTAs to be a violation of Art III:2, when it charged an amount to represent the 
‘predominant’ PPM where no information was available on a product’s substances.116
 
  A key 
advantage of requiring BAT is that it limits the extent of the administrative burden of 
quantifying inputs into a product and collating all such complex data. 
An example of how BAT would work within the BTA framework follows the Fiji-Samoa 
sugar example as used at 40.  In this case the sugar processing plants waste high levels of 
water.  Fiji regards this process method as environmentally damaging.  It places an excise tax 
on sugar processing to represent the wasted water.  However technology is available on the 
market which reduces the level of water wastage in sugar processing.  The BAT is that which 
wastes the least water.  Fiji exempts processers from tax who can show they have used this 
BAT.   
 
To make the same apply to imports, all imports are subjected to the same level of excise tax, 
except those imports which can show they have been produced using the same BAT.  In 
reality, this process would be more complex since reduced levels of the excise tax could be 
                                                             
113 Directive 2001/77/EC, OJ 27.10.2001, L 283/33. 
114 Regulation EC/1980/2000 on a Revised Community Eco-label Scheme of 17/7/2000, OJ L 237 of 21/92000, 
at 1 and the Commission decisions adopted thereunder. 
115 Demaret P and Stewardson R, ‘BTAs under GATT and EC Law, and general Implications for Environmental 
Taxes’ (1994) 28 J.W.T. 4, 5-65, at 33. 
116 GATT, see n.13, paras. 5-2.9-10. 
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available to processers depending upon the quantity of water wastage as another incentive, 
and this would need to be reflected as a BAT for imports to level the playing field for them.  
 
A number of challenges counter the acceptability of the BAT-BTA method.  Bernstein 
explains that for some environmental problems it is not certain which is the ‘best’ PPM.117  If 
there are a range of potential production methods, any technology used to achieve a given 
method will only be the BAT for one PPM, which itself may not be the most suitable for the 
environmental problem.  Bernstein cites the instance where the World Bank considered a 
specific tool to assess forest certification.  It was argued that the chosen tool, if used, would 
have favoured one system of forest management over others, which would have imposed that 
system on anybody aiming to gain forestry certification. 118  Applying this to the present case, 
a State imposing environmental standards internally may need to recognise alternative 
methods used by other States to achieve the same standard, using a principle of mutual 
recognition.  Therefore in order to minimise taxation internally and at the border, a range of 
PPMs may be available given that their capacity to achieve the environmental goal can be 
proven.  The onus could be on the producer, if they wish their PPM to be recognised 
alongside the officially recognised PPMs.  Similarly, each PPM may have a selection of 
BATs which could also be recognised as being applicable to one type of PPM.  Each type of 
BAT would need to be capable of reaching a similar threshold of improvement required by a 
selected PPM.  This system draws similarities with the EU’s environmental Framework 
Directives, which provide a particular environmental target for all Member States, but allow 
each Member State autonomy in determining their own method of achieving that target.119
                                                             
117 Bernstein and Hannah, see n.8 at 600-601. 
  
118 Ibid, at 600-601. 
119 See eg. EU Water Framework Directive, Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23/10/2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. 
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A further problem suggested by Quick and Lau is that a country may invent the BAT but 
patent it, so that either importing countries would have to buy that technology – which it 
could restrict or sell at high prices – and if they fail to use it then national industries would be 
put at a competitive advantage.120
 
  However, this protectionism could be avoided using Ismer 
and Neuhoff’s ‘commercially available’ qualification. 
42.4 DUTY DRAWBACK 
 
The ‘Duty Drawback’ mechanism, permitted by the ASCM, allows imported intermediary 
goods which are never sold in the domestic market but are instead used to manufacture 
primary products, to be exempted from import duty.121  Such a system is in place in the EU, 
the aim being to enable manufacturers to produce competitively.122
This mechanism could potentially be manipulated as an alternative to BTAs to limit the use 
of any imported intermediary goods which have not been produced using BAT.  Any duty 
drawback scheme could be amended to make the drawback conditional upon the intermediary 
good being produced using BAT, where such goods are commercially available.  This 
incentive for domestic manufacturers to import only BAT-produced goods could have a large 
impact upon foreign PPMs who would likely become incentivised to produce more efficiently 
using BAT in order to sell to importing manufacturers. 
   
 
43.  CONCLUSION                                                              
120 Quick and Lau, see n.95, at 432-433. 
121 See n.26, ASCM, Annex 1(i). 
122 Arts 114-129 of Council Regulation (EEC) 2913/92 of 12/10/1992 establishing the Community Customs 
Code [1992] O.J. L302/1 (and as implemented and amended by subsequent Regulations). 
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BTAs should not be assumed to be straightforward to apply.  They are a highly complex 
solution to a difficult global situation, with goals that are controversial, and their treatment is 
subject to ongoing international legal debate, creating uncertainty.  Further they are 
politically dangerous since their perception as protectionist measures can lead to trade wars 
which could imbalance global trade, whilst their intention could be interpreted as imposing 
their user’s national values upon smaller trading partners.123
 
   
Despite this, they are an enormously useful tool to achieve environmental protection at a 
unilateral (or potentially multi-lateral) level due to their influential ability and their means of 
reducing fears of competitive disadvantages amongst national businesses.  Their ability to 
ensure that negative externalities are internalised into the cost of goods means that consumers 
can make informed choices and this removes demand for low-cost, high-pollution goods.  It 
incentivises innovation in the market for more efficient production capabilities, which will 
further economic growth at the same time as benefiting the environment.   
 
Though BTAs are administratively difficult, a self-certification requirement would place the 
onus upon producers and costs would fall once this became the norm.  If States can utilise 
BTAs without sparking retaliatory trade measures, they can be useful in achieving 
environmental objectives.  Therefore policymakers will be able to utilise the solutions 
proposed within the Universal Model and introduce BTAs to mitigate any possible 
competitiveness disadvantages.    
 
                                                             
123 Biermann calls for WTO law to be reformed to restrict influence on PPMs overseas where there has been no 
attempt at multilateral agreement.  See n.75, at 434. 
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Two further issues associated with BTAs are discussed by this author elsewhere, with the 
intention of offering solutions to overcome the concerns raised therein.  The first is the risk of 
commercial abuse of export tax remissions available to exporters who, it is shown, may be 
able to unduly claim back a tax on production even though they continue to cause 
environmental damage.  The second is an original evaluation of the exploitation of a loophole 
aimed to protect DCs from the disadvantages to their development caused by unilateral 
environmental production standards.  Both seek to offer policy-makers the ability to 
introduce unilateral environmental taxes to achieve environmental objectives, without 
hindering wider policy goals. 124
                                                             
124 Truby J, ‘Towards overcoming the conflict between Environmental Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment 
Concessions for Developing Countries’ (2010) 12 VJEL. 
  
208  
CHAPTER 9 :  HOW CAN 
POLICYMAKERS USE TAXATION TO 
TARGET THE SOURCE OF AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM?  
 
44. INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY ................................................................................ 209 
45. CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS OF AIR PASSENGER DUTY ........................................................................... 211 
45.1 INTRODUCTION: INTENTION OF APD BANDING ............................................................................................ 211 
45.2 PERVERSE INCENTIVES: SHORT HAUL ........................................................................................................... 211 
45.3 INCOMPATIBILITY WITH DOMESTIC TRANSPORT POLICY ................................................................................... 212 
45.4 THEME APPLIED TO DOMESTIC TRAVEL ....................................................................................................... 213 
45.4.1 APD Revenue Recycling into Rail Travel.................................................................................... 213 
45.4.2 Comparison: Spanish Developments ........................................................................................ 215 
45.4.3 Incentives for Domestic Rail Operators .................................................................................... 216 
45.5 DISTANCES TO CAPITAL CITIES: LONG-HAUL ................................................................................................. 217 
45.6 USA TAX BREAK .................................................................................................................................... 218 
45.7 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF DISTANCE-BASED AVIATION TAXATION ....................................................... 219 
45.7.1 Alternative Reform Proposals ................................................................................................... 222 
45.7.1.1 Tax on Aviation Fuel ........................................................................................................................... 222 
45.7.1.2 Aviation Emissions tax ........................................................................................................................ 225 
45.7.1.3 Tax per plane ....................................................................................................................................... 227 
45.7.2 Final Aviation Tax Reform Proposal and Evaluation ................................................................. 229 
45.7.3 Legal Challenges and the Chicago Convention ......................................................................... 234 
45.8 CLASS INCIDENCE ................................................................................................................................... 236 
45.8.1 Inadequacy and reform of APD system .................................................................................... 236 
45.8.2 Limited behavioural impact upon Business .............................................................................. 238 
45.9 EXEMPTIONS FROM APD ......................................................................................................................... 240 
45.9.1 Private Jets: Unfair Exemption ................................................................................................. 241 
45.9.2 Private Jets: Possible Reform .................................................................................................... 242 
45.10 TRANSIT PASSENGERS ......................................................................................................................... 242 
45.10.1 Freight ...................................................................................................................................... 243 
45.10.1.1 Justification for lack of incentive .................................................................................................... 243 
45.10.1.2 Taxe de l’aviation civile .................................................................................................................. 244 
45.10.1.3 Freight: Reform and Exemptions .................................................................................................... 244 
45.10.2 Remote Locations: Scottish Highlands and Islands ................................................................... 246 
45.10.3 Summary of Exemptions ........................................................................................................... 247 
45.11 COMPETITION ASPECTS OF APD ........................................................................................................... 248 
45.11.1 European competition .............................................................................................................. 248 
45.11.1.1 UK and Ireland ................................................................................................................................ 248 
45.11.1.2 Continental European Countries ..................................................................................................... 249 
45.11.1.3 Comparison ..................................................................................................................................... 251 
45.11.1.4 Theme ............................................................................................................................................. 253 
46. TARGETING THE SOURCE (NON-AVIATION) ..................................................................................... 253 
46.1 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY: CONSTRUCTION PHASE ........................................................................................... 254 
46.1.1 Stamp Duty Land Tax relief ....................................................................................................... 254 
  
209  
46.1.2 The Principal Agent problem .................................................................................................... 255 
46.1.3 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ............................................................................... 256 
46.2 HOUSEHOLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION ......................................................................................................... 257 
46.2.1 Micro-generation ...................................................................................................................... 257 
46.2.2 Consumption of energy-inefficient appliances ......................................................................... 258 
46.2.3 Manufacturing .......................................................................................................................... 259 
46.2.4 Identifying the source ............................................................................................................... 260 
46.2.5 Group-targeting ........................................................................................................................ 261 
46.3 VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY .......................................................................................................................... 263 
46.3.1 Targeting parties with choice of rate ....................................................................................... 263 
46.3.2 Design of Tax ............................................................................................................................ 265 
46.3.3 Feebates ................................................................................................................................... 266 
47. CONCLUSION AND UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES .......................................................................... 268 
 
 
44.  INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY 
 
In responding to the Research Questions for Part II, means have been explored in Chapter 6 
providing policymakers with informed choices as to tax methods and wider supportive social 
measures available to influence behaviour towards the environment without the unintended 
consequences of potentially ruinous taxpayer opposition.  Chapter 7 has explored issues 
available to policymakers in determining which parties would be appropriate to bear the 
burden of environmental taxation depending upon the circumstances in hand.  Together such 
guidance allows a policymaker to make an informed choice as to both the incidence of any 
environmental taxation and methods to enhance its success.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance for a policymaker to ascertain how taxes 
can most effectively be targeted to create the necessary incentive for behavioural change.  
The most economically or environmentally efficient solution is regarded in this chapter to be 
the most effective, depending upon the context.  Environmental taxes targeted at specific 
environmental issues can deliver the appropriate message and achieve the desired changes, 
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and the chapter will aim to identify how a policymaker can do this.  The chapter will consider 
where some taxes have proved inefficient in failing to target the source of an environmental 
problem, and what lessons can be learnt from this.1
 
   
Further, it may not be possible to alter environmental behaviour without offering realistic 
alternatives.  If behavioural change is required, then targeting the source in practice means 
changing behaviour from one choice to another choice.  Without an alternative sustainable 
choice, change may not be possible and the source of the problem may not have been 
successfully targeted.  Hence this chapter will consider tax packages as both penalties and 
incentives to change decisions, in order to demonstrate to the policymaker the considerations 
to have in mind before introducing such tax reform.  Further it will identify unforeseen 
negative consequences associated with tax reform policies due to design flaws which fail to 
target the source in a fair and economical manner.  For such flaws the chapter will suggest 
reform solutions demonstrating how a source can properly be targeted.  With such knowledge 
a policymaker should be able to design the most effective means of targeting the source of an 
environmental problem in order to achieve the required improvements and outcome. 
 
The chapter will initially formulate and evaluate a case study.  Aviation taxation can be 
examined at this stage as an example of tax legislation which attempts to alter behaviour by 
targeting the source of the problem in encouraging alternative behaviour.  This first section 
will consist of a case study into the UK’s APD (Air Passenger Duty) as part of an overall 
policy of changing transportation behaviour, and compare it with other European 
jurisdictions.  It will note where the incentives and burdens falls.  The chapter then considers 
the subject of targeting taxes at the source of environmental harm in a general non-aviation 
                                                             
1 Echoed in Geyer-Alle´ly and Zacarias-Farah, see chapter 6, n.20 at 925. 
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context.  It is intended that the lessons learnt through these examples can provide guidance as 
to how a tax reform can most effectively be targeted to an environmental problem’s source. 
45.  CASE STUDY: ANALYSIS OF AIR PASSENGER DUTY 
 
45.1 INTRODUCTION: INTENTION OF APD BANDING 
 
APD from 1 November 20092 charged a fixed rate of tax3 for each passenger based on their 
destination country, with destinations categorised into four different regions allowing four 
different tax bands (Bands A-D).4  The rationale behind the distance-based banding structure 
was to ensure that the longer the flight, the higher the tax - in order that the environmental 
impact of a flight could be internalised, and as final incidence normally fell upon the 
passenger there was an incentive to avoid both unnecessary flights and long flights.5
 
 
45.2 PERVERSE INCENTIVES: SHORT HAUL 
  
Næss-Schmid et al have criticised the design of some targeted indirect taxes (as opposed to 
taxing at root).  They are argued to be crude in offering uniform rates which do not take 
account of variations between different models to reflect different efficiencies.  They are also 
argued to be arbitrary by using average estimations of factors such as usage and fuel 
efficiency, which may not be appropriate to many given circumstances.  This is shown to lead 
to a failure to provide appropriate incentives to change behaviour, and these arguments are 
                                                             
2 Pursuant to FA 1994, s.30, as amended by FA 2010, s.14. 
3 From 1 November 2009, pursuant to FA 1994, s.30, as amended by FA 2010, s.14.   
4 See the rates in HMRC, ‘2008 Pre-Budget Report: Air Passenger Duty’ at para. 8, 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2008/pbrn20.pdf> Accessed 28 April 2010. 
5 A DfT White Paper set out the intention to reduce demand, DfT, ‘The Future of Air Transport’ (2003) Cm 
6046. 
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applicable to APD rates.6 Arguably the broad rates were somewhat arbitrary and unfair on 
passengers because of the banding formats.  For example Band A charged the same rate on 
destinations with capitals between 0 - 2,000 approximate miles from London.  Therefore a 
passenger on a flight to Jersey bore the same tax liability as a passenger flying significantly 
further to Western Sahara.  The banding’s justification may have been to reduce short-haul 
and unnecessary flights where alternative sustainable means were available.7
 
  However a 
negative consequence was the incentive for airlines to offer flights as far as possible within 
the 2,000 mile zone.   
Furthermore, since the distance was always measured from London and not the actual airport 
of departure, a passenger on a flight from London to Paris paid the same rate as a passenger 
flying from Glasgow to Paris regardless of the significant differences in distance and 
alternative transport methods.  This may have succeeded in incentivising a passenger 
departing from London to use alternative means of transport to Paris, enabling a policy of 
discouraging short-haul flights from London.  However a passenger departing from Glasgow 
would have been at a comparative tax advantage compared to a passenger departing London 
given the additional 350 approximate miles that the former could travel for the same amount 
of tax.   
45.3 INCOMPATIBILITY WITH DOMESTIC TRANSPORT POLICY 
 
Given that the GBP £12 rate applied8
                                                             
6 Næss-Schmid et al, see chapter 6, n.22 at 18. 
 (on top of other standard charges such as airport fees 
and the fuel surcharge) to both, a passenger departing Glasgow using an Economy ticket 
would still normally have found it more economical to fly to Paris than use public transport.   
7 Over 40% of the recent growth in UK leisure air travel was generated by fare reductions, according to Dargay 
J and Hanly M, ‘The Determinants of the Demand for International Air Travel to and from the UK.’ (2001) 
ESRC Transport Studies Unit working paper. 
8 The reduced rate for the lowest class of travel in 2010-11. 
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A train or coach would take many times longer than a flight, and a train would almost 
certainly cost much more and involve a number of changes to different rail operators.  A 
basic search for Economy tickets at the time of writing found that it was frequently possible 
to fly directly from Glasgow to Paris for circa GBP £20-£40 return including all charges and 
APD, taking around 2 hours each way.  At the same time it was possible to buy a return train 
ticket for circa GBP £120-£160 which took 8-9 hours each way with at least one change, or to 
travel by coach for circa GBP £70 return in 22 hours with 2 changes.  However, from London 
the fares were not significantly different, and train travel was generally faster when the 
commute to the airport and check-in times were included.  Seemingly the incentive applied 
more to departures from London than elsewhere. 
 
With air travel continually being significantly cheaper and quicker for domestic or European 
travel than alternative sustainable transport, it is difficult to argue that APD had appreciable 
impact on travel behaviour.  Therefore the incentive within Britain was not completely 
effective in achieving the environmental objective – targeting the source of pollution, in this 
case the demand for flying short-haul – though this is largely to do with the lack of 
alternative sustainable transport options.   It is accepted, however, that the rates were 
categorised for administrative efficiency as it would be onerous to link the tax charge with 
the exact distance flown.  At the same time, the tax was not working to its full effect in 
reducing short-haul flights, and appeared to be simply raising revenue rather than achieving 
the objective of behavioural change. 
 
45.4 THEME APPLIED TO DOMESTIC TRAVEL 
 
45.4.1 APD REVENUE RECYCLING INTO RAIL TRAVEL 
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In order to promote a White Paper9 objective of replacing short-haul flights with train travel, 
it may have been sensible to continue collecting APD so that a message could be sent about 
the environmental cost of air travel, but to make further efforts to alter behaviour by 
earmarking APD revenue to subsidise alternative domestic transport.10
 
  Today, this could be 
done in a way that makes alternative transport better value than flying – including subsidising 
rail tickets to directly bring down their prices.  Price-related demand would allow train travel 
to compete more successfully with air travel.  This follows the theme of polluters paying 
combined with environmental improvers being rewarded.   
Price changes could also be coupled with improvements in train services, with APD revenue 
earmarked to invest in improvements in order to make train travel a real alternative and 
increase demand.  Presently, many parts of the UK are poorly connected to the rail network, 
with slow and/or infrequent services, making trains struggle to compete with air transport on 
longer journeys.11
 
  It is difficult to justify increased costs of air tickets if passengers have 
little other option to travel – otherwise it feasibly becomes a revenue-raising charge with no 
behavioural impact. 
                                                             
9 DfT, ‘High Speed Rail’ (London: TSO, 2010) White Paper No. Cm 7827. 
10 Businesses, passengers, the aviation industry and the media have initiated campaigns against APD.  A main 
concern is that the revenue goes to HM Treasury and not to environmental projects, showing the rationale of 
internalising negative externalities has not been accepted by the public.  See eg. The Telegraph’s campaign 
‘Budget 2010: Air Passenger Duty and the rising cost of flying for British families’ The Telegraph, 24/3/2010, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/air-passenger-duty/7513091/Budget-2010-Air-Passenger-Duty-
and-the-rising-cost-of-flying-for-British-families.html> Accessed 22/4/2010. 
11 DfT, see n.5, at 58. 
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Regular, comfortable and inexpensive services funded by APD earmarked revenues could 
help make rail travel the norm.12  It would send a better environmental message than the 
situation where the purposes of APD rate increases are questioned.  High speed, electric rail 
service especially around hub airports were key recommendations of the Royal Commission 
report on Environmental Pollution which recognised that short-haul flights have a much 
larger impact than rail transport over the same point-to-point journey.13
 
   
45.4.2 COMPARISON: SPANISH DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Spain has been at the forefront of changing transport behaviour, where large public 
investments in the industry have meant new train routes making long-distance travel by rail 
become inexpensive and fast.  The high speed 410-mile Barcelona-Madrid route takes 2.5 
hours and at the time of writing a ticket can cost only GBP £40.  In 2007, 72% of long-
distance domestic travellers chose air travel over rail, but increased investments in new high-
speed trains combined with low prices reduced this to 60% in 2008.14  This change of 
behaviour led to 20% less passengers on domestic flights and a corresponding decrease in 
carbon emissions.15  The Spanish Government planned investments of EUR €108 billion in 
the rail industry by 2020, with an extensive network of ‘bullet’ trains covering both long 
distance routes and connecting rural parts of the country, so that 90% of the country could 
live within 31 miles of a high speed rail station.16
                                                             
12 Such passenger requirements are recognised in DfT, 'Delivering a Sustainable Railway' (London: TSO, 2007) 
White Paper No. Cm 7176, at pp. 92-110. 
    Such commitment provides real 
alternatives for people to be capable of altering their environmental behaviour – though 
13 RCEP, The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight (London: RCEP, 2002) Special Report, at 37, 
para. 6.4. 
14 ‘Spain's high-speed trains win over fed-up flyers’ The Guardian 13/1/2009 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/13/spain-trains> Accessed 28/1/2010. 
15 Ibid. 
16 ‘Spain's Bullet Train Changes Nation -- and Fast’ The Wall Street Journal 20/4/2009 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124018395386633143.html> Accessed 28/1/2010. 
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whether this project remains affordable given Spain’s national economic crisis remains to be 
seen.  
 
45.4.3 INCENTIVES FOR DOMESTIC RAIL OPERATORS 
 
 
The UK’s general policy on encouraging rail transport is developing but has often been 
fragmented and badly targeted.  Train operators must run trains on the track provided for 
them and have little control over the type of track they use.  Electric trains are around 35% 
less expensive to operate and typically emit 20-35% lower emissions per passenger than 
diesel trains.17  Much of the UK network (at the time of writing) is not electrified so train 
operators must use diesel powered trains whilst having an obligation in their franchise 
agreements to provide a certain number of services.18  Nevertheless operators still must pay 
fuel duty.  While this tax may provide the desire to have electrified tracks offering lower 
emissions and greater energy efficiency,19
 
 it is not in the power of the operators to alter the 
tracks, thus it creates an impossible incentive.  The duty only provides an incentive to 
improve the fuel efficiency of train engines.   
Duty on biofuels for trains fell considerably following the 2006 Budget providing a 
substantial incentive to convert train engines.20
                                                             
17 DFT, ‘Britain’s Transport Infrastructure: Rail Electrification’ (London: DfT Publications, 2009) at 8, 
paras.13-15, <http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/rail-electrification.pdf> Accessed 21/4/2010. 
  Yet Government intervention was necessary 
18 Approximately 60% of passenger journeys are made on electric trains: Ibid, at 6, para.8, 
<http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/rail-electrification.pdf> Accessed 28/1/2010. 
19 In terms of carbon emissions“...all the electric trains [operating in the UK’s rail network] are better than any 
diesel train”; Kemp RJ, Engineering - Traction Energy Metrics (London: Rail Safety and Standards Board, 
2007) at 28, <http://www.rssb.co.uk/pdf/reports/research/T618_traction-energy-metrics_final.pdf> Accessed 
21/1/2010. 
20 ATOC, ‘Train Operators Welcome Chancellor’s Cut In Biofuel Duty’ 6th December 2006 <http://www.atoc-
comms.org/dynamic/atocpress-story.php?atoc=997790> Accessed 1/8/2009. 
  
217  
for a much greater impact; the announcement of a GBP £1.1 billion investment in electrifying 
the Great Western Main Line to create an alternative system of rail services.21  In 2010, the 
DfT announced ambitious plans to invest heavily in domestic rail services to such an extent 
that it would eliminate the need for short-haul domestic flights.22  The investment in such 
infrastructure could provide such an alternative and for the first time the British Government 
explicitly committed to the demise of short-haul flights.  However, this public investment 
may no longer be feasible following the recession, and Network Rail have indicated that large 
infrastructure projects may need to be cancelled or postponed following a decreased budget.23  
The point remains, however, that forcing passengers away from vehicles or air travel should 
only be popularised if public transport is a real and attractive alternative.24
 
 
45.5 DISTANCES TO CAPITAL CITIES: LONG-HAUL 
  
Moscow fell within Band A since it is less than 2,000 miles from London.  However, the 
majority of Russia is more than 2,000 miles from London and an exception was made to the 
way that the country was categorised.  Any destination airport west of the Urals was classed 
as Band A, whereas any destination airport east of the Urals was classed as Band B25
                                                             
21 ATOC, ‘Electrification announcement is excellent news for passengers and the environment’ 23/7/2009 
<http://www.atoc-comms.org/dynamic/atoc-press-story/997919/electrification-announcement-is-excellent-
news-for-passengers-and-the-environment> Accessed 1/8/2009. 
 which 
brought most of Russia into a higher charge.  Prima facie this would appear to have been 
designed to recognise the environmental impact of the considerable additional miles after the 
Urals.  A cynical view however may be that it was decided to make an exception for Russia 
22 DfT, see n.9. 
23 ‘Rail fares will rise as investment falls’ The Times, 4/6/2010, 
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/transport/article7143817.ece> Accessed 
7/6/2010. 
24 A point reinforced in Fedrigo D and Tucker A, ‘Blueprint for European Sustainable Consumption and 
Production’ (2009) EEB Publication No. 2009/07 at 12, 
<http://www.eeb.org/publication/2009/0905_SCPBlueprint_FINAL.pdf> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
25 Approximately 2001–4000 miles from London. 
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in order to gain the additional tax revenue as most of the country is further away from 
London than the capital.    While Russia was divided in two since the capital city was 
inconveniently close to London for the purposes of APD, the same rationale did not apply to 
another geographically large country, China, where the capital city is in the east – passing the 
4,001 miles barrier which placed the whole of China in Band C.  This meant that many 
Chinese airports located below the 4,001 mile barrier could have fallen within Band B had 
the capital been in the west of the country, or if the country had been divided for the purposes 
of APD banding as with Russia.26   Contrarily, Russia is by far the geographically largest 
country in the world27
 
 covering several continents and perhaps it was decided to only make 
an exception with this one country given its exceptional landmass.   
45.6 USA TAX BREAK 
 
 
It may have been sensible nevertheless to apply the logic used for Russia to flights departing 
for other countries such as the USA, to avoid arbitrary consequences undermining the tax’s 
environmental rationale.  Washington, D.C. is on the east of America and being 3,67428 miles 
from London it allows the USA to narrowly fall under the 4,001 mile limit to be classed as 
Band B.  Despite this, the vast majority of US airports are considerably over 4,001 miles 
from London.  California – a popular destination for British tourists but on the Pacific coast 
of America – could have been classified as Band C since it is 5,314 miles from London.29
                                                             
26 Urumqi in Xinjiang (west China) for example is under 4,000 miles from China 
<http://www86.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=Urumqi+to+london> 28/4/2010. 
  At 
27 By land mass.  Russia’s land mass covers 6.593 million square miles, while the next largest country, Canada, 
only covers approximately half of that with 3.855 million square miles.  
<http://www23.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=largest%20country&t=ff3tb01> 28/4/2010. 
28 <http://www93.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=washington+dc+to+london> 28/4/2010. 
29 <http://www93.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=california+to+london> 28/4/2010. 
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7,31530
 
 miles from London, Hawaii would have been well within the highest band, Band D – 
but instead a 13.5 hour flight to Hawaii was taxed at same rate as a 4 hour flight to Cairo.   
Whilst this seemed environmentally disproportionate, it was also detrimental towards certain 
tourist-dependent regions such as the Caribbean who were unnecessarily put at a competitive 
disadvantage with no environmental justification.31  A 7.5 hour flight to Barbados32 was 
taxed at a higher rate than a flight to Hawaii.  The Caribbean Tourism Organisation 
complained this was discriminatory since it damaged its tourist industry and attracted higher 
charges for dual nationals making the trip.33
 
  Such anomalies were seen consistently 
throughout the APD system caused by the uniform method of selecting capital cities as the 
means of banding.  Despite the administrative burden, it would be possible in principle to 
calculate the actual distance from the airport of departure (which will frequently not be a 
London airport) to the actual airport of destination.  This would have been a fairer system and 
the environmental message could be conveyed in a more effective manner, though may again 
have led to some airports unduly benefiting.  The environmental effectiveness will be 
analysed below. 
45.7 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF DISTANCE-BASED 
AVIATION TAXATION 
 
 
Taxing for distance travelled brings the additional fuel used for longer flights into charge.  
The message with distance-based charging is simple and effective, even if it does not fully                                                              
30<http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=hawaii+to+london> 28/4/2010. 
31 Falling numbers of tourists were reported by Civil Aviation Authority, ‘Recent trends in growth of UK air 
passenger demand’ (2008) <http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/589/erg_recent_trends_final_v2.pdf> Accessed 
22/4/2010.  
32 Barbados’ capital Bridgetown is estimated to be 4,213 miles from London 
<http://www93.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=bridgetown+distance+to+london> 28/4/2010. 
33 <http://www.onecaribbean.org/traveltrade/tradenews/newsandfeatures/apd.aspx> Accessed 22/4/2010. 
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explain the correct environmental situation.  The Civil Aviation Authority found it 
advantageous to use distance to meet environmental objectives.34  They argue that distance 
should be measured by function rather than purely geographical distance, in order to avoid 
hub-changes which would increase emissions.35
 
 
 
However  Calder believes that fuel use depending on the distance travelled is only marginal 
compared to the fuel used during the first phase of the flight.36  This makes short flights use a 
“disproportionate” amount of fuel.37  As such, he argues that it would be more 
environmentally effective to introduce a high tax for every flight and marginal increases for 
the distance travelled – whereas APD did the opposite.38  Nevertheless, this reversed tax 
proposal would make UK industry les competitive due to increased short-haul costs, and 
encourage flying outside of Europe.  A tax that discriminates between EU Member States, 
could fall foul of the right to freedom of movement within the EU39 or be regarded as too 
restrictive a measure since a basic freedom is at stake.40
                                                             
34 ‘Civil Aviation Authority Response to HM Treasury Consultation on Aviation Duty’ 
   If a message on environmental 
change – although technically incorrect as to the exact environmental impact – manages to 
achieve a given policy of reducing aviation emissions, then the (somewhat distorted) tax 
system will have been largely successful and therefore the flaws may be excusable.  However 
24/04/08, at para.42, <http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/5/20080424CAAResponseOnAviationDutyFinal.pdf> 
Accessed 28/4/2010. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Calder S, ‘Air Passenger Duty is still in a hopeless mess’ The Independent 29/11/2008, 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/simon-calder/simon-calder-air-passenger-duty-is-still-in-a-hopeless-
mess-1039849.html> accessed 2/6/2009. 
37 RCEP, see n.13 at 23, para.4.11. 
38 Calder, see n.36. 
39 Within Europe this is protected by Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29/4/2004, and Article 18(1) of the EC 
Treaty.   
40 Fiscal measures with the EU must be the least restrictive measure available when a basic freedom is at stake: 
Case C-320/03 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria [2005] ECR I-09871.  It a tax is 
incompatible with freedoms guaranteed within the EC, the tax is unjustifiable; Anido MAC et al, 
Jurisprudencia tributaria del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas: vol II, 1996-1999 (Madrid: La 
Ley, 2001) at 297. 
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if the tax system does not achieve the environmental policy then it will be deemed 
ineffective, and much worse if it ends up causing damaging substitutional behaviour.    
 
In fact Calder is incorrect to assert that take-offs and landings are the “most damaging part of 
the flight…”41  It is true that this initial phase uses a disproportionate amount of fuel, which 
encourages the argument for a high initial level of tax to discourage short-haul flights.42   
However the Royal Commission recognise that “take-off and landing become less significant 
as the flight distance increases…”43 and in particular very long haul flights vastly increase the 
fuel usage per passenger because a large quantity of fuel must be carried during the early 
stages of the flight. 44
 
  Therefore the marginal increases for distance proposed by Calder may 
need to be set at significant rates.  Combined with a high initial rate, the tax could be 
competitively unworkable as a unilateral measure. 
Since APD’s highest banding was 6,000 miles, some very long-haul flights were charged at a 
proportionately much higher rate of APD than others flying over 6,000 miles.  For example 
Cambodia is just over the 6,000 mile mark45 whilst New Zealand is over 11,000 miles46.   If 
this impacted upon passenger behaviour at all, it would surely have been to make passengers 
fly further.  This perverse incentive meant it would have only cost an extra GBP £10 in APD 
to take a 24-hour flight to New Zealand over a 7-hour flight to New Delhi which was unlikely 
to provide a disincentive to any average passenger in taking very-long haul flights.47
                                                             
41 Calder, see n.36. 
  Such 
realities of the system distorted the behavioural message of APD and could negative 
substitutional behaviour.  Even between bands, the limited increases in the rates also caused 
42 RCEP, see n.13 at 23, para.4.11. 
43 Ibid at 23, paras.4.13. 
44 Ibid. 
45 <http://www28.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=london+to+cambodia> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
46 <http://www28.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=london+to+cook+islands> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
47 On a reduced-rate flight in 2010-11. 
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perverse incentives.  A Business class passenger flying just outside the 2000 mile band was 
charged GBP £120, yet after that it was only an additional GBP £50 to fly over 6,000 miles, 
meaning it would only cost a Business class passenger £50 more in APD to fly to New 
Zealand than to fly to Egypt.  
45.7.1 ALTERNATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS  
 
 
Aviation tax in the form of APD as described above is not regarded to have had a significant 
impact upon overall passenger behaviour, as in many cases rates were relatively small 
proportionate to the ticket cost.  However, some areas such as the Caribbean reported falling 
numbers of tourists.   There are a number of drawbacks to the system and it generally 
provided a hap-hazard approach to affecting behaviour.  Depending on the environmental 
policy, a policymaker may find a reformed tax more effective in targeting the differing 
problems and sources of harm. 
 
Alternatives to APD are discussed below to determine which option in principle could 
produce a more desirable situation than the initial proposal.    These options concentrate 
solely on achieving the environmental goal of reduced aviation emissions and not on 
achieving reductions in matters such as noise or air congestion.48
 
  The options are explained 
and evaluated in order to highlight why any method is preferable. 
45.7.1.1 TAX ON AVIATION FUEL 
 
                                                             
48 Alternative types of Aviation Taxes for other environmental and non-environmental are reviewed in Keen M 
and Strand J, ‘Indirect Taxes on International Aviation’ (2007) 28 Fiscal Studies 1, 1-41, See eg. pp.7-21. 
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An aviation fuel tax could disincentivise airlines operating inefficient flights.  This would 
therefore not penalise passengers travelling to destinations for which the aircraft uses an 
‘optimum’ amount of fuel.  For the present day average aircraft the most fuel-efficient flight 
distance is approximately 2,700 miles, which would make a flight from Europe to the east 
coast of North America the optimum level.49
 
  An aviation fuel tax could reflect this in the 
price offered to passengers since it would make such flights the most economical for the 
airline.  This could make such optimum level flights the best value and may increase demand 
for such flights.   
Whilst in principal there would be environmental benefits to this, it would send a confusing 
message to passengers who may not understand the reasons for some flights being the most 
fuel-efficient and therefore less expensive.50
 
  This could lead to a mixed environmental 
message being sent to consumers who may believe that long-haul flights are always more 
environmentally efficient and alter their behaviour accordingly which would not be the 
desired behavioural change. 
Such fuel duty would nevertheless provide a significant incentive for airlines to invest in 
more fuel-efficient aircraft in order to lower their tax liability. This would be the main 
attraction for introducing such taxation as it could work similarly to VAT on vehicle fuel, 
which artificially increases the price and encourages the motor industry to invest in producing 
more fuel-efficient vehicles to meet consumer demand.   
 
IMF research suggests that the optimum aviation tax would be a combined system whereby:51
                                                             
49 RCEP, see n.13 at 23, paras.4.13. 
 
50 See concept of ‘transformative rationale’ in 30.2 and n.34. 
51 Keen and Strand, see n.48, at 37-38. 
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i. an aviation fuel excise duty is charged.  This would mean incidence is fixed 
between taxpayers and is intended as a polluter-pays aspect to account for the cost 
of environmental harm; and 
ii. a VAT on ticket sales.  This would be designed primarily to raise revenue but 
there would deliberately be no business incidence so as not to provide 
disincentives for business travellers in this part (though they contribute in the fuel 
excise duty).   
 
Despite this, any tax on aviation fuel for international flights is currently a moot point.  
Article 24 of the Chicago Convention prohibits any signatory nation from levying a tax on 
fuel for international aviation, either as a fuel duty or VAT.52  International aviation ticket 
taxes are consequently generally zero-rated for VAT purposes.53  Effectively this exemption 
subsidises international air travel over other transport means and therefore goes against global 
environmental objectives of reduced carbon emissions – a point highlighted in the Stern 
Review.54
 
  Since APD is not a tax on fuel but on passengers, it does not breach the Chicago 
Convention which may partly explain why it was implemented.  
It is both common and legal under the Chicago Convention to charge domestic aviation fuel 
to VAT.55
                                                             
52 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, 7/12/1944; TS 8 (1953); Cmd 8742. 
   However this means any VAT-registered business may be credited for their VAT 
expenditure and there will be no behavioural impact for such businesses.  An excise tax may 
then work more effectively, though this would create distortions between domestic and 
international flight costs with international flights becoming proportionately less expensive.   
53 The ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) continue to recommend reciprocal tax exemption of 
fuel for international flights: ICAO, ‘ICAO's Policies on Taxation in the Field of International Air Transport’ 
(2000) Doc 8632 <http://www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/8632/8632_cons_en.pdf> Accessed 26/5/2010. 
54 Stern, see chapter 2, n.57 at 485-486. 
55 See Tables 2 and 3 in Keen and Strand, see n.48, at 6-8. 
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It is also legitimate under the Convention to tax fuel bought for international flights in a 
country’s own jurisdiction, so long as it is not bought abroad.  Yet this solution could create 
distortions by incentivising ‘tanking’ – the purchase of fuel in jurisdictions not charging tax – 
which could also be environmentally undesirable since it can mean aircraft landing 
unnecessarily to avoid tax.   
 
45.7.1.2 AVIATION EMISSIONS TAX 
 
A tax on aircraft emissions would have similar consequences to an aviation fuel tax in terms 
of encouraging the most efficient flights.  However an emissions-based tax would provide a 
much greater incentive to reduce emissions than either APD or an aviation fuel duty as the 
aviation industry would have a specific incentive to invest in low-emissions aircraft.  If this is 
a policymaker’s environmental objective (there may be other environmentally damaging parts 
of a flight which may need addressing over and above the emissions), the tax could work 
similarly to VED. 
 
One main criticism of APD was that it failed to differentiate between environmentally 
efficient and inefficient aircraft – instead the tax was the same on all commercial aircraft 
models.  Fixed APD rates combined with an exemption of aviation fuel duty provided no 
incentive for airlines to become more fuel-efficient.  It was only in the airlines’ interests to 
increase efficiency in order to decrease ordinary fuel costs and limit negative publicity related 
to flying.  EasyJet advocated replacing APD with an emissions-based tax to act as a financial 
incentive for passengers to choose cleaner aircraft, as well as an incentive for airlines to 
invest in cleaner aircraft and a disincentive for airlines to run older more polluting aircraft.56
 
   
                                                             
56 Harrison A, ‘If you want cleaner skies, then ban old, dirty aircraft’ 26/4/2007, 
<http://www.easyjet.com/common/img/Andy_Times_ban_old_aircraft.pdf> Accessed 3/6/2009. 
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A combined international response to bring aviation emissions into charge could work to 
create the necessary incentives to invest in low-emissions aircraft without unilateral 
competitive disbenefits.57  However, there is little pressure to do so particularly as the 
obligation to reduce overall emissions of GhGs under the Kyoto Protocol excluded aviation 
emissions.58  The International Civil Aviation Authority was given the task of regulating 
emissions but no enforcement powers. 59  The only pressure to reduce aviation emissions is 
for domestic aviation which was included in Kyoto’s targets – though the Royal Commission 
argues that this obligation does not go far enough since it only includes CO2 emissions and 
not other forms of aviation emissions.60  The Copenhagen Accord61 made no reference to 
aviation, partly due to the industry collectively setting its own targets to reduce emissions.62
 
 
As a coordinated international response is not feasible, countries can continue to implement 
unilateral measures.  An ‘aircraft excise duty’ based upon emissions would make the annual 
running costs of an aircraft dependent upon its efficiency, as with vehicles in the UK.  
Combined with incentives such as tax reductions for replacing older aircraft, and R&D tax 
incentives to develop clean aircraft, this system could provide the appropriate model for 
reducing emissions.  Indeed, older aircraft are recognised as being considerably more 
inefficient that modern ones so replacement can be highly beneficial for environmental 
objectives.  An IPCC report predicts there could be a 40-50% increase in aircraft’s fuel 
efficiency from 1997-2050, citing a 70% increase from 1950-1997.63
                                                             
57 Methods to reduce such a risk are analysed by this author elsewhere, see chapter 8, n.124. 
 It would not prevent 
58 Pursuant to Article 2.2. 
59 Pursuant to Article 2.2. 
60 RCEP, see n.13 at para.2.26. 
61 Draft decision -/CP.15 (1999) FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf> 
Accessed 26/4/2010. 
62 IATA, Copenhagen Agreement Step in Right Direction - Aviation Strengthens Commitment to Tough Targets 
(2009) <http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2009-12-20-01.aspx> Accessed 27/4/2010. 
63 Penner JE et al, Aviation and the Global Atmosphere (London: CUP, 1999) 
at para7.2.4. 
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other taxes aimed at creating similar incentives from working alongside it, so long as the total 
tax liabilities did not make operating uncompetitive.   
 
Emission taxes could however prove difficult to collect.  Lack of available monitoring 
technology to quantify emissions may cause administration and compliance costs to be higher 
than per passenger, per-plane or per fuel use.64
 
  However, if the emissions tax was 
categorised based upon provable average emissions as with VED, it could be chargeable 
based upon the quantity of flights taken by an aircraft.  This could prove more effective than 
an annual charge, which provides no incentive for an aircraft to fly less; quite the reverse as 
airlines would be keen to spread the cost of an annual tax across as many flights as possible.  
An ‘aircraft excise duty’ based on quantity of flights is therefore the advocated solution and 
will be inputted into the final proposal. 
45.7.1.3 TAX PER PLANE 
 
Thus far, the discussion has referred to improved fuel efficiency, but McCarthy highlights 
that efficiency improvements can also refer to improved load factors – the capacity of seats 
occupied.65  The British Government announced in the 2007 Pre-Budget Report that it 
proposed to replace APD with a duty payable per plane rather than per passenger as of 1 
November 2009.66
                                                             
64 The varying costs related to different monitoring and verification methods offering a range of accuracy levels, 
are discussed in Kruger J and Egenhofer C, ‘Confidence Through Compliance in Emissions Trading’ (2006) 6 
Sustainable Development Law & Policy 2, at pp.8-9. 
   However, with the onset of a recession it was decided that it would be 
more advantageous for airlines to have a reformed APD than introducing a replacement duty 
65 McCarthy JE, ‘Aviation and Climate Change’ in Blumenthal GT, Aviation and Climate Change (USA: Nova 
Science Publishers., 2010). 
66 HM Treasury, ‘2007 Pre-Budget Report: Meeting the Aspirations of the British People’ (London: TSO, 
2007), Cm 7227, at para.7.56. 
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which was expected to bring in a greater amount of tax receipts.67 The 2008 Pre-Budget 
Report consequently abandoned plans to replace APD.68  From a business-behaviour 
perspective it was deemed that a per-flight tax would discourage the opening of new routes 
during times of financial hardship, so taxes were not targeted at entire aircraft.69  In fact, 
airlines actually cancelled planned routes due to APD.70  The UK’s 2010 Coalition 
Government decided to replace APD with a per-plane tax.71
 
 
From an environmental perspective, it is preferable to have one aeroplane taking off and 
polluting with many passengers on board, than multiple aircraft taking off with fewer 
passengers on board and emitting several times more pollution.  Though aircraft with fewer 
passengers use less fuel than full aircraft, this is negligible compared to fuel used with 
additional aircraft taking off.72  The ordinary incentive for an airline to fill a plane is to gain 
greater income which in particular spreads the costs of the fuel and running the flight.73
                                                             
67 HM Treasury, ‘2008 Pre-Budget Report: Facing Global Challenges: Supporting People through Difficult 
Times’ (London: TSO, 2008) Cm 7484, at para.7.55. 
  APD 
offered no additional incentive to improve load factors as airlines do not pay more per 
passenger under circumstances where passengers bear final incidence.  Perversely, an aircraft 
68 Green Air Online cited reports suggesting the amount raised under the reformed APD could be GBP £270 
million less than the amount that could be gained from a tax per plane policy:  Green Air Online, ‘UK 
Government decides against change to a plane tax and instead opts for increases on passenger duty’ 
<http://www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory=321> Accessed 4/6/2009. 
69 HMRC, ‘Changes to Air Passenger Duty’ (2009) <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ria/apd-reform-ia/pdf> Accessed 
on 8/6/2009, at p.8. 
70 ‘Recession and APD forces airlines to cancel routes’ The Telegraph, 4/7/2009 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/air-passenger-duty/5731618/Recession-and-APD-forces-airlines-
to-cancel-routes.html> Accessed 26/4/2010. 
71 HM Government, ‘The Coalition: Our Programme for Government’ (2010) at 30, 
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_1878
76.pdf> Accessed 25/5/2010. 
72 See Green JE, ‘Civil Aviation and the Environment – the Next Frontier for the Aerodynamicist’ (2006) 110 
The Aeronautical Journal, pp.469-486; Hileman JI et al, ‘Payload Fuel Energy Efficiency as a Metric for 
Aviation Environmental Performance’ (2008) Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of the 
Aeronautical Sciences; U.S. Department of Transportation, Air Carrier Summary Data, Form 41 Schedule T-2 
for 1991-2008 (As of 17/7/2008)  <http://www.transtats.bts.gov/> Accessed 26/4/2010. 
73 Fuel costs make up 30% of Direct Operating Cost on long-haul flights, and 10% on short-haul flights, 
according to DfT ‘Aviation and Global Warming’ (2004) at para.3.2.2, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/whitepapers/air/docs/aviatio
nandglobalwarmingreport> Accessed 14/6/2010. 
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flying one passenger attracted a charge to APD based upon only that passenger which was 
clearly an environmental inefficiency. 
 
A per-plane tax is environmentally more favourable than a per-passenger tax because it taxes 
the flight, and therefore internalises the cost, regardless of load factors.  An airline’s incentive 
is to reach maximum seat capacity to cover the tax.  It is likely that fewer planes would 
operate but with improved load factors and lower emissions-per-passenger.74
 
  As such, the 
notion of a per-plane tax will be inputted into this chapter’s final APD reform proposal.  
45.7.2 FINAL AVIATION TAX REFORM PROPOSAL AND EVALUATION 
 
 
It is argued herein that the per-plane tax is particularly favourable compared with APD as it is 
a more effective means of achieving an environmental objective of reduced emissions.75  One 
downside is that this tax also fails to differentiate between high emissions and low emissions 
aircraft.  Further, a per-plane tax could lead to the undesirable consequence of increased 
numbers of smaller aircraft in operation since it would be easier to reach passenger 
capacity.76
 
  This could produce a net environmental disbenefit if many small aircraft produce 
emissions.  Clearly it is important to take account of emissions as part of the charge. 
                                                             
74 See e.g findings in Morrell P, ‘The Potential for European Aviation CO2 Emissions Reduction through the 
Use of Larger Jet Aircraft’ (2009) 15 Journal of Air Transport Management 4, 151–157; Jardine CN, 
‘Calculating The Carbon Dioxide Emissions Of Flights’ (2009) Oxford University Environmental Change 
Institute <http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/research/energy/downloads/jardine09-carboninflights.pdf> Accessed 
26/4/2010. 
75 These arguments are echoed by the IFS in Leicester A, The UK Tax System and the Environment (London: 
IFS; 2006) at 43. 
76 A point recognised in Fullerton et al, see chapter 7, n.37 at 491. 
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Therefore the most advantageous system proposed herein would be for a charge which taxes 
the airline: 
 
i. Per aircraft for each flight taken; and 
ii. Taxes low-emissions aircraft at a lesser rate than high-emissions aircraft. 
 
This would send a clear signal to airlines that it is necessary to invest in cleaner technology.77  
A prudent use of the substantial revenues raised from flight taxes would be to offer airlines 
tax deductions for upgrading their aircraft.78  Since it is the airlines who will be responsible 
for paying such taxes, this could be a revenue-neutral scheme to reduce the negative 
economic effect on the airline industry.79
 
  Given that airlines may not be able to claim tax 
deductions if they have reported no taxable profit, it could further be worth offering an 
aircraft ‘scrappage’ scheme similar to that seen with cars but as an integral part of claiming 
any future tax deduction.  This would be environmentally attractive since it would prevent 
airlines simply selling such aircraft overseas (possibly at a discount) to countries without 
such a tax system, where their continued use would produce no net reduction in emissions. 
Therefore the reform proposal envisages that aircraft would be chargeable as follows: 
 
i. An ‘aviation excise duty’ payable based upon the certified emissions of an 
aircraft.  As with VED this would be divided into bands whereby lower emissions                                                              
77 The IPCC recognise that “…environmental levies have the potential to reduce aircraft emissions by providing 
further incentives to develop and purchase low-emission technology, improve operational efficiency, and reduce 
demand via higher fares.” Penner et al, see n.63 at para.10.4.3.1. 
78 Alternatively the incentive could be offered to manufacturers, as proposed in AEA’s report for DfT, ‘Report 
on International Aviation and Maritime Emissions’ (2009) AEA/ED46526/Issue 1, at 87.  
<http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/eibr/int/intcopenhagenagreement.pdf> Accessed 14/6/2009. 
79 Notably the UK Coalition Government’s APD reform was not intended to be revenue-neutral but instead 
would attempt to recycle revenues to increase tax allowances, potentially in order to initiate a welfare double 
dividend.  HM Government, see n.71 at 30. 
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aircraft pay the least (possibly zero) and the highest emissions aircraft pay the 
most.80  Like VED, charges would rise periodically for the highest emission bands 
so as to send a message that emissions charges will never fall.81
 
  This part of the 
proposal would provide the incentive to invest in modern, more efficient aircraft. 
ii. Unlike VED, the duty is not proposed to be chargeable as a fixed annual fee but 
instead to be chargeable on an aircraft per flight taken.82
Rate of Excise Duty 𝑥 � Number of Flights _________________Estimated total emissions of all �lights� 
  This can be based upon 
estimated emissions for the flight taking into account the type of aircraft and 
distance travelled.  The charge would be calculated each period as follows: 
iii. The aviation excise duty must be set at a rate low enough to be commercially 
viable for airlines to take numerous flights throughout the aircraft’s chargeable 
period, whilst providing a noticeable impact upon operating costs.  This charge 
would be particularly noticeable for the least efficient aircraft since the duty 
payable would be the highest.83
 
  This part of the proposal would provide the 
incentive for airlines to reduce the number of flights flown, in order to reduce 
unnecessary flights with low load factors. 
iv. The revenue from the duties would be earmarked partly or wholly to provide tax 
credits for airlines renewing older aircraft with the most efficient new aircraft, and 
for R&D of more efficient aircraft.  The availability of such credits would be                                                              
80 Pearce and Pearce argue that taxes should differ depending upon the aircraft type, in Pearce B and Pearce D, 
‘Setting Environmental Taxes for Aircraft: A Case Study of the UK’ (2000) GEC-2000-26, at 23-25.   
81 As per the policy advocated by HM Treasury discussed in 32.5.1. 
82 Though may be payable to HMRC periodically in bulk. 
83 In the context of feebates, Greene et al identify that distinct schedules can be used to for distinct vehicle 
classes, see chapter 6, n.38, at 758. 
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dependent upon the policymaker’s desired quota of total aircraft, in order to allow 
control over the extent of total emitters in the national fleet. 
 
Final incidence would likely fall upon passengers as part of their ticket price.84  Crucially the 
expected result would be that tickets for the most efficient aircraft would be consistently less 
expensive than the least efficient.  This is important as demand for low emissions flights 
would affect the services on offer and airlines would consequently phase out the most 
polluting aircraft.  The IIED echo this, explaining that “With informed choice based on 
aircraft and airline emissions efficiency, passengers can encourage the adoption of better 
aircraft technology.”85
 
  The informed choice would be reflected in the price.  Whilst differing 
duties dependent upon aircraft type may prove administratively onerous, if models were 
categorised in a similar format to VED bands (which themselves are imperfect), a more 
effective environmental incentive could be provided for passengers and consequently airlines. 
To send a comprehensive message to passengers about the environmental cost of their air 
travel, this system would need to be reasonably clear to passengers when choosing their 
tickets so that the message is not confused.  Providing an analogy with VED may be useful 
since the public are familiar with this concept and its purposes.  This could also increase 
support for such taxation as consumers would feel able to make an environmental choice by 
choosing airlines operating efficient aircraft.  It could prevent the view that APD is simply a 
tourist tax.   
 
                                                             
84 Cairns and Newson note that it is “...normal commercial practice for airlines to pass on the APD charge 
directly to their passengers.” Cairns S and Newson C, ‘Predict and Decide: Aviation, Climate Change and UK 
Policy’ (2006) Report, University of Oxford Environmental Change Institute, at 95; 45-50. 
85 ‘Flight plan: Taking Responsibility for Aviation Emissions’ (2007) 
<http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/17019IIED.pdf> Accessed 26/4/2010.  Pearce and Pearce reach a similar 
proposal, and demonstrate that different aircraft types pollute in different ways, see n.80, at 16-25. 
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It is worth noting the potential environmental drawbacks of improved aviation efficiency is a 
subsequent increase in demand for low-emission flights which could increase net emissions.  
Research at the Australia National University points out that, while future patterns are 
unknown, historically “…demand growth generally outstrips emission intensity gains…” and 
explains that the “…chances of stabilising aviation emissions without restricting demand are 
diminutive.”86  Once emissions have reduced generally in line with emissions-based taxes, it 
may be the case that tax bands can be reformed to further incentivise emissions reductions so 
that there is a continuing process of restricting demand for the highest emission flights and 
encouraging cleaner technology, whilst utilising the tax system to stabilise passenger 
numbers.87  Such a concept has been advocated by Langer, who argues88 for a ‘pivot system’ 
of incentives where rates can be set high enough to encourage a certain level of positive 
consumption, and once this is achieved the rate can be changed so that there is a continuing 
incentive to achieve even greater fuel efficiency.89  Gordon and Levenson further argue90 for 
rates set to provide continuing incentives to improve fuel efficiency with the rolling arrival of 
improved technology.91
 
   
                                                             
86 Macintosh A and Wallace L, ‘International Aviation Emissions to 2025: Can Emissions be Stabilised without 
Restricting Demand?’ (Canberra: Australia National University Centre for Climate Law and Policy, 2008) at 15. 
<http://www.aef.org.uk/uploads/International_aviation_emissions_to_2025___Macintosh_1.pdf> Accessed 
28/4/2010. 
87 Cockfield discusses the interaction between tax policy and technology change in Cockfield AJ, ‘Towards a 
Law and Technology Theory’ (2004) 30 Manitoba L.J., pp.383; 391-395.  For instance it may be possible for 
Britain’s year 2050 aviation emission levels to return to 2000 levels through technology advances and 
alternative fuel usage: According to Sustainable Aviation, ‘Progress Report ’09’ (2009) at 18, Figure 5, 
<http://www.sustainableaviation.co.uk/images/stories/key%20documents/sa%20second%20review%20final.pdf
> Accessed 27/4/2010. 
88 The argument is made in terms of feebates to improve vehicle efficiency incentive rates, but the concept is 
applicable to this context. 
89 Langer T, Vehicle Efficiency Incentives: An Update on Feebates for States (2005) American Council for an 
Energy-Efficiency Economy, Report No.T051, at 2 <http://www.aceee.org/transportation/T051.pdf> Accessed 
18/6/2009.] 
90 In the context of feebates but applicable here. 
91 Gordon D and Levenson L, Drive+: A Proposal for California to use Consumer Fees and Feebates to Reduce 
New Motor Vehicle Emissions and Fuel Consumption (Berkeley, California: Applied Science Division, 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 1989) at 131. 
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Drafters of tax legislation would find it advantageous to separate the charge from the rates, 
such as by attaching a rates schedule in a separate section of the legislation, so that rates can 
be modified periodically without the need to continually amend the actual charging section.  
For instance this is done with VED, where annual Finance Acts are able to replace the rates 
Schedule attached to the charge in the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994. 
 
45.7.3 LEGAL CHALLENGES AND THE CHICAGO CONVENTION 
 
 
A potential flaw of the proposal is that it may breach the USA-EC Air Transport Agreement92  
and/or the Chicago Convention,93 which the USA claimed would happen when the UK 
planned to introduce a per-plane tax.94  The Dutch Ticket Tax95 was challenged domestically 
on the basis that it contravened Article 15 of the Chicago Convention, which prohibits “fees, 
dues or other charges” from being charged on the right of air transit into a territory.  The 
Dutch Supreme Court, in Board of Airline Representatives in The Netherlands v. The State of 
The Netherlands (Ministry of Finance),96
                                                             
92 Adopted in the EU pursuant to Decision of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council of 25/4/2007 on the signature and 
provisional application of the Air Transport Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, on the one hand, and the United States of America, on the other hand, OJ L 134, 2007/339/EC. 
 refused to declare that the charging statute was 
incompatible with the Chicago Convention, on the basis that there was no manifest breach of 
the Convention. Its interpretation of “charges” within the meaning of Article 15 was that it 
referred to charges levied in order for an aircraft to enter the territory.  Since its duty was 
only levied upon chargeable passengers, it meant that aircraft could enter or depart the 
territory without charge, such as if they entered to refuel or only carried transfer passengers 
93 Article 15. 
94 O’Connell D, ‘United States says Air tax is Illegal’ The Times, 11/5/2008. 
95 See 45.11.1.2. 
96 (2009) Supreme Court, Civil Chamber, 10/7/2009, 08/04121, NJ ; 2009, 563; MR Mok (The Netherlands). 
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who were not chargeable.97 Therefore aircraft of any State would technically not be 
prohibited from entering or departing Dutch territory without paying a tax.98
 
   
A similar case in the UK failed in R (on the application of the Federation of Tour Operators 
and others) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury,99 where the applicants sought judicial review of APD 
on the basis that it was unlawful.100  The High Court held that Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention did not apply to APD because it considered that the prohibition on charging 
“dues” did not intend to prohibit taxes – otherwise, the argument went, it would have 
specifically referred to taxes in the Convention text.  Instead, the court decided that the 
prohibition on charging “fees, dues or other charges” was actually a most favoured nation or 
anti-discrimination provision.101 Since the tax charged all aircraft regardless of State origin, 
and charged even domestic flights, it did not advantage its national carriers or disadvantage 
any particular State’s carriers.  This rather unconvincing interpretation came alongside the 
rejection of a host of challenges based upon international law.102
 
   
Despite the rejected application in the English High Court with reference to APD, the Air 
Transport Association of America have issued proceedings in England’s Administrative 
Court against the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS,103
                                                             
97 At para.2.1.1. 
 on the basis that it breaches 
sovereign regulatory rights pursuant to the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
98  For analysis of the legal challenges see Havel BF and Antwerpen NV, ‘The Dutch Ticket Tax and Article 15 
of the Chicago Convention’ 141 (2009) 34 Air & Space Law; Kernkamp H, ‘BARIN v. The State of The 
Netherlands’ (2009) Kernkamp's Netherlands Civil Court Case Summaries. 
99 [2007] EWHC 2062 (Admin); [2008] Env. L.R. 22; [2008] STC 547. 
100 APD was introduced pursuant to FA 1994, s.28. 
101 GATT Article I:1. Requires any preferential trade advantage offered to one nation to be offered to all nations, 
so that foreign producers can compete on a level platform without discrimination. See chapter 8. 
102 It was deemed outside the ambit of Regulation 549/2004/EC (Single European Sky Framework) Arts 1 and 2.  
Further it was not a breach of Art.1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 or Art.49 of the EC Treaty. 
103 Emissions Trading Scheme, based upon Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23/4/2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme of the Community, OJ L 140/63.   
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USA-EC Air Transport Agreement.104  In R (on the application of Air Transport Association 
Of America Inc). v Secretary Of State For Energy And Climate Change,105 the High Court 
referred the case to the ECJ (European Court of Justice) for a ruling on the validity of the EU 
law in this instance.106  The outcome may have implications not only for ETS but for the 
legality of APD itself.107
 
 
45.8 CLASS INCIDENCE 
 
The following sections critique the rationale and effect of perceived inadequacies in the APD 
system (as existed in 2010), and in doing so will also test the robustness of the proposal in 
45.7.2. 
 
45.8.1 INADEQUACY AND REFORM OF APD SYSTEM  
 
 
A per-flight tax as proposed at 45.7.2 would allow airlines to decide how to distribute the 
charge between passengers, if they opt not to bear it themselves, and it is unlikely this 
distribution would follow APD which bluntly distinguished all types of premium passengers 
from economy passengers – regardless of the considerable differences in environmental 
impact within the different premium seats. APD imposed double the tax on passengers in any 
premium class than the lowest class of travel (known as the reduced rate).  A passenger flying                                                              
104<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/international/pillars/global_partners/doc/us/ec_us_open_skies_agree
ment_24_4_07.pdf> Accessed 28/5/2010. 
105 (2009) EWHC (Admin); See also Leon P, ‘ATA and others v. the UK Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change (2009)’ 2010 25 Air & Space Law 2, 199. 
106‘English High Court Permits ATA Legal Challenge to EU Emissions Trading Scheme to Proceed’ 
International Airport Review, 27/5/2010, 
<http://www.internationalairportreview.com/airport-news/english-high-court-permits-ata-legal-challenge-to-eu-
emissions-trading-scheme-to-proceed/> Accessed 28/5/2010. 
107 At the time of writing, the case had not yet been heard. 
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Premium Economy, Business or First class would therefore all be charged the same ‘standard 
rate’ despite differing seat sizes and baggage entitlement which impact upon emissions-per-
passenger rates.108  For instance, a BA (British Airways) First class seat offers over double 
the space of its Premium Economy seat, though both charge identical APD rates.109
 
  This is 
economically and environmentally disproportionate as it means ‘lower’ premium passengers 
effectively subsidise ‘higher’ premium passengers.  This confused message may have been 
intended to broadly convey the message on the impact of premium passengers, though in a 
simplistic and inaccurate manner. 
Furthermore, the incentive for business travellers to fly in economy class and reduce their 
emissions, is limited by the tax-deductibility of flights taken for business purposes.110  
Despite being only around 10% of total passenger traffic, Keen and Strand found that First 
and Business class passengers in 2003 counted on average for 30% of airline revenues.111  
Consequently the high rates which discourage premium class travel were particularly 
damaging for airlines’ profits and ability to compete, particularly during a recession.  BA for 
example relies on premium class customers for over 50% of its revenues and saw a sizeable 
slump in Business class sales following the recession and the introduction of APD.112  On 
average, transatlantic flights Business class sales allow higher profit margins than any other 
class.113
                                                             
108 A long-haul first class passenger can produce four times the CO₂ emissions per kilometre than an Economy 
passenger: See ‘Table 4: Seating class based CO2 emission factors for passenger flights’ in DEFRA, ‘2008 
Guidelines to Defra’s GHG Conversion Factors: Methodology Paper for Transport Emission Factors’ at 10 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/business/reporting/pdf/passenger-transport.pdf> Accessed 28 April 
2010. 
  Whilst APD rates may have been in line with the policy to encourage as many 
passengers on a flight as possible, if an airline is unable to operate a competitive business, 
109 See comparison charts on <http://www.seatguru.com/> Accessed 27/04/2010. 
110 Conditions for deductions of business travel for employees are found in ITEAP, Part 5, Chapter 1. 
111 Keen and Strand, see n.48, at 35, Table 12. 
112 Milmo D, ‘British Airways ditch first class in new planes as age of austerity bites’ The Guardian, 22/5/2009 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/may/22/british-airways-first-class-loss> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
113 The Travel Insider, ‘Who Flies First Class Anymore?’ 20/5/2009 
<http://thetravelinsider.info/airlines/flyingfirstclass.htm> Accessed 8/6/2009. 
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then a tax combined with poor economic conditions could drive the airline out of business.114  
A poorly competitive UK air industry could be undercut by foreign competitors aiming to 
increase their market share, thus causing the environmental policy merely to harm domestic 
companies.  This point emphasises that such a tax may not necessarily be appropriate in times 
of an economic slow-down, and that it could work much more effectively if there is a 
common international strategy which would eliminate competitiveness concerns.115
45.8.2 LIMITED BEHAVIOURAL IMPACT UPON BUSINESS 
    
 
 
In the UK, under circumstances where a business or self-employed person makes a taxable 
profit, flights taken for business purposes116 may be tax-deductible.117  There may then be no 
incentive for a business or self-employed person to reduce their travel costs, which makes the 
behavioural impact apply mainly to private leisure passengers.  Further, Strand suggests that 
as far as Business class seats are purchased for business passengers and Economy class seats 
are purchased for leisure passengers (as is generally the norm), the deductibility of the charge 
for business travel is effectively an implicit tax subsidy for business travellers.118
                                                             
114 In 2009 airlines around the world saw a slump in sales – particularly business class sales - and heavy profit 
losses: Mostrous A,  ‘Airlines to lose $9bn as recession bites’ The Times, 8/6/2009) 
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/article6454529.ece> Accessed  8/6/2009. 
  The result 
is that non-business passengers, normally flying in Economy class, bear a higher burden of 
tax than businesses whose passengers fly in premium cabins.  If a policymaker intends 
businesses to bear a greater proportion of the tax burden and consequently to alter their 
115 See Truby, chapter 8, n.124. 
116 Which are wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business. 
117 Conditions for deductions of business travel for employees are found in ITEPA, Part 5, Chapter 1. 
118 Strand J, ‘Optimal Aviation Taxes with Distortive Taxation and Endogenous Labor Supply’ (2005) 
unpublished, International Monetary Fund; Keen and Strand, see n.48, at 22.  
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environmental behaviour in the skies, then it may be necessary for businesses to be charged a 
non-deductible excise tax.119
 
   
If it was desired that businesses should share a greater proportion of the burden then the 
proposal in 45.7.2 would not suffice as the charge is a per flight tax payable by the operator 
of the aircraft.  It would be necessary to amend the proposal so that the per-flight tax made up 
only a large proportion of the intended tax receipts, and that a ‘ticket tax’ was introduced for 
the remaining proportion.  The ticket tax would necessarily be a non-refundable excise tax, 
either on a standard rate based upon the class of seat, or ad valorem based upon the ticket 
price.120
 
  Business passengers would consequently bear a share of the burden, and would pay 
a higher rate for using business seats.  This would allow both an incentive for airlines to run 
an efficient and full aircraft, and an incentive for both business and leisure passengers. 
However, there may be wider policy purposes to continue with the implicit subsidy to 
business flyers.  Businesses often rely on employee travel to generate revenue both in 
carrying out work and securing new work; incentives to reduce such travel may then be 
counter-productive in hindering the competitiveness of business by forcing up costs.  Keen 
and Strand point out that by ensuring business travel is non-deductible, other receipts can 
suffer such as corporation tax on both airlines’ business customers and airlines themselves in 
lost income.121
                                                             
119 The Meade Report highlighted that policy-makers should determine their intended tax base before 
introducing a tax by considering the various choices: See chapter 1, n.9. 
  The environmental aim of the class-based APD may simply have been to 
encourage business travellers to travel in economy-class rather than to stop travelling 
altogether – which would protect business interests as well as serving an environmental 
purpose.   
120 A non-creditable ticket tax is advocated in Keen and Strand, see n.48: See eg. 37-38. 
121 Keen and Strand, see n.48 at 22. 
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The situation differs under circumstances where little or no taxable profit is being made for 
which business travel expenses may be deducted.  There would be a much greater incentive 
to avoid business travel costs and therefore a high rate of APD for business passengers would 
have provided a further disincentive to take business flights.  Therefore the extent to which 
APD could affect business behaviour can depend more upon the state of the economy than 
the existence of aviation tax.   
 
Nevertheless, this raises the further point introduced in 31.2, regarding which rate of tax 
would work to make somebody accustomed to flying Business class change their behaviour 
by taking an Economy ticket122 – which they may perceive as a reduction in their standard of 
living or a hindrance to their productivity.123 There is a risk that removing perks from 
business travellers, such as Business class seats or First class rail travel, could decrease the 
likelihood that such groups use public transport at all for short journeys.  An undesirable 
consequence may be that business travellers opt to use private cars and claim mileage if they 
cannot travel in the comfort to which they are accustomed, which could increase net 
emissions.124  It may, however, work to encourage businesses to invest in better 
communication technology such as video-conferencing than to physically travel.125
 
   
45.9 EXEMPTIONS FROM APD 
 
                                                             
122 This is referred to as ‘loss aversion’ in Murkowski, see chapter 6, n.11 at 358.  
123 ‘BBC's Alan Yentob: I can't do my job if I can't fly business class’ The Guardian, 28/4/2010, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/apr/28/bbc-alan-yentob-job-business-class> Accessed 7/6/2010. 
124 ITEPA 2003 allows employees to claim business mileage in company cars. 
125 When aircraft were grounded in Europe due to volcanic ash in 2010, businesses increasingly used video-
conferencing, demonstrating its ability to replace unnecessary travel.   ‘Stranded Travelers Turn to 
Videoconferencing’ New York Times, 19/4/2010, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/technology/20video.html> Accessed 7/6/2010. 
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45.9.1 PRIVATE JETS: UNFAIR EXEMPTION 
 
A number of exemptions further distorted the behavioural impact of passengers.  Aircraft 
permitted to seat fewer than 20 passengers126 (flight crew, cabin attendants and other airline 
staff were not defined as passengers for the purpose of APD)127 or weighing less than 10 
tonnes128  were exempt from APD.129  This therefore excluded private jets, corporate jets, 
helicopters and air-taxi services. On the one-hand policy reasons may have justified these 
exemptions to protect small industries, as it protects small or growing industries such as 
operators of micro-flights, small air-taxi services and private-hire jets for the individual “who 
builds and flies his own aircraft as a hobby.”130
 
   
Absurdly it also means that a private jet for a wealthy person who refuses to travel in a 
commercial aircraft was exempt from paying any APD.  This is grossly unfair for commercial 
passengers who have to bear the burden of the environmental impact of a person enjoying the 
luxuries of a private flight who can likely most afford to pay the duty.  More so, it is grossly 
disproportionate since the emissions-per-passenger rate on an aircraft with perhaps only one 
passenger would be extremely high in comparison with virtually any other form of flying.  
No impact could be made upon such sectors.  It sent a confusing and frustrating message of 
behavioural change to commercial aircraft passengers who may have regarded it as socially, 
morally and environmentally unfair that they effectively subsidised private-jet travellers 
when queuing at the airport and sitting in a seat with under 1.016 metres (40 inches) pitch.131
                                                             
126 FA 1994, s.29(1)(b). 
 
127 FA 1994, s.43(1). 
128 FA 1994, s.29(1)(a). 
129 Such aircraft are not chargeable aircraft for the purposes of APD pursuant to FA 1994, s.29(1). 
130 HMRC, see n.69 at 7. 
131 FA 1994, s.30(11) classified seats above 1.016 metres in pitch as ‘standard rate’ after 1/11/2008.  S.30(12) 
defined ‘pitch’ for this purpose as the distance between a seat and the seat in front of it. 
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45.9.2 PRIVATE JETS: POSSIBLE REFORM 
 
 
An emissions-based, per-flight tax or aviation fuel tax would work to resolve these issues 
without large complications in reclassifying aircraft sizes.  If a policymaker requires such 
businesses to share the burden of environmental taxation then it would be advisable not to 
allow such taxes to be deductible by businesses - though the remainder of their flight travel 
expenses could be tax-deductible in order to protect their competitivenes. Therefore this 
could be made as an excise tax rather than as a VAT-type tax in order that it is non-
creditable.  Policy grounds would likely permit essential operators such as military aircraft 
and air ambulances to claim back the tax or be exempt from it entirely.132
 
 
45.10 TRANSIT PASSENGERS 
 
 
Passengers who change aircraft at connecting stops are known as ‘transfer passengers’ while 
those who remain on board an aircraft at the connecting stop are ‘transit passengers’.133  Both 
types of passengers were exempt from APD in order to protect the position of the UK as a 
hub for international-to-international airports.134  It was officially recognised that subjecting 
such passengers to tax would only cause aircraft to transfer at alternative European hubs, thus 
harming UK industry whilst producing no net reduction in emissions.135
                                                             
132 Military flights and passengers became exempt from APD: see HMRC, ‘Air Passenger Duty’ Notice 550 
(12/2009) para.3.9 
<http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=p
ageExcise_ShowContent&propertyType=document&id=HMCE_CL_000505#P303_17674> Accessed 
27/4/2010. 
  This justification 
only increases the requirement for greater international cooperation – initially within the EU 
133 HMRC, see n.69 at footnote 5 on p.6.. 
134 FA 1994, s.31(3). 
135 HMRC, see n.69 at 7. 
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– to achieve the required behavioural change so that the 13%136
 
 of UK passengers who are 
exempt as transit and transfer passengers can be included without losing business overseas.   
45.10.1 FREIGHT  
45.10.1.1 JUSTIFICATION FOR LACK OF INCENTIVE 
 
 
Planes carrying freight were only charged APD based on the number of actual passengers 
carried.  Freight flights often carry no passengers, so emissions of freight flights were not 
taken into account and were instead borne by commercial airline passengers.  If APD 
achieved its required behavioural change of reducing passenger numbers, there would still 
have been a great many planes in operation given that they have no tax incentive to alter their 
behaviour.  One justification for this may have been that it protected UK business and 
consumers by preventing prices being increased on imports and exports.  Particularly it aided 
commercial exports. 
 
Frequently it may have been more fiscally economical for freight to be carried domestically 
via aircraft than by train – given the exemptions from both APD and aviation fuel duty – 
which distorted the behavioural impact of the APD system.  It also meant that those sending 
and receiving freight by air caused a negative externality which was not internalised, whereas 
transport by road and rail attracted duties.  This meant that recurrently it was businesses who 
were exempt from a tax that private individuals were not.  The fact that freight was exempt 
meant that it could be artificially inexpensive to import or export goods.  For example the UK 
                                                             
136 Ibid at 6. 
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and Australia exchange 20 tonnes of bottled water every year at an uncompensated 
environmental cost.137
 
   
45.10.1.2 TAXE DE L’AVIATION CIVILE 
  
In France there is a taxe de l’aviation civile (civil aviation duty) which imposes a charge both 
on the number of passengers and on the weight of freight and mail.138 It is the obligation of 
the airline to declare and pay this duty.  It operates similarly to the original system of APD in 
charging one rate for passengers flying within the EU and a higher rate for flights outside the 
EU – though the rates are significantly lower than APD rates.139  There is only one rate for 
freight regardless of distance which is lower than the passenger rate and thus protects 
business competitiveness whilst ensuring it bears some burden.140  While the French system 
is not primarily designed for environmental purposes, a reformed UK APD system could 
operate similarly and ensure that both freight and passengers are accountable to 
environmental tax if policymakers seek a system which shares the tax burden between 
passengers and freight.141
 
 
45.10.1.3 FREIGHT: REFORM AND EXEMPTIONS 
 
 
Imposing a tax on freight based on emissions would encourage operators to either increase 
the environmental efficiency of their aircraft or persuade freight-carriers to switch to land-                                                             
137 Rosenthal E, ‘Environmental Cost of Shipping Groceries Around the World’ The New York Times 26/4/2008 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/26/business/worldbusiness/26food.html?pagewanted=all> Accessed 
27/4/2010. 
138 Pursuant to Article 302 bis K of the General Tax Code (Code général des impôts). 
139 Between 2006-2009 the rates for passengers travelling within and outside the EU were €3.92 and  €7.04 
respectively.  Article.37 of FA 2007 No. 2006-1666 of 21/12/2006 (France). 
140  Between 2006-2009 the rate was €1.17 per tonne of cargo and/or mail. Ibid. 
141 FA 2009 (France) fixed a quota allocation of the proceeds of the fee, allocating 82.14% for the budget’s 
"control and air operations" and 17.86% for the general state budget. 
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based transport.142  So that transport by sea is not unfairly advantaged by this charge (fuel 
used in international maritime transport is also exempt under the Chicago Convention), 
changes may need to be made to shipping tax incentives to encourage a shift to lower 
emissions.  A per-plane tax would ordinarily include freight flights.  However, freight carriers 
have protested strongly that a per-plane tax would be extremely damaging for their 
businesses, putting UK business at a competitive disadvantage.143
 
 
Exemptions may, however, need to be made for aircraft carrying essential perishable goods 
which must be carried by air; otherwise carriage to certain remote locations in particular may 
become unprofitable.  On the other hand, many perishable goods could be grown 
domestically which would cause such a tax to benefit both local farmers and reduce the 
amount of goods flown into the country at a high cost to the environment.  If certain goods 
which cannot be grown locally were singled out for exemption this would limit the extent to 
which other taxpayers bear the burden for exemptions from environmental taxes.     
 
It can actually be environmentally superior to import some goods depending on the nature of 
the country in question.  For example shipping apples from New Zealand may produce fewer 
emissions than having to produce apples in Europe and refrigerate them for months in 
storage.144
                                                             
142 The CAA recognise that: “Typically, pure freight aircraft operating to the UK are older aircraft, often 
converted passenger aircraft (e.g. B757, A300, MD11 all of which are 15-25 years old). These aircraft are likely 
to have higher emissions than more modern models…” CAA, see n.34 at para.83. 
  The problem is in ascertaining the true environmental cost which involves the 
onus of finding precise non-contentious information to support this (importing and exporting 
legislatures tend to disagree about the environmental advantages and disadvantages of 
importing produce). 
143 Freight Transport Association, ‘Per plane tax will make UK business less competitive’ Press release, 
14/5/2010, <http://www.fta.co.uk/news/item/per-plane-tax-will-make-uk-business-less-competitive> Accessed 
9/6/2010. 
144 Rosenthal, see n.137. 
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45.10.2 REMOTE LOCATIONS: SCOTTISH HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS 
 
 
As indicated above, some remote locations depend upon air connections to sustain their 
livelihoods.  Airports in regions where the population density was not more than 12.5 persons 
per square kilometre could be exempt145 from APD by order of HM Treasury.146  The only 
qualifying exemptions in 2010 were airports in the Scottish Highlands and Islands where 
departing flights were exempt.  The policy behind this was to recognise the regions’ 
remoteness and dependence upon air transport.147  Regional campaigners argued APD would 
put a “life-threatening constraint” upon air services in those regions.148
 
   
This demonstrates that taxes can both be targeted to affect behaviour, whilst at the same time 
protecting services that may be negatively affected to a disproportionate extent.  The impact 
of increasing rates of APD may well have served the environmental purpose of reducing or 
even eliminating flight services.  However, in this instance policymakers deemed it a greater 
social cost if such remote areas became cut off from the rest of the country or if it caused 
reductions in the lifestyles of residents so severe that the negative impact would have been 
worse than the environmental gain.   
 
Pearce and Pearce’s proposal could, however, allow these exemptions to continue or for 
flights departing from remote locations to only attract a nominal rate of tax.  Their proposal                                                              
145 Pursuant to FA 1994, s.31(4B), as amended by FA 2000, s.19(1), (3). 
146 Air Passenger Duty (Designated Region of the United Kingdom) Order 2001, SI 2001/808. 
147 Explained by HM Customs & Excise (as it then was) alongside the introduction of Clause 19 of Finance Bill 
2000, at para.10, <http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/financebill/2000/Clause19.html> Accessed 9/6/2009. 
148 The Scottish Council Development and Industry: Highlands & Islands Area Committee, Air Passenger Duty: 
A Case for Exemption in all Scottish Highlands and Islands Flights’ (1999) at para.24, 
<http://www.scdi.org.uk/pi/1999/1330.doc> Accessed 9/6/2009. 
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intends for tax rates to reflect the marginal damages caused in any particular locality.  The 
rate to which an aircraft flight would attract tax would vary by location, reflecting localised 
conditions and population density.  The purpose is to account for more than one type of 
environmental harm, in an attempt to internalise a number of negative externalities such as air 
pollution and noise pollution to local residents. Airports in densely populated areas such as 
Heathrow, or those in areas with already high levels of pollution, may cause higher marginal 
damage and subsequently attract higher rates of tax than more remote airports. 149
 
 
45.10.3  SUMMARY OF EXEMPTIONS 
 
Exemptions from APD were mostly utilised where policy made it desirable to do so, mainly 
where the social costs of non-exemptions were regarded as greater than the environmental 
benefit.  These exemptions were targeted to induce or maintain the behaviour of those 
involved – both individuals and enterprises, in order to avoid distortion where policy 
required.   
 
As shown however the consequences of exemptions do not always justify their existence. In 
particular some exemptions which were targeted to protect particular kinds of behaviour 
ended up also exempting environmentally damaging behaviour.  The replacement of APD 
could be manipulated to target behaviour that is environmentally unjustified – such as private 
jets – in order that, if policy requires, this behaviour is both discouraged and brought into 
charge akin to the polluter-pays principle.   
 
                                                             
149 Pearce and Pearce, see n.80, at 8-13. 
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45.11 COMPETITION ASPECTS OF APD 
 
 
The point about how airlines can compete internationally whilst unilaterally charging an 
aviation duty to target behaviour has already been introduced and will be expanded herein. 
45.11.1 EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
  
45.11.1.1 UK AND IRELAND  
 
Unilaterally introducing increasing levels of APD in a time of economic instability can harm 
industry.  In 2009, Ryanair blamed APD for having to reduce staff and services at Liverpool 
airport, arguing that airlines operating from European airports were put at a competitive 
advantage since they did not have to pay such a tax.150
 
  As customers were unable to avoid 
paying the fee by taking an alternative airline or route out of the UK, the tax may therefore 
have discouraged customers from taking short-haul flights in which case the environmental 
objectives may have succeeded - at a cost to airlines.   
Ireland also introduced an equivalent to APD called Air Travel Tax (ATT) applying to 
departures on or after 30 March 2009. 151
                                                             
150 Ryanair, ‘Flight and job cuts at Liverpool Airport’ 18/2/2009 
<http://www.ryanair.com/site/EN/news.php?yr=09&month=feb&story=gen-en-180209> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
  ATT similarly provides exemptions for aircraft 
carrying below 20 passengers and for small airports, in order to protect remote locations. The 
fact that this was introduced during a recession and very much mirrors APD, shows that both 
the UK and Ireland were willing to sacrifice some growth in air traffic.  Whilst this may have 
been partially or mainly intended to increase tax revenues to counter high Government debts 
151 ATT is governed by s.55 of Finance (No. 2) Act 2008, as amended by section 18 of FA 2009, and Air Travel 
Tax Regulations 2009 (SI. No.134 of 2009). 
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during the recession, it also served the environmental purpose (to some extent) of controlling 
passenger demand.   
 
Nevertheless airlines operating in the UK and Ireland suffered heavy losses during the 
recession in 2009.  Ryanair posted a EUR €169m loss152 and BA posted a GBP £401m 
loss.153
 
  It is unclear who the policymaker intended to bear the tax burden in these cases.  On 
the presupposition that this was partially the fault of APD which reduced sales and profits, 
then it was the airlines who were made to bear the cost of aviation emissions.  However, if 
the losses are carried over and deducted against future profits, then airlines would share the 
burden with the general taxpayer.  Governments may be prepared to fund behavioural change 
in this way as it may be less politically sensitive to make this tax expenditure than to make a 
direct Government expenditure.  Essentially, however, it may be the individual taxpayers and 
not enterprise who bear the greater burden of APD – putting a greater strain on taxpayers who 
may not themselves fly. 
45.11.1.2 CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
 
The Netherlands introduced a levy on air tickets in 2008 into their Environmental Tax Act154 
to control the growth in aviation traffic, but zero-rated this Ticket in 2009155
                                                             
152 ‘Ryanair reports first annual loss’ BBC News 2/6/2009  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8078349.stm> 
Accessed 9/6/2009. 
 since it was 
153 ‘High costs fuel record loss at BA’ BBC News 22/5/2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8062844.stm> 
Accessed 9/6/2009. 
154 Wet van 23 december 1994, houdende vaststelling van de Wet belastingen op milieugrondslag (The 
Netherlands) (Environmental Tax Act), Section VB, Articles 36R to 36RG (subsequently Articles 72-79), as 
amended pursuant to (Belastingplan 2008) (Tax Plan 2008), 31205 STB 2007 562, Wet van 20/12/2007, 
houdende wijzigingen van enkele belastingwetten, Kamerstuk 31 205, (Staatsblad 2007, 562). (Law of 
20/12/2007, amending certain tax laws) (Gazette, 2007, 562). 
155 Besluit van 1/6/2009 tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van artikel X van de Wet fiscaal 
stimuleringspakket en overige fiscale maatregelen (Staatsblad, 2009 281). (Royal Decree of 1/7/2009 fixing the 
date of implementation of Article X of the Fiscal Stimulus Package and Other Tax Measures Act) (Gazette), 
2009, 291). 
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regarded as harming its economy and tourist trade during the global recession.156  The 
behavioural impact was therefore deemed too great for the economic circumstances.  The 
levy raised a reported EUR €312 million for the Dutch treasury but cost an estimated EUR 
€1.2 billion in lost revenue from travellers.157
 
  If this economic calculation is applicable in 
other countries, it may well be decided that it is better to avoid introducing aviation tax in 
order to use the current revenue from tourism for environmental purposes, as hoped in the 
Netherlands. 
Spain also used its tax system as an incentive to encourage aviation growth during the 
recession.  It announced that it would waive taxes for airports that carried more passengers in 
the second half of 2009 than in the first half of 2008 – clearly putting economic recovery 
above environmental goals and creating a perverse incentive that could undermine demand 
for its rail projects (see 45.4.2).  It also announced similar assistance158 for the Canary Islands 
by subsidising 30% of tickets to the islands for island residents.159  Greece similarly reduced 
its regional airport charges to zero for 2009 and Belgium announced it would scrap its air 
passenger duty.160  Denmark abolished161 its air transportation tax162
                                                             
156 Plans were put in place to abolish the tax altogether for the prosperity of the industry.  Act Abolishing Flight 
Tax was proposed via the official Belastingplan 2010 (Tax Plan 2010) and a private member’s motion in and 
Leijnse cs, Kamerstukken I 2008/09, 31 301, D, No Reprint, Wet afschaffing vliegbelasting. (Motion ‘Leijnse 
cs’ for the Act Abolishing Flight Tax). 
 which was an 
environmental tax, and a single rate for all passengers regardless of distance, except for a 
157 IATA, ‘ Load Factors Drop as Passenger Demand Falls - Freight Stabilises’ 28/4/2009 
<http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/2009-04-28-01.htm> Accessed 10/6/2009. 
158 Royal Decree 1316/2001, dated 30/11.   Modified by Royal Decree 1340/2007, dated 11/10. 
159 ‘Rivals hit out at Canaries’ Ryanair 'subsidy'’ The Telegraph, 4/4/2010, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/7545529/Rivals-hit-out-at-Canaries-Ryanair-subsidy.html> 
Accessed 8/6/2010.  A previous measure which offered the discount only to Spanish residents was declared 
incompatible with Article 90 (1) of the EEC Treaty: 87/359/EEC: Commission Decision of 22/6/1987 
concerning reductions in air and sea transport fares available only to Spanish nationals resident in the Canary 
Islands and the Balearic Islands, OJ L 194, 15/07/1987 P. 0028 – 0029. 
160 ‘Ryanair: Irish Traffic and Tourism Collapses’ FinChannel 15/5/2009 
<http://www.finchannel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37342&Itemid=1> Accessed 
10/6/2009. 
161 Abolished by Law No 1415 of 21/12/2005 (Denmark). 
162 Named the Tax on certain types of flights (transportation tax) or Afgift af visse flyrejser (Passagerafgift), 
introduced pursuant to Statutory Notice No 566 of 3/8/1998 (Denmark). 
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reduced rate for light aircraft.  Malta had an airport passenger service charge163 which 
constituted an environmental transport tax on passengers164 leaving Malta by aircraft but this 
was abolished in 2008.165
 
 
45.11.1.3 COMPARISON  
 
 
Britain and Ireland put their tourist and aviation industries at risk by continuing to introduce 
increasing rates of aviation taxes despite the global recession.  To some extent, the purpose of 
this may have been concerned with balancing budgets, though from an EU environmental and 
economic perspective the practice of some Member States unilaterally charging aviation 
taxes whilst others did not is an inefficient distortion.  Recognising OECD advice that tax 
competition can be damaging,166  the EU have agreed on a Code of Conduct against such 
practices.167  However, for a tax measure to be considered harmful under this voluntary Code, 
it must both be significantly lower than those which generally apply across other Member 
States,168 and significantly influence the location where business activities in the Community 
occur.169  Since the Anglo-Irish aviation tax rates are uncommonly high amongst Member 
States, it cannot be argued that other Member States are falling below a benchmark and 
pursuing competitive tax policies to attract business.  As such, EU abilities to correct this 
market distorting structure are wanting.170
 
 
                                                             
163 Dritt ta' Hlas ta' l'Ajruport ghal Servizz lill-Passiggieri.  Pursuant to Airport (Passenger Service Charge) 
Regulations, 1997 (Malta). 
164 Other than the air crew and infants under two years of age, and passengers returning on the same day as the 
day of departure. 
165 By 1/11/2008. 
166 As explained in OECD, ‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue’ (Paris: OECD, 1998). 
167 Conclusions of the Ecofin council meeting on 1/12/1997 concerning taxation policy, OJ (98/C 2/01). 
168 Code of Conduct: B. 
169 Code of Conduct: A. 
170 For an explanation of this area see Kiekbeld, see chapter 6, n.9 at 33. 
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 A European macro-environmental view would regard the overall policy as confused and 
inefficient, with some countries aiming to reduce air traffic and passenger numbers and others 
aiming to increase both. Similarly a European macro-economic perspective would indicate 
that UK passengers are at a comparative benefit somewhat since they are not subject to 
equivalent taxes overseas whereas foreign residents contribute to HM Treasury.  Shifting part 
of the burden onto foreign residents (known as ‘tax exporting’) can be beneficial to UK 
passengers who will be responsible for a smaller proportion of the tax burden.171
 
  However, 
this may be at the expense of UK tourism and aviation which will share the burden, though 
both would suffer more if there was equivalent foreign taxation which would increase the 
cost of travelling to Britain above the increases brought through APD.  Perhaps the 
difference, at least for Britain, is that its economy is not as dependant on tourism as its 
European neighbours – and therefore aviation tax may not be suitable for every type of 
economy. 
All of this points to the pressing need for a common European policy on aviation taxation.  A 
consistent policy across Europe would put all European airlines on an equal footing and 
provide no competitive advantage or environmental inequities.  Indeed if the problem of 
national sovereignty to tax was set aside, the European Parliament could in principle 
introduce a general aviation tax across the Union which would contribute to its overall budget 
or could be used for environmental purposes.  Alternatively an EU Aviation Tax Treaty could 
ensure that all Member States apply a minimum duty, as with the VAT Directive.  
This is vastly favourable to the present system given the inequities and inefficiencies 
involved and the inconsistent tax incidences.  Indeed, the EU have gone some way towards 
this by enacting a Directive permitting Member States to introduce kerosene tax for air 
                                                             
171 Keen and Strand, see n.48, at 23. 
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navigation.  Taxes can be introduced nationally (in line with the Chicago Convention) and 
internationally (potentially breaching the Convention) pursuant to a bilateral agreement.172
 
 
However, until this is more commonly adopted and further measures are introduced, the 
pressures to meet European and global environmental targets may cause the reintroduction of 
such unilateral taxes, particularly if countries calculate that they are losing foreign income, or 
when growth returns. 
45.11.1.4 THEME 
 
Returning to the theme, the lack of any European or global cooperation on aviation tax means 
that, from the UK’s perspective, the present system allows it to effectively tax foreign aircraft 
which do not themselves have aviation taxes.173
 
  Since the rates of APD were not linked with 
any environmental issue per se, it is feasible that their high rate essentially included foreign 
flights to the UK and not just UK departures, under the façade of only taxing UK departures.  
In the absence of any international cooperation, the UK is therefore to some extent 
accounting for the polluting impact from both the outward and return legs of a trip through 
such taxation. 
46.  TARGETING THE SOURCE (NON-AVIATION) 
 
 
                                                             
172 See chapter 7, n.63, Art.14. 
173 Rudolph examines the political difficulties and various interest groups involved in the introduction of any 
aviation taxation or ETS, in Rudolph S, ‘The Sky is the Limit or Limits to the Sky? A Political Economy 
Perspective on Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments in EU Aviation’ in Cottrell et al, see chapter 7, 
n.17 at 265-282. 
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Outside of the aviation case-study, a similar strategy can be applied to find the source of 
environmental harm in order that taxes can be also targeted where they can be most effective 
in achieving the overall environmental objective.  Further if incentives are to be provided, the 
type of tax and its design ought to be evaluated in order that the tax can be targeted in its 
most effective manner. 
 
46.1 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY: CONSTRUCTION PHASE 
 
46.1.1 STAMP DUTY LAND TAX RELIEF 
 
 
Recognising that one of the UK’s key sources of energy inefficiency is buildings including 
private households, tax legislation has been targeted to encourage improved efficiency levels 
for homes.174  For example relief from SDLT (Stamp Duty Land Tax) can (subject to 
conditions) be granted to the first acquisition of a newly built ‘zero-carbon’175 dwelling.176 
Under circumstances of economic growth, this provides an incentive for home-buyers to 
purchase carbon-neutral properties since it offers a reduced price and limited energy bills, 
which consequently encourages property developers to construct such properties to meet 
demand.  However, in circumstances of economic recession this may not be a sufficient 
incentive.  For instance during the recession, SDLT was temporarily suspended177
                                                             
174 Law C, ‘Energy efficiency for existing homes’ The Times 15/2/2009 
 on the 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article5732920.ece> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
175 It is uncertain what would constitute a zero-carbon building.  For further discussion on this point see 
Hamilton P, ‘Finance Act notes: environmental tax changes – sections 10-24’ (2007) 5 BTR 443-449, at 446. 
176 Pursuant to ss.58(B) and ss.58(C) of FA 2003 (as amended). 
177 Pursuant to Stamp Duty Land Tax (Variation of Part 4 of FA 2003) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/2338), and 
Stamp Duty Land Tax (Exemption of Certain Acquisitions of Residential Property) Regulations 2008 (SI 
2008/2339).   
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acquisition of residential properties up to the value of GBP £175,000.178   This reduces the 
impact of the zero-carbon incentive, until the end of the SDLT ‘holiday’.179
 
  This may mean 
that tax incentives in some circumstances only effectively target consumption decisions in 
times of economic growth.  
46.1.2 THE PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM 
 
 
Such incentives are required particularly if the developer or purchaser of a residential 
property is not the end user.   A developer or landlord for example may otherwise have little 
interest in constructing the building in order to achieve maximum energy efficiency in the 
long-term, or installing the most energy efficient appliances such as boilers which can be 
expensive to replace.  Researchers referring to this scenario identify it as the ‘principal agent 
problem’ and consider that it inappropriate to offer reduced VAT rates on energy-efficient 
appliances purchased, as the incentive to reduce energy costs is to attract tenants.180
                                                             
178 S.55 of FA 2003 (as amended) provides for a 0% SDLT rate on acquisitions of  residential property up to the 
threshold of  GBP £125,000; this threshold was temporarily extended to GBP £175,000 for acquisitions between 
3/9/2008 and 2/9/2009 inclusive. 
  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in many instances this is not the case.  For instance 
tenants (particularly short-term tenants) may frequently only consider the actual rental price 
and only look at energy efficiency levels as a secondary factor.  In areas of high demand-to-
supply ratio the landlord knowing the property will easily let will have a reduced incentive to 
spend additional time and money searching for the most efficient construction methods or 
appliances.  To ensure newly built residential properties will have a lifetime of energy 
efficiency, policymakers must target incentives according to market reality.  The zero-carbon 
179 The planned expiry date for SDLT is 1/10/2012 under The Stamp Duty Land Tax (Zero-Carbon Homes 
Relief) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/3437), Regulation 1(2)(b).  HM Treasury may subsequently substitute the 
expiry date by a new regulatory order. 
180 Næss-Schmid et al, see chapter 6, n.22 at 20. 
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SDLT method is attractive and its impact upon the purchase price makes it self-publicising.  
Tax methods could instead work to alter construction and appliance consumption behaviour 
by applying non-deductible excise taxes on the most inefficient products, in order to 
artificially increase their prices to affect developers’ and landlords’ consumption behaviour.  
By recognising the reality of such relationships it can be possible to target the appropriate 
decision-maker.   
 
46.1.3 AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 
 
The USA made federal tax credits available to homebuilders constructing new energy 
efficient residential houses which satisfy specified energy savings targets.181  The credits are 
aimed at improving energy efficiency through replacement of items such as windows, doors 
and roofs, additional insulation, new water heaters and biomass stoves. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 added to and extended the credits available 
following the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (which had previously been extended to 2009 by 
virtue of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008).  Tax deductions were also 
made available182 for commercial buildings for owners or designers of new or existing 
commercial buildings saving 50% or more of a building’s heating and cooling energy.183
 
  
These incentives were designed to reduce energy waste in buildings and incentivise growth in 
energy efficient construction in the hope of making it the ‘norm’. 
                                                             
181 In order to be considered an ‘energy efficient home’ the dwelling must satisfy §45L(c)(1)(A) and (B) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) (USA).  If the credit is for a ‘manufactured home’ the requirements to be satisfied 
are provided within §45L(c)(2) or (3) of IRC. 
182 Pursuant to § 179D of IRC (USA). 
183 See Energy Star (EPA),‘Federal Tax Credits for Energy Efficiency’ 
<http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=products.pr_tax_credits#c3> Accessed 18/6/2009. 
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46.2 HOUSEHOLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION  
46.2.1 MICRO-GENERATION 
 
In Britain, domestic premises184 may produce electricity at or near185 the home using a 
‘microgeneration’ system186 such as a solar panel or wind turbine.  So long as the amount 
produced does not significantly exceed the level of consumption in the household, the 
electricity generated can be sold and the income from the sale is exempt from income tax 
under ITTOIA.187  This provides some incentive to invest in such technology, though it will 
still take much time to earn back the initial investment.  Perhaps a greater incentive would 
have been direct subsidies for the purchase of microgeneration technology, or even tax credits 
on employment income as an incentive which more people could relate to as they may not 
have considered that such generation would be subject to tax in any case.  Such tax credits 
were made available in the USA for solar panel and water heaters, fuel cells, solar water 
heaters and geothermal heat pumps. 188  Consumers installing these in both existing homes 
and newly built properties were made eligible to claim 30% of the cost through tax credits, 
with no maximum amount claimable.189  This became a considerable incentive which 
consumers were readily able to understand, making them a potentially attractive purchase.  
The UK Government has supported its microgeneration tax incentives by cooperating with 
energy companies through a ‘Feed-in Tariff’ scheme whereby households can produce 
renewable energy and sell any surplus back to the National Grid at a profit, thus justifying 
their investment in the technology.190
                                                             
184 “Domestic premises” means premises used wholly or mainly as a separate private dwelling: Income Tax 
(Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, s.782A(2). 
 
185 There is no indication in the Act of the necessary proximity to the domestic premises. 
186 Given the same meaning as given in Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006, s.4. 
187 See n.184, s.782A. 
188 Following the Energy Policy Act, see chapter 6, n.55. 
189 Currently this is available until 2016. 
190 <http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generate-your-own-energy/Sell-your-own-energy/Feed-in-Tariff-
Clean-Energy-Cashback-scheme> Accessed 21/4/2010. 
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The incentive to improve household energy efficiency will likely increase in the UK with 
improved measurement abilities.  The British Government announced plans191 to install 
compulsory ‘smart’ meters in all UK homes by 2020 in order to provide real-time 
information on household’s actual (as opposed to estimated) usage of gas and electricity.192  
The DECC (Department for Energy and Climate Change) aim to change consumers’ energy 
habits through this193
 
 by making energy users more aware of their energy usage.  This non-
tax measure which is both an educational tool and a measurement device will reinforce both 
the message sent through energy taxes and the desire to become more energy efficient 
domestically.  Consequently taxes and tax incentives which are clear and achievable may 
well work to an increased extent given the increased demand to save costs and improve 
personal environmental behaviour.  
46.2.2 CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY-INEFFICIENT APPLIANCES 
 
 
Depending on the structure and type of tax used, some incentives may not be enough to alter 
the consumption decisions of consumers and consequently would be a wasted tax 
expenditure.   An example given by researchers is utilising the VAT system to encourage 
purchases of the most energy-efficient compliances, such as a PC (personal computer), where 
energy saving can amount to only a small fraction of the total cost of the PC.194
                                                             
191 House of Lords Hansard, 28/10/2008, Column 1516. 
  It may cost a 
substantial amount in lost VAT to incentivise the purchase of efficient PCs, whereas the 
192 The Secretary of State has statutory powers under Energy Act 2008 to roll-out smart meters to certain 
customers. 
193 DECC, Energy Metering: A Consultation on Smart Metering for Electricity and Gas (2009) p.13 at 1.1, 
<http://bis.ecgroup.net/Publications/EnergyClimateChangeDECC/EnergyMetering.aspx> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
194 Næss-Schmid et al, see chapter 6, n.22 at 20. 
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annual saving made can be nominal.195
 
  This can do little to alter the consumption decision 
but prove costly for the Treasury.  The design and type of the tax therefore is important, and 
in such situations alternative methods may better serve the environmental (and economic) 
objective.   
The example suggests regulation such as prohibitions on certain high-energy use PCs, which 
could work to achieve the objective.  Instead of regulation, a tax solution could be to impose 
disproportionately high levels of VAT (or an alternative tax) on appliances using the most 
energy in order to reduce or eliminate demand for them, thus encouraging efficient 
alternatives.  This could prove a more economical method for taxpayers since regulation 
requires taxpayer funding, whilst this proposed system could bring in revenue and require the 
compliance costs to be covered by the retailer.  Further, an EU study found that for 
appliances, subsidies were generally less cost effective than energy taxes in changing 
consumption behaviour.196   The problem then however is that the increased cost of an 
appliance (due to an energy tax) creates the image that such products are luxury goods for 
which a higher premium is worthwhile, therefore in some circumstances a tax on 
manufacturers may be more appropriate to alter the sort of goods they produce.  Additionally, 
if tax reductions are available for energy-efficient appliances regardless of cost, then this 
could be applied to the most expensive goods and be regarded as subsidies for luxury goods, 
which is neither fiscally practical nor likely to be politically acceptable.197
46.2.3 MANUFACTURING 
 
 
                                                             
195 The example suggests VAT revenue losses on EUR €1,000 PCs, for annual energy savings of EUR €10.   
196 Mudgal S, et al, ‘A Study on the Costs and Benefits associated with the use of Tax Incentives to Promote the 
Manufacturing of More and Better Energy-efficient Appliances and Equipment and the Consumer Purchasing 
these Products’ (2008) TAXUD/2007/DE/330, at 254. 
197 Næss-Schmid et al, see n.194 at 625. 
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Indeed, an EU study analysing the various tax methods available to promote the 
manufacturing of more and better energy-efficient appliances and equipment found that 
different appliances required different tax techniques.198
 
  In terms of use of incentives 
including tax credits and direct subsidies, the study found it to be generally more cost 
effective to target these at consumers than manufacturers.  The specific differences are 
noteworthy.  With refrigerators and washing machines it was found to be possible to 
successfully increase sales of the most energy-efficient models if tax incentives were directed 
at sales prices or in another form where the consumer specifically benefited.   It is likely that 
manufacturers tended to absorb the benefit which reduced the cost-effectiveness of the tax 
incentive.  However other appliances required alternative benefits to consumer-focused 
benefits, and this differed between countries.  All of this reinforces the need for policymakers 
to consider the impact of the introduction of taxes depending upon the particular economic 
(and other) circumstances of the country in question.  It also shows that taxes can alter 
consumption behaviour if they are well targeted, so matching the type of tax or incentive to 
the problem is crucial. 
46.2.4 IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE 
 
It is necessary therefore for policymakers to use an economic and possibly scientific 
approach to identify the ‘root’ of the environmental problem.  In doing so it will be possible 
to align an appropriate tax method to ‘target’ the problem at source, if the solution is then 
regarded as the most effective and socially acceptable type.  For example research into 
domestic energy consumption has found that items including household electrical appliances,                                                              
198 Mudgal et al, see n.196. 
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boilers and consumer electronics are valued at only 3% of household consumption when 
purchased (perhaps due to their low purchase cost) but cost approximately 60% of the total 
household consumption.199
 
  Consequently if the policymaker’s objective is to reduce 
household energy consumption, then discovering this root of the problem will allow 
policymakers to consider the most appropriate tax method to target it.  In this instance it 
could be to make consumers of electrical goods realise the efficiency levels of their 
purchases, and policymakers would need to consider which type of tax incentive, perhaps 
combined with supplementary techniques such as informational campaigns or subsidies, are 
suitable, or whether non-tax incentives would work more effectively.   
46.2.5 GROUP-TARGETING 
 
It is also pertinent to assess whether certain groups of society can be most easily targeted to 
change their consumption behaviour and lifestyles.  This can be useful if the environmental 
objective is to alter the behaviour of as many people as possible.  For instance a tax designed 
to discourage as many people as possible from buying or using a certain good would need to 
be set at a level that affected the incomes of most people.  This would depend entirely upon 
national economic circumstances.  If most people in society had low-incomes then the rate 
could be set at a low level, as most people would be targeted effectively.  However, if there 
was a large middle class of higher-income workers then the tax would need to be set higher to 
make it appropriate to them.  This would also raise distributional concerns since the poorest 
in society would lose out even more by a higher rate of tax – which again raises the question 
of how to compensate the poor (if necessary) whilst providing enough of an incentive to 
change their behaviour. Ghayad sums up this situation with specific reference to cars, but the                                                              
199 Næss-Schmid et al, see n.194 at 6. 
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message can be applied generally, in explaining that “everybody has a price that they are 
willing to pay in order to use their cars versus public transportation.  Governments need to 
find ways to sway those drivers whose price is relatively low.”200
 
 
It may instead be that it is a small number of people or enterprises who consume the most 
energy, and in this case taxes can be better targeted at them rather than being introduced 
generally.  For example if a small number of the highest earners were able to afford energy-
intensive goods or appliances which use a disproportionately high amount of energy then the 
tax could be targeted at them, but would need to be significant to affect their behaviour as a 
modest tax may be easily absorbed.  This is increasingly becoming the case with the highest 
band of VED which aims to target drivers of fuel-intensive vehicles.  The VED rate for such 
vehicles must continually rise so that it is not negligible compared to the vehicle’s purchase 
price or the average income of such vehicle proprietors.   
 
Furthermore, incentive-side tax methods may need to be targeted depending on the income 
group that would have the largest impact, if that is the intention of the policymaker.  For 
instance domestic solar panels may be readily affordable for high-income groups but such 
groups may neither count for a significant percentage of a country’s energy consumption or 
they may not value the energy savings available through microgeneration.  Consequently 
smaller incentives may be needed to attract low-income families who may make up a higher 
amount of energy consumption and appreciate the savings available.  Research highlights that 
low-income families may be unable to afford the purchase of energy-saving appliances even 
though they would appreciate the savings – and in this case energy-generating devices – so 
tax incentives or even direct subsidies may be necessary to reduce the one-off purchase                                                              
200 Ghayad P, ‘Creative Taxing can save the Environment’ (2006) Canadian Politics from Canada's Centre 
Bulletin <http://centrerion.blogspot.com/2006/06/creative-taxing-can-save-environment.html> Accessed 
28/4/2010. 
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price.201
 
  Feed-in tariffs can be a means of providing social benefits to the poor, and could be 
economically beneficial as surplus energy could be sold abroad if such improvements 
allowed a country to meet its energy requirements. 
Kurani and Turrentine study different groups of society in order to identify groups with 
particular behaviour towards energy cost savings.  While the study was arguably not wide 
enough to reach concrete answers, further research could be extremely useful when 
attempting to identify which groups require behavioural change or alterations in their 
consumption patterns.  For instance many students were found to make fuel economy a 
priority in their consumption decisions, having increased awareness of environmental matters 
and limited incomes, and fuel costs often being the only item paid directly by themselves in 
contrast to a car completely funded by their parents. 202  As Greene et al contend, there is 
little incentive for manufacturers to improve fuel economy levels if consumers do not value 
such improvements.203
 
 
46.3 VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY 
 
46.3.1 TARGETING PARTIES WITH CHOICE OF RATE  
 
There are a variety of issues concerning how to ensure vehicle drivers become fuel-economic.  
Næss-Schmid et al make the argument for equal abatement costs amongst all users of 
energy;204
                                                             
201 Næss-Schmid et al, see n.194 at pp.20-21. 
 applied to the case of vehicles this means charging everybody the same rate of 
vehicle fuel duty.  The rationale behind this is that there should be an equal incentive 
202 See Kurani and Turrentine, see chapter 6, n.27, at 17. 
203 Greene et al, see chapter 6, n.38 at 768. 
204 Næss-Schmid et al, see n.194 at 18. 
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amongst all drivers to reduce their fuel consumption – otherwise some drivers would have 
less of an incentive than others.  It could be argued that this is not true in reality since those 
on higher incomes have proportionally less of an incentive to achieve an efficient fuel 
economy than others. 205   However any method of means-testing fuel tax would provide the 
poor with a reduced incentive to achieve fuel economy which would be counter-productive 
from a policy perspective, and would be extremely difficult to administer.  Even though those 
on higher incomes are able to afford to use more fuel, the focus should perhaps instead be on 
how much one can save.  High-earners are able to save the same amount by achieving fuel 
economy as low-earners, and from this perspective there is an equal incentive.  Despite the 
additional income, high-earners do not necessarily have the inclination to waste their income 
and in reality would look to achieve cost savings at a similar level as low-income earners.206
 
 
Furthermore a means-tested method would negate efforts to encourage use of public transport 
and the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles.  Even if the equal abatement method does not 
discourage high-earners from travelling long distances in their vehicles to the same extent as 
low-earners, it at least encourages all parties to invest in fuel-efficient vehicles or take public 
transport in order to achieve cost savings.   
The one-rate method is distinct from taxes targeted at specific groups; rather it is a universal 
tax-at-root system.  The UK’s fuel duty follows this by taxing at root with standard rates for 
all users - though there are concessionary rates for ‘red diesel’207 and for ‘excepted vehicles’ 
which mainly includes vehicles used in agriculture, construction and fishing.208                                                             
205 The IFS note that VED is highly regressive on car-owners in Leicester, see n.75 at 29.  See also findings of 
Blow L and Crawford I, ‘The Distributional Effects of Taxes on Private Motoring, Commentary no. 65’, 
(London: IFS; 1997). 
  UK vehicle 
206 This may not be as true for very-high net worth individuals as for earners generally in one of the top earnings 
brackets. 
207 ‘Rebated gas oil’ is commonly referred to as ‘red diesel’ because red colouring is added for tax purposes to 
distinguish it from non-exempt fuel. 
208 Rebated gas oil is permitted in excepted vehicles as defined by Schedule 1 of Hydrocarbon Oil Duties Act 
1979. 
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fuel prices are made up of both a fuel duty209 and VAT (charged on both the cost of fuel and 
the duty) which creates a significantly higher price upon purchase than the actual cost of the 
fuel without any duties;210
 
 thus there is a considerable incentive for most users to limit their 
fuel consumption.   
46.3.2 DESIGN OF TAX 
 
 
More targeted indirect taxes have been criticised for being crude and poorly designed.  The 
USA implemented a ‘Gas Guzzler Tax’211 on manufacturers or importers selling passenger 
vehicles which failed to meet statutory fuel economy levels.  As of 1991, the minimum fuel 
economy level was 22.5 mpg (miles per US Gallon) and the maximum charge was USD 
$7,700 for vehicles managing less than 12.5 mpg,212
 
 providing an incentive to avoid selling 
vehicles with poor fuel economies.  However, the tax did not apply to light trucks which at 
the time of enactment were not in wide use; this meant that minivans, sports utility vehicles 
and pick-up trucks were exempt despite their often very poor fuel economies, and such 
vehicles subsequently became more popular.   
Other targeted indirect taxes may also be too broad.  VED has been criticised as it fails to 
take account of drivers’ actual car use, and uses arbitrary measurements of fuel efficiency 
which do not account for the specifics of the vehicle such as tyre types. 213
                                                             
209 Pursuant to Hydrocarbon Oils Duties Act 1979. 
  This does not 
therefore provide incentives to modify such vehicles to make them more economical.  
210 <http://www.whatprice.co.uk/petrol-prices/cost-litre-breakdown.html> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
211 Pursuant to Energy Tax Act of 1978 (USA). 
212 See Tax Schedule in EPA, ‘Gas Guzzler Tax: Program Overview’ (2006) 
<http://www.epa.gov/fueleconomy/guzzler/420f06042.htm> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
213 Næss-Schmid et al, see n.194 at 18. 
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Additionally, the IFS highlight that VED provides no incentive for motorists to drive less; 214 
and the point can be made that since it is a fixed cost those who drive less pay proportionately 
more per mile used than those who drive more.  These criticisms can be applied to the UK’s 
VED banding, though it should be recognised that VED provides a general disincentive to 
purchase such vehicles and the incentive to drive more economically and modify such a 
vehicle would be to reduce the cost of fuel consumption as opposed to VED. 215
 
 
An alternative approach is to set various rates to target the specific marginal external costs of 
road use identified by Sanson et al.216 These costs cover externalities wider than 
environmental costs, but the principle of targeting external costs applies.  Fullerton et al 
suggest targeting external costs of road transport by designing a road pricing system based 
upon the actual use of a road.  This relates to specific use of a road and aims to send a 
targeted message to motorists of their actual marginal cost of road usage at any one time by 
charging based upon factors such as the time of use (to reduce congestion), distance travelled 
(to reduce fuel consumption and emissions) and location (to account for specific locality 
issues such as air pollution and noise).217  Nevertheless, a DfT feasibility study showed that 
the costs of setting up such a road pricing scheme (beginning with an initial cost of up to 
GBP £62 billion) could outweigh the benefits – due to the need for monitoring technology in 
every vehicle and a national system of road monitoring and enforcement.218
 
 
46.3.3 FEEBATES 
                                                              
214 Leicester, see n.75 at 29. 
215 The IFS note this in Leicester, Ibid. 
216 Sansom et al. ‘Surface Transport Costs and Charges: Great Britain 1998’ Final Report for the Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (2001).   
217 Fullerton et al, see chapter 7, n.37 at 478-481. 
218 DfT, Feasibility Study of Road Pricing in the UK (London: TSO, 2004) at 174. 
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An alternative tax method of promoting sustainable lifestyles and consumption behaviour can 
be referred to as implementing ‘feebates’.  The concept is to charge a fee on the purchase of a 
good or service which policymakers wish to discourage and use this to finance rebates to 
encourage alternative purchases.  The rationale is to use a revenue-neutral system where the 
price of negative externalities falls upon those who would use them.219  In the present 
instance, this would penalise purchasers of vehicles with low fuel economy in line with the 
polluter-pays principle, and reward those who purchase vehicles with high fuel economy in 
line with the theme.  Further, consumption patterns are intended to be amended by increasing 
the price of the most polluting purchases and subsequently offering rebates for 
environmentally positive purchases. This is important given that research suggests many 
consumers mostly fail to account for fuel economy savings when purchasing a vehicle.220
 
  
The feebate can additionally work to affect manufacturer behaviour by encouraging more 
efficient models.  
The most simple design of a vehicle feebate scheme is to set the fee or rebate at a 
proportionate level to the per-mile level of fuel consumption.221  This can be easily 
understood by motorists and, combined with the cost differences, it may have the most 
effective impact upon consumption choices.  One criticism of feebate schemes raised by 
Greene et al is that they can confer differing costs and benefits on different manufacturers.  
This can be overcome by introducing distinct feebate schedules for distinct vehicle classes.222
                                                             
219 Though the system may not always be revenue-neutral. 
  
Though the system may be unpopular if it is regarded as a tax, a fully revenue-neutral system 
220 Kurani and Turrentine,see chapter 6, n.27, at 13. 
221 Langer, see n.89, at 2. 
222 Greene et al, see chapter 6, n.38 at 758. 
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may alleviate such concerns and drive the correct message on sustainable consumption. 223  A 
feebate system to discourage low fuel-efficient vehicles was enacted in Ontario, Canada in 
1990224 and has been proposed in the USA to help achieve oil independence.225
 
   
47.  CONCLUSION AND UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES 
 
Aviation tax experience demonstrates how policymakers have attempted to target the source 
of one environmental externality.  It was shown that while APD was designed in a simplistic 
and thoughtful manner, having given consideration to where final incidence should fall and 
how to incentivise reduced air travel, there were a number of flaws.226
 
  By highlighting these 
flaws it could be expressed to a policymaker how a system can fail to target the source of an 
environmental issue, which prevents the environmental objective being reached in an 
economical manner.  Without creating the most economically efficient tax reform, finite 
resources are wasted and an environmental policy is destined to fail.  Therefore reform 
solutions were suggested and evaluated to illustrate how taxes and incentives can be targeted 
in the most effective manner to achieve an environmental policy objective.  A final reform 
proposal incorporated the key aspects of each of the reform solutions and suggested a 
possible version of per-plane tax. 
The aviation case study found uneven distribution of the tax burden, incentives which were 
disproportionate and led to negative unforeseen consequences, and exemptions which 
                                                             
223 UNEP have suggested extending the feebate system to vehicles presently on the road by charging a fee on 
inefficient vehicles, to fund a rebate on the purchase of a new efficient vehicle upon the older vehicle’s 
scrappage: Bradbrook AJ, ‘Energy Efficiency in Road Transport’, in UNEP, see chapter 5, n.3, pp.86-105, at 96. 
224 Retail Sales Tax Act, RSO 1990, c R.31 (Ontario, Canada) introduced the ‘Tax for Fuel Conservation’. 
225 Lovins et al, Winning the Oil Endgame (Colorado: Rocky Mountain Institute, 2004). 
226 These are further examined by this author elsewhere in Truby J, ‘Reforming the Air Passenger Duty as an 
Environmental Tax’ (2010) 12 Environmental Law Review 3 94-104. 
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distorted the environmental effectiveness of the tax programme.  Various aspects of the tax 
design could be justified for reasons of industry competitiveness but demonstrated in 
themselves the need for wider international reform as the status quo was shown to be 
inefficient and unfair.  Negative consequences were also shown to have been in the form of 
detrimental impacts on a wider level than were foreseen, such as in damaging much-needed 
tourism in the Caribbean due to an uneven punitive technicality.   Further, comparisons were 
made with European models to draw on such experiences, showing the importance of 
learning lessons from other jurisdictions before introducing any reform.   
 
Generic lessons pointed to technological improvements being a key factor in achieving such 
environmental objectives.  Findings stressed the importance of investing in or creating the 
incentives for, practical and desirable alternatives (such as train travel over aviation) in order 
for a person to have realistic substitution choices, and for it to be in their financial interest to 
reach the choice of using the substitute.  A strong case was also made for a coordinated 
international response to overcome the status quo which is fraught with problems. 
 
The chapter followed with non-aviation to show the complex nature of deciding upon where 
to target an incentive.  It was found that this very much depended not only upon demand and 
supply, but on relationships between parties in practice which must be understood in order for 
an incentive to have its desired effect.  It was shown that the structure of a tax can be 
designed so that the point of taxation (or incentive), rate, and method of tax have the most 
impact on the desired parties.  Further, it was demonstrated how consideration can be given 
to how specific groups to be targeted.  For instance income levels of a group can be assessed 
so that a tax can impact upon most parties, or it can be questioned whether it is appropriate to 
offer incentives broadly or narrowly in order that resources are utilised the most efficiently.   
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By considering how to design methods of targeted taxes and how to avoid unintended 
consequences, the understanding of how a policymaker may utilise tax reform to achieve 
environmental objectives is furthered.  Guidance from this chapter as well as Chapters 6-8 
allows a detailed response to the RQ(ii) and contributes to the design of a framework model 
relevant to RQ(i).  The relevance of policymakers understanding economic and market 
realities prior to introducing such taxes has been emphasised.  This contributes to answering 
RQ(iii)(c).   
 
Further analysis however should be given to RQ(ii) in explaining how to determine what 
unintended consequences might be of a tax reform.  This is a prudent question for a 
policymaker as the answer may not be clear cut – there may be an obvious consequence, but 
detailed evaluation can assist with a deeper understanding of how to assess other unexpected 
consequences.  This final important part of RQ(ii) will be considered in Chapter 10, along 
with further evaluation of this subject. 
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48.  INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY 
 
 Part II thus far has focused upon distinct aspects of guiding a policymaker as to how to 
model an environmental tax reform which can have the desired effect of changing behaviour 
to achieve an environmental objective.  As part of their analysis, the chapters within Part II 
have each considered how to avoid unintended consequences of an environmental tax reform.   
It is important to understand why unforeseen consequences may impact negatively upon both 
environmental objectives and wider fiscal and social policy.    
 
However only the foremost consequences of such a reform – those related to the objective 
itself - have been covered.  There may however be a range of other indirect or more remote 
consequences which a policymaker ought to consider prior to introducing such taxes.  
Providing a wider gauge of such consequences allows a policymaker to make an informed 
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decision on the long-term impacts of a tax reform, outside of the primary consequences.  It is 
intended therefore in this chapter to analyse potential impacts in both a factual and a 
hypothetical manner which will demonstrate to a policymaker the kind of outcomes which 
should be considered.  This will enable a fuller response to RQ(ii). 
 
The second section also intends to provide more in-depth analysis into the findings made 
through research into this Part.  This will attempt to piece together recurring conclusions 
from existing policies as to the most appropriate means of achieving certain environmental 
objectives, in order to input such common policymaker responses when designing a tax 
reform.  Finally, this chapter will seek to distinguish how the Universal Model will aim to 
recommend the most effective solution. 
49.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
 
49.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Merton explained and popularised the concept of unintended consequences of purposive 
social actions – the idea being that Government intervention may result in negative, 
consequences for society, which can prove costly.1
                                                             
1 Merton RK, ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action’ (1936) 1 American Sociological 
Review 6, 894-904. 
  Compton et al describe that whilst policy 
interventions are normally evaluated by whether they managed to achieve the desired result, 
it must also be recognised that frequently “...people respond to incentives in unexpected, 
perverse, and costly ways. By overlooking these unintended consequences, both during the 
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design phase and evaluation phase, policy makers are left with an incomplete picture of the 
effect of their intervention.”2
 
 
Failure to appreciate the impact of a chosen tax model upon the context in which it is 
implemented can, as mentioned, mean the model is ineffective or cause consequences which 
policymakers do not desire.  Further not all tax models have been tested – particularly not in 
varying economies – and may not work if the same conditions do not exist as proposed in 
theory.   Merton recognised this and explained that intervening parties should not simply 
repeat past successes but acknowledge that “procedures which have been successful in certain 
circumstances need not be so under any and all conditions.”3
 
 
49.2 EXAMPLES OF UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
Serious consequences of taxes or incentives can be demonstrated in the fiscal policy to 
promote biofuels.  Concerned about energy independence and the environmental impact of 
fossil fuel usage, a number of countries introduced fiscal reforms and regulations – including 
taxes and incentives such as subsidies – to ensure biofuels partially replaced fossil fuels to 
power vehicles.4  For example the USA announced a target of replacing 20% of petrol 
consumption largely with ethanol produced from corn.5
                                                             
2 Compton et al, ‘Backdating, Tax Evasion, and the Unintended Consequences of Canadian Tax Reform’ (2010) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586987> Accessed 18/5/2010.   
  This increased demand for corn 
3 Merton, see n.1, at 901. 
4 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The State of Food and Agriculture 2008 - 
Biofuels: Prospects, Risks and Opportunities (Rome: FAO, 2008) at 23-24. 
5 Aldhous P, ‘Bush's address tackles energy and climate’ New Scientist 24/1/2007 
<http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11020-bushs-address-tackles-energy-and-climate.html> Accessed 
18/5/2010. 
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considerably, driving up prices and led to grave warnings from the UN that it could risk food 
security and cause starvation in hundreds of millions of the world’s poorest.6
 
 
A number of experts warn of possible dangers of ill-considered consequences of ‘purposive 
social actions’, while past experiences demonstrate flawed policy and implementation. For 
example several Eastern bloc States including Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine have been 
criticised by the OECD for imposing charges on environmentally harmful products which 
offer no incentive to alter consumption behaviour, because of a lack of viable less harmful 
alternatives on the market and due to the rates of taxes being set at a level too low to have any 
significant impact.7
 
   
Equally, alternatives to paying a tax may themselves be harmful.  Sandmo explains Norway’s 
attempt to reduce plastic bag usage by imposing a user charge on refuse sacks collected by 
refuse collectors.8  Users would limit the number of sacks used by not wrapping up waste 
before disposing of it in garbage bins which caused severely bad odours.  Further study found 
that households would overfill bags to limit their use, and resort to fly-tipping to avoid paying 
the tax; this substitutional behaviour caused alternative environmental problems.9  Smith 
argues it is important when deciding whether to impose a tax to consider ‘linkage’, which 
involves identifying whether taxpayers will try to reduce their tax burden by “...reducing the 
processes or activities that give rise to polluting emissions, or...find ways to reduce their tax 
payments that do not change their level of pollution.”10
 
   
                                                             
6 FAO, see n.4 at 72-86. 
7 OECD, ‘Environmental Policy’ (2007)  ENV/EPOC/EAP/POL(2007)1, at p.6, paras.17-21. 
8 Sandmo A, ‘Direct versus Indirect Pigouvian Taxation’ (1976) 7 Europ. Econ. Rev. 337-49, at 339. 
9 Smith, see chapter 2, n.48 at 22. 
10 Ibid at 21. 
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49.3 BEHAVIOURAL ATTITUDES OF DIFFERENT SOCIETIES 
 
 
Clearly therefore it is important to research behavioural attitudes towards the environment 
and taxation in the population in question in order to determine how effective the taxes can 
be.  Countries and regions will likely differ in the way their environmental behaviour is 
affected by taxation.  The World Bank recommend that countries use fuel taxes since they are 
a “reliable, high volume source of revenue, essentially because demand is relatively inelastic 
and the tax base is relatively large.”11  Whilst this is true, it fails to consider that such models 
may not be transferable to every country.  For instance the UK has one of the highest levels 
of taxes on vehicle fuel in the world and increases are a highly political issue which in the 
past have led to mass protests.12
 
 
49.4 JURISDICTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
 
There may also be reasons of domestic importance which hinder a tax solution from being 
suitable within a particular jurisdiction.  For instance, the EU discourage Member States from 
lowering energy taxes from their present levels in order that all parties continue to pursue 
environmental goals, whilst if one State reduced energy taxes then single market rules would 
allow consumers to cross the border to purchase energy  at a decreased cost thereby unfairly 
favouring trade in States with lower taxes.  From a centralised perspective, a reduction in 
energy duty (such as VAT on petrol) may not decrease prices; the total price may remain the 
same and funds could transfer outside of the Member State and therefore the EU to countries 
                                                             
11 The World Bank, Environmental Fiscal Reform (Washington DC, The World Bank, 2005) at 87. 
12 As explained in Dresner et al, see chapter 3, n.32, at 931. 
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exporting energy such as in the Middle East. Aside from achieving any domestic political 
goals, this would merely raise the overall cost of importing energy into the EU. 
 
49.5 HYPOTHETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
49.5.1 PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY  
 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a demonstration of how a policymaker must consider 
unforeseen consequences aside from the most direct or primary consequences.  Failure to 
consider the more remote or indirect consequences of a chosen tax method could lead to 
considerable adverse impacts either upon the environmental objective in question, or upon 
other social, economic or policy goals.  This section will therefore attempt to hypothesise 
potential unforeseen consequences utilising facts from the case study on aviation taxation 
reform in Chapter 9.  The hypothetical analysis will proceed by first ascertaining the outcome 
of the policy before explaining various possible consequences – some negative and some 
positive. 
 
49.5.2 SCENARIO 
 
 
Scenario: The policy of reducing short-haul flights through increased taxes succeeds in the 
UK. 
Consequences:  
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Passengers needing to commute domestically and to Europe have resorted to alternative 
transport.   
Demand for train travel increases above available supply, so train ticket prices increased 
considerably and many trains become overcrowded. 
This has priced out some passengers who previously used trains, and have themselves 
resorted to alternative transport.  Demand for coach travel increases leading to an increase in 
the coach fleet.  A considerably increased number of vehicles enter the roads, leading to 
overcapacity of the road network; traffic jams cause decreased productivity of workers and 
businesses, reducing GDP, and higher rates of traffic accidents and casualties.  Passengers 
commuting to Ireland and Continental Europe also travel by ferry, whose fuel is exempt from 
tax pursuant to the Chicago Convention.  Net UK carbon emissions increase due to increased 
transport. 
 
With a boom in transport by sea and road, and with a lack of electrified trains, demand for oil 
increases and oil prices soar.   This leads to an increased gap in the UK balance of payments 
and a fall in the value of the Pound Sterling.  British airlines who operated a large proportion 
of domestic flights see their market shares drop and value drop.  Oil-rich nations in the 
Middle East who benefited from increased oil prices, aid their national airlines in funding 
buy-outs of British airlines, causing profits to leave the UK.  However, UK brands popular in 
the Middle East benefit from increased Middle Eastern wealth and the decrease in the value 
of the Pound Sterling, causing an increase in UK manufacturing and exports, though such 
exports only add to the over-capacity of the transport network. 
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Fewer flights mean food cannot be transported as frequently to various parts of the UK.  
Daily shipments become weekly shipments, and consumers in some areas can only purchase 
groceries once a week at a higher cost.  Alongside the increased cost of importing food due to 
the low value of the currency, food shortages in remote areas become a problem.   Food 
poverty leads to increased public spending on welfare, funded through higher taxation which 
had already risen due to falling levels of aviation tax revenue.  People living in remote areas 
with food shortages migrate to other areas with ready supplies, causing overcrowding in some 
cities but ruining the economy in other areas.  Demand for domestically produced food both 
causes high increases in farm prices but fewer exports, widening the balance of payments 
deficit further. 
 
The impact is also seen on passengers who do not need to commute such distances.  Tourism 
to Spain (a popular destination for British holiday-makers) falls, due to higher aviation costs 
and the time taken to travel by train during the short annual leave available to many workers.  
Remaining tourists visiting Spain largely include those on higher incomes and retired British 
tourists who have time to travel by road.  Much of the lower-income groups were associated 
with high crime rates and excessive alcohol consumption in parts of Spain.  As holidaying in 
Spain becomes too expensive for many, low-income groups increasingly holiday in UK 
resorts.  Higher alcohol consumption and other consumption cause VAT and excise tax 
receipts to increase, and increased employment in UK tourism results in increased income tax 
receipts.13
                                                             
13 Cairns and Newson highlight that decreased numbers of passengers on international flights from the UK 
means a net benefit in tourism since UK domestic tourists spend more on tourism in the UK than foreign 
tourists.  Therefore reduced air travel can mean increased expenditure of tourism in the UK (despite fewer 
foreign tourists).  Cairns and Newson, see chapter 9, n.84, at 5. 
  However this is countered by increased levels of crime and alcohol-related 
hospital admissions in British resorts, causing increased public spending on police and 
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nurses.  Many resorts which traditionally were frequented by high-income tourists, see 
decreased custom from higher-income tourists who dislike lower-income tourists.  This leads 
to decreased average tourist expenditure in UK resorts, whilst higher-income tourists 
increasingly holiday overseas.  This causes reduced consumption of luxury goods and 
premium accommodation in the UK, and increased average tourist expenditure outside of the 
UK. 
 
49.5.3 SUMMARY 
 
 
The scenarios in this chapter are speculative and over-stated, to provide extreme examples of 
the types of consequences that can arise.  Whilst some of the benefits may be deemed to be 
positive, the range of both negative results and market-distorting results should alert a 
policymaker to the potential side-effects of a tax policy introduced without fully 
contemplating the consequences.  In this case, whilst the shift in transport behaviour worked 
with some success, the overall environmental outcome was negative – causing a direct 
negative consequence for the overall environmental objective of the policy.  Changing 
society’s behaviour resulted indirectly in severe impacts upon the economy and wider tax 
policy, both from a domestic and international perspective.  Negative and positive 
consequences were seen for the economy, but overall the shift in market behaviour left the 
UK economy less competitive than before.  It also had profound impact upon everyday lives, 
from limiting access to food to having migratory effects upon residents.  Clearly, such 
behaviour was never intended and it has been demonstrated that contemplating side-effects of 
a policy is crucial for it to have the desired effect. 
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50.  ANALYSIS CONCLUSION  
 
This conclusion seeks to bring together the key findings of Parts I and II for brief analysis.  
These inputs can determine means by which a policymaker will be advised of a 
recommended solution to achieve an environmental objective. 
 
50.1 FOCAL ISSUES 
 
This study is primarily concerned with offering informed guidance for a policymaker to 
decide how to achieve any given environmental policy.  The study has gathered evidence to 
ensure that such policy decisions can be made in line with general tax principles such as 
fairness and efficiency, and can be made in the most effective way of achieving the 
environmental objective, without impacting upon wider policies.  It has sought to ensure that 
such decisions can be made which are appropriate to the context of the jurisdiction, economy 
and society within which they are made.  Decisions can be thus be made with a more 
complete picture, but it is the choice of a policymaker as to the extent to which they intend to 
follow such guidance. 
 
For instance, the findings allow a policymaker to determine the optimum distributive impacts 
upon their society, depending upon the realities within that society.  It can be possible, 
depending upon area-specific circumstances, to target taxes or incentives and design tax 
methods to suit both the environmental objective and ensure that the policy is affordable to 
members of society with varying incomes.  However, wider political issues such as losses of 
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jobs or industries can, depending upon the circumstances, be considered a necessary cost with 
policymakers being the judge of the extent to which they wish to accept recommendations on 
the most effective means of implementing their policy.   
 
The importance of considering the international and competitive impact of any decisions has 
been stressed. It was shown to be futile in making costs (such as reductions in trade) be borne 
domestically if foreign actions will cancel out any environmental gain such as in increasing 
the level of harmful trade to fill the gap.  Equally all of the costs do not necessarily need to be 
domestic – nor do the benefits.  If the most effective way is to legally cause harm to an 
overseas entity then it will be the recommended action.   
 
50.2 RECURRING SOLUTIONS 
 
Recurring solutions from research cited in Parts I and II point to environmental targets largely 
being achieved with a technology-driven response.  This is frequently regarded as a practical 
means of meeting environmental targets.  However it is also recognised that improved 
technology alone is insufficient and environmental goals can only be fully met with 
behavioural changes.  A Government-led programme is commonly regarded herein as a 
means of achieving the wider social and economic reform necessary to allow both 
technological and behavioural change.  Such a programme would model the market so that 
improved technology is economically efficient and demanded over environmentally 
inefficient equivalents, by offering a mixture of tax incentives, taxes and subsidies.  The 
impact of costs would largely be effective, but would need to be supported by a consistent 
educational message to enable society to support the purpose of such change.  For instance, 
the UK’s DfT introduced a programme to both incentive Ultra–Low Carbon 
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Vehicles and provide the infrastructure for their usage.14
50.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
  This was a technology-driven 
programme with targets over 50 years.  The changes in VED and continuous message about 
climate change in other parts of the Government and legislature were aimed to support the 
programme by altering attitudes and consumption choices.  Hence, a combined, proactive and 
forward-thinking programme mixing both technological improvements with behavioural 
change would appear to be a key recommendation from this chapter’s findings.   
 
To summarise the findings of Part II, when an environmental problem is discovered which 
policymakers consider needs addressing, it seems important to conduct economic, social or 
scientific research to discover the main cause(s) of the problem.  The main cause(s) can 
include a large number of factors and may be anything from a particular group of society to 
the pricing of an appliance which does not account for its externalities.  Once the source of 
the problem has been found, it is necessary to consider what methods can be used to target 
the source.  This will involve evaluation of the costs and benefits of taking any action over 
other actions, and which one is the most practical.  If a tax method is decided upon it is 
important that it is the most suitable one, so consideration will need to be given to whether it 
can be used ‘effectively’.  Part of this will consider who the tax is targeted at in order to 
achieve the desired behavioural change, including how easily the target will be able to absorb 
the costs (or benefits) or the tax or tax incentive.  The importance of ensuring that both the 
polluter pays, and improvers are rewarded, has been stressed as part of the theme.  
 
                                                             
14 See particularly Box 3, ‘High-Level Technology Roadmap for the UK’s Decarbonisation of Road Transport’ 
DfT, ‘Ultra–Low Carbon Vehicles in the UK’ (2009) at 11, 
<http://www.dft.gov.uk/adobepdf/187604/ultralowcarbonvehicle.pdf> Accessed 28/4/2010. 
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50.4 BASIS FOR RECOMMENDING MOST EFFECTIVE 
SOLUTION 
 
 
Every potential solution for achieving environmental policy will likely have costs and 
benefits.  The purpose of designing a framework model for environmental taxation is to 
propose a solution deemed to be the most effective for achieving the environmental policy.  
This will be designed to be suitable for any given jurisdiction.  The most effective solution 
may not however be the most popular solution and may even result in severe costs falling 
upon a particular sector or group.  These will be regarded as potential costs or political issues 
and it will be for the policymaker to determine whether to implement the recommended 
solution, which will depend upon their judgement of the extent to which they wish to achieve 
the environmental policy against the costs of implementing the policy.  This understanding is 
the basis for Chapter 11. 
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51.  PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to illustrate how taxes can be harmonised between nations 
or to propose policies to achieve environmental goals, or to determine the goals themselves.1
 
  
Instead the purpose is to propose a model which can be used by any policymaker to 
determine the most appropriate taxation method available to achieve a given environmental 
policy.   
The basis is to offer policymakers a series of gateway questions to answer in order to 
ascertain the most effective solution for achieving a given policy.  The caveat of any solution, 
as explained in 33 is that the solution will be to effectively achieve the environmental policy 
at any cost;2
                                                             
1 In the 1990s all Scandinavian countries introduced carbon taxes but were unable to harmonise them: See 
Metcalf and Weisbach, see chapter 7, n.112, at 508. 
 it is the duty of the policymaker to determine whether the costs (or benefits) are 
acceptable given pertinent issues within the jurisdiction.  This is in line with 
recommendations made in Chapter 5 and it is anticipated that policymakers will consider 
wider issues as part of the decision-making process in determining whether and to what 
extent to endorse the deemed appropriate action to achieve an environmental policy.  Both 
the recommended solution  and decision-making process consequently are apolitical and it is 
2 In line with the Baumol-Oates approach explained at 24. 
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acknowledged that certain political or influential factors may prevent the implementation of 
any given solution or dilute its impact through amendments.3
 
 
Abbreviations within the Model are available in the Glossary at 57. 
52.  PRINCIPLES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
52.1 THEME  
 
The model will follow the theme of this thesis so that any tax system will aim to both ensure 
that, where possible: 
 
(a)  the ‘Polluter’ pays; and 
(b)  the ‘Improver’ is rewarded.4
 
 
Part (a) will ensure that negative external costs are internalised and the correct environmental 
message is delivered, to provide the necessary incentive to limit negative externalities. This is 
in line with the ‘polluter-pays’ principle.  The principle considers that a party taking 
insufficient action to limit such externalities should be made to bear the external cost.  For the 
purposes of this model a “Polluter” is any party who causes a negative externality according 
to the relevant environmental policy. 
 
                                                             
3 Milne cites the example of the Clinton Administration’s attempt to introduce an energy tax and have the 
collection point at the point of production, but pressure from influential industry groups resulted in the tax being 
placed upon the end-user; a far less satisfactory result in terms of both administrative ease of collection and the 
ability to influence production choices.  See chapter 8, n.25 at 13. 
4 Meade emphasised that a tax structure in a mixed economy must provide “effective incentives for private 
enterprise”, which the Model will strive for in line with the theme.  See chapter 1, n.9 at 20. 
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Part (b) is considered to be a necessary extension of the polluter-pays principle.  For the 
purposes of this Model an “Improver” is any party (or potential party) who takes action to 
reduce a negative environmental externality or to cause a positive environmental externality, 
according to the relevant environmental policy.  This principle is developed to ensure there is 
some private benefit to a party taking such actions which is regarded as both essential in 
incentivising a party to take an action, and equitable given that the party would otherwise 
make a private loss.  This is not to imply that the entire private cost ought to be borne by the 
taxpayer, but that the Improver should expect some contribution.   
 
For example the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 offers rewards for the 
retirement of low-efficiency products.5  Green suggests the use of subsidies to incentivise 
reduced emissions, alongside the removal of subsidies which reward polluters.6  Taxes and 
tax incentives can work in a similar manner, especially where no subsidy exists which would 
work adversely to the tax.   A two-pronged solution such as this is in line with Buchanan and 
Tullock’s reasoning that: “...a two-sided tax subsidy arrangement can remove the industry 
source of opposition while still ensuring efficient results.”7
 
 
APPLICATION EVERYWHERE 
 
A further qualification is that these principles should apply everywhere where there is a 
relevant environmental impact.  If the policymaker considers it important that the burden of 
an environmental problem is not borne by a country at the expense of their economic 
                                                             
5 H.R. 2454, 111th Congress, §214. 
6 Green A, ‘Trade Rules and Climate Change Subsidies’ (2006) 5 WTR 3, 377-414, pp.381-383. 
7 Buchanan and Tullock, see chapter 7, n.14 at 143. 
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competitiveness, the Model will seek to accommodate this, with reference to findings in 
Chapter 8. 
 
PROPORTIONALITY 
 
A fixed limitation of the Model is that it will follow the EU principle of ‘Proportionality’ so 
that any action recommended will be limited to that which is necessary to achieve the 
environmental objective of the policymaker.8  This will be in line with ECJ conditions on 
fiscal instruments such as environmental taxes, which requires them to be shown to be 
necessary and proportionate to the objective.9
 
   
52.2 TARGETED TAXES AND INCENTIVES 
 
 
As far as possible the Model will aim for targeted taxes so that the source of the problem is 
dealt with, in order to fully comply with the ‘polluter-pays’ principle.  In order to do this the 
taxes will be specific rather than broad and aim to differentiate between specific 
environmental impacts.  Broad-based or uniform taxes are regarded as inadequate to achieve 
this and may be inefficient.10  In line with Whalley’s argument, the taxes (and incentives) 
will focus on altering specific parts of processes which cause specific environmental harm, 
such as production methods with high energy use.11
                                                             
8 Proportionality is enshrined in EU primary law pursuant to Article 5 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, 2010 O.J. (C 83/13). 
  Further, the externalities caused by 
specific goods (and services) will be targeted individually according to their impact, rather 
9 Case 302/86 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark [1988] ECR 4607; and Case 
C-314/98 Snellers Auto’s [2000] ECR I-08633. 
10 See ‘A Possible Landfill Levy in the UK: Economic Incentives for Reducing Waste to Landfill’ in IISD, see 
chapter 7, n.13 at 40-41. 
11 Whalley, see chapter 1, n.3, at 120. 
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than broadly.  Whalley refers to these concepts as ‘product-based’ and ‘process-based 
taxes’.12
 
 
Offering suitable incentives to achieve the environmental goal may involve offering 
subsidies.  Such subsidies will be used only where necessary in order to achieve the goal.  For 
example Dresner and Ekins identify that to improve energy efficiency in UK households, 
alterations to the council tax and SDLT systems could be used to incentivise homeowners to 
make improvements in a set time.  This would involve offering loans and grants to low-
income households so that all households would be able to make the required improvements, 
funded through ring-fenced charges for those not making the improvements.13
 
 
52.3 EXISTING SYSTEM 
 
The existing tax system will be utilised and reformed as much as possible as opposed to 
introducing a new tax.   The benefits of this are: 
 
• greater public acceptance of the changes;14
• administrative savings of not having to introduce a new tax; 
   
• shifting the burden of a tax system to protect the environment. 
 
52.4 SIMPLICITY 
 
                                                             
12 Whalley Ibid. 
13 Dresner S and Ekins P, ‘Economic Instruments to Improve UK Home Energy Efficiency without Negative 
Social Impacts’ (2006) 27 Fiscal Studies 1, 47-74. 
14 Public resistance to a new tax can undermine its effectiveness as with France’s failed carbon tax (see 16), 
whilst amending an existing tax to reflect environmental concerns can increase its acceptability and 
effectiveness as with VED reforms. 
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The Model aims to be as user-friendly as possible to ensure clarity of application and ease of 
use.  Once the policymaker states their environmental objectives the Model aims to 
coherently offer viable solutions.  Before offering solutions, the Model categorises taxpayers 
into two bands: private individuals and businesses.  It is recognised however that some 
taxpayers may not fall into either category.  For instance organisations within the voluntary 
sector or public sector are not commonly regarded as businesses.15
 
  For the purpose of the 
Model any such organisation will be regarded as a business since it is important to provide 
continuing incentives to all, though there may be policy exclusions as provided. 
52.5 MANOEUVRABILITY FOR POLICYMAKERS 
 
The Model is not intended to be inflexible as this could prevent it from being appropriate in a 
given context.  The framework questions will therefore deliberately refrain from defining 
certain meanings such as what constitutes a ‘high risk’, except where stated.  It is intended 
that the policymaker can use the information available to decide if for example a certain 
probability constitutes a high risk, since an exact percentile definition (such as a 51% chance 
or 75% chance) could prove arbitrary in some circumstances.  However it is anticipated that 
common use of this Model will develop non-binding guideline meanings based on categories; 
for example a 25% chance risk of human death may constitute a high risk, whereas a 25% 
chance of an old building collapsing may not.  Used responsibly, this provides the 
policymaker with the flexibility to respond on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
individual circumstances. 16
                                                             
15 Stroud’s definition of ‘business’ extends the ordinary meaning to include some public sector activities for 
legal purposes, such as under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1965, in Greenberg D, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary 
of Words and Phrases (London: Sweet & Maxwell; 2009) at 334. 
  It is however important that policymakers can defend their given 
16 Meade stressed that a “good tax structure must be flexible” to manage both demand and the political policy of 
the day: see chapter 1, n.9 at 21. 
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interpretations and understandings, based on any evidence available to them at the time of 
making the decision.  
52.6  SINGULAR POLICY FOCUS 
 
Since the Model is designed to enable the policy to be carried out rather than creating the 
policy itself, is it essential for the policymaker to determine the policy.  This will be based 
upon evidence of need.  Its definition of the environmental objective will determine its 
“practical implementation, design and fiscal revenue uses” as well as its final impact.17  The 
OECD Framework for Effective and Efficient Environmental Policies provides guidance for 
policymakers to ask appropriate questions about both their environmental institutions and 
policies in order to achieve the most effective and efficient outcome.18
 
  It is expected that this 
is done prior to use of the Model, whereupon the Model will aim to accommodate this as far 
as possible. 
52.6.1 DOUBLE TAXATION AND TAX DISTORTIONS 
 
 
Any recommended taxation solution of the Model must not be allowed to be distorted by 
present environmental tax policies or taxes which would dampen the impact of any new taxes 
proposed by the Model.  The Model therefore works on the assumption that the areas where 
the environmental policy is to apply are currently subject to: 
 
(a)  no environmental taxation; or 
                                                             
17 Baranzini et al, see chapter 4, n.15, at 410. 
18 [ENV/EPOC(2008)6/FINAL] at 2. 
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(b) taxation which will be removed or reformed so as not to distort the impact of any tax 
introduced pursuant to this Model. 
 
This does not rule out the possibility of several different types of environmental taxes 
operating comprehensively to achieve an overall objective.  Indeed such possibilities can 
work well, as in Sweden where four differing taxes work collaboratively.19
 
  
52.6.2 CAP-AND-TRADE SCHEMES OR REGULATION 
 
 
Similarly whilst the Model can potentially work alongside cap-and-trade schemes it may be 
economically harmful to engage both to achieve the same targets.  If there is an overlap 
between a tax and another instrument then the polluter may end up having to bear the cost 
more than once and may need to continue paying even after the environmental target has 
been met, which makes part of the tax a non-environmental tax and could trigger deflation. 
 
The Model focuses on using taxation to achieve an environmental target.  Consequently if 
there are policies in place which are not to be removed or reformed, then the Model can only 
be used to target an area over and above the area presently covered by the existing policy.  
For example if regulation is presently used to reduce industrial water consumption by 20% 
then the tax should not focus on that 20% since it is already covered and expenditures are 
already being made to achieve that binding target.  Instead the tax should only be used for an 
additional policy of incentivising a further reduction.  Otherwise a taxpayer could end up 
                                                             
19 See Speck S, ‘The Design of Carbon and broad-based Energy taxes’ (2008) 10 VJEL. 31-59, at 50. 
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paying both a fine and a tax for the same consumption which together amounts to a sum 
which is more than the requisite level of taxation to achieve the target. 
 
Where there are already non-tax policies in place, it may be harmful to instantly remove them 
and replace them with tax policies.  For instance Anderson identifies that the removal of an 
ETS may cause a price crash which could lower prices of pollutants in the short term. 20
 
  An 
ETS may have established a relatively stable cost of a pollutant such as carbon, so without 
the need for companies to purchase a quantitative trading permit the prices of carbon could 
suddenly drop – which may result in more carbon being emitted until it becomes more 
expensive to use again.  In such circumstances – or in other circumstances where the removal 
of the status quo could damage the environmental interest - it may then be necessary to 
gradually change the system from a non-tax to a tax system in order to provide stability.  
52.6.3 VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS 
 
 
It is perceivable that policymakers may utilise the threat of a tax formed through this Model 
to reach voluntary agreements with taxpayers to achieve certain targets.21
                                                             
20 Andersen MS, ‘Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing and Trading Carbon: Some European 
Experiences’  (2008) 10 VJEL.. 1, 61-84, at 83. 
  Whilst this may 
work to an extent it must be noted that a revenue-recycling result proposed by the Model 
cannot be achieved through a voluntary agreement.  This is because the voluntary agreement 
will bring in no revenue to be used for purposes considered within the Model.   This will 
render the Model’s results incomplete since certain positive externalities may not be created 
to offset the negative externalities – meaning that the targets to reduce the negative 
21 See the experience of Switzerland in Felder and Schleiniger, see chapter 3, n.5, at 109. 
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externalities would have been necessarily higher.  Thus the voluntary agreement’s targets will 
not go far enough in achieving the environmental goals.  Even if the voluntary agreement 
included payments to create the proposed positive externalities, the actual predicted effects 
may be distorted whilst any double dividend created through proposed revenue recycling 
possibilities will not operate.  The system of exempting large polluters from taxation if they 
agreed binding emissions targets was introduced in Switzerland,22 but has been criticised for 
being an inefficient solution since all parties will have varying costs particularly if all parties 
within an industry do not sign up to the agreement.23
 
 
52.6.4 ABSENCE OF TREATY 
 
 
Many environmental problems exist on an international scale and therefore require an 
international response.  This may be in the form of a global treaty or pact such as the Bali 
Action Plan.24
 
  However whilst such treaties may be desirable or necessary in achieving an 
environmental goal, they may not be politically feasible in the short term.  In the absence of 
such an international agreement it may be necessary for one nation to take unilateral action 
using its tax code to achieve the goals within its borders, and, as far as possible outside of 
them.  This may be in coordination with other nations taking similar action. 
The Model is designed to have the potential to operate on an international scale on the basis 
that there is no applicable international law or treaty currently in place which would render 
the Model unnecessary.   
                                                             
22 Article 9 of the Federal Act on Reducing CO2 Emissions (CO2 Act; SR 641.71). 
23 Felder and Schleiniger, see chapter 3, n.5 at 109-110. 
24 Agreed at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties meeting in Bali, Indonesia, 2007. 
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52.7  LEGALITY 
 
 
The Model is designed to work within prevailing international law and assumes that no 
international treaty already applies to the areas targeted by the Model.  There is an 
assumption that national sovereignty continues to apply to tax law and that one jurisdiction 
cannot directly tax within another jurisdiction. 
 
It is also assumed that international trade rules (such as WTO rules and EU Competition 
Law) continue to apply to limit the ability of Governments to subsidise private enterprises.  
Any recommended subsidies must be approved by relevant authorities and considered 
legitimate.  Within the EU for example certain subsidies are permissible given that they 
qualify as being in the environmental interest.25  WTO rules also importantly prohibit internal 
taxes which discriminate against imported products.26
 
 
52.8 ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
 
It is assumed that there is a competent administrative framework to manage the tax system,27 
providing “equity, economic efficiency, and ease of administration”.28 This crucially involves 
horizontal and vertical tax equity,29 which the Model aims to provide.30
                                                             
25 The Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection 2008 OJ C/82 1, governs this area and 
determines when special tax provisions are allowed. 
  Further it requires 
26 See chapter 9. 
27 The need for this was recognised in ‘Water Taxes in Germany’ in IISD, see chapter 2, n.90 at pp.36-37. 
28 See chapter 2, n.23 at 70-98. 
29 As explained in Klein et al, Federal Income Tax (2005) at 3-4 <www.ilrg.com/.../FederalIncomeTax-
Georgetown-Pearlman-Fall2005.doc> Accessed 5/5/2005. 
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coordination between local and national authorities to ensure information is complete and tax 
incentives are correctly applied.31
 
  
The administration must also ensure the rules and policies are enforceable and enforced.  The 
means of doing this will vary between jurisdictions depending on local laws and customs.  
Legislation in British Colombia ensures carbon tax revenues are recycled in full according 
with tax provisions by penalising the Minister of Finance personally with a 15% salary cut 
for failure to carry this out.32
 
  This ensures the administration satisfies its duties related to the 
environmental tax reform, where otherwise a Government may only be accountable to itself.   
52.9 PRE-REQUISITE TO USE OF THE MODEL 
 
 
Following from Chapter 5, as a pre-requisite to use of the model, it is necessary that an EAS 
(‘Environmental Assessment Study’) must be carried out.  The EAS would be carried out by 
a team composing some or all of professional environmental engineers, scientists, ecologists, 
economists and accountants to produce results in a similar manner and along similar lines to 
both the Green Book (see 28) and UNEP’s description of environmental assessments required 
by many legislatures.33
 
  It is anticipated that where required to identify anything within the 
EAS, the entire category will be included so that the list is as exhaustive as possible.  
However the examples below are inevitably over-simplified, contrived and incomplete as 
they are for demonstration purposes only. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
30 See Mann, chapter 7, n.53 at 1206. 
31 As noted in Mann & Hymel, see chapter 6, n.10 at 10428. 
32 Carbon Tax Act 2008, S.B.C, ch.40 § 5(3) (Canada). 
33 UNEP, see chapter 5, n.3 at pp. 6; 10-17.  
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The EAS must perform the following: 
 
1. Identify an overall environmental problem to be addressed (known as the “EP”)). 
 
This will require a scientific or other professional explanation of the perceived 
problem.  Where there is doubt as to the existence of the problem of its causes, 
the precautionary principle applies (see Chapter 1, 1.8). 
 
2. Identify the geographical location within which the EP exists. 
 
The examples given to demonstrate the EAS are that the EP is either: 
 
i. Global GhGs are too high to be sustainable; 
ii. A local area is overpopulated with badgers; 
iii. A region is in danger of being flooded; or 
iv. An historic building is in a state of disrepair. 
 
3. Identify one or more contributing factor(s) causing the EP (known as “CF”(s)). 
 
The purpose is to set out the categories of the overall problems causing the EP. 
 
In the above examples these could be: 
i. CO2 emissions are too high; nitrous oxide emissions are too high. 
ii. Badgers are reproducing in an area with no natural predators. 
iii. A region has too much deforestation and insufficient flood defences. 
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iv. Nobody has repaired the building in 100 years and it is unlikely that 
anybody will do so. 
 
This description should specifically indicate the gravity at which the CF is 
contributing to cause the EP, such as by attributing it with a percentage of the cause. 
 
4. Identify one or more causes of the CF(s) known as the “Pollutant”(s). 34
 
 
The purpose is to set out the use of any commodity, service, activity or other factor which 
specifically contributes to the CF in question and to what extent. Any one of these may 
contribute in various ways to the CF and the intention is to identify the varying causes for 
this.   
 
The rationale for this is to properly account for the varying reasons for the Pollutant’s 
contribution to the CF in order that externalities may properly be internalised and/or the 
correct incentive to amend behaviour can be established. 
 
This involves separating out the various stages in the polluting activity and identifying the 
precise (if possible) factor(s) resulting in the CF, including the processes or methods involved 
in creating it in the first place (where possible). 
 
In the case of a good for example there will be two measures of its contribution to the CF: 
 
(a) that resulting from its usage; and                                                              
34 Ligthart recognises that there can be multiple ‘nonpoint’ causes of an environmental externality, in Lighthart, 
see chapter 4, n.19 at 8. 
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(b) that resulting from the processes of its production. 
 
Both must be counted.  Further, rather than counting the entire production process as one, the 
purpose is to ascertain each specific process’s contribution.  Only by doing this can the 
unsustainable parts of its production be accounted for and then altered.  Similarly in the case 
of an industry or sector, rather than counting the entire industry or sector together, it must be 
differentiated by counting the processes of production individually.35
 
  Therefore the 
component parts of any given product will be identified and the processes of their production 
accounted for, in order that the full polluting output of that product is known.   
In such cases the onus of proof that a process is sustainable will be on the Polluter (see 
below). 
 
In the above examples these could be: 
i. Causes of CO2 emissions include: commercial aircraft engines produce 10% 
by using fuel (showing bands of efficiency depending on engine type); coal 
combustion produces 8%; TVs produce 3% whilst switched on and 1% whilst 
on standby; cows produce 2% through flatulence; machinery used in 
manufacturing of stationery produces 5%; machinery producing aerosol caps 
produces 1%; aerosols produce 1%; there are too few trees to absorb CO2 
emissions. (Nitrous oxide emissions dealt with separately). 
ii. Causes include: there are no natural predators for badgers in the area and 
badgers are able to reproduce. 
                                                             
35 Whalley, see chapter 1. n.3, at 120. 
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iii. Causes of deforestation include: 2% of the rainforest is being depleted every 
year.  Causes of the insufficient flood defences include: trees are not being 
planted; no investment in flood defences. 
iv. Causes include: there is no private benefit to be accrued from repairing the 
building since it has no commercial value. 
 
5. Identify one or more parties responsible for causing the Pollutant(s), known as the 
“Polluter”(s). 
 
The purpose is to analyse the chain of responsibility so that any party causing or 
influencing the cause of a Pollutant is considered.  This is not to indicate that the 
‘beneficiary pays’ principle will replace the ‘polluter pays’ (see Chapter 7) but to have a 
list of parties who can be influenced at varying levels. 
 
In the above examples these could be: 
i. Causers of aircraft engine emissions: owner of airline; passengers; senders of 
freight by aircraft. Causers of coal combustion: coal mining company; coal 
power plants; energy companies; consumers of electricity to the proportion 
that it is produced through coal.  Causes of TV emissions: manufacturers; 
importers/exporters; sellers; consumers.  (Others dealt with separately). 
ii. Badgers themselves by reproducing. 
iii. Loggers cutting down trees; sellers of wood; manufacturers of wood products; 
consumers purchasing products made from wood.  
iv. The depredation of the building. 
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6. Identify one or more factors which could reduce or reverse the impact of CF(s), 
known as the “Improvement”(s). 
 
In the above examples these could be: 
i. More trees could absorb a greater amount of CO2; improved aviation 
technology can reduce aviation CO2 emissions; availability of alternative 
sustainable transport for passengers can reduce number of flights to reduce 
CO2 emissions.  Education of consumers can shift demand from non-
renewable to renewable resources. 
ii. Foxes can kill badgers; badgers can be neutered. 
iii. Trees can be planted; existing trees can be prevented from being cut down if 
there is no commercial benefit or suitable alternatives; flood defences can be 
built.  Education of logging communities can encourage sustainability. 
iv. The building can be repaired periodically.  
 
7. Identify one or more party able to carry out Improvements, known as the 
“Improver”(s). 
 
In the above examples these could be: 
 
i. Private forest owners could authorise logging reductions and/or tree-
planting programmes; airlines can replace old aircraft with more efficient 
versions; manufacturers of airline engines can design and produce more 
efficient versions; passengers can use alternative sustainable transport. 
ii. Animal organisations can neuter badgers. 
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iii. Private enterprises could invest in tree planting programmes; alternative 
products can be researched or manufactured; companies can invest in flood 
defence systems;  
iv. Local building firms can carry out repairs; private companies can fund 
repairs.  
 
8. Where possible, identify the elasticity of demand and supply of each Pollutant and 
each Improvement. 
 
9. Identify the financial capacity of any Polluter(s) or Improver(s). 
 
This attempts to estimate the income levels of each in order to understand their ability to 
pay taxes.  This information can be gained from the nation’s tax collection agency.   In 
the case of a group within society, estimates of average per capita income would suffice. 
 
10. Estimate short-term and long-term costs of: 
i. the EP; 
ii. the CF(s); 
iii. the consequences if the EP is left unchecked (known as the “Threat”); 
iv. the consequences if the EP is reduced to various more sustainable 
levels (known as the “Reduced Threat”(s); 
v. the private benefits to the Polluters of allowing the EP to be left 
unchecked; and 
vi. any social benefits derived from continued use of the Pollutants. 
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The costs above must value both private and social costs, (unless otherwise indicated) along 
similar lines to that indicated in the Green Book36
 
 and in Chapter 5.  It may be necessary for 
example to conduct surveys to understand how greatly the public value a certain 
environmental factor.  Alternatively an area may be of considerable ecological importance so 
both private and social costs would need to be included. It is anticipated that such valuations 
would be carried out independent of Government.  This is an area requiring further 
interdisciplinary study however if policymakers decided to omit certain factors from the 
valuation then this would not represent the actual costs and the use of the Model would be 
flawed. 
11. Not financially cost more to carry out the cost of the Threat as in 10(iii) above.37
  
 
                                                             
36 HM Treasury, The Green Book - Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (London: TSO) 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf> Accessed 5/5/2010. 
37 The Model adopts the principle that with Government intervention, it should not cost more to correct a market 
failure than the cost of the failure itself.  Friedman refers to this type of failure as ‘Government failure’ (as 
opposed from ‘market failure,’ in Friedman M and Schwartz AJ, A Monetary History of the United States 1867-
1960  (USA: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
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53.  THE UNIVERSAL MODEL 
 
 
The information provided by the EAS should be sufficiently complete to allow the 
policymaker to utilise the Model below. 
 
53.1 WHAT DOES THE POLICYMAKER WISH TO ACHIEVE?  
 
 
The policymaker must specify: 
 
53.1.1 The “Policy”.  This must be an overall target determining the extent to which the 
EP will be affected to limit the scope of the Threat.  
 
For example this could be to reduce climate change to only a 2°C increase from a 1990 level.  
This therefore would not entirely avoid the Threat but could reduce it to a more sustainable 
level – a Reduced Threat option.  The policymaker therefore has the option to decide what 
level of change (if any) is desired and can use the EAS to make an informed decision based 
upon the various implications of each Reduced Threat option. 
 
 
53.1.2 The “Policy Objective(s)”.   The policymaker must select the CF(s): 
 
a.  to be affected in order to achieve the Policy; and 
b.  the level to which any CF will be affected. 
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If there is only one CF there will be no choice because the CF must be affected to a 
level that will achieve the Policy. 
 
If there is more than one CF, the policymaker has the choice of selecting one or more 
CFs and can affect them in a combined way to achieve the Policy. 
 
For example it may be decided that CO2 emissions should be reduced by 10% and tree levels 
are required to rise by 15%, but that nitrous oxide emissions are not to be affected. 
 
Importantly, the Policy Objective will differ depending upon the type of CF.  For instance, 
Bell and McGillivray divide all environmental policy between two definitions: pollution and 
conservation.38
  
  If this is accepted then considerably different approaches would be 
appropriate for reducing pollution than conserving an environmental factor.  
53.2 HOW FORESEEABLE IS IT THAT THE FREE MARKET 
WILL ACHIEVE THE POLICY WITH NO GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION? 
 
It is important that the tax system allows free enterprise to solve market problems, or 
allows room for it to do so.39
 
 
Where possible, Government economists will respond to this question with an estimated 
percentage chance.  Policymakers will decide whether to intervene based upon the 
likelihood of a satisfactory market intervention in sufficient time to achieve the Policy.  
                                                             
38 See Bell S and McGillivray D, Environmental Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at pp.4-10. 
39 See 5.2.1.  As the entire use of fiscal instruments is dependent upon the need to correct market failures in 
meeting environmental policy, if the market can solve the problem with no intervention then there will be no 
need to consider using taxes. 
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The policymaker’s requirement for a high degree of probability increases as the severity 
of the Threat increases. 
 
Given that intervention is selected, the policymaker must move onto the next question. 
 
If it is decided that private enterprise will achieve a proportion of the Policy, but not all, 
then the Model can be utilised to achieve the remainder of the Policy. 
 
 
53.3 HOW ARE THE POLLUTANT(S) AND IMPROVEMENT(S) 
DEFINED AND MEASURED? 
 
 
DEFINITION  
 
Prior to determining which Pollutant(s) and Improvement(s) are to be involved in the Model, 
it is necessary for the policymaker to determine how any tax base will be defined.  The 
definition will differ depending on the type of tax base involved.  The policymaker’s choice 
must depend on the nature of the Policy Objective(s).   
 
For example Milne explains that if the objective is to reduce carbon emissions then this limits 
the base to fossil-based fuels.40  Whereas if the objective is to reduce energy consumption 
then the base is wider including renewable energy or nuclear power. 41
                                                             
40 Andersen explains that Slovenia focused its energy taxes onto fossil fuels and measured it by carbon content, 
in Andersen MS and Speck S, ‘The Environmental Tax Reforms in Europe: Stabilisation, Mitigation 
Compensation, and CO2 Stabilisation’ in Cottrell J et al, see chapter 7, n.17 at 520. 
 
41 Milne, see chapter 8, n.25, at 4. 
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MEASUREMENT 
 
The means of measurement also relate to the Policy Objective(s).  For example a goal of 
reducing energy consumption may define its base in terms of either its: 
 
• market price per unit of energy; 
• volume of fuel; or 
• energy content.42
  
 
In this instance a measurement using the ‘market price per energy unit’ may not be 
appropriate for a goal of encouraging renewable energy if the unit price for renewable energy 
was higher than that of fossil fuels.  The latter two could be more preferable in this case since 
the ‘energy content’ may reflect the efficiencies of renewable energy and the ‘volume of fuel’ 
may exclude renewable energy altogether.   
 
Therefore how widely the tax base is defined and measured depends upon the most 
appropriate means of achieving the Policy Objective(s). 
 
53.4 HOW DOES THE POLICYMAKER WISH TO ACHIEVE THE 
POLICY OBJECTIVES? 
 
This is decided as follows:- 
53.4.1 WHICH POLLUTANT(S) (IF ANY) WILL BE TARGETED?                                                              
42 Milne, see chapter 8, n.25, at 4. 
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This is ascertained by answering the following:  
 
53.4.1.1 
 
How many Pollutants are there? 
53.4.1.1.1 Multiple Pollutants: 
 
Ascertaining which of the multiple Pollutants to target will determine what will be included 
in the tax base.  The policymaker has the option of choosing: 
 
(a) None of the Pollutants: (4.4.1.1.3) below will apply; 
(b) One of the Pollutants: (4.4.1.1.2) below will apply; 
(c) Several of the Pollutants; or 
(d) All of the Pollutants. 
 
The policymaker has several considerations when making this choice.  
 
MOST DIRECT LINK  
 
Milne explains (in the context of designing an energy tax) that it is advantageous for the tax 
base to be the factor which has the most direct link to the environmental problem.43
                                                             
43 Milne, see chapter 8, n.25, at 4. 
  For 
example since CO2 causes 85% of USA’s GhGs, most policies aim at reducing CO2 emissions 
as opposed to other emissions.   
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This can be applied herein so that the policymaker may determine which of the multiple 
Pollutants most directly causes the CF(s) and make this Pollutant the tax base.  This will be 
particularly appropriate when the selected Pollutants together make up the over-whelming 
majority of the CFs.  In the above example this may lead to the base being a single Pollutant. 
 
In terms of achieving the Policy Objectives the ‘most direct link’ rationale can provide a 
straightforward focus point, and can work well as an educational tool if the concentration 
focuses upon fewer rather than many Pollutants (see distributional impacts in 36.4).  For 
example many households now commonly understand the concept of decreasing one’s 
‘carbon footprint’ and the need to do so, whereas they may not appreciate the other non-
carbon factors causing the environmental problem of GhGs such as methane or nitrous oxide, 
and may not be aware of methods to reduce their non-carbon impact. 
 
WIDER FOCUS 
 
Depending on the scope of the tax base which a new tax has the ability to influence, the 
policymaker may instead decide to spread the focus amongst all or most of the Pollutants, 
even if several are only minor in scale, in order to get to the root of the problem. 
 
53.4.1.1.2 One Pollutant or only one selected: 
 
If there is only one Pollutant then this will be targeted in the tax base.  However if the 
Pollutant becomes excluded then 54.4.1.1.3 below applies. 
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53.4.1.1.3 No Pollutant: 
 
These circumstances will apply when: 
(a)  there is no Pollutant; 
(b)  no Pollutant is selected by the policymaker; or 
(c) any selected Pollutants are excluded pursuant to 53.4.1.2. 
 
Under these circumstances the tax base must be redirected in order to fund any 
Improvement(s).  The first option is to target an alternative Pollutant to a different CF (even 
if not related to the present EP) in order that the tax is still raised to achieve an environmental 
goal.  If this is not available the tax base will need to be non-environmental which makes it a 
tax ‘for environmental purposes’ (without an environmental tax base, but to achieve an 
environmental goal, rather than an ‘environmental tax’, as explained in 5.1). This may not be 
necessary if there is some other Government funding available in lieu of raising taxes on an 
non-environmental tax base.   
 
53.4.1.1.4 
 
Is any Pollutant subject to a continuing environmental tax within the 
jurisdiction’s tax code? 
Any such Pollutant must be exempt from the Model’s potential tax targets if: 
(a) the environmental and economic impact of the continuing tax on the Pollutant would 
be adversely affected by the introduction of an additional tax on the same Pollutant;  
(b) the perceived impact of a new environmental tax may be adversely affected by the 
continuing tax; 
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(c) there would likely be so serious an adverse impact upon a selected Polluter whose 
activities are of significant social, economic or environmental importance, that it 
would be more detrimental to the public interest to include than to exclude the 
Pollutant.  
The word ‘continuing’ qualifies the requirements of 53.4.1.2, so that 53.4.1.2 does not apply 
if the existing tax will be: 
a. revoked; or  
b. reformed to an extent that will not interfere with an 
environmental  tax perceived by the Model. 
 
53.4.2 WHICH IMPROVEMENT(S) (IF ANY) WILL BE TARGETED? 
 
 
The policymaker must determine any Improvement(s) necessary to either: 
 
(a)  off-set the impact of any Pollutant(s) in achieving the Policy Objective(s); or 
(b)  achieve the Policy Objective(s) in any case. 
 
53.4.2.1 
 
How many potential Improvements are available? 
53.4.2.1.1 Multiple Improvements: 
 
Ascertaining which of the multiple Improvement types to target will determine where 
incentives are aimed.  The policymaker has the option of choosing: 
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(a) None of the Improvements: 54.4.2.1.3 below will apply; 
(b) One of the Improvements: 53.4.2.1.2 below will apply; 
(c) Several of the Improvements; or 
(d) All of the Improvements. 
 
The policymaker should decide on this based upon which Improvements are perceived to be 
capable of having: 
(a) the most direct effects in achieving the Policy Objectives;  
(b) where relevant, the least negative side-effects and the most positive side-effects. 
 
In this context “side-effects” refers to any impact the Improvement may have outside of 
achieving the Policy Objective itself.  For example if an organisation is encouraged to neuter 
badgers, a negative side-effect could be the extinction of badgers or a predator species.  The 
positive side-effects of this may be the reduction in the spread of tuberculosis. 
 
53.4.2.1.2 One Improvement or only one selected: 
 
If there is only one Improvement then this will be where any incentives must be aimed. 
 
53.4.2.1.3 No Improvement: 
 
These circumstances will apply when: 
(a)  there is no possible Improvement; 
(b)  no Improvement is selected by the policymaker; or 
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(c) any selected Improvement may reduce or counteract the impact of existing 
Improvement programmes. 
 
53.4.3 THE LEVEL(S) OF CHANGE REQUIRED IN (4.4.1) AND/OR (4.4.2) IN 
ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE POLICY OBJECTIVE(S). 
 
Once the above has been determined there may be options (if more than one) as to the 
level(s) of change required in either the Pollutant(s) or the Improvement(s). The policymaker 
should calculate a realistic and practical combination of reducing the Pollutant(s) and/or 
increasing the Improvement(s) in order to achieve the Policy Objective(s): the result is 
referred as the “RC” (required change(s)).  It is essential that any target or combined target of 
change amounts to that required by the Policy Objective(s) and is capable of fulfilling this.  
 
Where more than one, any combination should be based on a balance to determine those 
which can most directly achieve the Policy Objective(s).  It may not be necessary to include 
all or any Pollutant(s) or Improvement(s) if the Policy Objective(s) can be achieved more 
directly without any.  The balance is determined by deciding whether the Policy Objective(s) 
can be most achieved by one of:44
 
 
a. Internalisation of external environmental costs; 
 
The RC will primarily consider all Pollutants before any Improvements. 
The preference is for revenue to be recycled in order to maximise the overall benefit – 
a double dividend scenario may be achievable.45                                                             
44 These are not mutually exclusive.  
  Revenue could therefore be used for 
45 See chapter 4. 
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environmental projects to increase the overall dividend, or for another policy area 
such as in decreasing payroll taxes to boost employment, or in providing technical 
assistance for organisations to improve production methods so they are more 
environmentally positive. 
 
b. The necessity of achieving a certain degree of behavioural change; 
 
The RC will consider both Pollutants and Improvements.  The overall burden on 
taxpayers can be limited if Improvements can be achieved as much as possible so that 
Pollutants are taxed as little as possible.  Whether this is achievable will depend upon 
the circumstances.  The preference is for revenue gained from Pollutants to be 
recycled into Improvements as far as is efficiently possible.  If the revenue recycled 
(or even directed from Government funds) into Improvements can have a greater 
impact upon achieving the Policy Objectives than if more Pollutants were taxed and 
fewer Improvements were targeted, then this will be the preference.  However if 
Improvements only have a  modest impact upon the Policy Objectives and it would 
require higher levels of taxes on Pollutants to fund those Improvements, than if less 
Pollutants were taxed but fewer Improvements were made, then this will be the most 
efficient situation for the taxpayer. 
 
c. Utilisation of Government revenue to achieve the benefit in the Policy 
Objective(s).46
 
 
                                                             
46 These categories are referred to in Milne, see chapter 8, n.25, at 5. 
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The RC will solely include Pollutants (in order to fund the required Improvement(s). 
Primarily the Pollutants will be related to the CF.  If not they will be related to another 
CF for the same or another EP, otherwise the tax base may be a non-environmental 
issue.  If the issue is not a negative externality the tax base should be as broad as 
possible to minimise its impact. 
 
By considering the Pollutant(s) and Improvement(s) necessary before considering any 
Polluter(s) or Improver(s), the method is fairer towards taxpayers since it is not assumed that 
any taxpayer needs to change their behaviour, and therefore there is no discrimination 
towards any one taxpayer or group thereof.  If the policymaker can show that this is not 
feasible then both considerations may be made together in order to answer the above.  For 
instance it may be important to know where many emissions are coming from first to 
understand whether it is practical to achieve such targets. 
 
The overall goal for this part is: 
 
53.4.3.1.1  Identify the combination of change in level(s) of Pollutant(s) or the 
Improvement(s). 
53.4.3.1.2   If there are no Pollutants or no changes required to the Pollutants, move to 
53.4.7. 
53.4.3.1.3   If the Polluter is not a human or owned or directly controlled by a human then 
that Polluter will be excluded from 53.4.4, therefore move to 53.4.7. 
 
For instance if the party responsible as the Polluter is an animal then they will be 
excluded since they are not taxable.  
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An example of the balance in RC is as follows.  In 2009 the Committee on Climate Change 
considered carbon as a pollutant and advised the British Government that if they wanted the 
aviation industry to grow, then emissions from households may need to fall by 90%.47
 
  This 
includes expected ‘improvements’ based upon greater carbon efficiency in aviation 
technology.   There are of course other options for lowering carbon emissions depending on 
different levels of growth and different parties able to change their behaviour.  However this 
exemplifies the balance of priorities with which it is necessary for the policymaker to decide 
upon given a range of options.  
 
LEVEL 
 
According to the type and location of Pollutant and/or Improvement (both of which can be 
gauged from the EAS) the policymaker must ascertain whether the Model will be 
implemented at a local, national, or international level.  For instance congestion-charging in a 
city centre would be considered local, though the powers to introduce the charge may need to 
be secured at a national level. 
 
REMOVAL OF SUBSIDIES 
 
Philosophically the purpose of internalising the cost of a negative externality through taxation 
is to remove the indirect implicit subsidy created by non-taxation of the externality.  Aside                                                              
47 Committee on Climate Change, ‘Meeting the UK Aviation Target – options for Reducing Emissions to 2050’ 
(2009) See eg. p.36 <http://www.theccc.org.uk/reports/aviation-report> Accessed 19/2/2010. 
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from this the Model requires the removal of any perverse subsidies48 which would counter or 
hinder the effects of the Model.49  This will prevent revenue from being wasted, serve the 
environmental purpose more efficiently, be fairer on taxpayers and abide with international 
laws on creating an even competitive playing field.50
 
 
Therefore any tax and non-tax implicit and explicit subsidies must be removed.  This includes 
not only direct fiscal policies such as preferential tax treatments, but also wider fiscal policies 
such as trade restrictions and protection of markets contributing to the negative externality.  
Exemptions should be removed, and any explicit subsidies such as grants or low-interest 
loans should be removed.   
 
The OECD provide the following checklist to enable environmentally harmful subsidies to be 
removed:51
 
 
                                                             
48 See 6.1. 
49 See 4.4. 
50 See Pieters J, ‘When Removing Subsides Benefits the Environment: Developing a Checklist based on the 
Conditionality of Subsidies in OECD’ (2003) in OECD, Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Policy Issues and 
Challenges (Paris: OECD, 2003) at 35; EEA, see chapter 2, n.100. 
51 OECD, see chapter 2, n.104 at 92. 
  
319  
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53.4.4 WHICH POLLUTER(S) WILL BE TARGETED? 
 
 
If 53.4.3.1.1 results in a target reduction level in one or more Pollutant it is necessary to 
ascertain which Polluter(s) will be targeted, if any.  If there is only one Polluter then move 
onto 53.4.5. 
 
WHERE FINAL INCIDENCE SHOULD FALL 
 
53.4.4.1.1 For each Pollutant, the policymaker must consider the list of Polluters to 
ascertain where the final incidence should fall.  This should be the Polluter(s) 
most able to alter their behaviour in such ways that the RC can be achieved.52
 
   
This will depend upon where a tax could have most effect in achieving the environmental 
goal stated in the RC, which requires an economic and practical analysis.  It may be that final 
incidence is needed to fall on one party in order to influence another party.  For instance it 
could fall on consumers (as ends users of a polluting good or service) in order to affect their 
consumption choice; which in turn may influence producers to change the products they 
produce.  Alternatively it could be on producers (or service providers) in order that they 
produce different products (or services) which can affect consumer choice.53
 
 
Yet if the manufacturing process of a consumer product produced high emissions, then 
targeting the consumer with higher purchase costs will have some impact since demand may 
                                                             
52 Milne, see chapter 8, n.25, at 5. 
53 For the sake of conciseness, descriptions henceforth will refer to goods, producers and manufacturers, but are 
taken to include services and service providers.  
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fall, depending on the elasticity of the good.  However if the good is inelastic then the fall in 
demand may be insufficient to achieve the RC.  In this case or in any case where the 
reduction in demand is insufficient to affect the manufacturing process in such a way that the 
RC is achieved, then targeting consumers will fail.  It may be that the manufacturer is 
prepared to take a loss of sales or simply amends the selling price to continue the same level 
of demand.  In such circumstances an economic analysis will allow the policymaker to 
determine that the most effective targeting is focused upon the manufacturer to alter the 
manufacturing process. 
 
Therefore 53.4.4.1.1 is completed in two steps.   
 
The first is by identifying: 
 
53.4.4.1.2 any Polluter whose behaviour directly contributes to the Pollutant (referred to 
as the “Direct Polluter”); and 
53.4.4.1.3 any other Polluter whose behaviour has direct or indirect influence over the 
behaviour of any Direct Polluter in relation to the Pollutant (referred to as the 
“Influencing Polluter”). 
 
For example the Direct Polluter may be the end user of a good while the Influencing Polluter 
may be the good’s producer.  This is based on the premise that a good causes a pollutant 
through its production or its end use. 
 
The second is by identifying: 
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53.4.4.1.4 the extent to which a change in the behaviour of the Direct Polluter could 
achieve the RC; 
53.4.4.1.5 the extent to which a change in the behaviour of any Influencing Polluter can 
affect the behaviour of the Direct Polluter in relation to the Pollutant to 
achieve the RC. 
 
By determining whichever of 53.4.4.1.4 or 53.4.4.1.5 can produce a change to the greatest 
extent, the result becomes the Polluter where the final incidence should fall. 
 
To ascertain which change can have the greater extent involves evaluating the ability of the 
Direct Polluter to control their contribution to the Pollutant, and comparing this to the level of 
influence the Influencing Polluter has over the direct Polluter.  This is a practical and 
economic evaluation looking at the reality of each party’s situation and the processes behind 
it. 
 
The Direct Polluter’s level of control depends upon: 
 
(a) their level of demand for the Pollutant;  
(b) the availability of sustainable alternatives to the Pollutant; and 
(c) whether the Direct Polluter has the option to change their usage of the Pollutant. 
 
If the Direct Polluter has no option but to use the Pollutant, then their behaviour cannot 
realistically be altered by a tax and this can only be used to raise revenue for an 
Improvement.  However if the Pollutant is non-essential then their use can be altered given 
that there are alternatives to the Pollutant available – such as low-energy light bulbs or public 
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transport.  However this will only apply if the choice of changing from the Pollutant is within 
the control of the Direct Polluter. 
 
The Influencing Polluter’s level of influence depends upon their: 
 
(a) elasticity of demand; and 
(b) ability to offer alternatives to the Pollutant. 
 
If the Influencing Polluter is able to offer an alternative to the Pollutant and even remove the 
option of using the Pollutant, their influence will be high.  However if there are no 
alternatives to the Pollutant and/or the demand for the Pollutant is such that any action of the 
Influencing Polluter would have negligible consequences upon the Polluter’s behaviour in 
relation to the Pollutant, their influence is regarded as low.  
 
 
FINAL INCIDENCE 
 
The need to ensure that the final incidence falls upon the targeted Polluters in 53.4.4.1.1 will 
dictate where the tax will lie. 
 
For instance if a tax falls upstream in order to influence production choices (such as on a 
manufacturer), it may simply be passed onto the consumer in terms of higher costs, meaning 
final incidence will ultimately fall upon the consumer.  Similarly if a tax falls upon an 
employer then it may be passed onto employees in terms of lower wages, meaning final 
incidence falls upon the employees (see Chapter 7). 
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The ability to tax upstream therefore depends upon the: 
 
(a) elasticity of demand and supply of the Pollutant; and 
(b) availability of substitutes to the Pollutant. 
 
If the Pollutant is easily substituted with a sustainable alternative then the tax will largely fall 
upstream (such as on producers) since consumers are able to change consumption habits.  
However if the consumer will demand the Pollutant regardless of cost (such as with 
petroleum) then tax incidence will eventually rest upon consumers since upstream costs will 
be passed on.54
 
   
The levels of elasticity can be gauged from the EAS. 
 
a. If the Pollutant has inelastic supply and elastic demand: 
Imposing the tax upstream will affect the behaviour of the Influencing Polluter.   
 
It will mean that the producer or service-provider (for example) bears the tax 
burden.  This will be the most direct means of influencing both process  and 
consumption behaviour because the producer or service-provider will have an 
incentive to alter production methods or provisions methods in order to minimise 
their tax liability, which will affect the type of product or service available on the 
market.  Consumer behaviour will then be determined by the availability of 
                                                             
54 The ultimate user may however not be the consumer, but persons dependent upon the actual consumer.  For 
instance, if the petroleum is for transport then the provisions of essential services may be affected – such as 
public transport and emergency services – which could lead to increased fares or decreased services – thus 
indirectly affecting the ultimate consumer. 
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choice, which will have been affected at an upstream level. The expected result is 
one or more of the following: 
 
i. the Pollutant good or service is replaced by 
sustainable goods or services (since there has 
been a shift in the type of good produced or 
service provided); 
ii. the Pollutant good or service becomes more 
expensive to consume than sustainable 
alternatives (since the cost of producing or 
providing rises); or 
iii. the Pollutant as a process of producing or 
providing goods or services is replaced by 
sustainable processes (since there is a shift in the 
process method of production or provision). 
 
b. If the Pollutant has elastic supply and inelastic demand: 
Imposing the tax upstream will mean final incidence will fall on consumers and 
demand will not shift significantly. 
 
 
APPLICATION TO RATIONALE 
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Given the level of control and final incidence choices, to achieve the RC, the policymaker 
should respond to the market circumstances to ascertain which Polluter is most able achieve 
it.  This is done by considering which purpose allows which level of influence as follows: 
 
a. Purpose:  Internalisation of external environmental costs; 
 
Imposing a tax upon the Polluter who stands to benefit from use of the Pollutant can 
achieve this.  Therefore the policymaker must first ascertain the party who will benefit 
and find the most appropriate circumstances below accordingly: 
 
 
Market conditions: 
Inelastic supply and elastic demand 
 
Final incidence will fall upon the Influencing Polluter.  The increased costs may decrease 
demand of the Pollutant and ensure the producer bears the environmental cost. 
 
Elastic supply and elastic demand 
 
Imposing a tax upon either party should decrease demand and consequently supply of the 
Pollutant and so final incidence should fall upon the Influencing Polluter. 
 
Inelastic supply and inelastic demand  
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Imposing a tax on either party should not reduce demand of the Pollutant and so will almost 
certainly fall upon the Direct Polluter who may be a consumer. 
 
Elastic supply and inelastic demand 
 
Imposing a tax on either party should not reduce demand of the Pollutant and so will mostly 
fall upon the Direct Polluter. 
 
b. Purpose:  The necessity of achieving a certain degree of behavioural change; 
 
Market conditions: 
Inelastic supply and elastic demand 
 
Imposing a tax on either the Direct Polluter or the Influencing Polluter will decrease demand 
for the Pollutant and so impact upon the behaviour of both the Direct and Influencing 
Polluter.   Therefore this is recommended to achieve behavioural change. 
 
Elastic supply and elastic demand 
 
Imposing a tax on either party will impact upon the behaviour of either party since the supply 
levels of the Pollutant will react to demand. 
 
Inelastic supply and inelastic demand, or, elastic supply and inelastic demand 
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Imposing a tax on either the Direct Polluter or the Influencing Polluter is not recommended 
under such circumstances since there will be no behavioural change. 
 
c. Purpose:  Utilisation of Government revenue to achieve the benefit in the 
Policy Objective(s). 
 
Market conditions: 
 
Inelastic supply and elastic demand, or, elastic supply and elastic demand 
 
Imposing a tax on the Direct Polluter will only allow short-term revenue to fund any 
Improvement(s) since use of the Pollutant will alter sharply. 
 
Elastic supply and inelastic demand, or, inelastic supply and inelastic demand 
 
The ultimate burden of a tax imposed upon either party will fall upon the Direct Polluter who 
will demand the same level of use of the Pollutant despite the price.  Revenue can be gained 
in the long-term by taxing the Direct Polluter for use of the Pollutant, and used to fund any 
Improvement(s) whilst sending out a message on the environmental Policy.  Therefore this is 
recommended for this purpose. 
 
EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
  
329  
For policy reasons certain Polluters may be exempted from tax targeting, such as the military 
for reasons of national security.55
 
  However it is still possible to influence behaviour by 
targeting those who are not included in the policy but can still have an impact.  For instance 
targeting suppliers to the military may result in the military purchasing more efficient 
equipment. 
Though the policymaker may have certain policy reasons for making exemptions, it is 
recommended that IEEP (Institute for European Environmental Policy) guidance is followed.  
This includes only allowing exemptions (to eco-taxes) which: 
• are necessary, adequate and proportional to public interests; 
• are conditional upon the beneficiary taking efficient mitigation measures; 
• use tax reductions rather than exemptions thereby not fully covering the polluter’s 
costs; and 
• last for a determined and limited time period which is reviewed periodically.56
 
 
Allowing too many exemptions or unjustified exemptions reduces the effectiveness of the 
environmental tax.57  This can be limited by implementing exemption or rebate ceilings58
                                                             
55 This does not necessarily exclude sectors such as the military from any environmental programme.  A 
Government can take direct action to shift the behaviour of public bodies within its control.  For instance, the 
USA’s National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110–81, Section 951(a) (2007), requires 
the military in future missions to reduce its impact upon climate change. 
 
though this may prevent some potentially justified public interests from being exempted in 
order that the environmental goal is reached.   Exemptions may mainly be focused upon 
whether the lower level of polluting activity will have any detrimental effects upon the 
56 IEEP et al, Reforming Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: Final Report to the European Commission’s DG 
Environment (2007) at 61. 
57 See OECD, chapter 2, n.39 at 105. 
58 As discussed in Baranzini et al, see chapter 4, .n.15 at 405. 
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economy or society.  Reasons for deserving exemptions on grounds of being within the 
public interest may therefore include choices of: 
 
• Social Utility: avoiding severe losses or securing substantial gains; 
• Humanity: avoiding an inhumane choice; 
• Social Welfare: limiting the burden on those who can least afford it where it will 
make their living conditions worse; 
• Equity: sharing the burden equally amongst similar taxpayers.  Physical or economic 
conditions may mean that some taxpayers will suffer disproportionately with the same 
levels of tax.  For example residents of the countryside may suffer unduly from higher 
fuel taxes; 
• Mobility: whilst all taxpayers should share the burden, losing those with high mobility 
to foreign jurisdictions may result in those with the least mobility having to pay more.  
Further it removes the ability of the jurisdiction to influence the environmental 
behaviour of those with high mobility. 
• Competitiveness: avoiding hindering national competitiveness by imposing greater 
burdens upon domestic businesses than those abroad.  For instance, though BTAs may 
charge tax on inefficiently produced imports, exporters may need tax refunds to 
compete in jurisdictions without the same standards. 
• Political achievability. 
 
The above choices will depend entirely upon the policy and philosophy of the jurisdiction and 
are meant only as illustrative guidance.  Furthermore, there should be sufficient taxpayers 
outside of the exemptions to be able to bear the burden without undue harm. 
53.4.5 TYPE OF TAX ON POLLUTER 
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To achieve any of the three rationales above requires taxes focused on re-pricing.  This can 
internalise the negative externalities, achieve behavioural change and bring in revenue for 
Improvements.  It is necessary therefore to re-price the Pollutants through taxation.  The 
appropriate method for re-pricing depends upon the RC and can be broken down as shown 
below.   
 
The policymaker will determine the element of the Pollutant to be affected in order to finalise 
the type of tax to be implemented.  Depending upon the requirements of the RC, an element 
of a Pollutant may be targeted by either encouraging or discouraging that element. 
 
The choice of type of tax depends upon the decisions made in the previous questions on: 
• the type of Pollutant involved;  
• where final incidence will fall; and 
• the purpose in the RC.  
 
Using those results the policymaker can find the most appropriate element to target the tax 
upon from the options below.   
 
Jurisdictional point: 
 
Note that unless non-jurisdictional issues are dealt with, the type of tax is only to be 
introduced domestically.  However if the Polluter is foreign then it will be appropriate in each 
case (unless where specified) to target that Polluter with the corresponding Improvement as 
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in 53.4.8 unless a Tax Treaty will allow the foreign Government to charge the same type of 
tax. 
 
Element of Pollutant to target: 
 
Extraction choices 
 
This includes mining or otherwise extracting any natural resource regarded as a Pollutant 
such as forestry, energy or mineral Pollutants.  For those Pollutants where extraction is to be 
discouraged the tax to be applied is an ‘extraction tax’.  This can be applicable to businesses 
or individuals. 
 
In the case of targeting an extractor this may be: 
 
• Severance tax.  This can be charged upon any taxpayer responsible for extracting 
specified natural resources regardless of whether a profit is made on this investment. 
• Specific Pollutant-related Income tax such as a logging tax, charged on any taxpayer 
who has income from extracting the Pollutant. 
• Licence fees.  This charges for the right to use the Pollutant, such as on fishing stocks. 
 
These taxes can increase the overall cost of extraction which, depending on market conditions 
determined above, may reduce demand.  Further some extractors may decide it is not worth 
the cost and cease such extraction.  The tax should be progressive in that any extraction done 
above the optimum rate is taxed at rates which increase as the level of extraction increases, so 
as to dissuade the extractor from offsetting the costs of the tax by increasing supply. 
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A further option in a price-elastic context is to increase the cost of purchasing the extracted 
Pollutants to reduce supply and thereby impact upon the extractor’s behaviour.  This can be 
done via a consumption tax or VAT (see Q.5.1.2). 
 
Process choices 
 
This is mainly applicable to businesses where the process of production or the performance of 
a service causes a Pollutant. 
 
To discourage a part of a process involving or resulting in a Pollutant: 
• A tax on the use of the Pollutant in the producing/servicing process.   
• A tax on the output levels of the Pollutant resulting from the producing/servicing 
process.  The tax base is the resulting Pollutant.  For instance, a carbon tax if the part 
of the process has high energy usage causing carbon. 
• Licence fees.  This charges for the right to use the Pollutant, such as on operators of 
fishing vessels. 
 
To encourage recycling or discourage waste: 
• Waste disposal taxes 
 
Production output choices 
 
If a product or service is regarded as a Pollutant then the level of its production or servicing 
can be affected through: 
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• An output-related tax on the final product or service 
• A consumption tax or excise tax on the product (see Purchase choices at Q.5.1.2). 
 
Purchase choices  
 
The type of tax is determined by where final incidence has been chosen to fall upon: 
 
(a) Within the jurisdiction: 
 
Private individual consumers 
• Consumption tax 
This can be in the form of a VAT or sales tax.  Business users may be able to claim a 
refund for the tax. 
 
All consumers: private individuals and business consumers 
•  Excise tax  
Charged on production or sale of goods (or services) produced within the jurisdiction.  
It can be made non-refundable to business users.   
 
Either type of consumers 
• Registration taxes 
This is payable to register a good or service for use within the jurisdiction.  It can be 
made chargeable for private consumers and/or business consumers.  For instance a 
vehicle registration tax may apply to both, whilst the registration of a polluting 
business asset will apply to only business users. 
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• Feebate: this charges a fee on purchases of Pollutant goods or services to subsidise 
sustainable alternatives (Improvements). 
 
(b) Outside the jurisdiction 
Any of (a) plus: 
• Customs duty, tariff or BTA59
This is chargeable on importers of goods containing or made using Pollutants so that 
imports are treated equally to domestically produced goods for tax purposes. 
 
It is designed to protect the competitiveness of local businesses which could be 
harmed if national tax costs and standards are set above those of imports.  This is 
done by reflecting the charge for the tax types on domestic consumers shown above; 
for instance the equivalent of excise taxes can be charged on imported goods to the 
level that those goods are not taxed to the same extent in their country of origin.  This 
will make the imported goods taxed as if they were domestically produced goods. 
 
Use or activity choices 
 
Mainly applicable to private individuals, the use of or activity involving a Pollutant can be 
affected by: 
 
To discourage access to a protected area 
• Toll 
A charge for each use can discourage usage, such as a charge for access to a conserved area, 
or a congestion charge. 
                                                             
59 See chapter 8. 
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To discourage use or activity of a Pollutant 
• Licence fees 
The end-user bears the cost, such as on fishing in an area. 
 
To encourage recycling or reduce waste: 
• Waste disposal taxes 
 
To increase the price of the usage or activity 
• User fees: A tax on the Pollutant resulting from the usage or activity factors in the 
cost of usage.  For instance increased fuel costs can reduce overuse of heating.   
 
Improvement choices 
To encourage Improvements on land 
 
• Site value taxes.  These can be measured on the unimproved value of land or plant. 
 
To encourage Research and Design / Innovation 
 
• Tax overall technologies or services mostly related with causing the Pollutant. 
For instance high-energy use computers can be taxed. 
 
To encourage replacement of technology  
• Tax overall technologies or services mostly related with causing the Pollutant. 
For instance high-energy use computers can be taxed. 
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Investment choices 
 
To discourage investments and entrepreneurship that will enable the growth of Pollutants 
‘Enable’ is used here rather than ‘cause’, in order to include investment activities which have 
the potential to cause growth of Pollutants, rather than only those currently causing such 
growth.  By being proactive rather than reactive, financial activities which have the potential 
to cause growth in Pollutants can be discouraged at the planning stage, so that the cost of 
causing Pollutants becomes a factor in deciding whether a project is viable and thus the cost 
of causing the Pollutants is internalised.  The EC Nitrates Directive works in a similar 
precautionary fashion, by attempting to mitigate harm from the outset rather than coming into 
operation only after the harm has materialised.60
 
 
This proactive response can be achieved by categorising certain types of business activities as 
Pollutant activities.  For example, if coal combustion was classed as a Pollutant, and a 
company sought investment to build a coal-fired power station, then potential investors 
would be dissuaded from investing due to higher levels of taxation being charged upon either 
their investment, or the business’ profits.  The decreased profitability of such a venture could 
cause its attractiveness to be lost compared to alternative investment opportunities, or could 
simply ensure that such activities only go ahead if they are able to internalise Pollutant costs. 
 
Personal 
• Investment and savings tax on investment in Pollutant-categorised businesses. 
                                                              
60 Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12/12/1991 (OJ L135 30.5.91) concerning the protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources. 
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Business 
• Corporate taxes – corporation taxes on investment in Pollutant-categorised businesses 
• Income taxes on enterprises encouraging the growth of Pollutants. 
 
 
Funding Improvements only 
 
Broad-based taxes can ensure regular income.  The primary option is to consider taxes on 
Pollutants as above, and options to tax non-environmental issues go against the polluter pays 
principle but may be necessary to raise funds to pay for an Improvement.  These can be in the 
form of non-environmental taxes on bases such as: 
- Consumption tax 
- Tax for use of local services 
- Income tax 
- Corporation tax 
- Poll tax 
- Property tax 
- Capital gains tax 
- Inheritance tax 
- Transfer tax 
- Wealth tax. 
 
In order to avoid harming industry or individuals, ensuring any non-environmental tax base is 
as broad as possible can spread the cost of funding the Improvement.  For example having a 
nominal fee on certain goods or services which would not significantly affect demand or 
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supply can achieve this.  This may not however be suitable for every economy, and in 
particular DCs may find this more harmful than positive and may need to focus on narrower 
tax bases. 61
 
  
53.4.6 RATE OF TAX 
 
Once the tax base has been decided upon, the required rate of tax can be determined.  At 
Chapter 5 is shown that the requisite level is where the damaging activity (the Pollutant) is 
limited to “a level where the marginal (private and social) costs of the environmental impacts 
are equal to the marginal benefits derived from undertaking the activities which cause 
them.”62
 
  Therefore whether the tax is set at a high or low rate will depend upon the costs 
involved.   
However in the Model the purpose is to achieve the RC, so the tax rate must instead be set at 
such a level to do this.  Since the RC is based upon a rationale, the following will be 
applicable to Milne’s assertions: 63
 
 
Rationale of RC:64
 
  
a. Internalisation of external environmental costs; 
 
The rate is determined by the external costs.  From the EAS the costs (at 52.9) of any 
Pollutant for which the Polluter is responsible for can be reflected in the tax rate.  This should                                                              
61 The World Bank argues against broad VAT systems in DCs.  See Whalley, chapter 1, n.3, at 121. 
62 HM Treasury, see chapter 4, n.38 at 20, para.5.19. 
63 Milne, see chapter 8, n.25, at 5. 
64 Again these are not mutually exclusive. 
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ensure final incidence falls upon the required Polluter.  The revenue may be utilised to fund 
Improvements to achieve the RC. 
 
b. The necessity of achieving a certain degree of behavioural change; 
 
The rate will be determined by the level necessary to achieve the RC.   
 
Where there are both Pollutants and Improvements to be affected, the rate will be set at such 
a level as will reduce the Pollutants to the required level and use the revenue to fund the 
Improvements.   
 
Where there are only Pollutants the rate will be set to reduce these to the level in the RC. 
Where there are only Improvements, (c) below applies. 
 
c. Utilisation of Government revenue to achieve the benefit in the Policy 
Objective(s). 
 
Since the purpose is to gain revenue to apply to any Improvement(s), the rate is determined as 
follows: 
Tax revenue = tax base x tax rate65
Therefore tax rate = tax revenue ÷ tax base 
 
As a result, the revenue required to fund the Improvement should be divided by the tax base 
to determine the tax rate. 
 
                                                             
65 Milne, see chapter 8, n.25, at 6. 
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If the tax base is a non-environmental issue and is not on another negative externality, it 
should ideally be a low tax on as broad a tax base as possible in order to minimise its impact. 
 
Educational and advertising costs should also be factored into all tax rates. 
 
THEME  
 
However as the theme is to ensure the Polluter pays and the Improver is rewarded, the tax 
rate should be set to re-price, in order to: 
a. Make polluting undesirable, and 
b. Provide an incentive to improve.   
 
Where possible the rate of tax should be ad valorem based not upon the market value, but on 
the quantity of Pollutants, so that it reflects the environmental cost of the Pollutant – as with 
an excise tax.  This will not always be possible.   
 
IMPROVEMENTS 
 
Improvements may reduce the level of revenue brought in.  The rate should be set to take 
account of this depending upon the rationale of the RC. For instance, tax deductions may 
reduce the amount of revenue brought in.  If the purpose is to change behaviour, even 
deductions to make net tax revenue reach zero may be acceptable given that the RC is 
achieved.  However zero net revenue may not be acceptable if the purpose is to gain revenue 
to use on Improvements. 
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GRADUAL INCREASE AND LONG-TERM MESSAGE 
 
If the Pollutant is a long-term issue then the tax rate can be set to send a long-term message to 
provide certainty about where it is going.  Duff cites the example in British Columbia where 
a CO2 emissions tax was set at a low rate with increasing rates over five years.  This was 
designed both to allow businesses time to readjust and to respect decisions made before the 
introduction of the tax, whilst providing certainty over five years that the tax would stay in 
place and continue to increase, thereby encouraging consistent behavioural change.66
 
 
INCOME LEVELS 
 
The extent to which the Polluter can be influenced depends partly upon income levels and it 
is important that the tax rate will be set at a rate where it can have the required behavioural 
impact upon the Polluter or a sufficient number of Polluters to achieve the RC.  If the rate is 
set too low considering the Polluter’s income then there may be minimal behavioural change 
since the tax may be too insignificant to warrant a behavioural change.67
 
  However if the tax 
rate is set too high there may be significant negative side-effects.  Taxing those with little 
economic power or those below the poverty line may have only negative side-effects and so 
using an incentive to Improve may have a greater overall effect.  However such members of 
society should be not excused from the disincentive to pollute. 
                                                             
66 Duff DG, ‘Carbon Taxes in British Columbia’ (2008) 10 VJEL.. 1, 87-103, at 96. 
67A standard rate or percentile rate may not suffice depending upon the varying incomes of the taxpayers.  For 
example in 2009, the top 1% of US taxpayers paid more in taxes than the bottom 95%:  ‘Tax Foundation, 
Income Tax Payment of Top 1% of Filers Exceeds that of Bottom 95%’ 30/7/2009 
<http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/24953.html> Accessed 1/10/2009. 
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Depending upon the differing income groups and the corresponding ability to influence them, 
it may be appropriate to set a progressive tax rate, so that the rate increases as the quantity of 
use of the Pollutant increases.  The justification for doing this rather than having a uniform 
rate, would be so that minimal Polluters and those in low-income groups would only bear a 
relatively small burden which could be set to be sufficiently affordable to prevent suffering, 
yet noticeable enough to encourage behavioural change.  Heavy Polluters, who may be 
industrial or in high-income groups, may be able to more easily afford a uniform rate, paid at 
the same rate as those on low-incomes.  Therefore to provide a greater disincentive for heavy 
Polluters to change their behaviour, a progressive rate could be set which could, at least, 
encourage such Polluters to make Improvements so that their tax rate falls below a threshold 
which charges a lesser rate of tax. 
 
MOBILITY OF TAXPAYER 
 
Whilst there are means of ensuring that imports of foreign Pollutants are taxed to the same 
standard as domestically produced Pollutants, it is still the case that domestic taxpayers may 
leave the jurisdiction if the tax rate is too high.  Immobile tax bases are the least able to move 
abroad and this is less of a concern.  However it is often the case that the most mobile 
taxpayers are those with the highest incomes and this tax base may be lost to another 
jurisdiction with lower taxes.68
 
  This includes both businesses and individuals, who may 
continue to utilise the Pollutant but pay less tax.  However it will be necessary to include 
them in the tax programme therefore it may be possible to utilise Improvement incentives to 
do this, so that the RC can still be achieved.  
                                                             
68 See Bhagwati JN, Income Taxation and International Mobility (USA: MIT; 1989). 
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CAP-AND-TRADE OR REGULATIONS 
 
If there are any regulations or a cap-and-trade system in place, the rate should be set to 
achieve the excess – that over and above what the regulations or cap-and-trade systems do 
not aim to achieve.  This will prevent any double taxation whilst serving the purpose of 
achieving the RC.  Therefore the tax rate may need to be zero-rated until the excess amount is 
targeted.  If the regulations or cap-and-trade only apply to certain Polluters or on certain 
Pollutants, and taxing them would cause unnecessary double-taxation in achieving the RC, 
then those Polluters or Pollutants may be exempted from the tax which would then only apply 
where the former do not apply. 
 
CONTINUING CHANGE 
 
The rate may need to be flexible in order that it continually changes to adapt to any necessary 
changes in the RC which may be amended if the Policy is altered.  For example the rate may 
be set to increase over time in order to continue sending out the correct message, and to be 
imposed on previously exempted products so that any potential rebound effect is countered. 
 
53.4.7 WHICH IMPROVER(S) WILL BE TARGETED? 
 
If 54.4.3.1.1 results in a target of one or more Improvements it is necessary to ascertain which 
Improver(s) will be targeted, if any.  If there is only one Improver then move onto 53.4.8. 
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53.4.7.1.1 For each Improvement, the policymaker must consider the list of Improvers to 
ascertain the types of Improvers to be included.  This should be the 
Improvers(s) most able to alter their behaviour in such ways that the RC can 
be achieved.   
 
This will depend upon where an incentive could have most effect in achieving the 
environmental goal stated in the RC, which requires an economic and practical analysis.  It 
may be that the tax revenue should be aimed at one party in order to influence another party.  
For instance it could fall on consumers in order to affect their consumption choice which in 
turn may influence producers to change the products they produce.  Alternatively it could be 
on producers in order that they produce different products which can affect consumer choice. 
In the example in 53.4.4 an incentive aimed at installing individual energy meters in 
apartments could work by aiming the incentive at the property owner. 
 
The process of identifying the appropriate Improver to target will mimic the system in 53.4.4 
so that there will be a “Direct Improver” and an “Influencing Improver” and the same points 
apply to these Improvers as apply to Polluters.  The purpose of finding the appropriate 
Improver is so the tax incentive can target the Improver where the incentive to achieve 
Improvements can have the most impact. 
 
The practical and economic analysis to determine the level of control of Direct Improvers and 
Influencing Improvers will apply the same logic as in 53.4.4.1.1.  Goldstein considers the 
example of encouraging the installation of energy meters in residential flats to reduce wasted 
heating.69
                                                             
69 Goldstein DB, ‘Energy Efficiency in the Building Sector’ in UNEP, see chapter 5, n.3, pp.63-85, at 74. 
  If the building is master-metered and the owner pays the bill then targeting the 
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owner to install meters would work efficiently since the owner would make cost savings.  
However if each flat has its own meter then targeting the owner will not work as efficiently 
since the owner will have to bear the cost of installing the meters whilst the residents will 
benefit from lower heating bills.  Alternatively, each tenant may be obliged to pay a service 
charge which varies as necessary to meet all of the landlord’s obligations, which could mean 
that targeting the landlord would then become more effective.  Hence it will depend upon the 
specific factual circumstances at the time of applying the Model relating to the levels of 
control over Improvements.  
 
The level of influence may be determined by analysis of the existing relationships between 
the Direct and Influencing Polluter.  An example provided by UNEP is the relationship 
between utility companies and their customers.70
53.4.8  WHAT KIND OF INCENTIVES WILL BE USED? 
  A utility company’s existing arrangements 
with customers mean it would be the most influential in offering incentive programmes to 
customers to promote energy savings and/or efficiency.  If the reality is that the utility 
company are unlikely to sponsor such a programme since it would reduce its profits, then this 
makes the utility company the most appropriate to target with incentives since it would be 
most able to achieve the Improvement.  Such analysis is therefore important to establish the 
Polluter with the most control and the most potential influence. 
 
As well as any incentive to reduce Pollutant levels which therefore can create an 
Improvement, tax incentives can also be used to reward Improvements.  The type to be used 
depends upon a range of factors as explored in the questions below.   
                                                              
70 Ibid, pp.63-85. 
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Where possible, incentives should relate to the tax to which the Pollutant relates so that the 
Improver can see a direct connection.  If a tax is created through the Pollutant tax, the 
incentives can be to reduce that level of tax.  For instance this is the case with VED where 
there is total or partial exemptions from the full amount for energy efficient vehicles (see 
Chapter 3).  Where there is already a tax system in place, it may be possible to reform this 
system in order to relate it to the Pollutant and Improvement, as was seen with the reform of 
UK road Tax.   Alternatively where there are feebates in place the fees will subsidise the 
rebates to incentivise the Improvement.  However where there is no Pollutant tax to reduce, 
the incentive must be aimed at alternative taxes such as income tax, to provide a benefit. 
 
Identify the Improver most able to carry out the Improvement. 
Q1. Is the Improver based within the jurisdiction?71
 Yes: Go to Q.3 
 
 No: Continue to Q2. 
Q.2 Is the Foreign Improver a Direct or Influencing Improver? 
 Direct:  
Q.2(a): Is there an Influencing Improver more appropriate to target? 
o No: Go to Q.6 
o Yes: go to Q.2(b) 
 Influencing:  
Q.2(b) Is the Influencing Improver based within the jurisdiction? 
o Yes: Go to Q.4 
o No:  Go to Q.6 
Q.3 Is the Domestic Improver a Direct or Influencing Improver?                                                              
71 If the Improver is multi-jurisdictional but has an entity within the jurisdiction of sufficient size in order to 
influence the Improvement, then it can be classed as being within the jurisdiction. 
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 Direct:  
Q.3(a): Is there an Influencing Improver more appropriate to target? 
o No: Go to Q.4 
o Yes: go to Q.3(b) 
 Influencing:  
Q.3(b) Is the Influencing Improver based within the jurisdiction? 
o Yes: Go to Q.4 
o No: Go to Q.6 
Q.4 Based upon the Domestic Improver’s level of income (gauged from the EAS), would 
a tax incentive be sufficient to affect the Improver’s behaviour?72
 No: An explicit subsidy through earmarked revenues is necessary. Refer to part (b) in 
the appropriate answer to Q.5 
 
 Yes: Refer first to part (a) in the appropriate answer to Q.5 
 
Q.5 Which decision type(s) of the Improver most directly impacts upon achieving the 
required Improvement?  Select and determine the appropriate incentive to achieve the 
RC Improvement target based upon the details provided within.   
 
Q.5.1.1 Extraction choices 
 
Causing the optimum extraction level qualifies as the required Improvement. 
 
Private individuals
 
:  
                                                             
72 For example a farmer who makes a negligible sum of taxable profit may not be motivated by the chance to 
reclaim part of this.   The policy-maker must analyse the Improver’s income levels versus the required effort to 
reclaim part of their taxation. 
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a. Is the Improver being charged a related Pollutant tax? 
 
 Yes: The incentive provides full or partial exemption from Pollutant tax dependent 
upon the extent to which the optimum extraction level was met.   
 No: Personal income tax credit dependent upon the extent to which the optimum 
extraction level was met.   
 
b. Cash grant for individual dependent upon the extent to which the optimum 
extraction level was met.73
 
   
a. Is the Improver being charged a related Pollutant tax? 
Business 
 Yes: Full or partial exemption from Pollutant tax dependant upon the extent to which 
the optimum extraction level was met.   
 No: Income tax credit or corporate tax credit (as appropriate) dependant upon the 
extent to which the optimum extraction level was met.   
 
b. Cash grant or investment dependant upon the extent to which the optimum 
extraction level was met and which is most suitable. 
 
 
Q.5.1.2 Purchase choices 
 
a. Is there a registration tax related to the Pollutant? 
                                                             
73 For instructions on how to use part (b) of each question, see Q.4. 
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 Yes: Offer reduced rates from the registration tax for Improvements with the 
possibility of zero-rating the best Improvement. 
 No: What type of consumer is it? 
 
 
Private individual consumers 
a. Is there a related Pollutant tax on consumption? 
 
 Yes: The type of incentive depends upon the level of revenue gained from the 
Pollutant tax and the economic circumstances related to the Improver and 
Improvement.   Select  from the most appropriate option: 
o Introduce a feebate system; or 
o Offer lower rates of sales or service tax / VAT / other duty for Improvements, 
funded by corresponding higher rates for Pollutants. 
 
For instance APD could be reduced for passengers of the most-efficient 
aircraft. 
 
 No: Is there an existing tax with which the consumption of the Improvement can 
relate?   
o Yes: Reduce the tax rate (or offer exemption) for the consumption of the 
Improvement to an extent that will create the appropriate economic incentive. 
 
For instance if the consumption of an efficient TV is regarded as an 
Improvement, the TV licence fee could be reduced.  Even though the current 
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tax is not a Pollutant tax, the fact they are in the same category allows a 
corresponding incentive and message to be sent.  Similarly property tax could 
be reduced for consumption of Improvements related to the home. 
 
b.  
o No: Can the consumer afford the consumption of the Improvement?  
 Yes: Offer income tax credits following consumption. 
 No: Would a reduced consumption price allow the Improver to afford 
the consumption of the Improvement? 
• Yes: Use tax subsidies focused on reducing the production or 
selling cost of Improvement. 
• No: Offer free Improvement. 
 
 
Business consumers 
a. Is there a related Pollutant tax on consumption? 
 
 Yes: The type of incentive depends upon the level of revenue gained from the 
Pollutant tax and the economic circumstances related to the Improver and 
Improvement.   Select  from the most appropriate option: 
o Introduce a feebate system; or 
o Offer rebate or lower duty of sales or service tax / VAT / other duty for 
Improvements. 
 No: Does the Improver have sufficient taxable profits to afford the consumption of 
the Improvement? 
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o Yes: Offer accelerated depreciation for Improvement plant or technology. 
b. 
o No: Would a reduced consumption price allow the Improver to afford the 
consumption of the Improvement? 
 Yes: Reduce price of Improvement consumption by offering tax 
subsidies to producers or sellers. 
 No: Offer grant for purchase. 
 
Q.5.1.3 Process choices 
 
Applying primarily to business, the Improvement is the improved part or whole of the 
process of production or provision of a service. 
 
a. Is the Improver being charged a related Pollutant tax? 
 Yes: Offer rebate or refund from that tax to reflect the Improvement cost.  This may 
be in the form of a Pollutant tax credit. 
For example, refundable fees from waste disposal taxes OR rebate for installation of 
windmill to improve energy efficiency.  A Pollution tax credit may be in the form a 
recycling credit.74
Is the Improver being charged an end-of-pipe tax or output tax? (such as a 
production tax) 
 
o Yes: Offer production tax credits for implementing desired Improvement 
process 
o No: Offer income tax credits for implementing desired Improvement process                                                              
74 See ‘Recycling Credits in the UK: Economic Incentives for Recycling Household Waste’ in IISD, see chapter 
7, n.13 at 42-43. 
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  No: Does the Improver have sufficient taxable profits to afford the consumption of 
the Improvement? 
o Yes: Offer production tax credits for implementing desired Improvement 
process and/or offer accelerated depreciation for Improvement plant or 
technology. 
b. 
o No: would reduced consumption cost lead to Improvement in process? 
 Yes: Is there a VAT or sales or service tax? 
• Yes: Zero-rate VAT or sales or service tax 
• No: Reduce consumption price through consumption-focused 
tax subsidies where appropriate.  If not appropriate, see below: 
 No: Offer investment or grant to fund new processes. 
 
Q.5.1.4 Production output choices 
 
Applying primarily to business, the Improvement refers to achieving the optimum production 
output of certain goods or provision of certain services.  In this context the terms ‘producer’ 
and ‘production’ may be used to cover service provision meanings also.  For example this 
could be to increase production of more efficient goods at the expense of less efficient 
Pollutant goods.  Alternatively it may be to reduce the provision of certain services to a 
sustainable level.  The desired good or service is referred to as the ‘Improvement Good’ or 
‘Improvement Service’ as opposed to the ‘Pollutant Good’ or the ‘Pollutant Service’. 
 
a. Is the producer subject to production taxes? 
 Yes: offer production tax credits for achieving Improvement. 
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 No: Does the Improver have sufficient taxable profits to afford to achieve the 
Improvement? 
o Yes: Are there any related Pollutant taxes? 
 Yes: Offer tax rebates to reflect the cost of achieving Improvements. 
 No: Offer reduced income or corporate tax for achieving 
Improvements. 
b.  
o No: Would reduced costs of achieving the Improvement allow the Improver to 
achieve the Improvement? 
 Yes: Subsidise costs through exempting Improvement costs from sales 
taxes / VAT. 
 No: Offer grant or investment to fund Improvement costs. 
 
Q.5.1.5 Use or activity choices 
 
In this context the Improvement occurs when the Improver partakes in an activity regarded as 
an Improvement or uses an Improvement as opposed to a Pollutant.  For instance, an 
Improvement activity for an individual could be taking public transport over a private car or 
exterminating an animal regarded as a pet. 
 
 
Individuals 
a. Does the Improver have a sufficient taxable income to make a tax incentive 
worthwhile? 
 Yes: Offer a personal tax credit. 
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 No: Can the Improver afford to carry out the Improvement? 
 
o Yes: Would a reduced cost encourage the Improver to carry out the 
Improvement? 
 Yes: subsidise cost by focusing tax subsidies on the main Improvement 
costs.  This can be via the Influencing Improver. 
 For example a bus service operator can reduce their tax through 
targeted tax subsidies.   
b. 
 No: Offer a cash payment / grant / award 
 
o No:  Offer a cash payment / grant / award 
 
 
Businesses 
a. Does the Improver have a sufficient taxable income to make a tax incentive 
worthwhile? 
 Yes: Allow taxes to be deferred or reduce business taxes such as payroll taxes. 
 No: Can the Improver afford to carry out the Improvement? 
o Yes: Would a reduced cost encourage the Improver to carry out the 
Improvement? 
b.  
 Yes: offer partial grant or low interest loan 
 No: Offer a business grant to help carry out the Improvement. 
o No: Offer a business grant to help carry out the Improvement. 
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Q.5.1.6 Improvement choices 
 
Improvement choices relate to decisions such as to replace technology, upgrade property, 
plant or equipment, carry out research into improvements and install new devices. 
 
 
Individuals  
a. Would a tax deduction encourage the Improver to carry out the Improvement? 
 Yes: Is the Improvement within the home? 
For instance the installation of energy savings devices  
o Yes: offer property tax deduction / energy tax credit where appropriate 
o No: local tax credit OR income tax credit if no local tax 
b.  
 No: Offer grant to fund or achieve Improvement 
 
 
Businesses 
a. Is the Improver being charged a related Pollutant tax? 
 Yes: Would a tax incentive encourage the Improver to carry out the Improvement? 
o Yes: offer tax rebate for cost of carrying out the Improvement and reduced 
overall Pollutant tax.  This may be available through accelerated depreciation 
or deferred tax payments, where the Pollutant is the unimproved site. 
For example a site valuation tax rebate followed by deferred site valuation 
fees. 
  
357  
 
o No: Answer next question. 
 
 No: Would a tax incentive encourage the Improver to carry out the Improvement? 
o Yes: offer tax credit related to alternative Improver tax (such as corporate tax) 
o No: would reduced costs of achieving the Improvement encourage the 
Improver to carry out the Improvement? 
 Yes: Subsidise the cost by reducing any purchase or installation taxes 
and/or offering grant or low interest loan  
 
Investment choices 
 
In this context a qualifying Improvement would be to invest either directly or indirectly in 
such a way that the RC can be achieved.  Indirect investment refers to one party investing in 
the business of another party, whilst direct investment refers to one party investing in its own 
business such as for R&D. 
 
a. Would a tax incentive encourage the Improver to carry out the Improvement? 
 Yes:  Is the investment a direct or indirect investment? 
o Direct: Offer tax credits for expenditures on R&D or other investment 
regarded as an Improvement.  Also possible to offer tax deferrals for 
enterprises promoting Improvement. 
o Indirect: Qualifying investments can be investments or enterprises which 
enable the Improvements to be carried out.  Tax rates for qualifying 
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investments can be reduced, or investment tax credits for qualifying 
investments can be offered. 
b.  
  No: Offer direct investment in Improvement enterprise. 
 
Q6. Non-jurisdictional Improver 
 
a. Is it possible to provide a tax incentive to the Improver via a Tax Treaty with the outside 
jurisdiction?75
 Yes: conclude Tax Treaty arrangements and offer appropriate incentive to Improver 
as in Q.5 via Improver’s Government 
 
 No: select an appropriate non-tax incentive to offer based upon the circumstances 
from: 
o Direct investment 
o Interest free or low-interest loan 
o Grant 
o Foreign aid 
 
53.4.9 RATES OF INCENTIVES 
 
The rate of incentive must be offered to such an extent that the RC can be achieved and 
therefore depend upon the financial capacity of the taxpayer and market conditions.  The rate 
can be altered as the policy changes, so that if a relevant Policy Objective is achieved and a 
                                                             
75 Whether it is possible is based upon whether any present treaty allows this or whether one can feasibly be 
concluded. 
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new RC is set, the rate can be fixed at such a level that can push for further change.  
Alternatively if the RC is not met the rate may be altered to achieve it. 
 
As an example, the DfT considered it necessary to offer a high level of subsidy to consumers 
of ultra-low carbon vehicles, in order to achieve the desired mass market sales of them.  It 
was proposed that subsidies of between GBP £2,000-£5,000 would be necessary to 
incentivise this consumption change.76  An example of a system where the incentive is for an 
exemption from the related tax is in Sweden.  Environmental tax rates are set at high rates, 
though available exemptions from such taxes provide incentives to meet environmental 
targets through improvements.77
 
  From an environmental perspective it would seem prudent 
to have rates that can adapt according to the objective at any one time. 
53.4.10 WIDER FISCAL POLICY 
 
 
Prior to imposing any tax and incentive policy, it must be determined that no taxes or 
expenditures will conflict with the Model’s solutions.  Unless such matters are removed, the 
Model should not be imposed. 
 
For instance, State expenditure such as that incurred for the car scrappage scheme to 
encourage the purchase of new ‘clean’ cars could be countered in Denmark by competing tax 
policies.  Danish registration taxes for imported vehicles (“registreringsafgift på 
                                                             
76 See n.14 at 9. 
77 EC, see chapter 7, n.44, at 36; Sterner T, ‘Environmental Tax Reform: The Swedish Experience’ (1994) 4 
Environmental Policy and Governance 6, 20-25. 
  
360  
motorkøretøj”) ranges from 105-180% of dutiable value;78
 
 a considerable disincentive to 
purchase an imported vehicle, unless exemptions for clean vehicles apply. 
53.4.11 CAN NON-TAX METHODS SATISFACTORILY ACHIEVE THE POLICY MORE 
EFFICIENTLY THAN THE ABOVE? 
 
 
The Policy may be best achieved, not by any tax solution, but by regulatory changes or other 
perhaps radical alternatives, such as Hughes suggested changes to investment rules to 
incentivise investments.79
 
  But this final question would involve a further examination of 
methods such as regulation and/or trading schemes which would require examination beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
54.WORKED EXAMPLE 
 
54.1 HYPOTHETICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The following worked example is a hypothetical situation where a coal power plant in 
Amsterdam is damaging the local air quality.  This is the only environmental issue at hand in 
this scenario as the combustion of coal is not known here to cause other environmental 
problems.  The answers deliberately simplify what in reality would require much detail. 
EP:   Air Quality in Amsterdam is causing serious harm to local residents.  
EAS 
                                                             
78 See <http://www.skm.dk/foreign/english/taxindenmark2008/6649/>  Accessed 6/5/2010. 
79 Hughes H, ‘Enabling Investment in Environmental Sustainability’ (2010) 85 Ind.L.J. 2, 597-651. 
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CF(s):  SO2 (Sulphur Dioxide) emissions are the sole contributing factor to the EP. 
Pollutant(s):  Coal combustion within Amsterdam causes 100% of the SO2 emissions. 
Polluter(s):  Causers of coal combustion due to power station:  
a. A local coal mining company provides coal to a coal power station. 
b. A coal power plant in Amsterdam combusts the coal and emits the SO2. 
c. An energy company buys the electricity produced by the coal power plant 
in Amsterdam and sells it to consumers in Amsterdam. 
d. Consumers in Amsterdam buy electricity that is produced solely through 
coal. 
Improvement(s):  
a.  Chimneys at the coal power plant could be replaced with improved 
technology which reduces the level of SO2 emissions. 
b.  Less coal could be combusted. 
Improver(s):   
a. The owners of the power plant could implement the new technology. 
b. Consumers could demand less electricity resulting in less coal being 
combusted. 
Elasticity of demand:  
a. Coal demand is inelastic so raising the price of coal will not reduce demand. 
b. Lower costs of new chimneys would not significantly increase demand 
under present market conditions.    
Income levels:  
a. Mining company reported modest profits last year. 
b.  Power plant turned a small profit last year. 
c.  Energy company is running at a loss. 
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d. Consumers in Amsterdam are generally on low-to-middle incomes. 
 
Costs: The short-term costs of medical treatment for residents was relatively small, however 
the long-term costs were substantial and would continue to rise sharply.  A reduction in SO2 
emissions below a level causing serious harm to residents would see significantly reduced 
medical costs in the long-term.  The Polluters benefit by not internalising this negative 
externality, leading to lower electricity costs and coal costs than if there was internalisation.  
The coal power station and the mining plant both employ many local residents which is 
regarded as socially beneficial. 
 
The costs of carrying out the EAS falls below the cost of the perceived Threat. 
 
Policy: to restore Air Quality in Amsterdam to levels of only minor harm. 
Application to Model: 
Policy Objective(s): to reduce levels of SO2 emissions by 75%. 
Free market achievement? Achieving the policy objectives without Government 
intervention would cost any Polluter – as such there is no financial incentive to do so. 
Method of achieving Policy Objectives: 
Pollutant: There is only one Pollutant which will be targeted.  Currently this is not subject to 
tax. 
Improvement: Demand for electricity cannot be reduced due to inelasticity.  The sole 
Improvement will be to implement new technology. 
Required Change: The level of change required is to firstly internalise the external costs of 
the SO2, and to achieve a degree of behavioural change in causing the Improvement. 
There are no subsidies which could distort any incentives. 
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Which Polluter will be targeted:  
The only Direct Polluter is the power plant.  The other Polluters are Influencing Polluters.  
Targeting an Influencing Polluter may have some impact, but an economic analysis 
considering elasticity suggests that targeting the Direct Polluter can achieve the Policy 
Objectives at the least cost.  The Influencing Polluters have little other option but to supply to 
or consume from the Direct Polluter.  It would cause less harm to the business of the Direct 
Polluter to change the chimneys than for the Influencing Polluters to offer incentives to the 
Direct Polluter to change the chimneys. The Direct Polluter is most able to offer an 
alternative to the Pollutant. 
No other relevant considerations. 
Type of tax 
An emissions tax placed upon the SO2 emissions was considered but rejected as the 
inelasticity of demand from consumers would mean that the tax would simply be passed on 
and no change would occur.  The most effective means of ensuring that the power plant 
owners would bear the burden would be via a corporation tax surcharge for the externality.   
This surcharge could be reduced to zero if the chimneys are replaced to meet the RC.  The 
power plant business can depreciate the cost of the replacement at a higher rate in the first 
three years in order to reduce taxable earnings and recoup the cost. 
Therefore the tax system is revenue-neutral. 
The rate of tax is set at between 1% and 5% depending upon the quantity of SO2 emissions, 
in order to have a noticeable impact upon the factory owners.  This is reviewed annually, and 
will rise each year that the RC is not met. 
 
This outcome should ensure that the RC is met in the most economical manner with a fair 
incidence targeting the taxpayer most able to achieve the RC. 
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54.2 EXAMPLE IN PRACTICE: MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
COUNCIL, MARYLAND 
 
An example of a local level implementation not dissimilar to the Universal Model took place 
in the US State of Maryland, where a local county council, Montgomery, introduced a Bill 
implementing a carbon excise tax on major emitters of CO2.80  The processes involved in 
implementation were performed in a similar fashion to the Universal Model and work as a 
practical example of how legislature can introduce a tax.  By going through the stages of the 
Montgomery Bill in terms of the Model, it is possible to understand in practice how a 
policymaker can evaluate the introduction of a tax. 
EP:  The Bill cites US EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) evidence which 
recognises that “greenhouse gases in the atmosphere endanger both the public 
health and the environment for current and future generations.”
EAS 
81
This EP therefore is the cited danger to health and environment. 
 
CF(s):  Based on the same clause, GhGs would be the contributing factor to the EP. 
Pollutant(s):  A perhaps oversimplified justification of only taxing CO2 as a contributor to 
GhGs, simply points out that “Carbon Dioxide is a greenhouse gas.”82
Polluter(s):  Causers of coal combustion due to power station:  
  CO2 in 
the County would therefore be the only Pollutant. 
                                                             
80 Montgomery County Code, Chapter 52, Taxation Article XIII, Excise Tax on Major Emitters of Carbon 
Dioxide, Sections 52-95 through 52-99, Bill No. 29-10 of 19/5/2010. 
81 Ibid, Article XIII, ss.52-95. Finding (a). 
82 Bill 29-10E, Introduction Packet 4/27/10, Circle No.7, Carbon Tax fact, ‘A Carbon Tax for Montgomery 
County’. 
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 The County uses EPA evidence to identify that a local coal power plant, the 
Mirant Dickerson Plant, causes 25% of CO2 emissions in the county.  The 
remaining 75% comes from other sources in the County.83
Improvement(s):  
 
a. Reduced emissions from the coal power plant.84
b. The Bill’s preamble names “GhG reduction programs” as the intended 
improvements, but is not specific about which programs.
 
85  The Improvements 
are listed in a supporting document to the introduction of the Bill as including 
the “Home Energy Loan Program, Clean Energy Rewards, and transit.”86  The 
Bill states that 50% of revenues must be utilised for GhG reduction programs 
including mass transit.87
 
 
Improver(s):   
a. The Mirant Dickerson Plant would be able to reduce its emissions. 
b. The Councils’ Finance Department at the Department of Environmental 
Protection is listed as responsible for coordinators.88
Elasticity of demand:  
  This department 
would be responsible for the GhG reduction programs apart from the 
reduced emissions in the power plant. 
The proposed tax is not expected to be passed on to ratepayers since the 
electricity produced is sold at an auction.  A supplementary report identifies                                                              
83 Bill 29-10E, Public Hearing Packet 5/18/10, No.18, ‘Mirant Dickerson Plant Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
(CO2)’. 
84 As an emissions-based tax, the intended Improvement is designed to reduce emissions.  Bill 29-10E, Action 
Packet 5/19/10, Circle No.6, ‘Memo from lead sponsor’, states the tax would “incentivize Mirant to reduce its 
emissions.” 
85 Preamble, para.1. 
86 See n.83. 
87 See n.81, Article XIII, ss.52-59. 
88 See n.83, Circle No.5, Legislative Request Report. 
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that if the power plant’s cost of selling electricity “is not competitive, it will 
not be purchased; and Mirant does not have enough ‘market power’ to raise 
the price of power unilaterally.”89
Income levels:  
  Therefore the tax is expected to have an 
impact directly upon costs at the power plant rather than being passed on, 
which should allow the tax to be targeted effectively. 
a. Mirant, the company owning the power plant, is noted as having USD $2 
billion in cash and power plants. 90
b. The Council reported an operating loss of USD $1 billion.
 
91
 
 
Costs: Significant health and environmental costs have been reported by the EPA but are not 
specific to the County.92
 
  Without internalising environmental costs, they fall below the true 
social cost.  
Policy: To reduce County CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050.
Application to Model: 
93
Policy Objective(s): To tax the major producers of CO2 emissions, defined as “any person 
who owns or operates any stationary source of carbon dioxide located in the County that 
emits more than 1 million tons of carbon dioxide in any calendar year.”
 
94
Free market achievement? As there is no financial incentive to achieve the policy objective 
without intervention, it is assumed that it would not happen. 
  
                                                             
89 See n.82. 
90 Ibid. 
91 ‘Montgomery County Council Approves $4.3 Billion Total Operating Budget for FY11’ Montgomery County 
Council Press Release, 27/5/2010, 
<http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/Apps/Council/PressRelease/PR_details.asp?PrID=6640> Accessed 
1/6/2010. 
92 <http://www.epa.gov/> Accessed 1/6/2010. 
93 See n.81 Article XIII, ss.52-95. Finding (b).  
94 Ibid, s.52-96.Tax levied; rates, clause (b). 
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Method of achieving Policy Objectives: 
Pollutant: There is only one Pollutant which will be targeted, CO2.  Currently this is not 
subject to tax. 
Improvement: The Improvements will be (a) reduced emissions, and (b) County 
environmental programmes. 
Required Change: Internalise the external costs of the CO2; raise revenue earmarked 50% 
for environmental programmes, and 50% for the Council budget; to achieve a degree of 
behavioural change in causing the Improvement. 
There are no subsidies reported which could distort any incentives. 
Which Polluter will be targeted:  
The only Direct Polluter is the power plant.  As the Power Plant will not be able to pass on 
the cost of the tax, it is thought to be the most appropriate target.95
Type of tax 
 
This will be an excise tax based on levels of emissions.96
A tax credit will be available to the Polluter for reduced emissions via the County 
environmental programmes.
    
97
Rate 
 
The rate of tax is set at USD $5 per ton of CO2 emissions.98  It is estimated this would raise 
revenues of USD $1l.7 -$17.6 million annually.99 
Legitimacy 
Principles of Model 
                                                             
95 See n.82. 
96 See n.93, s.52-96.Tax levied; rates, clause (a). 
97 Ibid, 52-97, Credit (a). 
98 Ibid, s.52-96.Tax levied; rates, clause (c). 
99 See n.82, Circle No.15, ‘Fiscal impact statement’. 
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The legislature took legal advice to ensure that the tax would not contradict the CAA and 
there was the authority to introduce the tax into Montgomery County Code §52-l7. 
Subsidiarity 
It was believed that the tax would complement an existing regional cap-and-trade scheme and 
was necessary since there was no federal tax in place to achieve the same objective.100
Conclusion 
 
The information within was taken from a variety of sources but shows the necessary 
processes that take place prior to the introduction of a tax.  Whilst it is considered that there 
are significant differences in actual approach, and the Universal Model will require more in-
depth analysis, the consultative process used and the methods to justify and necessitate the 
introduction of the tax in the County demonstrate that the Model could work in practice.  
                                                             
100 See n.82. 
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55.  EVALUATION 
 
This section attempts to identify potential problems with the Model and evaluate whether 
such challenges can be overcome. 
55.1 PROBLEMS WITH EAS 
 
The EAS is fundamental to the Model since the information it reports is necessary for the 
Model to be used.  Its theoretical conception faces a range of practical difficulties.  The main 
criticisms are summarised herein in order to ascertain whether it could work in practice. 
 
55.1.1 INFORMATION PROBLEMS 
 
Gathering all of the required information could be extremely onerous and contentious.  Lack 
of scientific or other specialist skills or resources to satisfy the evidential burden may result 
in one or more of the stages of the Model seeming impossible to complete.  This is especially 
the case where the problem is a previously unknown one, or one similar to climate change 
where there still remains uncertainty about the exact causes or likely effects, as many of the 
predictions are based on models and necessarily require much estimation.  Further, 
inadequate or unreliable monitoring or assessment technology can prevent effective 
evaluation of both the scope of the problem and the allocation of responsibility – such as with 
emissions monitoring technology.101
                                                             
101 See Drury RT et al, ‘Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air 
Quality Policy’ (1999) 9 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 231-289, at pp. 259-60; McAllister LK, 
‘The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation’ (2010)  University of San Diego School of Law, 
Research Paper No. 10-017. 
  This is not a problem isolated to the EAS, but can be 
relevant to conducting an EIA and other Government decisions; as Green highlights (in 
relation to subsidies), Government decisions sometimes are based on “incomplete 
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information and value judgements.”102  There will however be many cases where sufficient 
information can be acquired.  The degree of scientific certainty required for a reliable EAS 
will be an issue for the policymaker to determine.  Given that the precautionary principle is 
an internationally accepted onus of proof, imposing it within the EAS would make the 
policymaker more likely to accept convincing findings rather than do nothing.103
 
 
55.1.2 SCALE OF PROBLEM 
 
The type and scale of the problem may also determine whether the EAS will be completed.  
For a minor environmental problem, it may not be economically efficient to fund an EAS 
involving specialist advice and monitoring.  Arguably this could prevent the entire Model 
from being utilised, as part of the Model indicates that the costs of the EAS should not be 
disproportionate to the environmental problem.  That said, in reality the Model envisages that 
the extent of the EAS report will be proportionate to the environmental problem.  This means 
that a minor environmental problem will normally require a minimal EAS involving few 
costs and sufficient advice to justify the procedure.  A large-scale EAS involving numerous 
surveys, reports and estimations would in practice be more necessary for environmental 
problems on a scale justifying such expenditure – most likely to be regional, national or 
international environmental issues.   
 
55.1.3 VALUATION 
                                                              
102 Green, see chapter 11, at n.2, at 386. 
103 For the complexity of what ‘proof’ means in this context, see Fisher E, 'Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: 
Developing a 'Common Understanding' of the Precautionary Principle in the European Community' (2002) 9 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 21; Fisher E, ‘Is the Precautionary Principle 
Justiciable?’ (2001) 13(3) JEL 315-334; Fisher, see chapter 2, n.37. 
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A further informational problem is ascertaining the correct values to determine firstly 
whether the EAS should go ahead, and later what the rate of taxation or incentive should be.  
This follows problems highlighted in Chapter 5, and again will be a matter of judgement. 
   
Availability of information in varying jurisdictions 
In developed economies where information on national wealth and incomes is more readily 
available, it may be more straightforward to collate the information required for the EAS.  
For instance in the UK there are a range of existing public bodies who could provide the bulk 
of the necessary information for the EAS.  HMRC would be able to provide largely accurate 
information on income levels and assets, whilst the ONS would be able to provide further 
information on population trends and other statistics required to undertake the behavioural 
changes.  Other agencies could provide specific information depending upon the particular 
issue at hand.  For instance the DVLA could provide information relating to motor vehicles, 
the Civil Aviation Authority could assist on air passenger numbers, whilst the Environment 
Agency would be able to assist with providing environmental reports.  The National Audit 
Office could later help determine whether the programme operates efficiently.  Utilising 
existing public departments could save costs of implementing the Model.  It is submitted 
however that even by using these existing departments, the information may never be fully 
complete.  For instance HMRC may not have accurate information on a number of very high 
net worth individuals or MNEs who are able to exploit tax loopholes to conceal the full extent 
of their wealth.  This can be of significant importance as such legal persons may be the very 
Polluter or Improver whom the Model would need to address, and without their behavioural 
change it may be impossible to achieve the desired environmental objectives.   
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In countries without publicly held information, for instance tax havens such as Switzerland 
where banking secrecy is legally paramount,104 Greece where tax evasion is allegedly rife,105 
or DCs where Governments may not have the resources to record such information, it may be 
even more onerous and expensive to complete the EAS.106  Further research is therefore 
invited in this area to question whether the Model is more suited to certain types of 
economies, as this would determine whether it is truly universal.107  In practice, policymakers 
may have to rely upon the most informed estimates, use available information, or undertake a 
potentially large and expensive task of assessment akin to the Domesday Book.108
 
  If a 
country only has information on certain matters and that information is utilised within the 
Model, it could lead to some taxpayers bearing an unfair burden or incentives being targeted 
inefficiently.  For example if a country does not know about local incomes as it does not have 
a general system of income tax, but it does have sales taxes, then it may result in sales taxes 
becoming oppressively high.  Therefore in forming the EAS it is important to gather as much 
information as possible.  Whilst it may not be practical or economical to assess every citizen 
in the jurisdiction, it may be feasible to gain a general picture through surveys and case 
studies, or other research. 
55.1.4 ETHICS 
 
                                                             
104 Art.47 of Swiss Federal Banking Act of 8/11/1934 imposes a duty of confidence between Swiss bankers and 
their clients. 
105 ‘Greek Wealth Is Everywhere but Tax Forms’ New York Times 1/5/2010, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/world/europe/02evasion.html?scp=1&sq=greek%20wealth&st=cse> 
Accessed 5/5/2010. 
106 Bair RR and Torrey BB, ‘The Challenge of Census-Taking in Developing Countries’ (1985) 2 Government 
Information Quarterly 4, 433-452. 
107 Such vital research can continue on the lines of Cottrell J, Oleraius A and Lorek S, ‘Environmental Fiscal 
Reform in Developing, Emerging and Transition Economies’ in Cottrell J et al, see chapter 7, n.17 at 793-804. 
108A detailed survey and valuation of all the land and resources held by the new King William in late 11th 
century England <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/domesday/> Accessed 5/5/2010. 
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A thorough debate into environmental ethics is outside the ambit of this thesis.  However it is 
important to note that some ethical issues may be relevant in the EAS.  DesJardins argues that 
relying upon science alone to resolve environmental issues is not only undemocratic, but 
means individuals relinquish their authority to determine what sort of world they want to live 
in.  Scientists have their own values which are based on reason but not always entirely 
objective.109  A counter-argument regarding the make-up of the EAS is that it is not purely 
scientific but can include, where necessary, input from other professionals such as 
economists, engineers, accountants and environmentalists – which can help to provide a 
range of perspectives to make the EAS as objective as possible.  When the EAS is actually 
used within the Model, it is a crucial factor in the policymaker’s decision-making process, yet 
it is envisaged that the policymaker will be able to exercise some discretion.110  Whether the 
process is democratic would depend entirely upon the type of decision-maker.111
 
  This may 
be an elected official such as a Minister, an elected body such as a Parliament or regional 
Government, or may be the result of a process of consultation such as exists within EIAs.  
Therefore democratic input is foreseen to exist within the use of the EAS.  Even if the 
policymaker is unelected it is anticipated that the reasoned inputs from professions in creating 
the EAS would enable a rational decision to be made which is in the environmental interest. 
55.2 PROBLEMS WITH THE MODEL 
 
                                                             
109 DesJardins JR, Environmental ethics: an Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (California: Thomson 
Wadsworth, 2006), chapters 1-2.  See also Benson J, Environmental Ethics: an Introduction with Readings 
(London: Routledge; 2000). 
110 Kaplow and Shavell make the case that economic analysis alone is insufficient for an important decision to 
be made, and that policy decisions will be political based on social welfare as otherwise decisions could make 
everybody worse off in some instances: Kaplow L and Shavell S, ‘Notions of Fairness versus the Pareto 
Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency’ (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 237; Kaplow L and Shavell S, ‘Any Non-
Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle’ (2001) 109 J.Polit. Economy 281. 
111 For an analysis of how democracy links to different areas of environmental policy see Duwel A, ‘Democracy 
and the Environment: The Visibility Factor’ (2010) University of California Working Paper. 
  
374  
55.2.1 COMPATIBILITY ISSUES 
 
It is possible that the structure offered by the Model may be incompatible with a nation’s tax 
structure.  For instance for a State to join the EU it must adapt its tax structure to comply with 
EU requirements such as the EU Tax Directive and State aid rules.  Hypothetically such a 
State may find that it is unable to implement the Model if the rules of the customs union or 
trading bloc it intends to join are incompatible with the Model.  In practice this is unlikely to 
be an issue as the Model is capable of being compliant with WTO law, and can respect 
commonly applied rules of competition law and State aid law. 
 
55.2.2 SUBSIDIES 
 
It may not be legally possible under competition laws to offer subsidies to the suggested 
Improvers.  Under EU law and international trade law it is regarded as discriminatory and 
anti-competitive for a Government to subsidise national industries, and it is impermissible to 
subsidise domestic consumers.112  However as identified in Chapter 8 mainly in the context 
of WTO law, there are exceptions available such as where the purpose is environmental and 
not to provide a trade advantage.113
 
    It is crucial therefore that when the Model identifies an 
Improver to incentivise, the policymaker takes sufficient legal advice to ensure the incentive 
is legitimate.   
Importantly, the Model does not discriminate between nationalities as it offers incentives for 
those outside of the jurisdiction in order to influence Improvers in the most effective manner.                                                               
112 See Sykes A, ‘The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, in 
Appleton A, Macrory P, and Plummer  M, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and 
Political Analysis, (USA: Springer-Verlag, 2005). 
113 GATT, Article XX(g). 
  
375  
This prevents it from being regarded as anti-competitive, so long as it is impartial and non-
discriminatory.   Incentives to countries outside the jurisdiction may be most effective in 
poorer countries where the funds could go further.114  Such ‘side payments’ may be 
beneficial in redistributing wealth to DCs, which could not only improve the environment but 
could go far in helping to achieve social goals.115
 
  Furthermore, this is aligned with the 
theme. 
56.  CONCLUSION 
 
Whilst the function of the Model works in theory, there are a range of practical 
implementation issues which must be addressed for it to operate effectively.  The foremost 
difficulty is in finding the necessary information required for the EAS – without this the 
Model will be unable to function.  However it is considered that in many circumstances it 
will be practically possible to fulfil both the informational requirements to a sufficient extent 
and apply this to the Model to achieve an outcome.   
 
The Model and EAS are designed to be sufficiently flexible to be capable of adapting to 
varying national legislatures, who may themselves have differing environmental values.  It is 
possible also that such a Model can operate at local or regional levels as well as larger-scale 
macro levels.   
                                                             
114 Russett and Sullivan argue that developed nations will need to fund the costs of developing countries’ 
participation in global environmental protection, in Russett BM and Sullivan JD, ‘Collective Goods and 
International Organisations’ (1971) 25 Int. Organ. 4, 845-65, at pp.863-65. 
115 Indeed, the Copenhagen Accord commits to a USD $100 billion annual fund which would largely be used to 
help developing countries adapt to the threat of climate change. Draft decision -/CP.15 (1999) 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para.8<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf> Accessed 3/5/2010. 
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 Further research is required in order to determine whether the Model is indeed ‘universal’, as 
it remains questionable whether it can operate effectively in each jurisdiction.  There may be 
varying degrees of success.  However a feature of the Model is to enable account to be taken 
of actual economic, social and environmental factors within a country, to allow it to consider 
who it can target to achieve behavioural change without causing disproportionate harm.  As 
such it does not provide a uniform answer to each environmental problem, but one that is 
based upon the most feasible solution given the realities in a country.  In this way, if the 
required information can be inputted into the Model, the offered solution should be suited to 
the needs of the country adopting the Model.  While it is impossible to fully test the 
hypothesis before it is put into practice; its ability to achieve its objective at any cost 
considered acceptable to the policymaker makes it a potentially powerful tool. 
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57.  GLOSSARY 
 
EAS:    Environmental Assessment Study 
EP:    the environmental problem to be addressed 
CF(s):   one or more identified contributing factor(s) causing the EP 
Pollutant(s):   one or more identified causes of the CF(s)  
Polluter(s):  one or more identified parties responsible for causing the Pollutant(s) 
Improvement(s): one or more identified factor which could reduce or reverse the impact 
CF(s). 
Improver(s): one or more identified party able to carry out Improvements. 
Threat: estimate of the short-term and long-term costs of the consequences if 
the EP is left unchecked. 
Reduced Threat: estimate of the short-term and long-term costs of the consequences if 
the consequences of the EP are reduced to various more sustainable 
levels. 
Side-effects:  refers to any impact the Improvement may have outside of achieving 
the Policy Objective itself. 
RC: required change(s).  The policymaker calculates a realistic and 
practical combination of reducing the Pollutant(s) and/or increasing the 
Improvement(s) in order to achieve the Policy Objective(s). 
Policy: an overall target determining the extent to which the EP will be 
affected to limit the scope of the Threat.  
Policy Objective(s):  the policymaker selects: 
• the CF(s):to be affected in order to achieve the Policy;  
• and the level to which any CF will be affected. 
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Direct Polluter:  any Polluter whose behaviour directly contributes to the Pollutant. 
Influencing Polluter: any other Polluter whose behaviour has direct or indirect 
influence over the behaviour of any Direct Polluter in relation 
to the Pollutant. 
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CHAPTER 12:  CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis has provided extensive guidance on the purpose and ability of using environmental 
taxation measures to achieve environmental policy objectives – all of which contributed to 
the design of a final Universal Model.  The intention throughout has been to provide 
policymakers with a framework available to introduce tax measures which can meet 
environmental policy objectives without causing undue detriment to wider policy goals.  It 
was considered that this could be carried out with both informed choices and a Model 
available to suggest suitable tax methods. 
 
In order to do this is has been necessary to analyse, up until the design of the Model, how 
taxes can affect behaviour to sufficiently cause the change required by an environmental 
policy.  This has required input from various legal disciplines and understanding of non-legal 
concepts, comparative evaluation of empirical findings and academic thought from many 
jurisdictions, and the design and testing of a Model within the thesis itself.  A qualitative 
exercise throughout has critiqued and compared relevant academic literature as a basis of 
understanding of the subject, before utilising the findings and conclusions to provide 
guidance to policymakers and contribute to the overall comprehension of the advisable usage 
of environmental taxes.   
 
Part I of the thesis introduced, explained and provided guidance into pervasive concepts 
which formed a basis of understanding for Part II.  Part II then offered a critical analysis into 
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more complex issues necessary to design the Model effectively and established informed 
guidance for policymakers.  The findings and guidance from both Parts were directly 
applicable to Part III and the design of the Universal Model, which was expressly set out, 
demonstrated through examples, and tested, before being evaluated. 
 
In order to appreciate how far the thesis has met its original objectives, the Research 
Questions will be returned to. 
 
i. Is it possible to design a universal legal model for environmental taxation 
that can be applicable within different jurisdictions? 
 
As indicated, the findings of every chapter were directly applicable to responding to RQ(i) in 
providing guidance to aid its design and testing.  By forming guidance as to tax methods 
available, a policy-maker has the ability to introduce tax measures appropriate to the context 
and their economy.   
 
Findings in Part I guided the design of a Model, by advising upon appropriate means of tax 
methods, dependent upon economic realities and the situation in hand.  The potential usage 
and benefits of hypothecation, revenue recycling and tax-and-incentive packages were 
explored, with the guidance from the findings inputted into the Model.  Further this provided 
guidance as to how to value environmental goals – a necessary part of the Model.   The scope 
and ability of environmental taxation to achieve its objectives was a continuing issue within 
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this Part, with methods being shown to be practically, legally and politically feasible 
depending upon given circumstances.   
 
The conclusions of Part II also contributed to the design of the Model.  Various methods 
suitable for the Model were evaluated, and by demonstrating how taxes can be appropriately 
targeted to ensure those intended to bear their burden do so, such methods were able to be 
utilised within the Model.  BTAs were considered to be a vital tool to ensure international 
factors did not hinder the environmental effect of any given Model solution.  This Part was 
able to establish how to efficiently target environmental factors, so that the Model could 
achieve its objectives at the lowest social cost. 
 
It was also deemed prudent to determine potential unintended or undesirable consequences of 
some environmental tax methods, and this guidance was directed towards the Model.  
Findings of Part II offer policymakers the ability to achieve environmental objectives within 
the Model at any cost, though policymakers were guided throughout towards making value 
judgements based upon both environmental and wider social issues, in order to avoid any 
form of environmental fascism.  It was emphasised that the perceived winners and losers of 
an environmental tax programme should be determined from the outset. 
 
Part II concluded by stipulating how it would recommend the most beneficial solution to 
policymakers within the Universal Model.  It was stated that when an environmental problem 
is discovered which policymakers consider needs addressing, it is important to conduct 
economic, social or scientific research to discover the main cause(s) of the problem.  The 
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main cause(s) can include a large number of factors and may be anything from a particular 
group of society to the pricing of an appliance which does not account for its externalities.  
Once a problem’s source has been found, it was found necessary to consider what methods 
could be used to target the source.  This involved evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
taking any action over other actions, and which one is the most practical.  If a tax method is 
decided upon it is important that it is the most suitable one, so consideration would need to be 
given to whether it could be used effectively.  Part of this considered who the tax is targeted 
at in order to achieve the desired behavioural change, including how easily the target would 
be able to absorb the costs (or benefits) or the tax or tax incentive.  
 
The purpose of designing a framework model for environmental taxation was to propose a 
solution deemed to be the most effective for achieving a given environmental policy, and the 
Model was expected to be suitable for any given jurisdiction.  Following all of the input from 
Parts I and II, a Universal Model was then designed and set out in Part III.  It explained the 
various questions which must be answered before the Model could be utilised, and the 
information required for it usage.  The intent of the design was to offer a series of gateway 
questions, which any policymaker could answer based upon their given circumstances and 
objectives, in order to offer a solution for the environmental problem in question.  Chapter 11 
thus set out all of the principles and assumptions made prior to use of the Model, in order that 
policymakers would not use it if these were not satisfied.  It set out the information required 
as a pre-requisite to the Model, including a professional evaluation of the environmental 
problem to be applied, and the costs and risks associated with it.  It then set out a series of 
questions with multiple possible answers, and sought to provide responsive solutions.  These 
were demonstrated throughout with hypothetical, basic examples, and the Model was then 
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exemplified further using both artificial and real-world scenarios.  The design of the entire 
Model took into account significant consideration of its implications, its correct use, and with 
the need to avoid undue consequences. 
 
The overall evaluation in Chapter 11 concluded that the Universal Model had the potential to 
work, thus answering RQ(i).  However its limitations were also pointed out.  It was 
recognised that there were a range of practical implementation issues which needed 
addressing for it to operate effectively.  The foremost difficulty was in finding the necessary 
information required for the EAS – without this the Model could not function.  However it 
was considered that in many circumstances it would be practically possible to fulfil both the 
informational requirements to a sufficient extent and apply this to the Model to achieve an 
outcome.  The Model and survey required as a pre-requisite to the Model’s usage were 
designed to be sufficiently flexible to be capable of adapting to varying national legislatures, 
who may have differing environmental values.  It was found to be possible also that such a 
Model could operate at local or regional levels as well as larger-scale macro-levels.   
 
Further limitations and uncertainties showed the difficulty in valuation – an issue that has 
been raised within the thesis, and the evaluation sought to alleviate fears that this could not be 
done, by explaining its practical implementation.  Ethical issues were raised, though it was 
reasserted that as the Model was intended to be used for environmental purposes in any given 
jurisdiction, there may not always be fairness or democratic input as intended, though the 
proper usage of the Model would not facilitate its abuse for political purposes.  The 
evaluation further pointed to the need to remove subsidies which would contradict the 
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effectiveness of the solutions given, though it is recognised that this is a principle of the 
Model itself.   
 
The scope and ability of the Model to both achieve its objectives and cause wider benefits 
have been set out, and it is considered that the Model could be put into use.  However the 
evaluation concluded that further research was required in order to determine whether the 
Model is indeed ‘universal’, as it remains questionable whether it could operate effectively in 
each jurisdiction.  This would require an empirical testing, perhaps at a local level to begin 
with.  However the purpose of the Model is to enable it to take account of actual economic, 
social and environmental factors within a country, to allow it to consider who it can target to 
achieve behavioural change without causing disproportionate harm.  As such it does not 
provide a uniform answer to each environmental problem, but one that is based upon the most 
feasible solution given the realities in a country.  In this way, if the required information can 
be inputted into the Model, the offered solution should be suited to the needs of the country 
adopting the Model.   
 
ii. How can environmental taxation promote environmentally sustainable 
lifestyles and consumption behaviour without unintended consequences?   
 
a. How can policymakers determine who ought to bear the burden of 
environmental taxation?    
b. What are the legal, economic and social justifications for environmental 
taxation? 
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As perhaps the most necessary ability of environmental taxation in achieving many 
objectives, behavioural change has been a subject considered in every chapter.  With the 
theme focusing upon means of offering both incentives and penalties to achieve behavioural 
change, the thesis has sought to provide guidance on appropriate means of achieving 
environmental targets without causing unforeseen or negative behavioural consequences such 
as negative substitutional consumption, environmental choices going against the policy, or 
criminal actions.  This has been considered from both an individual and business perspective. 
 
Chapter 2 began this by explaining how the availability and design of tax incentives is crucial 
to establishing a situation encouraging persons going beyond compliance and actually 
innovating to achieve environmental objectives as far as possible – in order to efficiently 
meet environmental policy.  This was shown to be possible using both tax liabilities which a 
taxpayer would seek to minimise, and instruments such as tax credits and deductions for 
incentivisation.  By offering tax expenditures such as subsidies, and removing subsidies 
which would negate the effect of such measures, it was shown to be able to complement these 
market conditions.  Such packages were shown to be in line with the theme, and provided a 
basis for purposeful design throughout.  This satisfied in part the economic justifications of 
environmental taxation attributable to RQ(ii)(b). 
 
The question of whether taxes should and could be utilised for such purposes was evaluated 
in Chapter 3, which concluded that taxes can influence human behaviour and using taxation 
as an instrument for achieving behavioural reform could be beneficial for society.  This 
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conclusion was studied further in Chapter 4, which showed how a tax package could be 
designed to be both politically acceptable, in line with Chapter 3, and achieve double benefits 
of economic and/or environmental improvements.  These chapters concluded that the most 
suitable methods for achieving social acceptability and economic improvements were 
revenue-neutral tax measures which recycled revenue from environmental taxation into either 
further environmental projects or to boost the economy, and that public desire for 
hypothecation could improve chances of the tax being successful.   This offered policymakers 
an opportunity to introduce tax measures which could be economically beneficial, politically 
acceptable, and achieve environmental policy objectives.  Both chapters contributed to 
answering RQ(ii)(b) in explaining political, social and economic justifications for using taxes 
as instruments for achieving environmental policy. 
 
Chapter 5 further contributed to answering RQ(ii) in guiding policymakers as to the 
necessary value judgements which they must make in order to achieve the required 
behavioural change.  As such valuation is essential for any tax measures to be introduced, a 
range of quantifying techniques were explained and evaluated, with any shortcomings 
exposed.  Valuation solutions were critiqued and it was explored how taxes could be 
introduced without causing undue detriment to wider policy targets.  Chapter 5 emphasised 
that crucially, both private and social costs should be used, due to limitations of a purely 
economic analysis.    
 
Chapter 6 proved critical in answering RQ(ii), by exploring a variety of methods available to 
influence human behaviour – including both tax methods, and non-tax methods to 
complement the impact of tax methods.  This required invoking interdisciplinary findings to 
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understand the psychology of human and business behaviour.  The need to support the 
introduction of any tax package was shown to be possible with a wider campaign of 
education, public information, a convincing explanation of the science and the purpose of the 
package, and in leading by example.  The freedom to make a choice on consumption or 
behaviour was advised to be protected to avoid undue consequences, though it was shown to 
be possible to influence such choices through pricing policies via taxes and tax expenditures, 
as well as by promoting positive environmental consumerism to change perceptions.  The 
answer to this RQ and the theme were answered in part by the finding that people wanted to 
be rewarded for changing their environmental behaviour rather than simply paying more if 
they did not, and even small incentives could satisfy this demand.  Fairness and equity in the 
tax system were found to be fundamental public expectations required for the tax to be 
supported and complied with.  This involved providing certainty of the system, such as 
whether taxes would continue to rise, so that people would be certain of the need to adapt 
behaviour and make their choices accordingly.  It was found that legal uncertainty and 
retrospective application could undermine confidence in the system.  The chapter also 
stressed that, in order to change behaviour, realistic alternatives must be available, to avoid 
simply penalising people for making a decision when they have no other choice.   
 
In order to change behaviour it was found in Chapter 7 to be necessary to determine where a 
burden of environmental taxation would fall, and the possibility of severe negative 
implications was explained for failing to design a tax measure which would take into account 
the economic reality of directing a tax to impact upon incidence.  This chapter gave an in-
depth response to RQ(ii).  Methods were analysed and shown to do this, and it was stressed 
that market realities must be taken into account both for policymakers to decide who should 
bear the burden, and how.  To do this, the chapter looked first at principles of responsibility, 
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and showed that the polluter-pays principle facilitated the theme and international law.  In 
evaluating possible methods, the chapter gave due consideration to distributional concerns in 
order that policymakers could understand implications on various income groups.  This 
meant that tax methods could be implemented to both ensure final incidence rested with 
intended parties and that policymakers could avoid causing undue damage to any income 
group.  It analysed means of ensuring business taxpayers bore the liability intended by the 
policymaker, and concluded means of ensuring different sectors of the economy could be 
included in an environmental programme, without bearing so much of the burden that there 
could be undesirable consequences.  This gave consideration also to the legitimate use of 
subsidies.   
 
The chapter explored burden-sharing within the context of wider social, political and policy 
objectives, including political feasibility and administrative efficiency to limit the burden on 
the general taxpayer.  This advocated reducing administrative costs via methods such as 
ensuring drafting certainty and utilising the existing tax code.  Finally an international aspect 
looked at how it can be advantageous and feasible for foreign taxpayers to share part of the 
burden.  This also looked at inequities for domestic taxpayers to bear a responsibility which 
foreign taxpayers may avoid, despite their contribution to the pollution itself.  This led the 
chapter to identify the usefulness of utilising border tax adjustments in achieving 
environmental objectives, as per Chapter 8.  This chapter was essential as it explained how 
taxes could be utilised without causing unilateral competitive disadvantages – a key concern 
for policymakers introducing environmental taxes.  It was demonstrated that their ability to 
ensure negative externalities are internalised into the cost of goods means consumers can 
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make informed choices – a necessary means of meeting environmental objectives, thus 
responding to RQ(ii).  Means were suggested and critiqued to achieve this.  
 
Chapter 9 responded to RQ(ii) by providing guidance to policymakers as to how taxes can 
most effectively be targeted at the source of an environmental problem, in order to achieve 
the required degree of behavioural change.  By utilising a case-study of aviation taxation, 
followed by non-aviation examples looking at incentives for property, vehicle and energy 
policy, the chapter was able to demonstrate both how taxes can be flawed and therefore 
inadequately effective in achieving their policy objectives, and how consideration of market 
realities allowed incentives and taxes to be appropriately targeted.  The aviation case study 
allowed the chapter to demonstrate the inefficiency of badly-targeted incentives, and how 
they prevented the required behavioural change from being achieved.   It was demonstrated 
how policymakers can evaluated means by which specific groups can be targeted.  For 
instance income levels of a group can be assessed so that a tax can impact upon most parties, 
or it can be questioned whether it is appropriate to offer incentives broadly or narrowly in 
order that resources are utilised the most efficiently.  The chapter also stressed the importance 
of investing in or creating the incentives for, practical and desirable alternatives in order for a 
taxpayer to have realistic substitution choices, and for it to be in their financial interest to 
reach the choice of using the substitute, and technological advancements were advocated.  
These findings further answered RQ(ii). 
  
iii. How can taxation be used to achieve environmental policy considering  
a. specific environmental problems; 
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b. other jurisdictions with varying social, economic and environment 
factors; and 
c. certain economic climates such as a recession?    
 
Environmental problems differ in every jurisdiction, but so do other factors such as 
preparedness to change behaviour and financial ability to pay.  Methods that may be suitable 
in an environmentally educated, developed nation such as Sweden, may not be appropriate to 
a less environmentally educated county such as the USA, a less financially able country such 
as Zimbabwe, or a country with very different environmental challenges such as South 
Africa.   
 
Economic, legal, social and political realities have been emphasised throughout the thesis to 
be essential considerations within every chapter.  It has been repeatedly concluded that the 
practical realities of specific circumstances must be determined before any tax method can be 
implemented.  For instance, Chapter 4 strongly indicated that the possibility of a double 
dividend from revenue recycling is entirely dependent upon economic circumstances, and 
may not be available in many cases, whilst Chapter 5 showed that the valuation of 
environmental factors will differ between jurisdictions based upon national priorities.   The 
success of methods of taxation and complementary tools explored in Chapter 6, such as 
pricing strategies and education, were shown to be dependent upon the economic and social 
circumstances within which they are used.   Demand, supply and elasticity were shown in a 
range of chapters and the Universal Model to very much determine what type of method to 
use.  The thesis has aimed to concern itself with distributional factors and consider how 
policymakers can mitigate harm to low-income groups, for instance, without preventing any 
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behavioural impact upon such groups.  Determining how to direct taxes towards an 
appropriate taxpayer in order that the intended party directly or indirectly bears final 
incidence, is a matter explored in Chapter 7 and utilised in the Universal Model – thus 
emphasising the importance of understanding a jurisdiction’s specific economic and social 
relationships prior to the introduction of such taxes.   
 
Chapter 8 proved also to be critical to answering RQ(iii), by providing means of overcoming 
economic influences which could hinder the effectiveness of unilateral environmental 
problems.  The BTA chapter also explored means of making environmental taxation methods 
suitable to the economic and environmental interests of a nation in question – making a 
distinction between developed and developing economies.  Chapter 9 also gives due 
consideration to the risk of imposing taxes in times of recession, while Chapter 10 follows 
this up by examining the wider economic, social and environmental implications of losing 
business competitiveness.  Chapter 9 further examines economic relationships in areas such 
as transport policy, providing a clear-cut answer to part of RQ(iii), emphasising that specific 
environmental problems cannot be affected without providing adequate sustainable 
alternatives. 
 
Chapter 5 also aided in answering RQ(iii), by demonstrating the difficulty of deciding which 
factors to include in a valuation for the purposes of setting a tax rate.  Policymakers were 
advised against the risk of undervaluation due to non-inclusion of relevant costs, but it was 
also explained that a tax does not need to be set so high that it prevents an activity from 
happening at all.  The chapter considered a range of conceptual values as well as practical 
ones, to guide policymakers to understand the values held by their society, and to 
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pragmatically assert a value dependent upon the environmental problem in question.  It was 
found that including scientific requirements of environmental change, alongside any 
economic, social and possibly ethical considerations deemed necessary to be included, could 
achieve a valuation appropriate to the environmental problem in question – though the actual 
rate of tax may need to vary periodically to reflect the continuing environmental change.   
Various official valuation techniques were summarised to learn from their methods, and it 
was shown to be possible for policymakers to utilise surveys and consultations to gain an 
understanding of both public perceptions and the environmental problem, as well as to exploit 
professional expertise on these matters.  These findings were inputted into the Universal 
Model, which required an extensive analysis including an ‘environmental assessment survey’ 
to gauge the full extent of an environmental problem.  The method utilised within this 
identified the possibility of determining a valuation, whilst the Universal Model’s structure 
went further in actually providing a means of using taxation to achieve environmental policy 
considering the varying factors within RQ(iii).  As such, the Universal Model was very much 
able to respond to overall RQ in a practical manner, while earlier chapters contributed to the 
response more generally. 
 
The thesis has been written during times of economic boom and bust.  As such it is explained 
throughout that policymakers may not find it appropriate to introduce certain measures during 
times of recession, and that impacts upon business and the wider economy go hand-in-hand 
with environmental impacts.  This can be seen in Chapters 7 and 9, which aim to reflect the 
importance of understanding economic reality in determining how taxes should be used.  The 
Universal Model takes account of this, and targets incentives at where they can be afforded – 
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though it allows policy exceptions for matters where appropriate, such as for industries with 
essential social importance. 
 
It is submitted however that further research could be useful in this area, such as in 
ascertaining the level of taxable profits at which a taxpayer considers it not worthwhile to 
seek incentives.  Equally, it can be shown that extreme economic circumstances can 
themselves go further in meeting environmental objectives than fiscal measures, such as the 
fall in UK emissions during a global slowdown.116
 
  This can further explain how a Model can 
be suitable for application in countries of varying economies, an area itself where further 
research is needed.  Further research could also meaningfully be carried out into drafting 
styles of the Universal Mode, to ensure its methods can be implemented unambiguously and 
effectively within a variety of jurisdictions.    
SUMMARY 
 
Overall the thesis has followed the intentions proposed in the introduction, and has pursued 
its theme throughout by explaining the purpose and possibility of tax-and-incentive packages, 
and in creating a Model which can offer both reward and penalty-incentives to achieve 
environmental objectives.  By building on both early and recent academic thought, empirical 
findings, and using comparative evidence from a range of jurisdictions, the thesis has 
conducted a qualitative assessment of critical work in this area.  Importantly the author 
submits that the thesis has gone further, in adding to the knowledge in this area and proposing                                                              
116 Climate Change Committee, ‘Meeting Carbon Budgets – ensuring a low-carbon recovery’ (2010) at 3 
<http://downloads.theccc.org.uk.s3.amazonaws.com/0610/pr_meeting_carbon_budgets_full_report.pdf> 
Accessed 5/07/2010. 
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a Model which could prove considerably versatile.  The methods, guidance and findings 
provided throughout bring together a range of arguments and can be used to introduce 
informed tax measures suitable to the jurisdiction.  It is concluded that the Model itself has 
the ability to be utilised throughout a range of jurisdictions, providing efficient methods of 
environmental taxation to be introduced dependent upon the specific circumstances in which 
it is adopted.  The limitations of the Model, and the various restrictions of the findings within, 
have been identified, and it is intended that further research can test the Model’s use in a 
practical sense, and whether it is truly universal.
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